Pеtitioner, Senly Sugiarto, a practicing Christian of Indonesian nationality, seeks review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the de
*92
nial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Sugiarto advances no argument on appeal with respect to her withholding of removal or CAT claims, and as a result, thеse claims are waived.
See United States v. Zannino,
I. Background
A. Facts
Petitioner, Sugiarto, is a native and citizen of Indonesia, as is her husband, Jemmy Korompis, and their 10-year-old daughter, Jeisy. 1 Sugiarto, was raised as a Protestant Christian in Tinoor, Manado, where she was a member of the local church and the treasurer of the church’s women’s group. She reports that the demographics of Manado have shifted in recent years: while the majority used to be Christian, 99% of residents are now Muslim. Sugiarto asserted that she had problems in Indonesia on accоunt of her identity as a Christian, and attributed the following incidents to her religious status.
First, Sugiarto describes an incident that occurred on September 15, 2003 while she was employed as the treasurer of a company called PI Pelni. Sugiarto was traveling with a security guard and a driver to a bank to pick up money for her company. At the bank, Sugiarto withdrew $99,000, which she held in her lap while returning to the office. While en route to her office, two men on a motorcycle blocked the road and broke the back window of the car, attempting to force open the back door near where Sugiarto was sitting. Although the men were unable to steal the money, Sugiarto’s arms were cut from the broken glass, causing her to seek medical treatment at the hospital. The petitioner asserts that these men were members of a Muslim terrorist group because that was thе kind of behavior these groups engaged in. Although Sugiarto had a current U.S. visitor’s visa when this incident occurred, she decided to remain in Indonesia because she “had a good job.”
Second, Sugiarto recounts an incident that took place on December 16, 2004. On that day Sugiarto and her family were forced to rush out of a mall in Manado when a bomb threat warning was issued. She reports that it was very difficult to breathe amidst the fleeing сrowds. Neither Sugiarto nor her husband or daughter required medical treatment after the incident. Sugiarto did not know specifically who caused the bomb threat, but reasoned that, because Manado is 99% Muslim and this event took place shortly before Christmas, those responsible were likely Muslim.
Sugiarto reported that she felt threatened as a Christian minority living in Manado due to both of these events and also because of bombings of hоuses, churches and various public places that were taking place in her surrounding area. She explained that these attacks often targeted church leaders and others with special duties in the church. Her fear of religious violence sometimes prevented her from at *93 tending church. Sugiarto also explained that her daughter, Jeisy, who was born with a leg condition that causes her to limp, suffered ridicule and hаrassment by her classmates in Indonesia because of her condition.
Sugiarto and Jeisy arrived in the United States on January 16, 2005 on a visitor’s visa. Sugiarto’s husband, Korompis, arrived in June of that year, also on a visitor’s visa. The petitioner explains that her daughter has felt more comfortable with herself since coming to the United States. Doctors in both Indonesia and the United States have indicated that Jeisy can undergo surgery once her bones develop further, which will enable her to walk normally. Since arriving in the United States, petitioner’s family has joined and regularly attended services at the Naturia Presbyterian Church in Rochester, New Hampshire, where, in March 2006, Sugiarto was elected deacon. The record contains evidence documenting her active participation in the church.
Sugiarto reported that she could not go back to Indonеsia out of fear of religious violence. She explained that since her departure from Indonesia, two of her siblings have also left Indonesia and moved to Korea out of fear of religious persecution. Some of her family members who remain in Indonesia no longer attend church because they are afraid. She has submitted, on the record, country reports and articles, including U.S. State Department Religious Frеedom Reports, documenting inter-religious violence in Indonesia and acts of terrorism against Christians by extremist groups.
B. Procedural History
Petitioner and her family remained in the United States without legal status after the expiration of their visitor visas. On January 3, 2006, Sugiarto filed a timely Form 1-589 application for asylum, accompanied by applications for withholding of removal, protection under the CAT, and voluntary departure. Sugiarto listed Korompis аnd Jeisy as beneficiaries on her application. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed the petitioner and her family in removal proceedings on February 21, 2006. Petitioner conceded removability.
On May 18, 2007, the IJ held a hearing on the merits of Sugiarto’s application. In an oral decision issued that day, the IJ found that petitioner testified credibly but that her testimony as to the attempted robbery and the bomb thrеat in Indonesia failed to establish harm sufficiently severe as to rise to the level of “past persecution.” Moreover, the IJ found that nothing in the record established a nexus between these incidents and petitioner’s status as a Christian. The IJ further found that petitioner failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution in that petitioner has not shown that she and her family were specifically singled out on account of their religion, nor that there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution against Christians in Indonesia. The IJ thus denied the petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, but granted voluntary departure to Sugiarto and Jeisy. 2
Sugiarto timely appealed to the BIA, which, in an order issued October 20, 2008, affirmed the IJ’s reasoning and decision, and dismissed the appeal. This petition for review followed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
This court has appellate jurisdiction over petitions for judicial review from
*94
the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Review of legal rulings is de novo but is deferential as to findings of fact and the determination as to whether the facts support a claim of persecution.”
Jorgji v. Mukasey,
“Usually, this court confines its review to the BIA’s order that is being challenged by the petitioner.”
Lumataw v. Holder,
B. Applicable Law
“To establish eligibility for asylum, an alien must prove either past persecution, which gives rise to an inference of future persecution, or establish a well founded fear of future persecution on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion.” Lumataw, 582 F.3d at *83 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)©; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).
If an applicant establishes past persecution, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, and the burden shifts to the Government to rebut this presumption. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1);
see also Jorgji,
[i]n evaluating whether the applicant has sustained the burden of proving that he or she hаs a well-founded fear of persecution, the ... [IJ] shall not require the applicant to provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if ... [t]he applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality ... of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and ... the applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of *95 persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
Finally, to establish a “well-founded fear” of future persecution an asylum applicant need not show that return to his home country will “probably” or “more likely than not” result in persecution.
INS v. Cardozar-Fonseca,
C. Petition for Review
1. Past Persecution
Sugiarto argues that the record compels the conclusion that she suffered past persecution in Indonesia on account of her Christian religion, and is thus entitled to a presumption of well founded fear of future persecution. As evidence of past persecution, Sugiarto points to her credible testimony regarding the attempted robbery and the bomb threat at the mall in Manado, both of which she claims were directed against her by anti-Christian extremist groups. The IJ and BIA found that these experiences did not amount to past persecution both because the harm she experienced did not rise to the level of “persecution” as that term is defined for immigration purposes and because Sugiarto failed to establish that these incidents bore a nexus to a protected ground.
In order to establish past persecution, Sugiarto must produce “convincing evidencе of a causal connection” between the harm she endured and a statutorily protected ground, in this case, her religion.
Amouri v. Holder,
As for the 2003 robbery, Sugiarto admits not knowing who attacked the car. Although we have held that a petitioner who was attacked was “not required to identify her antagonists with absolute certainty,” in order to establish nexus, “she was required, in the absence of a positive identification, to furnish some credible evidence of the motivation underlying the threats.”
Hincapié,
As for the 2004 incident involving the bomb threat in the mall in Manado, petitioner argues that her credible testimony that anti-Christian extremist groups were responsible for the attack compels a finding of past persecution. But no matter how credible a belief petitioner may hold about the perpetrator’s motives, she must nevertheless provide
some
objective basis for that belief in order to meet her burden.
See Akinfolarin v. Gonzales,
We thus find that the BIA’s conclusion that Sugiarto failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the incidents she relies on to establish past persecution bore a nexus to a protected ground is amply supported by the record. 3
2. Well-founded Fear of Future Persecution
Even absent past persecution, Sugiarto contends that the record compels the conclusion that she is entitled to asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution. As part of her argument, she urges us to analyze her “well-founded fear” claim through the lens of the Ninth Circuit’s “disfavored group” analysis.
See, e.g., Sael v. Ashcroft,
As explained
infra,
“well-founded fear” has both a subjective and an objective component. The objective component is an inquiry into whether “ ‘a reasonable person in [the applicant’s] circumstanсes would fear persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground,’ ”
Castillo-
*97
Diaz,
To this effect, the regulations provide that an applicant need not provide evidence of a “reasonable possibility” of being “singled out individually for persecution” in the event that the applicant establishes “a pattern or practiсe” in her country of persecution of “a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant” on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A);
see also Pieterson v. Ashcroft,
However, our Court has always taken the position, articulated in
Kho,
that “evidence short of a pattern or practice [of persecution] will enhance an individualized showing of likelihood of a future threat to an applicant’s life or freedom.”
In
Banturino
we decided not to consider “whether the ‘sliding scale’ or ‘disfavored group’ approach suggested in
Singh v. INS,
Sugiarto concedes that she must show individualized targeting to satisfy her burden, as our Court “has repeatedly affirmed the BIA’s determinations that there is no ongoing pattern or practice of persecution against ethnic Chinese or Christians in Indonesia.”
See, e.g., Sipayung v. González,
It is relevant in this context that country conditions evidence on the record, namely, State Department Human Rights Reports, do indicate some degree of continuing violence against Christians perpetrated by terrorist groups in Indonesia, even if a pattern or practice is not established.
See, e.g., Budiono v. Mukasey,
III. Conclusion
Because the BIA’s denial of petitioner’s asylum claim is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the petition for review is denied.
Denied.
Notes
. Sugiarto's husband and daughter were derivative applicants on her asylum petition, and, thus, also petitioners here.
. Korompis was ordered removed to Indonesia.
. This infirmity of proof with respect to nexus alone forecloses Sugiarto's eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution.
See Elias-Zacarias,