Dоn S. STURGILL, Individually and as Acting Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant, v. John Wesley BEARD, Appellee.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky
June 21, 1957
Dissenting Opinion July 8, 1957.
303 S.W.2d 908
The judgment is affirmed.
E. Gaines Davis, Jr., Smith, Reed & Leary, Frankfort, for appellant.
Robert Hatton, Morris E. Britt, Louisville, for appellee.
Stanley B. Mayer, Louisville, amicus curiae.
WADDILL, Commissioner.
The appeal is from a judgment invalidating certain regulations the Department of Public Safety adopted on December 20, 1956, establishing a “Point System” under which the Department suspended the motor vehicle operator‘s license of John Wesley Beard. The circuit court was of the opinion the Department had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the regulations, and therefore held that the оrder issued by the Department suspending Beard‘s driver‘s license under those regulations was void. We reverse the judgment for the reasons hereinafter assigned.
The Department of Public Safety was created by
“The department * * * may immediately suspend the license of any person, * * * operating a motor vehicle in this state, with or without
hearing, and with or without receiving a record of сonviction of that person of a crime, whenever the department has reason to believe that: * * * (d) That person is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle or has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws. * * *”
Pursuant to the provisions of
It is apparent to us that the Department, in adopting the “regulations,” acted within the scope of the power delegated to it under
It is urged that the regulations violate the
It is now too late to contend that a citizen of this Commonwealth is born with a natural and irrevocable “right” to operate a motor vehicle on our public roads, because it is now a privilege granted by a license of the state, subject to reasonable regulations by the state in the exercise of its police powеrs. Ballow v. Reeves, Ky., 238 S.W.2d 141; Withers v. Marshall, 311 Ky. 659, 225 S.W.2d 121; Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W.2d 579; 33 Am.Jur., Licenses, Section 65; 5 Am.Jur., Automobiles, Section 151. Hence, when the conditions imposed by the license are violated by the licensee, the suspension of the privilege to operate a vehicle is not a denial of “due process of law.” Ballow v. Reeves, Ky., 238 S.W.2d 141; Ratliff v. Lampton, Cal. App., 187 P.2d 421; Goodwin v. Superior Court of Yavapai County, 68 Ariz. 108, 201 P.2d 124; Heart v. Fletcher, 184 Misc. 659, 53 N.Y.S.2d 369; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52; Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003.
Although we believe the reasons given adequately dispose of the contention made conсerning lack of “due process,” other sufficient reasons appear which dispel any lurking fear that a licensee may be denied his constitutional right of “due process of law” by the Department‘s application of the regulations. These safeguards are: (1) Under the regulations, no driver‘s license can be suspended by the Department except upon “twelve penalty points” assessed against the licensee for convictions of named moving traffic violations; and, (2)
Further attack is made upon the “regulations” on the theory that
“The court * * * is of the opinion that the regulation imposed by the defendant [Department] for the purpose of revoking a driver‘s license in Kentucky was solely a legislative function, and being so, could not be delegated to an administrative department, * * * by the General Assembly of Kentucky.”
We disagree. We think the “Point System” is constitutionally sound, and the contention to the contrary is wholly without substance, and must be rejected because we believe the administration of the traffic rules can lawfully be delegated to administrative officials. Our conclusion appears to be in accord with the decision reached by this Court in State Racing Commission v. Latonia Agricultural Association, 136 Ky. 173, 123 S.W. 681, 683, 25 L.R.A., N.S., 905, wherein the contention was made that the legislature could not constitutionally delegate to the Racing Commission the power to prescribe rules, regulations, and conditions under which running races would be conducted in this State. In the course of the opinion the court struck down the objections raised, and said:
“* * * Given that the subject is one for the legitimate exercise of the state‘s police power, thеn the means adopted by the Legislature, so long as it has an ascertainable relevancy to the object, is clearly within the scope of that power. Whether the end justifies the means is exclusively for the legislative discretion. Whether the means bear a pertinent and reasonable relation to the end may be looked into by the courts so far only as to determine the fact of pertinency and reasonableness. Only when the means adopted are manifestly unreasonable and oppressive, or bear no logical relation to the object of the legislation, are the courts at liberty to declare the act unconstitutional. * * * In all cases the Legislature selects the subject, and indicates the public policy with respect thereto. The subject is thereby brought within governmental control. Its free indulgence is deemed harmful. To so determine is the exclusive prerogative of legislation. The selection of the persons, places, and times, and the regulation of the conditions upon which it
is to be exercised, are matters of executive detail, which may be, and which are always, delegated to the ministerial body. * * *”
Later, in Craig v. O‘Rear, 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828, 831, this Court again considered the question of whether the legislature may confеr discretion upon certain boards and commissions to execute its laws, and therein the court resolved the query in this language:
“It is next insisted that the act is void as a delegation of the functions of the Legislature. It must not be overlooked that Legislatures are not continuous bodies. As a rule, they are in session for only a few days each year, or every two years, as is the case in Kentucky. Of necessity such bodies сannot undertake to determine all facts incident to the administration of the laws which they enact. Therefore when we say that the Legislature may not delegate its powers, we mean that it may not delegate the exercise of its discretion as to what the law shall be, but not that it may not confer discretion in the administration of the law itself. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154. The books are full of cases upholding the power of the Legislature to confer on boards, bureaus, and commissions the power to carry out the legislative will. * * * ”
It is further asserted that the regulations are invalid insofar as they attempt to provide for “mandatory suspension” of licenses when licensees accumulate twelve “penalty points” for moving traffic violations under the “Point System.” This view is predicated upon the language appearing in
“The depаrtment * * * may * * * immediately suspend the license of any person * * * ”
It is urged that the word “may,” limits the Department to issue “discretionary suspensions.”
The word “may” as used in
Appellee Beard claims that the “regulations” have been retrospectively applied by the Department in suspending his driver‘s license. The basis of his claim is that neither speeding, running red lights nor reckless driving were grounds for the suspension of his license when he was convicted of thosе offenses in 1954, 1955, and 1956, and therefore, the Department wrongfully considered those prior convictions in ordering the suspension of his license.
Beard‘s claim evaporates when the provisions of
We have concluded that the adoption of the “regulations” by the Department is a valid exercise of discretionary administrative power constitutionally delegated to the Department by the General Assembly.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, with directions to enter a judgment validating the “regulations” creating a “Point System” within the Department of Public Safety and sustaining the Department‘s order suspending appellee Beard‘s motor vehicle operator‘s license.
SIMS and BIRD, JJ., dissent.
SIMS, Judge (dissenting).
I find myself unable to agree with the majority opinion and will express my reasons therefor in this dissent.
It is provided in
At once it is apparent no yardstick is laid down to give the Department, which of necessity must act through its Director, a guide in determining when he has reason to believe a person is habitually reckless or has committed a serious traffic violation. This statute does not require a conviction before a license may be suspended as does
No provision is made in
Nor does
If there was ever a statute which violates § 2 of our Constitution, prohibiting arbitrary and absolute power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen, it is
The present Director of Public Safety has inaugurated what is known as a “point system,” wherein he arbitrarily lists the number of points he thinks a violation of various traffic regulations should carry and his system provides that where twelve such points accumulate against an operator within a three year period, the operator‘s license shall be suspended for six months. Thus, the Director in effect is legislating since
A careful reading of
To my mind, the Department and the Director were legislаting when it or he established the “point system.” But if one should conclude that the authority assumed in establishing the “point system” was exercised under
Much is said in briefs about the use of our public roads by an operator of a motor vehicle as being a privilege and not a right and the State may control this privilege by reasonable regulations. Admittedly this is the law in this jurisdiction. But I say let the State control the privilege through the General Assembly by constitutional legislation rather than have a Department or its Director assume such authority or to act
The Director is given no authority under
In the case before us, the Director instead of carrying out the legislаtive will is in effect and in form legislating on his own accord in inaugurating his “point system,” a thing the Legislature never had in mind when it enacted the various sections in
I have no quarrel with the “point system” and realize it is most important to strictly regulate motor traffic and to rid the highways of habitually reckless drivers or those who continuously and repeatedly violate traffic laws. But I say such authority is vested only in the Legislature and in enacting laws to this end, § 2 of our Constitution forbids it from placing arbitrary and absolute power in one department or in one man. It is to be hoped that the next General Assembly will enact its own “point system.” Our form of government does not permit the Department of Public Safety or its Director to substitute its or his appraisal of the punishment to be inflicted for a violation of law. Such punishment can only be inflicted by the General Assembly. No matter how lofty and noble are the plans of the Director, they must be founded upon a constitutional basis, rather than upon his own whims or even his benign judgment or wise discretion.
I am authorized to say Judge BIRD joins in this dissent.