Sturdevant v. PaulsenSturdevant v. Paulsen
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This interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity presents the legal issue of whether the Colorado State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education (“the Board”) is an “arm of the state” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the financial relationships between the state and the Board, as well as the Board’s degree of autonomy, but fundamentally comes down to the following question: Is the Board more like a political subdivision such as a local school district, or is it an alter ego of the state such as the governing board of a state university system? We conclude it is more akin to the latter, and reverse.
I
Plaintiff Katherine S. Sturdevant, a full-time history instructor at Pikes Peak Community College, asserts state law wrongful termination claims against the Board, as well as federal claims against other defendants that are not at issue in this interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Board asserted the defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity based on its claim that it is an alter ego or instrumentality of the State of Colorado. Adopting a magis
The Board controls and administers a “state board for community colleges and occupational education fund.”
Board powers and duties over the state system of community and technical colleges include, in part, constructing facilities and issuing “revenue bonds and other revenue obligations,”
In determining that the Board does not enjoy the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court concluded that it constitutes a political subdivision rather than an arm of the state. Specifically, the district court looked to the following factors: the Board’s status as a “body corporate,” its powers to raise and administer revenues, its “significant degree of autonomy,” the fact that its funds do not annually revert to the state, and, most importantly, a conclusion that although the state risk management fund would pay any judgment against the Board, “the state of Colorado would not be legally liable to pay a judgment against the Board.” (Appellant’s App. at 88-89.) Considering these factors de novo and in light of the fundamental purpose of Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the-state doctrine, we disagree.
II
We have appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. “States and state entities that claim to be ‘arms of the State’ may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
Ill
Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal law reviewed de novo. See Duke v. Grady Mun. Schs., 127 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir.1997). We give some deference to the rationale of state court decisions regarding the arm-of-the-state status of a particular entity, but do not regard them as dispositive. See id. at 978.
Eleventh Amendment immunity bars damages actions against a state in federal court, even by its own citizens, unless the state waives that immunity.
See
Our inquiry under the arm-of-the-state doctrine is well defined.
The issue here . . . turns on whether the [entity] is to be treated as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, or is instead to be treated as a municipal corporation or other political subdivision to which the Eleventh Amendment does not extend. The answer depends, at least in part, on the nature of the entity created by state law.
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 & n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997). In other words, the inquiry with regard to a particular entity is whether it is “more like a county or city than . . . like an arm of the state?” Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568. Although ultimately a matter of federal law, arm-of-the-state status must be determined in each case by reference to the particular state laws characterizing the entity. See Duke, 127 F.3d at 975, 978; Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 994 (10th Cir.1993) (en banc).
In Watson, we further elaborated on the Mt. Healthy test for arm-of-the-state status. To determine whether an entity is an arm of the state
we engage in two general inquiries. [T]he court first examines the degree of autonomy given to the agency, as determined by the characterization of the agency by state law and the extent of guidance and control exercised by the state. Second, the court examines the extent of financing the agency receives independent of the state treasury and its ability to provide for its own financing. The governmental entity is immune from suit if the money judgment sought is to be satisfied out of the state treasury.
Watson,
75 F.3d at 574-75 (internal quotations and citations omitted). With respect to the last and particularly important factor of state treasury liability, “[w]e interpret
Doe,
519 U.S. at 431, 117 S.Ct. 900, to require us to focus on legal liability for a judgment, rather than practical, or indirect, impact a judgment would have on a state’s treasury.”
Duke,
127 F.3d at 981. Although our consideration of the various enumerated factors requires consideration
A. Legal Liability for a Judgment
Because we held in
Duke, id.,
that state treasury liability strongly favors arm-of-the-state status, tve address that issue first. The Board claims that damages against it would be paid out of- the state risk management fund. This fund is authorized “[t]o pay liability claims and expenses related thereto, brought against the state, its officials, or its employees pursuant to the ‘Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’ . . . and claims against the state, its officials, or its employees arising under federal law.”
More importantly for purposes of the federal constitutional question, it is not at all clear that even if a risk management fund must pay a judgment, this obligation renders that judgment a judgment against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. “The key question is whether funds to satisfy a money judgment would come directly from the state, or indirectly through commingled state and local funds
or state indemnification provisions.” Sutton,
173 F.3d at 1233 (citing
Ambus,
995 F.2d at 996) (emphasis added). In answering this question, we focus on the legal incidence, not the practical effect, of the liability.
See Duke,
127 F.3d at 981.
Duke
held that indemnification by the New Mexico Public Schools Insurance Authority was not tantamount to legal liability upon the state of New Mexico.
See id.
at 980-82.
But cf. Watson,
75 F.3d at 575 .(holding, prior to
Doe,
that the Úniversity of Utah is an arm of the state in part because its participation in the Utah Risk Management Fund indicates that it would “appear that any judgment against the University might be satisfied, at least indirectly, from state resources”);
Graham v. State,
956 P.2d 556, 565 (Colo.1998) (en banc) (holding that a judgment against the University
Because its moneys are placed in a fund within the state treasury,
see
We need not resolve conclusively the questions of operation of the risk management fund and the state’s legal liability for a potential judgment. In Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1233, confronted with an analogous lack of clarity as to the legal liability for the judgment against a governmental defendant, we proceeded to resolve the question based on the remaining factors of the Mt. Healthy test, without definitively resolving the state law question of liability for the judgment: “It is not clear from Utah’s statutory scheme and case law how the State School for the Deaf and Blind satisfies money judgments against it. Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the State School for the Deaf and Blind is an ‘arm of the state’ entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at 1233 (footnote omitted). “[EJven after Hess and Doe, which emphasized the primacy of the impact on the state treasury as a factor in determining immunity, other factors remain relevant.” Duke, 127 F.3d at 978. We therefore turn to the other factors delineated in our arm-of-the-state case law. Concluding that these other factors decisively resolve the question in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity, we decline to address further the ambiguities attendant upon the question of legal liability for a judgment.
B. Factors of Autonomy and Financial Independence
Under the general rubrics of autonomy and financial independence, we have identified several other factors relevant to the arm-of-the-state determination:
(1) the characterization of the governmental unit under state law; (2) the guidance and control exercised by the state over the governmental unit; (3) the degree of state funding received; and (4) the governmental unit’s ability to issue bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf.
Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1232 (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. 568); cf. Duke, 127 F.3d at 978 (setting forth a substantially similar list of factors derived from Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44-46, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994)); Ambus, 995 F.2d at 994. We note that other circuits have considered additional factors in applying the Mt. Healthy test, including “whether the entity is concerned primarily with local as opposed to statewide problems.” Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Connick v. Hudson, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 498, 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999).
The Board is not explicitly defined by state statute as either an arm of the state or a political subdivision. It is defined as a “body corporate.”
By comparison, the school districts at issue in
Ambus,
995 F.2d at 995 (quoting
Sturdevant argues that
The Board is indisputably a kind of state-wide entity and absent from those provisions of Colorado law that define political subdivisions.
See, e.g.,
2. State Control
The district court surveyed the governing statutory provisions and concluded that the Board “operates with a significant degree of autonomy.” (Appellant’s App. at 88). Appellant vigorously contests this characterization. Our review of the Colorado statutory provisions confirms that although the Board enjoys a significant degree of autonomy, the extent of state control over its operations is greater than the district court indicated. For example, while the Board has the authority to fix tuition and fees,
see
Review of the case law suggests, in general, that despite the degree of supervision of the Board by the legislature and the CCHE, the district court is correct in concluding that the Board’s degree of autonomy is similar in some respects to that exercised by many local school boards held to be political subdivisions. For example, the court in Duke found that although the New Mexico State Board sets general public school policies and standards, “[ljocal school boards . . . have many other responsibilities and duties, which they perform without state control and supervision,” including supervision of schools (subject to regulation), property acquisition and sale, bond issuance, and employment decisions. Duke, 127 F.3d at 979. The Board’s authority to sue and be sued and its ability to own property are certainly indicia of autonomy analogous to those enjoyed by local school districts.
Nonetheless, these powers must be considered in light of the purpose, composition, and function of the state entity in question. Sturdevant’s arguments as to the degree to which the Board is free from direct state control by supervisory boards miss a fundamental point: The Board is itself the state’s instrumentality of control over local and regional educational institutions. We have previously noted that
Am-bus
(in which we concluded local school boards were political subdivisions) “gave significant weight to the fact that local school boards,
which consist of members who are locally elected,
exercise responsibilities free from state control,”
Sutton,
173 F.3d at 1232 (citing
Ambus,
995 F.2d at 996) (emphasis added), whereas in
Watson,
75 F.3d at 575, in finding arm-of-the-state status, we “placed emphasis on the fact that the University was controlled by a sixteen-member board of regents, fifteen of whom were appointed by the Governor,”
Sutton,
173 F.3d at 1233. Here, the Board
In addition, although both local districts and the Board are subject to some mixture of autonomy and oversight by state executive or legislative bodies, the Board is explicitly focused on state-wide rather than local concerns: The Board is “charged to develop and establish
state policy
for occupational education and to
govern the state system
of community colleges.”
3. Degree of State Funding and the Ability to Issue Bonds and Levy Taxes
The third and fourth factors identified in Sutton concern “the degree of state funding received . . . and . . . the governmental unit’s ability to issue bonds and levy taxes on its own behalf.” 173 F.3d at 1232 (citing Ambus, 995 F.2d at 994). While these factors overlap somewhat with the question of “whether a judgment against the [defendant] would be paid out of the state treasury,” id. at 1233 (citing Ambus, 995 F.2d at 996), as discussed above, uncertainty as to liability does not preclude consideration of other aspects of the financial relationship between state and entity, see id. at 1233 & n. 6, to‘provide guidance in applying our arm-of-the-state analysis.
a. Sources of Funding
A discrete fund within the state treasury — one that does not revert to the legislature annually — falls under the control of the Board.
See
b. Ability to Issue Bonds and Levy Taxes
Although the Board has the power, with certain limits, to issue bonds, unlike a county, city, or even school district, it most certainly lacks the power to levy taxes. The absence of this characteristic attribute of political subdivisions is a relevant distinction in the case law.
See, e.g., Mascheroni, 28 F.3d
at 1559 (holding that the arm-of-the state inquiry includes “whether the state has empowered the entity to raise bonds and levy taxes”) (citing
Jackson v. Hayakawa,
682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.1982));
see also Ambus,
995 F.2d at 996. We conclude, therefore, that the absence of taxing authority and the degree to which Colorado law provides that the Board’s issuance of bonds and setting of fees are to be carried out in accordance with legislative appropriations, which themselves are influenced by a budget reviewed by the CCHE,
see
C
Because of the open-ended nature of the arm-of-the-state analysis, it is easy to become caught up in the minutiae of state law, such as the extent of control over the Board by the executive and legislature, the details of the risk management fund’s operation, and the proportional sources of the Board’s funding. These details, however, must not eclipse a fundamental distinction that emerges from Mt. Healthy and the cases following it — between alter egos or instrumentalities of states on the one hand, and political subdivisions such as cities and counties on the other. Considering the various factors in context, the Board lacks a fundamental characteristic of a political subdivision-political control by some community other than the state as a whole.
Review of Tenth Circuit precedent in this area underscores the importance of this fundamental distinction. We have consistently held that state colleges and universities are arms of the state, whereas local school boards are political subdivisions, even if largely dependent on state funding and subject to state control. Kansas State University is an arm of the state,
see Innes v. Kansas State University (In re Innes),
184 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir.1999), ce
rt. denied,
— U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 1530, 146 L.Ed.2d 345 (2000); New Mexico municipal school boards are political subdivisions,
see Duke,
127 F.3d at 981-82; the University of Texas is an arm of the state,
see University of Texas at Austin v. Vratil,
96 F.3d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir.1996); the University of Utah and its associated medical center are arms of the state,
see Watson,
75 F.3d at 574-77; the Regents of the University of California constitute an arm of the state,
see Mascheroni,
28 F.3d at 1559; Utah school districts are political subdivisions,
see Am-bus,
995 F.2d at 997; the University of Oklahoma is an arm of the state,
see Seibert v. Oklahoma ex rel. University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center,
867 F.2d 591, 594 (10th Cir.1989); the University of Colorado is an arm of the state,
see Rozek v. Topolnicki,
865 F.2d 1154, 1158 (10th Cir.1989); the New Mexico School of Mines is an arm of the state,
see Korgich v. Regents of the New Mexico School of Mines,
582 F.2d 549, 551-52 (10th Cir.1978); and the Trustees of the State Colleges in Colorado is an arm of the state,
see Hamilton Manufacturing Co.,
356 F.2d at 601. Sturdevant has identified no significant respect in which the relationship of the community colleges to the State of Colorado differs from the relationships
IV
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Waiver was not addressed by the district court and Sturdevant does not argue that the State has waived the Board‘s immunity.
. II matters little whether the Board itself is a “state institution of higher education” under
. We have likewise consistently assumed that the state boards overseeing local school districts would be arms of the state. See, e.g., Ambus, 995 F.2d at 995-96 (contrasting local school boards and the Utah’ State Board of Education). The Board’s duties are remarkably similar to those of the Utah State Board of Education — general control and supervision of a state-wide school system composed of numerous local and regional institutions— as opposed to the local school boards we held to be political subdivisions. See id.