HUMPHREYS, J., (after stating the facts). (1)' It is first insisted by appellants that, because a judgment was rendered in the Supreme Court on appeal, in the original foreclosure proceeding, against Mrs. Nannie E. Sumpter and her bondsmen on the supersedeas bond, the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company had no right to take a mandate and attempt to enforce the collection of its original judgment and decree of foreclosure in the chancery court. Such is not the effect of an appeal with supersedeas. This court said in the case of Miller v. Nuckolls, 76 Ark. 485" date_filed="1905-09-30" court="Ark." case_name="Miller v. Nuckolls">76 Ark. 485, that “An appeal and supersedeas do not have the effect of vacating the judgment, but only stay proceedings thereunder.”
(2) It is next insisted that the chancery court had no jurisdiction to approve a sheriff’s sale made under general execution, directed and issued on the bond executed for the purchase money of the Sumpter property by William Sumpter, as principal, and Mrs. Nannie E. Sumpter and Orlando H. Sumpter, as sureties, upon their failure to pay it. The execution referred to under which the sale was made was a general execution issued on said bond, which had been executed in the manner provided in sections 3260 and 3261 of Kirby’s Digest. It is provided by section 3262 of Kirby’s Digest that “.All such bonds shall have the force and effect of a judgment, * # * ” This execution could have been raised as well without as with an order of the court. The order of the court directing it does not give it any additional force and effect. The sale under an execution on such a bond is strictly a statutory proceeding. No authority is given in the statute authorizing a court to confirm a sale of real estate made thereunder, nor to order the sheriff to make the sale and make a deed to the purchaser, or to issue a writ of possession for the property sold under it. It is a proceeding wholly independent of an order of sale made by a chancery court in the enforcement of a decree of foreclosure. In that character of sale, it is the duty of the court to fix the time, place and terms of sale, and the court making such an order is authorized to confirm the sale and order a deed and issue a writ for the possession of the specific property sold thereunder. The chancery court therefore erred in confirming the sheriff’s sale made under the first writ of execution, in appointing a commissioner to make a deed, and in issuing a writ of possession for the Sumpter House property in favor of appellees, Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company and J. F. George.
It is contended, however, by appellees, that, because J. F. George, Mrs. Nannie E. Sumpter’s tenant, attorned to the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company, it was in possession of the property and had a right to injunctive relief to protect its possession against trespassers, and that, under the rule that when the chancery court takes jurisdiction for one purpose it will give complete relief, it was entitled to have the sheriff’s sale confirmed, a court deed and a writ for possession.
(3) If the execution sale was regular,the effect of the sheriff’s deed was to divest whatever- title William Sumpter and his sureties, Orlando H. Sumpter and Mrs. Nannie E. Sumpter, had in the real estate sold under both executions, and to vest it in the Hot Springs Savings, Trust & Guaranty Company. Where the landlord’s title has passed to another by process of law,.the tenant’s responsibility is then to the true owner. Earle v. Hale, 31 Ark. 470" date_filed="1876-11-15" court="Ark." case_name="Earle's Adm'x v. Hale's Adm'r">31 Ark. 470. The rule is laid down in 24 Cyc., at page 956, that “A tenant may attorn to the purchaser of his landlord’s interest at an execution sale, or at a foreclosure sale. ’ ’
(4) Presuming, then, on the regularity of the execution sale and that appellees were, and are, in the rightful possession of the Sumpter House property, it does not follow that injunctive relief may be invoked to protect their possession against trespasses remediable at law. The trespasses and threats of ouster alleged in the complaint were not of such continuous and irreparable nature as would call for injunctive relief. Appellees, being in possession of the Sumpter House property, had a right to sue the Sumpters at law for any damages occasioned by their trespasses, it not being alleged that they were insolvent. This is the substance of their complaint as to said property.
(5) As to the other property purchased, for which they held a sheriff’s deed, the complaint can only be treated as a suit in ejectment if appellants are resisting possession thereof. The answer of appellants indicates that they are resisting the right to recover possession of the latter property, and also the action for damages on account of trespasses as to the Hotel Sumpter property, because the execution sale was not made according to law. It is said that such a defense can not be interposed, because the validity of the execution sale was involved in the bill for review. It was not a proper subject for a bill in review, because the sale was made after the final adjudication in the original foreclosure proceeding. It was proper subject-matter for defense in the suit of appellees for damages on account of trespasses to the Sumpter House property, and in a suit for the possession of the other property sold at the first execution sale. The court erred in striking out that portion of appellant’s answer.
For the errors indicated, the decree is reversed with instructions to transfer the suit to the circuit court.