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Subsequent Injury Fund v. Teneyck
566 A.2d 94
Md.
1989
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*1 for consideration of this issue. If the appellate court finds there, error Runge not, is entitled to a trial. If new judgment of the Circuit Court for Cecil must County affirmed.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS BE BY COURT TO PAID THE RESPONDENT. COSTS IN COURT OF SPECIAL TO ABIDE THE APPEALS RESULT.

566 A.2d 94 SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND

v. John W. TENEYCK et al. 36, Sept. Term,

No. 1989. Appeals

Court of Maryland. Nov. 20,1989. Motion for Reconsideration Denied Dec. *2 (J. Curran, Jr., Voelkel, F. Asst. Gen. Atty. Joseph Joanne Gen., Towson, Gen., Asst. all Atty. Sophia Swope, Atty. L. brief), for appellant. on Arnold, Bacot, O’Conor, J. D. James P.A.

Herbert Janet II, brief, Jr., Hershberger, on Law Offices John W. Baltimore, for appellees. C.J., ELDRIDGE, MURPHY,

Argued before COLE, McAULIFFE, RODOWSKY, ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ.

ADKINS, Judge.

The issue in this case is workers’ whether (1957, Article Maryland Cum.Supp.), Code 36(3)(d), provision a “scheduled member” of the Work § Article, Compensation applies qua men’s when the claimant Subsequent Injury lifies for from the Fund (1957, Repl.Vol.), Code Article pursuant Maryland 101, 66, to a “sched prior impairment and the worker’s The appellant, uled member.”1 (the Fund), the circuit Fund asks this Court to reverse holding compensate that the Fund must the claimant court’s (1957, Maryland Repl.Vol.), 1. All references to 66 are to Code (1957, and references 36 are to Md.Code Article Cum.Supp.), Article 101. for his pre-existing impairment according to scheduled provision. member

I. Appellee Teneyck (Teneyck) John was right blinded his eye age eight.2 6On he his May injured lower back place while at his employment, Montgomery Village Amoco Station. (the Compensation Workmen’s Commission Commis-

sion) decided that

claimant sustained a permanent partial disability under “other cases” 36(3)(j)] amounting to [Article 55% industrial loss of use as a result the injury and right back eye; due to the 25% accidental is due pre-existing 30% conditions. The Commission ordered pay $109 weeks, and ordered the to pay Fund weeks. $109 *3 against The award the Fund was under computed the provision “other cases” 36(3)(j). of § Teneyck appealed this order the Court Circuit for Frederick County arguing that for compensation prior his impairment 36(3)(d), should have been assessed under “scheduled member provision.” The circuit court agreed with Teneyck, ordering the Commission to the Fund’s revise weeks, for liability 36(3)(d). under $109 granted This petition Court the Fund’s for writ certio- rari to decide whether provisions” “scheduled member Compensation Workmen’s Act apply below, Fund awards. For the reasons affirm we circuit court decision.

II. Section 36 of Article 101 declares that employee “[e]ach ... compensation entitled to receive under article shall Teneyck’s employer employer’s compensation and the insurer also appellees. position they espouse are Since substantially is Teneyck’s, identify appellees collectively same as under name.

§2§> following sched- the same accordance with receive ule____” One forth a of “schedules.” It then sets number 36(3)(d), provision, a “scheduled member” of them is § (computed the amount of establishes which specific number multiplying wage by factor by weeks) produced paid permanent partial disability to be certain enumerated parts reason of loss or loss of use of by Loss of ah calls for 250 weeks. body. eye other cases applies [permanent to “all 36(3)(j) Section specifically other than those enumerated partial] disability (i)____” “other (c) As to these paragraph through cases,” por- is directed “to determine the the Commission of the em- or which the industrial use percentage by tion and in impaired injury as a result ployee's body was take into determining portion percentage or ...” [that] compensa- of factors and to “award consideration a number to 500 as the determined loss bears proportion tion such weeks.” (1) explains the Fund. Subsection

Section deals with impair- a permanent who has employee [w]henever congeni- any or disease or previous ment due to accident or is to be a hindrance likely tal condition or is which subsequent disability incurs employment, to his obstacle personal injury, reason of a which by or resulting permanent partial required this article substantially greater by total effects of the reason of the combined resulted than that would have injury alone, his from the subsequent *4 only compensation insurance carrier shall be liable However, injury. article for such under this payable the or compensation to which addition to such liable, completion after the carrier is his insurance article, employee the provided by therefor payments to receive ... additional shall be entitled the “Subsequent as special from a fund be known in the manner Fund,” purpose, for such created section, described hereafter in this it the being intent of this section to make the total payments which such employee shall become equal entitled to the that would be due for the combined effects of the impair- ment and injury resulting permanent total greater a substantially permanent partial disability.

Benefits from the Subsequent Injury Fund hereunder payable shall not unless the be combined effects resulting from previous impairment a and a subsequent accidental injury result a disability exceeding 50 per- whole; centum as ... a and that the previous impairment and subsequent accidental is each com- pensable, Commission, as determined period of not than However, less 125 weeks. the previous shall be determined as of the date of the subsequent injury. argues

The Fund that according to these provisions, the compensation it computed owes should Teneyck be under 36(3)(j). The Fund legislature asserts when the enacted the “scheduled adopted member” it presumption to the effect the loss of a “scheduled member” has on an employee’s earning capacity. Cox v. (D.Md. American Store Equip. Corp., F.Supp. 1968). Believing that on the effect earning capacity caused by the loss of a member can least roughly estimated in advance, Fund, says legislature decided that it was fair to make those estimates and them incorporate into the act through provisions. scheduled member In con- trast, the “other cases” provision does not contain similar presumption, leaving the determination of the effect on earning capacity discretion of the Commission. Id. In deciding a nonscheduled effect injury’s earning on capac- ity, Commission considers including various factors “the nature physical injury, occupation, experience, training age of time injured employee at the injury....” (1957, Md.Code 1985 Repl.Vol., 1988 Cum. Supp.), Art. 36(3)(j). *5 66(1) invoked, that is the Com-

The Fund insists when § the Fund’s with liability mission can and should determine must read hindsight. the benefit of Commission §§ in considering light the criteria of together, and 36 § surrounding prior impairment the facts the claimant’s The Fund liability. of the Fund’s determine the amount is section allows the 36(3)(j) only argues § 66(1). It con- of the factors set forth consideration § operate must under the flexible tends that the Commission so it can exercise discretion approach 36(3)® § Although approach may assessing liability. the Fund’s (as case) pay- than that in this less produce other 36(3)(d), produce under it could more under able § circumstances. between the

Teneyck, obviously, interprets interplay argues recovery He from the differently. subsections First, deter- two-step process. Fund is a the Commission 66(1) mines the claimant meets the criteria of whether making responsible part employee’s the Fund the claimant’s If the Fund must contribute to recovery. computed the amount of that is recovery, then contribution 36 as is done in case. by turning any of § depend upon prior impairment The results then whether the injury. a “scheduled or an “other cases” Once is member” determined, no consideration need be liability the Fund’s 66(1). contends that given Teneyck to the factors also is a 36(3)® precludes its own use when Teneyck “scheduled We think has the better member.” argument. III. require us us parties The contentions of the now before murky depths of Article Its again explore once our with engaged often have attention opaque provisions Nevertheless, again shall once seek frequency.3 some patchwork the article has often been amended in 3. Enacted 66(1) style quotation well illustrated from fashion. Its and effectuate the intent legislature, discover Rucker v. Comptroller Treasury, *6 564-565, 1060, (1989), 555 A.2d 1063 this time respect with 66(1) 36(3)(d) relationship and 36(3)(j). §§ Because there is a lack of relevant legislative history, we language must on the of the rely substantially statutes goals the context of the and seek objectives they to achieve. Baltimore, 505, 513-516, Kaczorowski v. 309 Md. City of 628, (1987). 525 A.2d 632-633 of the purpose Subsequent Injury Fund established by encourage 66 is to to hire employers handicapped Sons, 54, workers. McKenzie v. C.C. 311 Kottcamp & Md. 57, 703, (1987); 532 A.2d 704 Subsequent Injury Fund v. 628, 633, Thomas, 671, (1975); 275 Md. 342 A.2d 675 Subse Pack, 306, 308, 506, 250 Md. quent Injury Fund v. 242 A.2d 508 This if purpose by assuring achieved that hires a employer prior impairment, worker with and if a compensable injury worker suffers on the current then the job, only is liable for the subsequent and not injury prior the “cumulative effect of the and Pack, 308, subsequent injuries.” 250 Md. at 242 A.2d at balance, 508. The ordinarily up Fund makes since it must “contribute to the employee’s compensation an equal amount to the difference payable between award for the alone subsequent injury payable and that for the second injury previous impairment.” combined with Fund, 320, 325, Anchor Motor v. 278 Md. 363 Sub. (1976); Kraus, A.2d Subsequent Injury Fund v. 111, 112, (1984); 482 A.2d see also McKen zie, supra.

Section also establishes conditions that must exist brought (1) before the Fund is into the picture. They are: 629-630, also, pp. supra. e.g., (page type See one-third of sentences). only broken down into three A review of the annotations Code, courts, Maryland frequently reveals Article how both federal, upon provisions state and have been called to construe the Maryland’s Compensation suggests Workmen’s Act. This the desira- bility of both formal revision and substantive clarification. impairment previous effects that the combined in a must result (2) whole; and percent exceeds 50 each are subsequent injury and the previous Commission,” for not by determined compensable, “as seen, the Commission As have than weeks. less case. conditions requisite found the and when then, operates us the Fund tells how Section not tell us is how it does play. into What it comes properly the section is when payable the amounts compute information. rule, 36 contains this general invoked. As observed, has Appeals Special As Court deter- in Section are no [tjhere manner, benefits amount, paying or method of mine the *7 can Fund; these matters against made for ... awards of the provisions reference to only by determined be contained, setting 36, schedules therein and the Section calculating in to followed the formula be forth perma- for employees ... injured of due amount awards disabilities. partial nent Md.App. Chapman, Fund v.

Subsequent Injury curiam, 262 Md. 873-874, 375-376, per 274 A.2d aff'd McKenzie, An (1971). supra; also 277 A.2d See para introductory in its Motor, Section supra. chor to entitled employee ... makes it clear that graph, “[e]ach article shall receive under this receive ” [empha schedule following with the same accordance employee. is such an supplied]. Teneyck sis pertaining comprehensive 36 contains Section distinguishes It between of computation to the awards. (subsec- total disability, permanent e.g., different kinds of (2)), (subsection permanent and (1)), total temporary tion in the last (3)). disability (subsection Teneyck’s partial Thus, turn to subsection category. mentioned into deal- paragraphs itself That subdivided subsection (a) Paragraph impairments. or ing injuries of types with partial case makes it clear that “[i]n [the] character but in quality, compensation shall paid to the employee the rates enumerated ” periods as [emphasis supplied]. (c) Paragraphs follows (d) both deal weekly with flat payment periods for loss or loss use of specified parts body. Paragraph (j) “all covers ... of disability specifi- cases other than those cally (c) (i)____” enumerated ... in paragraphs through The statutory scheme and the statutory language combine to persuade us that loss loss of use of a bodily member listed one of the provi- scheduled member sions is to be calculated that provision; paragraph (j) only applies, language explains, as its “other cases.” We intimated as much Anchor Motor: ..., Section 36 of Article 101 delineating benefits pay- ..., able claimants is divided into several subsections apply types disabilities, to various following of which are to this applicable appeal [involving among things other prior impairment by of injury virtue 36(1), scheduled pertaining to permanent members]: § disabilities; 36(3) 36(3)(c)-(i) total ], applying to [now permanent partial (enumerated disabilities injuries); 36(4) 36(3)(j)], pertaining permanent partial [now § (other, cases). disabilities non-specific Motor, 1,.363 Anchor 278 Md. at n. A.2d at n. The evolution supports of Article 101 analysis. our Prior occupational introduction provisions, disease currently (1957, Maryland codified as Code 1985 Repl.Vol.), *8 101, 22-26, Article and the Subsequent Fund Injury §§ provisions, provided, the in 36, article com- methods for § puting compensable awards for impairments. Two methods existed for computing in permanent partial awards disabili- cases, ty one using provisions, “scheduled member” the other using the “other cases” provision. When occupational 1939, disease sections were added in legis- lature did not introduce a calculating new method for of amount for these in Except diseases. few specifically instances, enumerated it intended “scheduled provisions member” “other cases” to be

635 (1957, Repl.Vol.), Md.Code applied appropriate. 101, 22(a). Art. §

Thus, introduced Assembly the time the General award, 1945, it that an concept Fund was established 101, to under Article was be impairment compensable 36, appropriate to the schedule computed pursuant § 66 indicates that Nothing noted. within unless otherwise § the method of changing had intention of legislature any or 36 for “scheduled members” compensation laid out § “other cases.” provi to specify

The has been careful legislature Fund, it intends not to the when applicable sions of 36 are § See, 36(l)(c) (Fund not when result. involved e.g., § (serious executed), 36(3)(a)(iii) certain waiver § cases),4 36(3)(Z)(certain apply does not to Fund provision § of provisions “do provisions apply survival not due 66”),5 36(6) permanent disability (apportionment § not infirmity disease or subsection part pre-existing 66(1) met). The are applicable requirements where contain no disclaimer provisions scheduled member of this sort. 36 mean what conclusion is that the

Our Assem- in the context of this case. The General they say, for loss or loss of use of certain decided that awards bly specific periods. appears to run for That members were indicated loss or loss legislative determination that the effect on industrial loss legislatively-decided of use has a preempted respect discretion is with use. Commission a scheduled member is involved. question, when pay disability” apply 4. The “serious rates when an must resulting for an from claimant for 250 weeks more cases, impairment(s) arise from at least "one accident.” In Fund Thus, language displays legislative two incidents. the "one accident” injury” impose liability in a case. purpose not to on the Fund “serious 356, Co., Md.App. 486 A.2d 785 Barbee v. Hecht response Chap apparent legislative Fund v. 5. An curiam, man, Md.App. per 274 A.2d aff’d Barbee, (1971); Md.App. at see 486 A.2d A.2d *9 636

General Assembly made various 36 schedules applica ble generally compensation all payable under Article 101. It did not the Subsequent exclude Injury Fund from the 36(3)(d). provisions 36(3)(d) We hold that applies so, In doing case.6 we give 36(3)(d) effect to both §§ see Hosp. Sinai v. Dep’t 36(3)(j), and Employment, 309 28, 39-40, 382, Md. (1987) (court A.2d give should parts statute, effect all and not render legislative provisions surplusage), and carry goal we also out another 66(1): of §

to make the payments total which such shall employee become equal entitled the compensation that would be due for the combined effects injury resulting in a substantially greater .... permanent partial disability. Pack,

As we explained the employer for the pays second and the Fund pays for “the balance of the award, total so that the sum of the two payments [will] equal the compensation provided by statute com for the previous bined effects both the disability and subse quent 308, injury.” 250 Md. at 242 A.2d at 508. See also Motor, Anchor 325, PC & 509, 278 Md. at 363 A.2d at Telephone v. Fund, Co. Subsequent Inj. 508, Md.App. 511, 1243, 1244, per curiam, 453 A.2d 339, 297 Md. aff'd (1983) 466 A.2d 39 (explaining mechanics of allocation be Fund). tween employer and application

6. The dissent contends that this of the statute's may produce illogical true, sometimes results. If that is it problem have learned to live with in the world worker compensation. long ago Chvojan, As as Bata Shoe Co. v. (1947), 52 A.2d we observed: claimant, The fact that a compensation who receives for both a injury, may ultimately first and a second receive more than the single maximum injury, allowable for a not materi- al. The law logical fails to meet the test of consisten- cy many respects---- Act, duty It is our to construe the not to it. revise Sons, 54, 56, See Kottcamp also v. C.C. & McKenzie Md. 532 A.2d *10 of the purpose said that has Special Appeals of The Court a suffering employee, an injured when 66 is “achieved § of the than greater total 50% either disability, in receipt of whole, is assured as a body of the law provided not less than amount the claim from which of the at the time Maryland Son, Md.App. 20 T. Clark & Leach v. John arose.” concerned, (1974). Teneyck far as So 114, 314 A.2d 689 prior for his 250 weeks provided Maryland of the law did County for Frederick Court Circuit impairment. for that Teneyck to pay the Fund required it not err when 86(3)(d).7 pursuant impairment BY BE PAID TO AFFIRMED. COSTS JUDGMENT APPELLANT.

McAULIFFE, dissenting. Judge, intended to Assembly the General agree not I do for deter- disability section scheduled use of the mandate in degree previous of mining the contem- 66(1) of Article 101 Fund cases. Section per- of the the determination requires, indeed plates, from the combined resulting disability of industrial centage disabili- and a previous impairment effects of a body of the as a whole. disability made terms ty be case did the Commission precisely That is what of percent of 55 disability finding combined circuit court’s argument, represented to us that the the Fund 7. At oral practice contrary general in this case was decision support this asser- presented documentation to It no Commission. tion, Kottcamp & Compare v. C.C. Teneyck denied. McKenzie 54, 62, (1987), Sons, was in which there A.2d 707 particu- thinking the Commission on a general agreement as to the decision, reported a “scheduled mem- one point. But in at least lar 66(1). pursuant applied to the Fund provision 36 was ber” Co., Md.App. A.2d 785 As was Barbee v. Hecht (and McKenzie, Assembly also has amended § the General case in Barbee, nothing 36) "but has done on several occasions since practice in" Barbee. This factor modify reflected the administrative McKenzie, 66(1)----” weight of § in our construction “also entitled A.2d at 707. Md. at whole, made up percent a 30 disability industrial result- ing previous from the loss of sight in one and a 25 eye percent from disability resulting the current inju- industrial ry. approach The majority’s artificially, unnecessarily, legislative deviates from the intended provides scheme and a windfall to the employee. Instead properly allowing the Commission to determine the percentage previ- actual claimant, ous industrial suffered by a the majority upon using insists a schedule established for an entirely different purpose.

The schedule set forth in Section 36 serves useful purpose avoiding litigation endless concerning predic- *11 tion of the extent of disability industrial likely result from an anatomical suffered disability part of the body. However, as may useful the schedule in the be initial awarding future, of benefits for the it is unnecessary and inapplicable when the task is the retrospective of evaluation a pre-existing disability. case,

In the instant the could did Commission deter- mine the overall industrial the disability that loss an eye had actually caused this claimant at the time the current occurred. The Commission found that disability that percent was 30 of the as a body whole. The effect majority’s require decision is to the finding of this pre-existing disability deemed necessarily per- to be cent of the as a is body whole. This so because the schedule established by Section awards 250 weeks eye, loss and under the compen- current worker’s sation law whole body measured terms of 500 weeks. See Art. 36(3)(j). Adding percent the 50 pre-existing disability percent disability Commission found to have resulted from the current injury produces an percent overall as a whole. This is a disability have, that this claimant does not according to findings Commission, and it is a disability that should not be awarded. The majority.has findings rewritten the Commission a manner I legisla- intent of the the overall inconsistent with believe concept. Fund adopting ture of the Circuit Court the judgment I reverse would County. Frederick

Case Details

Case Name: Subsequent Injury Fund v. Teneyck
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Date Published: Nov 27, 1989
Citation: 566 A.2d 94
Docket Number: 36, September Term, 1989
Court Abbreviation: Md.
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