Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ROBIN STULL,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-574
v. Honorable Sally J. Berens UNKNOWN MCCALVEY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate order, the Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis . Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.6.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act , 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth , 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. , 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g. , Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t , 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood , 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”). [1]
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (JCF) in Jackson, Jackson County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following DRF staff in their individual and official capacities: Corrections Officer Unknown McCalvey, Corrections Supervisor Unknown Gregory, and Deputy Warden of Housing Unknown Garcia. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Plaintiff alleges that, on January 3, 2025, Plaintiff was assaulted by a prisoner who was on “non-bond status.” ( Id. , PageID.3.) Plaintiff claims that, where a prisoner accused of misconduct is denied “bond,” the prisoner must be confined to his cell pending the misconduct hearing. ( Id. ) [2] However, Plaintiff’s attacker had been allowed out of his cell for medication lines. ( Id. )
At the time that Plaintiff was attacked, Defendant McCalvey was the officer in control of prisoner movement ( id. ), and Defendant Gregory was the supervisor on duty ( id. , PageID.4). When Plaintiff asked Defendant Gregory “why the procedures for non-bond status were not being followed,” Defendant Gregory told Plaintiff that the Deputy Warden of Housing, Defendant Garcia, was in charge of enforcing prisoner discipline. ( Id. )
As a result of the events described in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights ( id. , PageID.5), and seeks declaratory and monetary relief ( id. , PageID.6).
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id . at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin , 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). For a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler , 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834); see also Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop v. Hackel , 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to plead facts that would plausibly suggest that each of the named Defendants were aware that the prisoner on “non-bond status” posed a substantial risk of serious harm in attending “med lines.” There is nothing to indicate that any named Defendant was aware that Plaintiff’s attacker, by attending med lines, posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff or even to other prisoners generally. Inmates may be placed on non-bond status for different reasons, including a threat to safety or security of others, a threat to property, or because of actions “so disruptive to normal prison operations that they required the charged prisoner to be confined separately . . .” MDOC Policy Directive 03.03.105.A.6. Nothing within Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that any of the named Defendants were aware that Plaintiff’s attacker, because of his prior misconduct, posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff such that it could be said that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff instead relies exclusively on Defendant Garcia’s alleged failure to follow MDOC Policy in confining prisoners on non-bond status. However, Plaintiff cannot bootstrap Defendants’ alleged violation of MDOC policy into a claim under Section 1983. Claims under Section 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of state law. Pyles v. Raisor , 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown , 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). To state an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that would plausibly suggest that the named Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. He has not. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore , 114 F.3d at 611. For the same reason the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States , 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: May 30, 2025 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge
[1] But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis ., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King , 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros .); Burton v. Schamp , 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
[2] According to MDOC policy, at the review of a misconduct charge, the reviewing officer “shall order a prisoner charged with a non-bondable misconduct to be confined in temporary segregation or, if temporary segregation is not available, on confinement pending the hearing except if the misconduct is for escape.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.03.105.R. (eff. Aug. 26, 2024). Plaintiff specifically refers to and relies upon the prisoner discipline policy directive terms and the prisoner discipline operating procedure in his complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–5.) The Court takes judicial notice of the MDOC policy directive in effect at the time of the events alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. The MDOC’s policy directives are a proper subject of judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). See Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R ., 306 F.3d 335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Administrative regulations fall within the category of facts ‘capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ ”); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Zantop Air Transp. Corp. , 394 F.2d 36, 40 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that “a [c]ourt may take judicial notice of the rules, regulations and orders of administrative agencies issued pursuant to their delegated authority”). “The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). Thus, the Court may take judicial notice even at this early juncture because the Court is permitted to take judicial notice sua sponte , Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1), and “the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The content of the policy directive at issue is not subject to reasonable dispute. MDOC policy directives are published by the MDOC on its publicly available government website. The Court notes that taking judicial notice of the policy language says nothing about whether Defendants complied with the policy.