SUGARCREEK TOWNSHIP, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF CENTERVILLE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2010-CA-52
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Greene County.
Decided April 15, 2011.
[Cite as Sugarcreek Twp. v. Centerville, 193 Ohio App.3d 408, 2011-Ohio-1830.]
193 Ohio App.3d 408
{¶ 39} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part,
and cause remanded.
POWELL, P.J., and BRESSLER, J., concur.
Scott D. Phillips and Joseph W. Walker, for appellant.
Matthew J. DeTemple, for amici curiae the Ohio Township Association and Coalition of Large Ohio Urban Townships.
GRADY, Presiding Judge.
{¶ 1} This appeal concerns a dispute between plaintiff-appellee, Sugarcreek Township, and defendant-appellant, city of Centerville, regarding land located in Sugarcreek Township that was annexed by Centerville in 2006 pursuant to
{¶ 2} In 2006, Centerville entered into a preannexation agreement with the owner of two parcels of real property located in Sugarcreek Township. The annexation was an expedited type-2 annexation pursuant to
{¶ 3} A TIF plan “is a method of financing that is used to pay for public improvements. A public entity will sell bonds for public improvements and recoup the money from the increase in value of property that is enhanced by the public improvements. The property owners make service payments to a fund in lieu of property taxes, and the public entity pays the bond obligations with the money in this fund, rather than with the public entity’s general revenue fund.”
{¶ 4} In late June and early July 2006, Greene County granted Centerville’s annexation petitions. In September 2006, Sugarcreek commenced an action for declaratory judgment in the common pleas court. In paragraph 58 of its second amended complaint, Sugarcreek sought “a declaration that Centerville may not implement a TIF on the Annexed Land, both because Sugarcreek is entitled to all real property tax receipts from the Annexed Land and because Centerville may not adopt a TIF on land that is already covered by Sugarcreek’s TIF.” Sugarcreek also sought a declaration that Centerville’s annexation of the two parcels of real property located in Sugarcreek Township was invalid because proper procedures were not followed in annexing the land.
{¶ 5} The parties filed motions for summary judgment in the declaratory-judgment action. The trial court found that Sugarcreek is entitled to all real property taxes collected from the two parcels of land annexed by Centerville. Therefore, Centerville could not adopt a TIF plan covering the annexed land. The court reasoned “that Centerville’s commitment in the Pre-Annexation Agreement, that would result in Centerville’s TIF for the annexed land, would divert real property taxes from Sugarcreek in violation of
{¶ 6} Centerville filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment, arguing that Sugarcreek Township neither had standing to challenge the annexation nor had presented a real case or controversy. Centerville also argued that the trial court had erred in finding that a municipality may not enact a TIF plan covering property that has been annexed under the expedited annexation procedure in
{¶ 7} Based on our review of the record before us, we held that the trial court did not err in finding that Sugarcreek had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action and that the controversy was ripe for adjudication. Further, we concluded:
{¶ 8} “[T]he trial court erred in part in holding that Sugarcreek is entitled to all property tax revenues from the annexed property. The trial court correctly concluded that Centerville cannot interfere with Sugarcreek’s collection of real property tax revenue levied on the unimproved and improved value of the real estate that remains in the township. However, the court failed to recognize that
{¶ 9} We reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. On remand, the parties could not agree on the correct application of our judgment to the parties’ motions for summary judgment with regard to the TIF plan that Centerville had agreed to implement in the preannexation agreements. Following additional briefing by the parties, the trial court applied our reasoning with regard to revenue that each entity could receive from the minimum levies (or statutory “inside millage”), and further found that Centerville and Sugarcreek were entitled to their respective revenues from additional levies (or voted “outside millage”) imposed by each for the annexed territory. Consequently, Centerville could not adopt a TIF plan that would affect Sugarcreek’s right to its outside millage. The trial court explained:
{¶ 10} “Centerville’s and Sugarcreek’s shares of the outside millage, are the outside millage real property taxes voted respectively by the residents of Centerville and Sugarcreek, including residents of the annexed territory, and applicable to Centerville and Sugarcreek respectively, including the annexed territory. Centerville may enact a TIF Plan to exempt its own share of the outside millage applicable to the annexed territory. * * * But Centerville may not enact a TIF Plan to exempt Sugarcreek’s share of the outside millage, i.e., real estate taxes voted by Sugarcreek on Sugarcreek Township including the annexed territory. Those Sugarcreek real estate taxes remain subject to Sugarcreek Township pursuant to
{¶ 11} Centerville filed a notice of appeal, raising the following two assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 12} “The trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that a municipality cannot TIF the voted (outside) millage of a township’s real property taxes on territory that has been annexed utilizing the
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 13} “The trial court erred as a matter of law by re-construing then misapplying
{¶ 14} When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. “De Novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.” Brewer v. Cleveland City Schools Bd. of Edn. (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023, citing Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 119-120, 18 O.O.3d 354, 413 N.E.2d 1187. Therefore, the trial court’s decision is not granted any deference by the reviewing appellate court. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153.
{¶ 15} Centerville argues that the trial court erred and varied from our mandate in Sugarcreek I in holding that any TIF plan Centerville may adopt cannot interfere with Sugarcreek’s right to revenue from the outside millage tax on the two annexed parcels that Sugarcreek imposed. Because municipal annexations are governed by statute, we necessarily refer to the sections of the Revised Code implicated by Centerville’s argument.
{¶ 16} Annexation is governed by
{¶ 17} S.B. 5 was enacted in 2001. Among other things, the bill provided for an expedited type-2 annexation procedure. The section governing that form of annexation is
{¶ 18} “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in section 503.07 of the Revised Code, unless otherwise provided in an annexation agreement entered into pursuant to section 709.192 of the Revised Code or in a cooperative economic development agreement entered into pursuant to section 701.07 of the Revised Code, territory annexed into a municipal corporation pursuant to this section shall not at any time be excluded from the township under section 503.07 of the Revised Code and, thus, remains subject to the township’s real property taxes.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} The issue in the present case is whether
{¶ 20} Townships, like municipalities, are taxing authorities,
{¶ 21} Centerville argues that the plain language of
{¶ 22} Centerville argues that it should be able to adopt a TIF plan that affects Sugarcreek’s voted outside millage because the legislature could have amended
{¶ 23} “The legislative authority of a municipal corporation may adopt an ordinance creating an incentive district and declaring improvements to parcels within the district to be a public purpose and, except as provided in division (F) of this section, exempt from taxation as provided in this section * * *.”
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} In matters of statutory interpretation, expression of one thing generally suggests exclusion of others. The 12 exceptions in
{¶ 26} Further, our interpretation of
{¶ 27} Centerville also argues that, being a special provision,
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} The assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgement affirmed.
FAIN and FROELICH, JJ., concur.