40 S.C. 154 | S.C. | 1893
The opinion of the court was delivered by
An action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendants, 6. W. Susong, W. A. Susong, A. E. Susong, D. L. Boyd, and James H. Rumbough, as composing the firm of Susong & Co., on the 17th June, 1887, in the Court of Common Pleas for Aikeu County, in this State. Service was made upon the defendants by an acceptance of their attorney at law, W. C. Benet, Esq., on the 1st day of July, 1887, in writing. The object of the action was to recover by the plaintiff of the firm of Susong & Co. the sum of $10,518.26,
On September 24th, 1892, A. J. Moseley, as administrator of the estate of George W. Susong, deceased, served a notice upon the plaintiff, that he would move the Court of Common Pleas for Aiken County, at its term next ensuing after date of notice: 1st. For an order vacating the judgment in this case, “upon
At the same time (24th September, 1892,) the defendants, W. A. Susong, A. E. Susong, and D. L. Boyd, served a notice upon the plaintiff, that at the time noticed by A. J. Moseley as administrator of the estate of G. W. Susong, they would move: 1. For an order vacating the judgment, as to them, upon the ground that the summons herein has never been served upon them, either personally or by publication, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to render said judgment; and upon the ground that G. W. Susong, the only defendant herein who submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, died before the hearing of this case, and judgment was rendered without the making of an order allowing the action to proceed against his representative or successor in interest. 2. To vacate the acceptance of service of the summons and complaint, and the answer filed herein, in so far as they purport to bind them, upon the ground that said acceptance and answer were unauthorized. 3. For an order vacating the attachments issued herein : (a), (&) Upon the same grounds set forth in the notice of A. J. Moseley as administrator, (o) Upon the ground that the said attachments were improvidently issued as to these defendants, in that they were not indebted to plaintiff in any amount.
The issues thus tendered came on to be heard before his
“This matter was submitted to me in open court at Aiken upon the call of the calendar, and argued before me by consent of counsel at Walterborough. The defendants, W. A. Susong, A. E. Susong, D. L. Boyd, and James H. Rumbough, gave notice of a motion to vacate, and set aside a judgment against Susong & Co. in favor of this plaintiff in the aforesaid action for $11,375.62, on the 14th July, 1890, by the clerk of the court of Aiken County, in pursuance of a decree of Judge Fraser, which has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court; also, a motion to vacate the attachment which was issued at the commencement of this action, as against the defendants as nonresidents, and levied on their property in this State. A. J. Moseley, clerk of the court at Greenville, as administrator of G.W. Susong (who, itseems, died before Judge Fraser’s decree), joins in said motion. At the hearing, the motions were withdrawn as to the defendant, James H. Rumbough. The grounds on which it is insisted that the judgment must be vacated are that the defendants were non-residents, and were not served personally or by publication, and that W. C. Benet, Esq., who accepted service for them, was not authorized so to do. The summons and attachment were issued on the 17th June, 1887. The attachment was levied on property of the defendants in several counties in this State. An order for publication of the summons was granted on the 20th June, 1887- On July 1st, 1887, within thirty days from the issuance of the summons and the granting of the attachment, W. C. Benet, Esq., a reputable attorney at the bar, accepted due service of the summons for all the defendants. If he were authorized so to do, then this was equivalent to personal service on the defendants.
“One mode of proof of personal service as laid down in our Code (section 158, subd. 4), is ‘the written admission of the defendants,’ and written admission by a duly authorized attorney is admission by the principal of said attorney. Reed v. Reed, 19 S. C., 551. That Mr. Benet had the authority to do*159 what he did, is presumed; and as a matter of fact I find after a careful examination of all the testimony and the argument that he was fully authorized and empowered by each of the defendants to accept service of the summons in this action for them, which he did in due form within the thirty days from the issuance of the summons. Plaintiff’s attorney applied to him, asking if he had authority and would accept service for said defendants; he said he would write to them for instructions, and afterwards, in pursuance of such instructions, he accepted service. Besides this, if this authorized acceptance and appearance needed ratification, there is abundant proof of such ratification by all the defendants. An answer was filed for them, a hot litigation ensued, promoted and counseled by them, which lasted five years, in various tribunals; in which some of them personally appeared, aiding their counsel, Mr. Benet, and of which all of them had knowledge. On the 27th July, 1887, a formal bond, prepared by Mr. Benet for the release of the attachment, was executed, as the preponderance of the testimony shows, by all the defendants, and the property attached in Greenville released, the benefit of which was reaped by the defendants. These matters and others in the ease clearly amount to an estoppel against the defendants from questioning Mr. Benet’s alleged want of authority to accept service for them, and he is estopped by its own act.
“Moseley, as administrator of George W. Susong, joins in the motion to vacate the judgment, on the further ground (and the other defendants claim the benefit of his motion) that his intestate died prior to the rendition of the judgment, and that such judgment should be vacated as to him, and for said reasons as to all, no person having been substituted on the record in his place. This position is not tenable. The action was against the defendants as partners. When G. W. Susong died, his other jiartners, as survivors of the firm, owned the partnership assets, subject to the claims of creditors and to the right of the administrators of a deceased partner to call them to an account. But no revival of the suit was necessary; it could proceed as against the concern. Besides this, the judgment is against the partnership; the defendants were joint*160 debtors, and no effort is now being made to enforce the judgment against the separate property of G-. W. Susong. As to the contention that A. E. Susong and W. E. Susong were not members of the firm, that matter is settled against them by the testimony, and especially by their powers of attorney to G-. W. Susong, which shows they were partners.
“The motions to vacate the judgments must be denied, as to all the defendants, and also as to Moseley, the administrator of G-. W. Susong, and so must be the motions to vacate the attachment. Even if said motion could be entertained after the rendition of the judgment, still, as it appears by my aforesaid finding of fact, that when Mr. Benet, on the 1st of July, 1887, within thirty days from the issuance of the attachment, was fully authorized to perform said act, then it follows that such written acceptance, being so authorized, bound the defendants and each of them, and stands in lieu of personal service upon them, and is such personal service. All questions as to the formal execution of the attachment bond, and its acceptance by and acknowledgment before the clerk, was abandoned at the hearing. Wherefore, it is ordered, that the motions herein made to vacate the judgment and attachment herein, be, and the same are hereby, denied with costs.”
From this decretal order of Judge Hudson, the appellants urge the following exceptions: 1. It is submitted that the Circuit Judge erred in holding, that each of the defendants, within thirty days from the issuance of the summons, authorized and empowered W. 0. Benet, Esq., to accept service of the summons for them, and in not holding that none of them had given such authority. 2. He erred in holding that, the acceptance of service by Mr. Benet was personal service upon the defendants, within the meaning of section 248 of the Code. 3. Because he erred in not holding, that the summons in this action had not been personally served upon the defendants, or publication commenced within thirty days after the issuance of the warrant of attachment, as required by law, and in not adjudging, therefore, that, the said attachment was void. 4. He erred in holding, that the acceptance of service by Mr. Benet was ratified by all the defendants, and that they were estopped from disputing
At this point we may refer to the decision of the Court of Appeals in this State, Kuhns v. Law, 14 Rich., 27, where Judge Wardlaw, as the organ of the court, amongst other things, said: “At law, the firm and every partner in it is bound for a partnership debt. The liability is said to be joint and several, but the contract is joint only. Suits against partners severally could not be sustained. Bach of them is the agent of the others, and the law makes no distinction between an execution against them as partners and one against them as joint contractors acting each for himself. (See cases cited, 11 Rich. Law, 730.) Either execution has a lien upon the goods of every one of them, and satisfaction of either execution may be executed from any one of them, leaving him to compel contribution from the others.” This case just cited was one from a Law Court, as distinguished from a Court of Equity.. The case, from its importance, was heard by the Court of Errors, and while no decision was announced by the Court of Errors, but the judgment was from the Court of Appeals, we are informed in the decision itself: “The Court of Errors attained no satisfactory conclusion respecting the rule which should prevail in equity in the distribution of separate effects between separate and partnership creditors; but the judges were nearly, if not entirely, unanimous in the opinion that at law the supposed preference given to a separate creditor should not be allowed to prevail against a prior lien acquired by a partnership creditor.” The Court
In the case at bar, it is quite true that no separate creditor raises any question as to the judgment now in question, but the administrator by law represents all the creditors, and we conceive it to be in the line of his duty to such creditors to intervene so that justice may be subserved and the principles of law upheld. Such administrator has been quite tardy in making his appearance in this action, and he has given no reason or excuse for this tardiness ; still he now complains, and we are not called upon to decide the effect of his slowness in putting in his appearance. While at law he is not a necessary party to a judgment against a firm of which his intestate was a party, if such judgment could be restricted to a lien on the partnership assets, still in equity, where it is hoped that an end may be reached in its judgment, which will include the liability of the partnership to its creditors as well as that of the individual members composing the firm, he would be a necessary party. To follow this view to its full logical result, and thereby upset this judgment, so that its finality as to the/otw surviving members of the firm of Susong & Co. should be destroyed, would be a very harsh conclusion. Courts are not children’s play houses. A lawsuit is a solemn thing. It is pre-eminently a practical thing. When this, the court of last resort in this State, is called upon to declare the freedom of the survivors of a partnership from a judgment to which they were parties, simply because another who was a party has died since the suit began, it is asking too much. Such a step would be monstrous: The words of the dean of the New York University Law School, Austin Abbott, in a recent article entitled “Lawlessness and the reason of the law,” where he says: “The time is ripe for a systematic effort to bring disputed questions and conflicts of legal authorities directly to the test afforded by the bearing of the law on public welfare,” are pregnant with meaning.
In the light of our duty, we are inclined to adopt the course here that will hold these survivors, A. E. Susong, W. A. Susong, D. L. Boyd, and James H. Rumbough, bound by this
The judgment of this court is, that the order appealed from be modified in accordance with the directions herein contained, but in all other respects, it is affirmed.
See 30 S. C., 305; 36 Id., 287.