211 P. 301 | Mont. | 1922
delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts of this case are substantially the same as those involved in Sweeney v. City of Butte, 64 Mont. 230, 208 Pac. 943. It is urged that in disposing of the Sweeney Case, this court did not give sufficient consideration to the provisions of the Act of August 11, 1919 (Chapter 11, Laws Extra. Sess. 1919). That Act is very brief. It consists of two sections, the first one of which reads as follows: “Actions to recover salaries by members of the police department of cities must be commenced within six (6) months after the cause of action shall have accrued. ’ ’ This section is nothing more nor less than a statute of limitations, and its terms are too clear to admit of construction. It construes itself.
Section 2 provides: “No action can be maintained by members of the police department of cities for unpaid salary, except for service actually rendered and if suspended or placed on the eligible list, then only for the days the member of the police department reports for duty.” The meaning of this section is difficult to determine. The two clauses in the senil, tence comprising the section are apparently contradictory in terms. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction
The governor was prompted to submit this matter to the legislature by a communication from the mayor of the city of Butte. The records of this court in the numerous eases decided prior to August 11, 1919, involving the right of ousted policemen to compensation during the period of enforced idleness, disclose that cities of this state had repeatedly attempted to discharge policemen or to suspend or relegate them to the eligible list, in utter disregard of the provisions of the Metropolitan Police Law, and that in each instance the policeman had recovered his salary from the date of his unlawful discharge to the date of his reinstatement. The fact that in these cases the city of Butte had paid out more than $100,000 for services never rendered, furnished the subject for the mayor’s communication to the governor, and when we consider that communication and the governor’s message, we are led reluctantly to the conclusion that by section 2 above, the legislature intended to declare the policy of this state to be (1) that a policeman, though unlawfully discharged from his office, may not recover salary except for services actually performed, and (2) that a policeman, though unlawfully suspended or relegated to the eligible list, may recover salary only for the days upon which he reports for duty. We are reasonably certain, however, that by section 2 the legislature did not attempt to intercept and cut off rights existing at the time the statute was enacted.
While our Constitution does not forbid the enactment of retrospective laws generally, it is a rule recognized by the authorities everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor. It is a maxim said to be as old as the law itself that a new statute ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operation. (Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill (Md.), 299, 52 Am. Dec. 694.) The maxim has its foundation in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make a new rule for past transactions and every reasonable doubt will be resolved against a retrospective operation. (Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 L. R. A. 50, 12 S. E. 736.)
There is not anything in section 2 above to indicate that the statute was intended to affect existing rights, and though the language is broad enough in its literal sense to comprehend pending actions, it ought to be construed as applicable only to cases that arise after the statute was enacted (Stevens v. Hicks, 156 N. C. 239, 72 S. E. 313); in other words, we think it is fairly inferable from all the circumstances surrounding its enactment that section 2 was intended to ap
In the Sweeney Case above, in considering the effect of the judgment in the mandamus proceedings we said: “This was an adjudication that plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of his office as patrolman and that he was entitled to a reinstatement and to the emoluments.” The last four words should have been omitted, for manifestly the judgment in mandamus could not go further than to determine the right to the office. (Bailey v. Edwards, above.) The language quoted, however, is made plain by what follows immediately: “The salary is an incident to the office and if entitled to the office his right to the salary follows.” Viewed in the light of the interpretation here given to Chapter 11 above, the ultimate conclusion reached in the Sweeney Case is correct and disposes of these appeals.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
!Affirmed.