*1 thought that it was that those children had confinement cannot be erased nor remedied been seen at her home. legislators unless benevolent would decide that there be occasions when victims jury guilty, After the found her as little prosecution of criminal compen- should be else testimony it could do with the admitted sated. Aldridge Boyer, Mr. and Ms. the district court, sentencing her All five years, agreed to five re- members of the Court are jurisdiction that 120-day tained her conviction to further con- cannot stand. All that case, appeal gained her could sider her as is have for her allowed was § 19-2601(4). overturning kidnap- The her convictionof majority opinion notes ping children, two little which charge that within four she period month the dis- all has at times denied. Mrs. Iwakiri here- custody trict court removed her from living eked out tofore her babysitting placed probation, her on also notes children, but since her conviction she has her conviction later reduced a mis- doing had turn to for housework others. majority demeanor. The opinion would judge presided trial, The trial who at her impression leave the that Mrs. Iwakiri is making and was faced with two crucial and probation, still on and will now have to rulings difficult on the admission of evi- endure misleading. a retrial. This is On dence, and happen, as could often commit- recommendation of the Senior Probation judge ted error. That has since declared Office, being objection regis- there no owe, satisfied the debt did that she not prosecutor’s office, tered from she was paid probation which with a successful completely discharged and released from days incarceration. probation January 26, 1983, order Judge Newhouse. It was in this same or- reason, only For whatever and the rea- Judge der that Newhouse reduced con- surfacing son is the Court’s formation of a felony viction from a to a misdemeanor— new rule this case rather than in Bain- But, majority does note. what bridge, the Court to make note refuses majority put refuses to paid is its she her dues in full for an has errone- Instead, that the same order also her sen- reduced ous conviction. it declares to the years tence from five to the that that rule can be indeterminate whole world new used days kidnapping already charge which Mrs. Iwakiri at her retrial on the had —a everyone served in will confinement at the she was trial which knows never take placed probation! place. All of this was done § 19-2604, provisions
under the of I.C. en- respectfully can I but dissent? How acted in and not did State object Judge leniency, Newhouse’s but it appealed has not from it. What this 26, 1983,
means January is that on Mrs.
Iwakiri, society debt for the she owed un- der today the conviction which this Court reverses, fully paid has nonetheless SUCHAN, Carmen Estelle penalty imposed upon yet, her. And Plaintiff-Respondent, sending that it her declares case back for a trial. indeed new This should SUCHAN, George A. judge startle the her district who turned Defendant-Appellant. ago. completely year free now well over a A correct from Court is No. 14890. decision undoubtedly important a most item Mrs. Supreme Idaho. Court of appeal brought Iwakiri’s life. Her was not May in order opportuni- that the Court have the ty to a new rule the fu- manufacture
ture, but to vindicate and eradicate a kid-
napping conviction. four months *2 purchase
used to install well and irrigation system on parcel. As a re- sult, the land was converted from desert productive land into farm land. through 1978, From *3 Carmen payments also made all the annual Half, on the except East for the 1972annu- 1971, payment. parents al In George’s as- signed the East Half to George. contract 1978, Subsequently, in a deed was issued in George name of Suchan to the East irrigation Half. The system well in- Roger Ling, Ling, D. Nielsen & Robin- stalled on the West Half was used also son, Rupert, for defendant-appellant. convert the East Half unimproved from Smith, Parsons, K. Smith, Richard desert productive land to farm land. Fletcher, Stone & Burley, plaintiff-re- for years prior For divorce, several to the spondent. in a lived home on located three DONALDSON,-Chief Justice. acres of which was owned George’s parents. The remodeled presents questions This case to us re- and, addition, the home in purchased and garding the character of various bins, grain installed shop two building, incident ato in a division divorce feeding hog facility and a on the proceeding. In particular, we will deal 1977, In George inherited a undi- one-half with the issue transmutation and will vided in interest from his examine an entered into 1980, George’s father. In quit- mother 30, parties on June 1972. claimed her one-half proper- interest in this undisputed facts salient are ty George. parties. Carmen and George Suchan were 28, 1980, On October 10, Carmen Suchan married June Throughout on filed for After a divorce. trial on the mat- marriage, George engaged was in the busi- ter, magistrate Findings issued farming. his 1950, ness of In years prior four Law, Fact and Conclusions and conclud- parties’ to the marriage, George’s parents ed that the were entitled to a di- purchased on contract both West Half grounds vorce on of irreconcilable dif- 16, and the East Half of Township Section addition, magistrate ferences. South, con- Range 22 East of the Boise Merid- cluded together that the three acres with ian. The contract for the Half in West was parties’ separate George’s home was George’s name. The contract for the East property, subject but was to the communi- George’s Half was in name of father. ty’s right of reimbursement in sum of George’s parents down payment made the $60,000 improvements for made pay- on each half and made the annual property by community, and that the through ments on each contract 1958. Be- property, including remainder of the real 1959, ginning George in and Carmen made the West and East Halves of Section payments pieces the annual on both property. Finally, was community property out of community funds. magistrate disregarded obligations two George Carmen made balance George contended were Half, payments except the West debts. payment. George the 1969 annual completed paying off George appealed magistrate’s Carmen deci- West Half in and a deed was issued sion to the district court. court The district name Opinion Suchan. The West Half filed both and a a Memorandum mortgaged, Supplemental Opinion, then and the funds were Memorandum magistrate’s acquired equitable right affirmed has before mar- decision. This an appeal riage separate property, though such followed. perfected marriage.” until after is not willWe first address the characterization Fisher, (quot- supra at 383 P.2d at of the West and East Halves of Section 16. ing Property Community Am.Jur. community’s right We will then address the § 20, 187). p. the contract on the Since expenditures to reimbursement for made George’s West name and was Half was parcel. on the three-acre years prior parties’ entered into four to the marriage, in- George acquired equitable I. property prior marriage. terest The trial court based its conclusion that Therefore, holding accordance our the West and East Halves of Section Fisher, George’s Half the West were on two separate property from the time it was (1) theories: that the West and East Halves acquired. *4 community property have been from the 16, to the East Half of Section As (2) they acquired; time that were even the trial the contract court found that if the and West East Halves were George’s in the name of father. Further property acquired, they at the time were more, the trial court found that this con they community prop- were transmuted to assigned George tract was in December erty by agreement on June of 1971. The evidence introduced re 30, appeal, 1972. On the district court was garding assignment testimony was the adopt hesitant to the trial court’s first theo- George’s mother wherein she stated that therefore, ry, expressed no “gift George.” assignment was a it. the district court affirmed evidence, Thus, according to the the con the trial theory. court on the second tract for the East Half was received determining In the character of the during marriage gift. Ap George 16, West East Halves of we are Section § 32-903, plying I.C. the contract on the guided by principles two fundamental George’s separate Half be East would community First, our property law. it is Therefore, property. we hold that the East property acquired by axiomatic that all ei George’s separate 16 was Half of Section spouse during marriage ther is rebutt property acquired. it at the time was ably presumed community property. Having determined that the West 725, Stanger Stanger, v. 98 Idaho 571 P.2d George’s East Halves of Section 16 were (1977); 205, Guy Guy, 98 Idaho separate property, we will now examine (1977). Second, pro P.2d 876 I.C. 32-903 effect, any, if what the June property acquired by vides that all either agreement had on the character of the spouse prior marriage, to the or thereafter property. The entered acquired by gift, bequest, de devise or reads as follows: scent, separate property. constitutes OF “AGREEMENT AS TO STATUS Applying these two rules of law to COMMUNITYPROPERTY case, the facts we conclude that both Spouses “After Death Of One Of the West and East Halves of Section Agreement, and entered “This made George’s separate property were from the June, day by and into this 30th they acquired. particular, were In George Carmen between A. Suchan and Half, characterizing the we are West Suchan, wife, Rupert, husband and presented with a factual situation almost County, Idaho. Minidoka State of presented to the one to us in identical Fish Fisher, That whereas er v. 86 Idaho “WITNESSETH: (1963). Fisher, quoted approvingly hereto are owners of certain we said portion Jurisprudence community American below described real property, “property that said real states which one and are desirous together with following thereto, described and the personal said described community personal property, property, owned, now now and all community owned, and all other community personal personal property hereafter be property that may acquired, hereafter be acquired, shall be considered and is here- pass delay without expense, community declared to be upon either, the death of to the necessary hereby survivor. and to the extent we do
transfer, grant convey the described “REAL PROPERTY other as “Said Real is situated in the county Idaho, of Minidoka State of and is “II.
described as follows:
“The West Half and the East Half of “That on the event of the death of (16), Section Sixteen also the Southeast lk either of parties, the aforementioned Seventeen, of Section Township both in survives, party while the other the whole (8) South, Eight Range Twenty-two (22) of said as herein Meridian, East Boise County, Minidoka immediately defined and described shall Idaho. surviving party simple. vest in the in fee “ /&/ A. Suchan “ “PERSONAL PROPERTY /s/ Carmen Suchan” Accounts, “Checking Savings Ac- After the executed the counts, Bonds, Automobiles, Stocks and County it was recorded in Minidoka *5 goods any Household and and all other June goods miscellaneous of whatsoever kind George Suchan admits the execution and description. or recording argues of the but THEREFORE, “NOW for and in con- entered into the ($1.00) sideration of the sum of Dol- § One pursuant to 32-921 repealed by I.C. 1971 paid, lar in hand and other valuable con- 11, p. Idaho Sess.Laws ch. (repeal sideration, receipt hereby of which is 1, 1972), July effective and that the hereto, acknowledged by party and intended the only to take effect also, in consideration of the love and upon spouses. of the death one of the Car- affection that each of said bears Suchan, hand, argues men on the other other, for the and the mutual benefits to only portion of the by hereto,
be derived it is dealing disposition covenanted, hereby agreed, prom- property upon spouses death of one of ised: death, upon was to take effect and that the
paragraph
agree-
identified as “I” of the
immediately.
ment
towas
take effect
“I.
property
begin
analysis by analyzing
“That the said described real
We
our
I.C.
§
§
appurtenances
Essentially,
with all
and fixtures
32-921.1
I.C.
32-921 au-
may
any
1. I.C. 32-921 read as
be made at
time
the husband and
§
follows:
wife
the execution of an instrument
"32-921. AGREEMENT AS TO PROPER-
writing,
acknowledged
executed
or
Nothing
any provisions
contained in
of
TY.—
proved in the same manner as deeds to real
state,
chapter
any
law
or in
of this
be,
required
property are
under the laws of
prevent
jointly
the husband and wife from
state,
any
and the same
at
time there-
entering
any agreement concerning
into
after be altered or amended in the same man-
disposition
any por-
status or
of the whole or
however,
provided,
that such
ner:
community property,
tion of the
then owned
creditors,
derogate
shall not
from the
of
acquired,
them or afterwards to be
to take
debt,
action,
action,
any
chose in
cause of
either;
upon
provided,
effect
however,
the death of
legal obligation which could have
or other
legal description
any
that a
real
against
presented
been
as a claim
the commu-
property
to be affected
must
nity property
spouse's
of a deceased
estate
be included therein. But such
arriving at this con-
Prior to
agreements
spouses.
thorized
entered
between
clusion,
court noted:
the Merriman
“concerning
husbands and wives
the status
determining
property
“A
disposition
community proper-
... of the
personal proper-
immediate status
ty,
upon
...
to take effect
the death of
is a non-
ty
husband and wife
between a
in-
Apparently,
legislature
either.”
pro-
26.16.050
statutory creature. RCW
provide
tended to
married individuals with
property
conveyances of real
vides
opportunity
dispose
property upon
26.12.120
spouses,
and RCW
between
avoiding pro-
death while at the same time
com-
disposing of
provides a method of
bate. We have never before had an occa-
upon the
to take effect
munity property
§
interpret
sion to
32-921.
there,
spouses, but
of one of the
death
Washington
we are aware that the state of
the immedi-
providing for
are no statutes
very
has
a statute which is
similar.2
by agreement
disposition
ate
Therefore,
Washington
will
we
examine the
spouses.”
analysis
agree-
courts’
their statute
Merriman,
(quoting
supra,
at
per-
ments
entered
into thereunder
(1958)).
Wash.L.Rev.
authority.
suasive
reviewing
Wash
In addition
law,
reviewing Washington
After
case
law,
have also examined
ington ease
we
Curl,
we find that Merriman v.
8 Wash.
§
It is clear
language of I.C.
32-921.
(1973),
App.
is most en-
death
upon the
phrase “to take effect
In Merriman the court con-
lightening.
“agreement.”
modifies the word
of either”
spouses,
community prop-
cluded that
via a
Therefore,
language of I.C.
relying on the
(1)
erty agreement, may:
affect
the status
§
authority of
persuasive
32-921 and the
their
at
the execu-
law,
conclude that I.C.
we
Washington case
(2)
agreement;
tion of the
affect
the status
agreements
authorized
32-921
death; and, (3)
dispose
their
at
transmutation
wherein the
one of the
upon the death of
property upon
takes effect
the death of one of
section,
for such
against
of death
surviving spouse.
a certificate
shall survive
debt,
recorder’s
recorded in the
any
must be
Statutes of limitations on
chose in
*6
agreement
action,
action,
county
the
legal obliga-
in which
of each
cause of
or other
office
against
tion
of the
is recorded."
run,
husband and wife shall
continue
as follows:
reads
26.16.120
§
2. Wash.Rev.Code
though
spouse
the deceased
had survived.
Any
brought against
surviving
action
Noth-
Agreements as to status.
"26.16.120
judgment
any
provisions
any
to recover a
such
ing
of the
in
contained
state,
obligation
pre-
any
shall be
within the
chapter
commenced
law of
or
jointly
ac-
enter-
time limited for commencement of such
from
and wife
vent the husband
ing
concerning
against
spouse,
status
any agreement
if he had
tion
deceased
any portion of
disposition
survived.
whole or
of the
or
agreement
any
community property,
them
"Before
entered into hereun-
then owned
effective,
any
effect
agreement,
acquired, to take
der shall be
or afterwards
thereto, shall,
agreement
prior
But such
upon
death of either.
to the death
amendments
any
the husband and
spouse,
may
at
recorder's
be made
of either
be recorded in the
of an instrument
county
the execution
in which there is real
wife
office of
seals, and to be
writing
agreement
under their hands
property described in the
or
witnessed, acknowledged
in the
and certified
amendments.
re-
estate are
as deeds to real
parties
into an
same manner
of the
entered
“Divorce
state,
be,
of the
agree-
quired
the laws
agreement
under
hereunder shall revoke the
may
any
be al-
at
time thereafter
same
ment.
manner: Pro-
in the same
"Nothing
prevent
tered or amended
contained herein shall
vided, however,
agreement shall not
agreement
That such
surviving spouse
from
to such an
creditors,
right
nor be
derogate
survivorship
electing
disregard
from
superi-
powers of the
curtail the
having
construed to
contained in the
or cancel such
court to set aside
the laws
estate administered under
decedent’s
recognized
some other
fraud or under
of Idaho.
ei-
jurisdiction,
the suit of
equity
at
spouses
head of
"Upon
death of either of the
party.”
ther
into an
under
who have entered
spouses. However,
(1981);
we hasten
Pocatello,
to add that
City
Parks v.
91 Ida-
analysis
our
241,
does not end
(1966).
here.
ho
Although there is no Idaho case law
After examining the contract as a
authorizing agreements which
whole,
transmute
we conclude that it was the inten
property at the time of the execution of the
parties
tion of the
herein
agreement as there is in Washington, I.C. property described in
was to
§
provide
32-916 does
such authorization.
be transmuted to community property im
Recently, our
Appeals,
Court of
after ana mediately upon the
agree
execution of the
§§
lyzing
32-919,
I.C.
through
32-916
con
particular,
ment.
we note that the sec
cluded that a
may
“husband and wife
elect
paragraph
ond
refers to
any
change
at
time to
their property
“certain
real
below de
rights.”
Stockdale,
Stockdale v.
102 Idaho
Also,
scribed.”
language
para
870, 873,
(Ct.App.1982).
643 P.2d
graph identified as “I” is clear and un
Although
specific
issue
Stockdale
equivocal
stating:
“That the said de
was whether or not oral transmutation is
scribed real
...
shall be con
Idaho,
recognized in
we believe that the
sidered and is hereby declared to be com
Appeals’
Court
conclusion that
I.C. munity property and to the extent neces
§ 32-916 authorizes transmutation which sary
transfer,
we do hereby
grant and con
place
take
any
at
time is correct.3 vey the
described
to each other as
community property.”
added.)
(Emphasis
Having determined that there is
language
This
clearly
parties’
reflects the
authority in Idaho for
types
agree
both
intention
to transmute the
imme
(i.e., agreements
ments
transmuting prop
diately.
Had the
intended the
erty at the time of the execution of the
place only upon
transmutation to take
agreements transmuting
them,
death of one of
it would have been
property at
spous
the death of one of the
relatively easy
language
to use conditional
es), we
agreement signed
now look to the
language
rather
than the
of immediate
they
to determine when
in
transfer which was used.
tended the
place.
transmutation to take
should,
The intent of
herein
if
argues
Suchan
that the contract
possible,
language
specifically
be ascertained from the
pursuant
entered into
contract,
32-921,
contained in their
and unless it
and that the subtitle of the
contradictions,
contains absurdities or
which reads “After Death Of
parties'
contract is the best evidence
Spouses”
One
Of
indicates that the
Development
intent.
Farm
Corp.
See
v.
intended the transmutation to take
Hernandez,
93 Idaho
place
upon
When en does is efforts, labor, by community par- hanced indus the execution of funds, try, question transmutation, community is entitled to ties bear reimbursement for such enhancement. Su but also other actions of the can be Suter, Here, ter v. 97 Idaho P.2d 1169 construed to reach the same effect. (1976); Hiatt, although ownership Hiatt v. legal Idaho of the farm (1971); Tilton, P.2d 1121 property Tilton v. 85 Idaho was for some time the name (1963). defendant-husband, Clearly, the facts as parents opinion, par- of this case it appli majority take outside the direct indicated cation of this improve very moneys rule. When the ties invested substantial here, property and, ments were property my opinion, made labor that separate not the George, it but treated and considered it Hence, was the of George’s parents. It property. the fact that the ultimate improvements after all legal placed title was in the name of made George were obtained title is immaterial and the earlier ac- defendant as his ef- property. would result in an tions noted, as the district court transmutation into the status of fective living record indicates that the community property. were with the consent of the part As to III Furthermore, parents. appears it dealing attorney’s I appeal, fees on there was tacit that, each point clearly, out further rather eventually acquire would very property as party obtained substantial Therefore, particular under the facts clearly a result of the divorce and case, magistrate we affirm the court’s attorney’s her able to bear his or own fees. *8 equitable powers, of its v. exercise Rudd (1983) Rudd, 105 Idaho BISTLINE, Justice, concurring part in (actions equity), are in divorce actions concurring judgment. in the holding community in that is to entitled improvements Agreeing made disposition reimbursement for with Court’s of doctrine, parcel. agree to the three-acre I with the transmutation thought separate, court that there be the district was no reason whether it be to determine whether the two half-sections thought community. to to be Such transfers Moreover, acquired were or were not as forever. I have been made Seeing the husband. property of that constitutionality any would doubt dictum, opinion much of our as I neverthe- purpose prohib- of which to statute agree less tend to that the alienation, Chief Justice’s right especially it that probably is the correct one. conclusion conveyance where the is in of a favor spouse. practitioners The older will re- inescapable There is an inference to be proce- member that in some instances the Community drawn from the fact that the sepa- was for a husband to deed his dure Property Agreement was executed and re- party to a third who would in rate very day last corded on before it back to the marital communi- turn deed repealer took effect. For that reason I ty that deed was lan- habendum of cannot believe our is sound not —in guage conveyance to the effect that the being persuaded by argu- the husband’s grantees was to the husband and wife as “Agreement” ment that the was entered community property. procedure, This order to obtain benefits of I.C. course, a throwback to technical com- § 32-921 while it still had life. But I do conveyancing. proce- law In time the mon not see that error as fatal to a decision simply dure became that one would provides with the which a result consonant simply convey to himself or herself and the unambiguous language Agreement, spouse, community other “to be held as compatible and also a result with the fact property.” Apparently the law of under at that time were not in- n Englandit had been thought at one time compatible. person convey- could execute a that a Going beyond declaring the status of the But, England ance to himself. law property, question clearly document in concept of a marital enti- did not have part evidences an intent on the of both is, course, ty the foundation of —which at parties to create a estate community property. my time. To mind it is of no concern issue here is whether the 1972 legislative The basic there was neither enact- any “Agreement” divested the husband of prior Supreme prece- ment nor Idaho Court prop- real separate estate the described “authorizing” a dent transmutation his interest to the two erty, and transferred Appeals opinion Court Clearly community property. it of them as totally me Stockdale Stockdale leaves parties in 1972 did so. Without doubt the perplexed, presently and I do not embrace advantage of forth, had in mind to take the views therein set other than the ineffective; but Idaho, 32-921 before it became p. p. at 873 of 102 at 85 of statement happy couple equally without doubt that declaring P.2d that “certain formali- are, sought expenses who then avoid required. ties” are Those formalities beyond doing which was least, probate, went instrument presently at a written so, necessary process and in the all of charged to do signed by party which is the described real became certainty. and described That described, couple’s community estate. marital property is so In this case the readily ambiguous, they did is not is signed by the husband and the document ascertainable, say, And, and it is unrealistic signatures by the wife. those Bakes, there should be does Justice day acknowledged on the 30th were years later “swearing some twelve match” June, 1972. they intended to do what ascertain if respect to the Court of With all due they did. Court, and the of this Appeals conclusion, I writ- I mention that have any never been in Idaho restraint there has perfectly make it separately only to transfer and con- ten on a husband’s § 32-921, there was prior to I.C. property, clear that wife his interest real vey to his *9 (and been), suggest part parties not I not er in could have intent the against executing the any prohibition outright convey- agreement. The title of an “Agreement other, reads as to spouse ance one document Status to the or one Community Property of Death spouse spouses community to both prop- as of After added.) (Emphasis Spouses.” One the certain, however, fraud, erty.1 For absent of addition, In mention made the no is of spouse executing conveyance the the of his in language agreement the which indicates separate property had to live that with act. parties agreement the that the intended § I.C. 32-921 in essence a testamenta- death, upon only to take effect such as that ry given device which would be effect at portion agreement the which that of states if death or modi- otherwise rescinded agreement the enter into this with Today we have instru- fied. reviewed an the desire prop- intent and the that the real conveyance praesen- ment which was a in erty named within the “shall ti. pass delay expense, upon without expression for the differ- Other than of either, death Another of to survivor.” forth, ing I in views herein set concur part of indicates that “on opinion. I in judgment Court’s concur of the death either event affirming the courts below. parties, aforementioned other while the survives, party the whole of said communi- BAKES, Justice, dissenting: ty property as herein defined and described disagree majority’s I must with anal- par- immediately surviving shall vest in the June, 1972, ysis between ty simple.” portion in fee Even that parties. these is an itself upon by majority is focused document,' ambiguous and thus no clear that, ambiguous in property while the gleaned intention of the can be “hereby community proper- declared” to be reading from a of the document itself. The ty “hereby transfer[ed], grant[ed] upon language focuses from one convey[ed],” para- at the same time the paragraph part one graph indicates that affect will reads, “That the said described real property only necessary.” “to extent property ... be considered and is It byis no means clear that as a matter of hereby to property declared be community law intended the to necessary hereby and to the extent we do transmuting separate have the effect of transfer, grant convey the described spouses one of into commu- community prop- to each other as gift nity property. large proper- a Such law, concluding, erty,” as matter of ty a spouse from one to another should not transmuted upon ambiguous be based document community property. having parties’ into Yet first without intentions parts agreement display other anoth- determined as matter of fact. a today, apparently to Prior the Court's issued saw no need to discuss the utiliza- Stockdale, prior to it had never occurred to me in tion of the declarations of a habendum clause anyone right doubted the to creating one interspousal conveyances community a community separate property prop- convert erty doing community. estate did marital But he procedure of the marital estate. The for application discuss of the above statute in probably suggested by so was 55- joint connection the creation of tenancies 104: community property particular, in a state. Every 55-104. Interests in in- gave common.— Dr. R.D. Brockelbank credit to views of persons terest created in favor of several spouses convey Merrill that “since free are to common, their own is an interest interests, they may agree their acquired partnership, unless them conveyed may conveyed be them them be partnership purposes, or unless declared in its joint p. tenancy.” and held in Brockelbank at interest, joint unless ac- creation quired be 238. I submit that that which the (Emphasis property." joint tenancy do where estates are concerned added.) can be where also done Brockelbank, teacher, W.J. Our esteemed Dr. estates are It ever concerned. thus. subject community property, book his on the *10 community property of the ambiguity agreement in the tion were the The obvious deciding question parties.” The district court was imperative makes it that the court, appeal, not as a but on entering intent of the into the this de novo the fact, as a as a matter of law. contract be determined matter concerning upon extrinsic evidence based Court, appeal ma- Finally, on to this surrounding the all of the circumstances ambiguities jority again overlooks the con- agreement. of the At each level execution agreement makes the tained in the and controversy’s through the of this course that “where a contract is clear statement legal system, agreement has inter- been unambiguous, of its and determination preted to be a transmutation as a matter meaning legal questions effect are and law, finding a of the intent of the Thus, court.” law to be decided parties as a has never been matter of fact ambiguities disregards contained Court magistrate, made. The in his written find- itself, even within within language ings, solely upon relied upon by the portion of the relied determining status of the majority cites the cor- majority. While the parties’ property. unambiguous docu- rect rule of law as to “The written intentions and declarations ments, equally recognize it fails to are, case, the best terms of a con- weighty rule that where parties’ evidence of the status of interpretation ambiguous, its tract are writ- property. By giving effect to those meaning question is a of fact to be-deter- intentions, ten declarations and the court mined the trier of fact. See Pocatello find the described West, must v. 101 Idaho Industrial Park Steel community property.” (1980); Phillips Werry v. Co., P.2d 792 97 Idaho Petroleum fact, supplemental finding of In a later (1975). magistrate again solely agree- relied itself, upon any extrinsic ment and not a were faced with In a recent case we parties in of the intent of the evidence in- we were very similar situation wherein declaring property to be compensation terpreting a workman’s agreement which had two sentences other, level, seemingly conflicted with court the district At the district singling the sentence sides were out possibility that an both court first indicated urging supported position their had oc- oral or informal transmutation curred, rule in their favor based an this Court to also noted that but sentence, the sen- ignoring Appeals particular had their the Idaho Court of refused opposing side.1 supported the tence which recognize oral transmutations. Co., that, Triangle Dairy ruled as a See Woodvine the district court then (1984). law, gave P.2d 1263 “the 1972 Idaho Wood- matter of compensation recognition to this situation vine we determined formal parcels ques- clearly stating ambiguous that the two and that we agreement, interpreting construed the a The commission had the Court was 1. In Woodvine law, agree- compensation agreement apparently to be an entered into between as a matter of award, employer employee-claimant merely in- disability and the an im- for a ment juries sustained in the course holding which had been rating. was made pairment That had employment. backdrop against statutory our workmen’s a Commission, approved Industrial been compensates generally compensation law which paid; II provided time loss Part in Part I for only "disability” "impairment.” Never- and not given per- provided, employee been “The has agreement to be am- held the theless Court rating impairment disability manent and/or biguous to the Indus- and remanded the matter ____"; payments provided III for medical Part as a matter of to determine trial Commission fact, Finally, conclud- made to date. law, whether rather than as a matter surety employer provision, with the "The .ed agreed "dis- the claimant’s had to settle accept, employee agrees agree pay, and the merely ability” "im- than the claimant’s rather period- disability above in award as set forth pairment.” ic installments." were “unable to magistrate’s determine the mand this case to the intent of the court to reading from a compensation taking allow for the of evidence on this *11 agreement,” point, thus magis- ruled determination permanent award was for “[w]hether trate as a matter of fact of intent of impairment permanent disability parties. is de- pendent on the actual of the
parties.” We then ruled that question parties what the agreed ques- to was a
tion of fact Thus, for the trier of fact. we
reversed the decision, commission’s
had been law, determined as a matter of
and remanded to the commission to allow a determination of the actual as a matter of fact. Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE of In this ease there is no clear indication reading from a of the itself of NIELD, David Lamar parties what the by executing intended Defendant-Appellant. agreement. If the were told that execution of such an would aid No. 15218. avoiding complications probate, Supreme Court of Idaho. and thus entered into the purpose conflicts, avoiding such then June the contract present would not constitute a separate property transmutation of the into
community property. Instead, it would
have been a specifically contract entered '§ pursuant 32-921,
into urged by to I.C.
appellant. addition, 32-921 would specifically governed
have the effect of agreement,
divorce of the upon the specifically
because that statute said that
“[djivorce of the entered into an
agreement hereunder revoke the
agreement.” hand, if On the other were aware that a question prop- was the
erty husband, by entering agreement they intended to make clear they agreed proper- had that all of this
ty immediately be considered com- would
munity they signed property at the time then the would upheld
be a transmutation and would be theory. interpretation,
upon that Either by the as a matter of
decided trier of fact
fact, compe- supported when substantial evidence, upheld
tent would have
upon appeal by such this Court. interpretation as a fact has been made to this
matter of never Box, Pocatello, thus, Gaylen L. deci- for defendant- point, based on our recent Woodvine, appellant. I would reverse and re- sion