Suchy v. HajicekSuchy v. Hajicek
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wilson
delivered the opinion of the court:
A decree of the superior court of Cook county, among other things, ordered partition of a parcel of real estate among the legal heirs of Marie Hajicek, deceased, allotting to them their respective portions of the parcel. John Hajicek, a son, prosecutes this appeal.
The pertinent facts disclosed by the pleadings and the evidence are as follows: Jan Hajicek, a resident of Chicago, died on February 20, 1927, leaving him surviving his widow, Marie Hajicek, and their seven adult children— Bessie Suchy, Lillian Novotny, Mary Franta and Bohumil, Charles, Louis and John Hajicek. At the time of his death Hajicek and his wife owned a parcel of real estate in Chicago in joint tenancy. The building on the premises was a two-story structure consisting of three apartments. Similarly, two savings accounts with the Kaspar American State Bank were in
Subsequently, Mrs. Suchy, together with three of her brothers, (Bohumil, Charles and Louis Hajicek,) John Franta, husband of Mary Franta, deceased, and three of his four children, filed a complaint in the superior court of Cook county against John Hajicek. John’s wife, a sister, Lillian Novotny, and one of the children of the deceased sister, were also made parties defendant. By their complaint the plaintiffs, appellees here, in addition to the facts previously set forth, charged that their mother executed and delivered the deed to Bartik, previously mentioned, and caused him to execute the deed to herself and her son John because of „tlie confidential relationship existing between herself and her son and in reliance on the blood relationship among the parties, and also because of the trust, reliance and faith reposed in said son. The complaint further alleged, among other
Additional facts and circumstances appear from the record. Mrs. Hajicek was in poor health at the time of her husband’s death, having suffered one or more strokes prior thereto. She was then about seventy years of age, unable to speak English, could neither read nor write and had had no business experience. About noon on February 20, 1927, she and six of her children, including John, assembled
William Kosobud, a disinterested witness, had been acquainted with Mrs. Hajicek for more than forty years. From his testimony it appears that upon the request of the son John he called at the home of Mrs. Hajicek prior to the transfer of the accounts; that the latter said she needed money from time to time, and that since her husband was dead
To obtain a reversal of the decree, John Hajicek, the appellant, makes the contention, among others, that he did not occupy a confidential fiduciary relation to Marie Hajicek, his mother, and that, in consequence, no burden rested upon him to establish the fairness of the transactions assailed. The appellees‘, on the other hand, to sustain the decree, maintain that the pleadings and the proof present a case of a constructive trust originating in a fiduciary relation, and that such relationship required the appellant to prove good faith on his part.
The principles governing this case are well settled. Constructive trusts are divided into two general classes: one where actual fraud is considered as equitable ground for raising the trust, and the other consisting of those cases in which
It may be conceded, as the appellant maintains, that he was not instrumental in causing the conveyance to be made. That sole fact, however, cannot give vitality to a deed obtained in the manner and under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case. Where it appears that relations of trust and confidence obtain between parties to a transaction like this, the dominant party, who has profited thereby, must rebut the presumption of fraud by clear and convincing proof that he has exercised good faith and has not betrayed the confidence reposed in him. (Commercial Merchants Bank v. Kloth, 360 Ill. 294; Dowie v. Driscoll, supra. ) In an analogous situation this court held that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between a mother and her son, who was the dominant party, and that the presumption of his influence over her was strong. (Stahl v. Stahl, supra.) It is not essential that the undue influence vitiating the transfer be deemed fraudulent, but it is sufficient if the influence arises out of the fiduciary or confidential relations.
Mrs. Hajicek’s appointment of her son to manage, her business affairs clearly indicated that she reposed unusual confidence in him. She, it appears, was on good terms with all her children, and especially, Mrs. Suchy, who nursed her mother and ministered to her personal needs. Evidence is wanting that even tends to indicate she desired to make a permanent disposition of her property so as to exclude six
The question remains whether the transfer of the savings accounts was a valid gift inter vivos. It is essential to a gift inter vivos that it be absolute and irrevocable, that the donor part with all present and future dominion and control over the property, that the gift go into effect at once and not at some future time, and that there be a delivery to the donee and such a change of possession as puts it out of the power of the donor to re-possess himself of the property. (People v. Csontos, 275 Ill. 402.) These elements are wanting in the present case.
The decree of the superior court is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.