31 Wash. 411 | Wash. | 1903
— Respondent brought this action against appellant for divorce and alimony. The complaint al-. leges that the two were, married at Lake Linderman, in British Columbia, on June 18, 1898; that .a child, two years of age at the time the complaint was drawn, was born as the issue of the marriage; that on or about August, 1899, appellant sent respondent out from Dawson City, where they were then residing, together with the child, then three ■ months old, and stated to respondent that he would send her money, and that he would also come out later in the autumn; that appellant did not come out, and has never sent respondent any funds of any kind since said date; that he has wholly deserted and abandoned her, and has contributed nothing for her support or that of her child, since August, 1899. The answer denies the marriage, and denies that respondent was a resident of King county at the time the action was commenced, or that she had resided in this state for one year immediately preceding the commencement of the action. The paternity of the child is admitted, and it is affirmatively alleged that by mutual agreement the two cohabited together during the summer of 1898 at Lake Linderman, aforesaid, and that they thereafter went to Dawson City, and there lived together until about the month of August, 1899, when they mutually consented to separate forever; that appellant then gave respondent one-half of all the property and money he then owned; and that it was further agreed that neither should have any claim against the other for any property thereafter accumulated by either, including any claim for alimony against appellant. These allegations are denied by the reply, and upon these issues the cause was tried by the court without a jury, resulting in a decree of divorce in favor of respondent, awarding her
It is insisted, first, that respondent failed to establish that she had been a resident for the required time before bringing the action. The suit was commenced in May, 1901. The evidence showed that respondent came out from Dawson in the summer of 1899. Much of the time following until this suit was begun she spent in Seattle. During a portion of the time she was in Victoria, where she says she went for employment. She testified, however, that her child meanwhile remained in Seattle, and that it was her constant intention to make Seattle her home. We think the evidence was sufficient to establish residence for a sufficient length of time to give the court jurisdiction.
Appellant’s main contention is that respondent failed to establish the marriage. She was very young at the time of the alleged marriage, being not quite sixteen years of age. She testified that in the spring of 1898 she and her mother were together at Lake Linderman, where they met appellant. Appellant’s own testimony shows that he was then about thirty-five years of age. Respondent says that while at Lake Linderman they agreed to be married, and that afterwards appellant took her before some one whom she believed to be a clergyman, and who performed the marriage ceremony between them. She says she really was excited at the time, and cannot well remember all that occurred. She saw no marriage license or marriage certificate. She testifies that from that time she and appellant lived together as husband and wife, her mother also living with them. Appellant denies her statements about the marriage cerem'ony, but admits that they began living and cohabiting together at Lake Linderman, and that the
Appellant takes the position that no more than a contract marriage was shown, and seems to assume that such was all that respondent meant to prove. He asserts that the alleged marriage occurred in British Columbia; that under the laws of England a contract marriage is void; that such was the law in 1858, when the Province of British Columbia adopted the English civil law as it then stood; and that such a marriage has, therefore, never since been valid in British Columbia. But, be that as it may, appellant is in error when he assumes that respondent undertook to prove only a common-law marriage. She introduced evidence of the performance of a regular, lawful marriage ceremony, and further evidence of subsequent cohabitation in substantiation of the fact that such a marriage had taken place. The intendment of the law is to presume from such testimony that a valid marriage existed, and, when such facts appear in evidence, the burden of proof is cast upon the party denying it to clearly show the contrary.
“Every intendment of the law leans to matrimony. When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether
Again, the same author, in § 959 of the same volume, says:
“If a ceremony of marriage appears in evidence, it is presumed to have been rightly performed, and to have been preceded by all the needful preliminaries.”
A marriage ceremony appeared in evidence in the case at bar. It is true appellant denied that there was any ceremony, but the court must have disbelieved him, and with that disposition of the testimony the fact of the ceremony stands established by the evidence of respondent. It follows from the rule stated by the learned author above that “all the needful preliminaries” are presumed to have preceded the ceremony, in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary. A valid marriage may be presumed to exist from general reputation among the acquaintances of the parties that such is the fact, when that reputation is accompanied by their cohabitation, and arises from their holding themselves out to the world as occupying that relation to which the law refers when marriage is mentioned. Wallace’s Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 530 (25 Atl. 260); White v. White, 82 Cal.
The amount of money allowed by the court was reasonable under the evidence. We find no reversible error, and the judgment is affirmed.
Fullerton, O. J., and Mount, Dunbar and Anders, JJ., concur.