*1 813 thing, charge jury’s rect. For one the limited the utilization replacement-cost-less-depreciation to those situations where method approach In Almond v. the market or income MARTA, is “not suitable.” (1982), court recognized establishing noted that there were three methods of the designated piece comparable property: market value of a the sales approach, approach, replacement- or “market” cost-less-depreciation approach. income holding
It is clear from the in Al MARTA, mond v. all three methods are of efficacy, assuming, course, that there was evidence of record which charge point charge would authorize a present valuing as to each. At no explain case does the court the three alternative methods of property, entails, what each method and when and how applied may jury method should be to the facts as the them. find Accordingly, charge disapprove we find this deficient and of its use. Pope, Deen, reversed. concur. April Peek, Peek, Jr.,
James Garland J. Corbett Attorney Googe, Bowers, General, Michael J. James P. James P. Howell, Matthew Gordon, Matson, Strother, Marion 0. Roland F. John R. J.
Dwyer, Beryl Jr., Howell, Weiner, James S. S. H. Assistant Attorneys appellee. General, for
69797. SULLIVAN v. et al. BROWNLEE Sognier, Sullivan, Colleen a former officer with the Fulton Department, disability pension filed an (Board) the Board of Trustees of the Fulton (Pension Fund), Pension Fund which denied her following hearing. brought petition tion Sullivan then for writ of Superior County, naming certiorari Court of Fulton as defen- dants the members of the Board of the Pension Fund. Sullivan peals from the trial court’s affirmance of the Board’s denial of her pension application petition and the trial court’s denial of her for writ of certiorari. by applying
“any evidence” standard of review of the record before the Board by failing rather than a “substantial evidence” standard and to hold a hearing appellant’s petition. parties agree on the merits of The hearing appellant’s petition the quested sequent held a and re- proper regarding for review. In their sub-
briefs supe- parties agreed briefs to the court the the “substantial evidence” standard rior court was in proceedings. 5-4-12 its review of the administrative (b); *2 appeal appellant demonstrating On has the burden of harmful App. record, Carter, 162, error Continental Ins. Co. v. 171 Ga. affirmatively Appellant SE2d failed to show the record that the trial court did not the “substantial evi- dence” appellant in its review of the administrative record. Because presumption
failed to rebut the faithfully lawfully performed devolving upon by law, the duties it (1) (269 471) (1980); App. Jones, 629, Smith v. v. 154 Ga. SE2d Cox (1) (308 City App. Lawrenceville, 119, 168 Ga. of we hold the trial court not err in did its consideration of pellant’s petition supra for certiorari. See Continental Ins. at 163. Appellant by affirming
2. denying pension Board’s decision supported by her because that decision was not appeal, substantial evidence. On our standard of review decision, test, of the trial court’s “is not intended supervene requirement or diminish the that an administrative rul ing supported by Guntharp County, be substantial evidence.” v. Cobb (b). (1983); 33, see OCGA 5-4-12 \ye any Thus must determine whether there is ruling appellant’s pen the sion court’s that the Board’s denial of supported by substantial evidence. See Gun tharp, supra at 35. line-of-duty disability pension pursuant claimed a creating provides pensions
the resolution for Fulton the Pension Fund which County Safety employees in the case of total and permanent disability. The resolution does not define the term “total permanent disability” but does state that the Pension Fund is governed practicable by regulations where the same rules and as the except Fulton Act, General Pension in cases of express Employee’s conflict. Under the Fulton General Pen- Pen- Employee’s Act, sion sion which sets forth the terms of the General pensioners may undergo Fund, be annual examina- continuing eligibility disability tions, to enable a review of their pp. 850, benefits. Ga. L. may section, 856-857. Under this pensioner be if terminated a is found not to be disabled. Id. presumption disability county However, there is a conclusive if of pensioner comparable job authorities fail to offer the with the same pay. pp. Ga. L. The applicable provisions creating resolution the Pension Fund under in very provi- consideration this case are similar to sions of pension Odum, act in v. examined this court Russell We in Russell in held initial determination eligibility permanent disability, of and total employee an capable performing of in capacity another is not entitled benefits, to disability pension if an position alternative of at least equal pay Therefore, has been tendered. Id. at 548. in the case sub if judice, evidence that the Board had before it substan- tial evidence that capable of in her performing former capacity capacity or Safety Department with the Public and had been position tendered an alternative pay, at least we must affirm. v. See Russell Guntharp, see supra at 35.
Appellant was wounded and a fellow officer killed a shooting incident response to a burglary placed call to the Fulton County Department. In deciding appellant’s application pension, the Board had deposition testimony before it the who agreed their diagnoses suf- post fered from syndrome traumatic stress as a result of the shooting episode. Only one of the *3 psychiatrists that, opinion, stated his permanently was disabled perform and could not job with the Public Department. The psychiatrists other three gave appellant good diagnosis recovery with treatment al- though they testified that would not at the time of their depositions be able to work as an on-line officer. Two of the that, testified at the time of depositions, appellant could work in an job administrative with the department. Other evi- presented dence was that appellant had been offered alternative and equal employment police department. with the
The foregoing support facts superior court’s determination that the Board’s decision was based on substantial evidence. See Rus sell v. supra; Guntharp, 5-4-12; § Elder, supra. Therefore, court did not err affirming the Board’s appellant’s denial of disability pension. Birdsong, concurs. Carley, concurs affirmed. specially. Judge, concurring specially.
Carley, I agree with the judgment However, of the I majority. do not agree with portion purports Division which to articulate the application of our standard of review of the court’s decision. Specifically I refer to the majority statement of the that “we must determine whether evidence court’s ruling that appellant’s pension Board’s denial of supplied.) supported evidence.” substantial tion was 814.) simply opinion, page that, (Majority in the con- not believe I do any application. I case, text of this us that convinces review of the record because “our own would affirm support of the the decision there was substantial Ga. [Board].” Smith v. 7, 1985 22, 1985. May Elroy, Saunders, Jr., F. Frederick Michael W. John Forsling, appellants. Tye Ferguson, Barker Susan CASUALTY COMPANY. 69954. MESSEX et al. v. ATLANTA (331 SE2d Carley, seeking payment action, instituted this (PIP) personal protection injury insur- under an automobile Casualty Company pur- policy appellee Atlanta and ance chased issued by appellant Appellee’s motion for and her husband. appellant appeals. judgment granted policy purchase at is- The record shows that driving employer’s sue, husband killed while his vehi- the em- appellant by cle, $5,000 in basic benefits was ployer’s appellee, claiming company. Appellant against then filed suit insurance comply application did not that the insurance (b) signature requirements rejec- of former OCGA 33-34-5 coverage. Flewellen v. Atlanta Cas. tion of complaint, appellant Ga. 709 In her also sought $50,000 PIP benefits to “stack” an additional single pol- alleged her on insurance which were icy to be available separate paying because it covered two vehicles for which she was *4 premiums. Subsequently, optional appellee $45,000in PIP bene- appellant, pay any optional PIP bene- fits to but refused to pursuant fits assertion that she was entitled to “stack” $50,000 PIP then amended her additional complaint accordingly, granted benefits. judgment was thereafter appellee. Appellant appeals. in favor of Voyager King, App. 269, In Ins. Co. v. Cas. (c) “prevents] that OCGA 33-34-4 court held op- stacking coverages highest amount of above coverage purchased policy. [Cits.]” tional one