241 Mass. 36 | Mass. | 1922
In this proceeding under the workmen’s compensation act, the employee was awarded compensation; and the insurer appealed, on the ground that'there was no causal connection between the alleged accident and the injury claimed, and that the employee has not sustained the burden of proving that the insurer was not prejudiced by the employee’s failure to give notice as soon as practicable.
There was evidence from which it could be found that while
The board found that notice of the injury was not given as soon as practicable, and adopted and affirmed the finding of the single member that the insurer was not prejudiced by this delay. They refused to find and rule as requested by the insurer that “The employee has not sustained the burden of proving that the employer and insurer have not been prejudiced by the employee’s failure to give a notice as soon as practicable.” By St. 1920, c. 223, § 1 (see now G. L. c. 152, § 44), it is provided that want of notice shall not bar proceedings under the workmen’s compensation act, if it be shown that the association, subscriber, or agent had knowledge of the injury, "or if it is found that the insurer was not prejudiced by such want of notice.” Assuming that the burden of proof is upon the employee — when notice as required by the statute is not given as soon as practicable — to show that the insurer was not prejudiced by such want of notice, in our opinion it could have been found that the insurer was not prejudiced by this failure.
The employee continued to work until September 18. He did not know until September 21 that the retina was detachedj he
Considering the employee’s ignorance of the nature of his injury and the exact cause of it, the knowledge of the employer that he was unable to work because of an injury to his eye, and all the other circumstances, the board could.have found that the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay in giving the written notice.
Decree affirmed.