183 Misc. 662 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1944
This is a motion for summary judgment. The action is for an injunction restraining the maintaining of a condemnation proceeding to acquire property in an area on the “ East Side ”. It is a substandard area which the authorities intend to improve with a housing development. This condemnation is the result of a contract dated June 1,1943, between the City of New York, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and Stuyvesant Town Corporation made pursuant to the provisions of the Redevelopment Companies Law (L. 1943, ch. 234). It has previously been determined that this law is constitutional. (Matter of Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N. Y. 320.)
The plaintiff is the owner of property in the area to be acquired. It is a corporation organized pursuant to the provisions of the State Housing Law (L. 1926, ch. 823; now Public Housing Law, L. 1939,. ch. 808). It asserts that its constitutional rights have been invaded because it built these structures under the State Housing Law which it claims resulted in a contract with the State and a part of the exemption granted by the statute (taxes of the City) still has years to run. It asserts that such a contract cannot be impaired by the transfer and exercise of the power of condemnation by the State to the City and in turn to the other defendants.
Whether the plaintiff has a contract with the State is a question of law. After reviewing all the facts disclosed by the papers and reading them in the light of the State Constitution and existing statutes the court finds there is no such contract, either express or implied. What the State did was to give certain exemptions provided a building, as contemplated by the statute, was erected. The granting of such exemptions created no different rights than those given by the sovereign to religious, educational or charitable bodies. The bringing of the condemnation proceeding does not infringe upon any contractual rights of the plaintiff. Moreover there is nothing in the State Housing Law which shows or even intimates that the State intended to or ever tried to surrender its sovereign power to take any private property for public
The theory that the State contracted away its right to condemn cannot be sustained even though there was a contract entered into between plaintiff and the State.
The plaintiff relies in part upon the case of People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Mealey (224 N. Y. 187) as authority for its position. It is not in point because the question of surrender of sovereign power was not involved and the privilege of exemption must always yield to the right of the sovereign power to condemn.
The language is explicit in conferring power to condemn the property of the plaintiff. The plan and contract before the court are the result of the actions taken by our administrative agencies and governing bodies. This power is conferred upon them by this statute which has been held constitutional. (Matter of Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N. Y. 320, supra.) The language is, therefore, controlling and although there had been previous condemnation or purchase for public use (which there has not been), nevertheless this present condemnation of plaintiff’s property would have to proceed. (People v. Adirondack Railway Co., 160 N. Y. 225, supra.)
Even if this statute did not have this exact provision as to superior use, the result would necessarily be the same because such use is implicit in the statute and its purposes. The legislative intent would still be present requiring a superseding of the present use by that contemplated in the Redevelopment
There is no ground for enjoining the sovereign or its legally-delegated agents from proceeding with the condemnation proceeding. Motion for summary judgment is granted. Settle order.