5 Mass. App. Ct. 532 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1977
This case is before us on an appeal from the dismissal of an action commenced by the plaintiffs as officers of the Massachusetts State Employees Association (MSEA) seeking review of a decision by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (commission) to certify an organization known as the “Alliance” as the bargaining representative of certain State employees.
In the spring of 1975, several organizations filed petitions, pursuant to article II, sections 2,5, and 6 of the commission’s Rules and Regulations Relating to the Administration of an Act Providing for Collective Bargaining for Public Employees (hereinafter referred to as Rules and Regulations) ,
On December 17, 1975, MSEA filed a motion with the commission requesting that certificates of recognition not issue to the Alliance because the Alliance was not an employee organization within the meaning of G. L. c. 150E, and because the Alliance had not complied with the reporting requirements of G. L. c. 150E, §§13 and 14, inserted by St. 1973, c. 1078, § 2
1. General Laws c. 30A, § 14, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 3, provides that “any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding... shall be entitled to a judicial review____” As representatives of a lawful employee organi
Postponement of judicial review is not necessary, however, when the commission has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy. v. Labor Relations Commn. 356 Mass. 563, 564 (1970). Harrison v. Labor Relations Commn. 363 Mass. 548, 551 (1973). Although the plaintiffs have alleged that the commission has committed errors of law, we do not read their complaint to allege that the commission acted outside its jurisdiction. Nor have the plaintiffs alleged any other circumstance that would justify our deviating from the usual rule that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies before judicial review will be available to him. See Harrison v. Labor Relations Commn. supra; Ciszewski v. Industrial Accident Bd. 367 Mass. 135, 140-141 (1975). Particularly where, as
2. We think it advisable to add that we agree with the commission’s conclusion that the election need not be set aside because the Alliance failed to comply with the reporting requirements of G. L. c. 150E, §§13 and 14. Each provision, inserted by St. 1973, c. 1078, § 2, contains a statement with the following language: “In the event of failure of compliance with this section, the commission shall compel such compliance by appropriate order, said order to be enforceable in the same maimer as other orders of the commission under this chapter.” The commission’s decision to condition its certification of units 1, 2, 6, and 8 upon the Alliance’s prompt compliance with the reporting requirements of sections 13 and 14 was certainly within its statutory power. The commission was correct in stating that the purpose of those sections is to afford members of employee organizations an opportunity to know who is representing them and to hold those representatives accountable as their exclusive bargaining agents. The remedy formulated by the commission of requiring compliance with the reporting requirements of sections 13 and 14 prior to granting certification to the organization adequately protects the interests of the employees.
Judgment affirmed.
As these Rules and Regulations are readily accessible to us as a State publication, we take judicial notice of them. See Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 269 (1962); Bagge’s Case, post, 840 (1977).
Throughout this opinion we will refer to the Alliance, AFSCME/ SEIU, AFL-CIO and Local 780 AFSCME, AFL-CIO, a member of the Alliance, interchangeably as the Alliance.
The several local unions which comprise the Alliance complied with the reporting requirements of sections 13 and 14.
The commission found that the question whether the representatives of the Alliance intended to represent employees jointly in the units involved was prematurely raised by the plaintiffs.
As mentioned above, instead of requesting judicial review at this time, the plaintiffs could have brought an unfair labor practice complaint at the proper time under G. L. c. 150E, § 11, as amended by St. 1974, c. 589, § 3. See G. L. c. 150E, § 10, as amended by St. 1974, c. 589, § 2. In addition, the plaintiffs could have asked the commission to reinvestigate, hold another hearing, and if the circumstances warranted it, revoke the Alliance’s certification. Rules and Regulations, article II, section 18.