Sullivan v. Malta ParkSullivan v. Malta Park
Lead Opinion
J^This is an appeal of a trial court judgment denying a Motion for Sanctions, Motion to Strike, and Rule for Contempt filed on behalf of appellant, Judith A. Sullivan. Appellees, F. Evans Schmidt, Koch & Schmidt, LLC, and respondents-appellees, Marta-Ann Schnabel and Caitlin Morgen-stern,
Under Louisiana law, “[j]udgments are either interlocutory or final, and the distinction between the two is that a judgment that determines ‘the merits in whole or in part’ is a final judgment, whereas a judgment that decides only preliminary matters in the course of the action is an interlocutory judgment.” Brennan v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 93-1525, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/29/94);
“A final judgment is appealable in all cases in which appeals are given by law, whether rendered after hearing, by default, or by reformation under Article 1814.” La. C.C.P. Art. 2083 A. “A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment.” La. C.C.P. Art. 1841. “No appeal may be taken from a partial final judgment under Article 1915(B) until the judgment has been designated a final judgment under Article 1915(B),
La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B(1) requires more than a designation that a partial judgment be designated as final. It further requires the trial court make “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” La. C.C.P. art. 1915B(1).
“An interlocutory judgment is ap-pealable only when expressly provided for by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 2083 C. Our juris
Similarly, the denial of a motion for contempt is not one that decides the merits of the case and is therefore, interlocutory in nature. See, Robinson v. Harlan, 11-0703, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/11),
A motion to strike an affidavit, too, does not decide the merits of a case and, is therefore, “an interlocutory ruling that is not generally appealable.” Madison v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Corp., 14-0717, p. 5, n.4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/26/15),
Thus, in the instant matter, there can be no question that the trial court’s May 27, 2016 judgment, denying the various motions, was an interlocutory judgment.
|/This Court recently reiterated the well-settled rule that “proper procedural vehicle for seeking review of an interlocutory judgment is by application for a supervisory writ.” Llopis v. State,
In the instant matter, the trial court denied Ms. Sullivan’s Motion in open court on May 13, 2016. The Motion for Appeal was not filed until June 24, 2016. Because the motion for appeal was filed beyond the thirty day period applicable to supervisory writs, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider the motion for appeal as an application for supervisory writ.
Turning to the Answer to the Appeal filed by Mr. Schmidt, Koch & Schmidt, Ms. Schnabel and Ms. Morgen-stern, we note that damages, including at
The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages, including attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs, and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, | ¡-.against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable.5
Our jurisprudence reflects that damages for a frivolous appeal damages may be awarded “if the appellant is trying to ‘delay the action’ or ‘if the appealing counsel does not seriously believe the law he or she advocates.’” Hunter v. Maximum Grp. Behavioral Servs., Inc., 10-0930, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/11),
However, “ ‘[a]ppeals are always favored and, unless the appeal is unquestionably frivolous, damages will not be granted’ due in part to the possible chilling effect on the appellate process.” Johnson v. Johnson, 08-0060, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/28/08),
In the instant matter, while we find that there is questionable merit in this substance of this appeal, we cannot say that it was filed in bad faith or for purposes of delay. Nor does the record reflect that appellant does not seriously believe the law she advocates, particularly considering the current contentious nature of this case. Having considering the arguments of counsel, we do not find that this matter meets the requirements of a frivolous appeal.
We therefore decline to award damages or tax costs against appellant under La. C.C.P. art. 2164.
APPEAL DISMISSED
LANDRIEU, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS
Notes
.Ms. Schnabel and Ms. Morgenstern are not defendants in this case. Ms. Morgenstern is co-counsel with Mr. Schmidt and Ms. Schnabel represents Mr. Schmidt and Koch & Schmidt, LLC in the defense of the motions filed by Ms. Sullivan. Ms. Morgenstern and Ms. Schnabel were also the object of at least one of Ms. Sullivan’s motions—a motion for contempt (for the alleged "breach of the duty of candor” to the court—and appear herein as respondents-appellees.
. The defendants-appellees and respondents-appellees answered the appeal seeking an award of damages for a frivolous appeal.
. We note that the Order granting the appeal states that "the judgment at issue is final as allowed by C.C.P. art. 1814 [sic], et seq." However, the judgment, itself, is not designated as final and there is no express determination by the trial court that there is no reason for just delay, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B(1).
. When an appeal has been taken of an interlocutory judgment, courts may convert the appeal to an application for a supervisory writ, but do so when "the motion for appeal was filed within the thirty-day delay allowed under Rule 4-3 of the Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal for the filing of an application for supervisory writs. Ramirez v. Evonir, LLC, 14-1095, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/9/15),
. We note that, even when an appeal is dismissed as untimely, the appellate court may still consider whether to impose sanctions. In Harper v. Eschenazi,
Concurrence Opinion
CONCURS WITH REASONS.
hi concur in the result. I agree the trial court’s judgment is an interlocutory judgment from which an appeal does not lie. I would pretermit the issue of whether sanctions are warranted until such time (if ever) as a proper appeal is before this Court.