321 Mass. 156 | Mass. | 1947
The plaintiffs are the daughters of John P. Sullivan, deceased. The defendant is their stepmother. She married Sullivan in 1925 shortly after the decease of the plaintiffs’ own mother while the plaintiffs were small children. The plaintiffs received $820.50 as the proceeds of insurance policies upon their mother’s life. This money came into the hands of Sullivan, their father, as their duly appointed guardian. He died in 1946. The plaintiffs, having come of age, seek by their bill to hold the defendant, their stepmother, as constructive trustee for the money and to enforce a charge for it upon a house and land in Newton standing in her name.
The trial judge found that the plaintiffs had not established a constructive trust “to which the defendant was a party,” and that the real estate now owned by her is not chargeable as claimed. The plaintiffs appeal. The evidence is reported.
The salient facts, about which there appears to be scarcely any dispute, are these: On October 13, 1925, Sullivan bought the real estate, received a deed thereof, and placed thereon a first mortgage to the Newton Cooperative Bank and a mortgage for $800 to the plaintiffs. These papers were duly recorded. The plaintiffs’ mortgage was expressed to be subject to the bank’s mortgage and to a second mortgage to the wife of the seller. The amounts of the bank’s mortgage and of any mortgage to the seller’s wife and of the total purchase price do not appear. Neither does the value of the property. In making this purchase Sullivan used $800 of the money which was in his hands as guardian of the plaintiffs. He took the title in his own individual name. Nearly five years later, under date of June 9, 1930, he conveyed the premises “for consideration paid.” to the defendant “subject to” the three mortgages hereinbefore mentioned. Under date of February 6, 1934, he purported as guardian of the plaintiffs to discharge the mortgage he had given to them. In 1936 the bank foreclosed its mortgage, and thereafter conveyed the premises to one Coakley, who a short time later conveyed them to the defendant.
When Sullivan used the money of his wards, the plain
It follows that when the bank foreclosed and its title subsequently came into the hands of the defendant she took free of the hen of the plaintiffs. She now has the full benefit of the bank’s paramount legal title, which was never charged with any equitable hen. This is true even if the defendant was a volunteer and had notice of the breach of trust when in 1930 she took a deed of Sullivan’s equity of redemption, or if she acquired notice later. Equitable interests are cut off when the property passes through the-hands of a bona fide purchaser. Suffolk Savings Bank v. Boston, 149 Mass. 364. La Fleur v. Chace, 171 Mass. 59. Paika v. Perry, 225 Mass. 563. Flannagan v. Keefe, 250 Mass. 118, 122. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. English Construction Co. 303 Mass. 105, 115. Restatement: Trusts, § 316. Scott on Trusts, § 316. There was no evidence of fraud or collusion in the bank’s foreclosure.
The plaintiffs argue that they have a right to recover money from the defendant. But the defendant never had any of the plaintiffs’ money and, so far as appears, had no part in the original breach of trust. At most, on this record, the defendant took Sullivan’s title to the real estate in 1930, at a time when that title would be subject to an equity in favor of the plaintiffs as against any holder of that title other than a purchaser for value without notice, but the defendant has since acquired through the bank a paramount title not subject to that equity. There is nothing in this that gives the plaintiffs a right to recover money from the defendant. Even if the evidence would support a finding of a constructive trust against the land in Sullivan’s hands, which for reasons, already stated we think it would not, and if such trust became enforceable against the defendant when
It will be observed that we have dealt with the case as if the defendant had had notice of Sullivan’s breach of trust. There is, however, no finding to that effect, and there is no very clear evidence of that fact.
We are compelled to conclude that the plaintiffs have not made out a case.
There was no error in admitting in evidence the deed from the bank to Coakley and the deed from Coakley to the defendant. These deeds were material to show the true state of the title upon which the plaintiffs by the third prayer of their bill were apparently seeking to impose a charge.
We do not understand why the bill was dismissed “without prejudice,” but the defendant has not raised the point by appealing.
This is the opinion of a majority of the court.
Decree affirmed.