7 Ga. 2 | Ga. | 1849
By the Court. —
delivering the opinion.
There are numerous points in this case, and, involving as they do the life or death of a fellow-creature, they are entitled to the most careful and patient examination.
It will be perceived, that Manuel Studstill cautiously abstained from announcing himself ready for trial on the merits of the indictment, but instead thereof, he pleaded a former acquittal in bar of the prosecution. No step was taken, therefore, in the main trial. All that was done was merely to remove an obstacle out of the way. After this, the case stood as though it had never been called. Concede, however, that the practice was irregular, has the defendant been prejudiced by it % He could not possibly have been injured, and he may have been benefited by the course pursued. The record shows that Manuel Studstill was iutroduc
Had Holliday been offered, during the progress of the trial, in support of the prosecution, we should hold that the Court erred in not allowing the motion — due diligence having been shown to procure the attendance of Spencer. But the presiding Judge certifies that Holliday was not, in fact, sworn. Consequently, the necessity for the presence of Spencer was obviated. Had the State agreed, in the first instance, to dispense with the testimony of Holliday, the application for postponement would have been unavailing. The failure to introduce him answers the same purpose. It cures the error.
The State offered Capt. Sanderson, to prove the acknowledgments of Mattox, the principal in the first degree, that he (Mattox) shot the gun when William Slaughter was killed. This testimony was objected to by the defendant, on the ground that Mattox was not upon his trial, and that he could not be criminated by the confessions of a third person. The evidence was received by the Court, and the prisoner excepted.
In order to avoid repetition, I have found it convenient to consolidate these two grounds. They depend on the same principle.
I would remark merely, in relation to one of the points,, that original documents,, such as bills, answers, declarations, de
As to the main question, that is, how far the record of the -conviction of Samuel Mattox, the principal in the first degree, and his confessions as to his own guilt are admissible, it is one not without difficulty. It is very desirable, if practicable, to define and apply some definite rule in such cases. It obviously will not do to hold, on the one hand, that as against the accessory and principal in the second degree, it is entirely res inter alios acta, and no proof whatever of the guilt of the principal; and that the whole question of the principal’s guilt is just as open as though there had been no previous trial. Neither, on the other hand, will it .do to maintain, that this record is conclusive evidence of the principal’s guilt. In the case of principal and surety in civil contracts, the doctrine is'now well settled, that a verdict and judgment against the former, is only prima facie evidence against the latter. It would be strange if, in criminal cases, the accessory or principal in the second degree, were not permitted to show that the offence alleged to have been committed did not amount to felony, or not that species of felony with which the principal was charged; as for example, -in the case before us, that the homicide was manslaughter and not murder; or, lastly, that the principal himself was manifestly innocent.
In South Carolina, in the State vs. Sims, (2 Bailey’s Ref. 20,) the Court held, that the record of the conviction of a slave before a Court of Magistrates and Freeholders, as principal in the felony, might be given in evidence on the trial of an indictment against a free white man as accessory before the fact, and that the confessions of the slave of his own guilt as principal, were admissible iq. evidence on the trial of a free white man as accessory before the fact.
Whether, under our Statute, which renders slaves testimony incompetent against a free white citizen, those propositions bo maintainable, we forbear to express any opinion. As between free white persons, however, the authorities all agree, and we think the position incontrovertible, that the record of the conviction of the principal is evidence against the accessory, subject to be rebutted by showing, satisfactorily, that the principal was not guilty; and if the prisoner may, in his defence, resort to parol testimony to establish that, notwithstanding the record, the crime was not, in fact, committed, or that his principal .was innocent, it follows, necessarily, that it may be offered on the part of the prosecution to show his guilt; and nothing can be better for this purpose than the free and voluntary confessions of the party.
All persons are considered by our Code capable of committing crime, who are neither idiot, lunatic, nor insane, and who have arrived at thejlage of fourteen years, and before that age, if they know the distinction between good and evil; and if capable of committing crime, they are liable to be convicted upon their own confession. We cannot, therefore, recognize the distinction which is sought to be ingrafted on the law. It would lead to endless metaphysical|discussions on the philosophy of the mind. Besides, experience teaches that, in point of fact, the cunning and crafty are. much more likely to conceal and misrepresent the truth, than those who are less gifted. It is the trite observation
Mrs. Bailey, a witness for the State, swore on the'trial, that she had never conversed with one Samuel Spencer on the subject of the murder. The defendant offered John J. Underwood to testify that, at the request of Spencer, he prepared an affidavit for Mrs. Bailey, which she qualified to, without alteration, for the purpose of attacking her credibility. The Court, as we think, very properly rejected this testimony. Fifty persons, who had seen and talked with Mrs. Bailey concerning the transaction, might, any one of them, have communicated to Spencer what she know or said about it, and thus have enabled him to have her oath drawn up, without any personal interview between deponent and himself.
If the charge as given, or as it is contended it should have been given, was applicable to tho facts as proven, it might, perhaps, be sufficient to say that it is no just cause of complaint that the instructions are too general, provided they are right. But the evidence shows that Mattox shot at the boy; negligence, therefore, has nothing to do with the matter. Nor can we sanction the position assumed by counsel, that, owing to the distance, it was improbable that the ball would reach its object; and that, consequently, the killing is reduced to involuntary manslaughter. Can he who takes deliberate aim at another with a rifle, and kills him, be said not to have intended it 1 "We think not. He might, it is true, suppose the chances to be against it; still he.puts forth all his skill to reach the mark, and he succeeds. It is enough, as tho act itself was unlawful, if the killing was the possible consequence of the act. To hold otherwise, would be to trifle with human life.
It-will be recollected that this witness was formerly the wife of Mattox, who perpetrated the deed. She would naturally, therefore, represent the transaction in the most favorable light. She does not remember whether the gun was fired with a rest; yet Manuel Studstill swears that it was. She knows nothing of their thrusting the pine-knot into the skull to conceal the bullet, while the unfortunate and unoffending b.oy was still alive — of the misrepresentation which they made to his miserable parents, as to the cause of his death — of the enmity existing between one of the parties and the elder Slaughter, the father of the boy, &c. But take the affair as narrated by her, and what is there to mitigate the offence from murder to manslaughter % It is not pretended to be voluntary manslaughter. It is insisted that it is at most but involuntary manslaughter. Let us investigate this point.
Involuntary manslaughter consists in the killing a human being, without any intention to do so, but in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner. It cannot, surely, be gravely argued, that to send a bullet wilfully into the brain of a peaceable youth, is a lawful act! I dismiss then, without comment, this branch of the definition. If it be involuntary manslaughter, at all, it was in the commission of an unlawful act. And the Code expressly declares, that where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, the offence shall he deemed and adjudged to he murder. Prince, 623.
We have reserved to the last the14th exception on the-record. Before any evidence was submitted, the defendant moved the Court to instruct the Jury to find a verdict of not guilty, on the following grounds:
1st. Because the indictment does not charge Samuel Mattox, the principal in the first- degree, as' being of the County of Lowndes.
2d. Because in the indictment, Sarnuel Mattox, the principal in the first degree, is no where directly charged with the offence of murder.
3d. Becatise it is no where charged in the indictment, that Samuel Matto-x and the defendant committed the crime jointly.
4th. Because there is a variance between the name of the foreman of the Grand Jury, in the inside and on the back of the bilí of indictment.
The 1st, 3d and 4th- of these grounds are easily disposed! of
The indictment, after charging Samuel Mattox with the murder, alleges that Jonathan Studstill, at the time and place of the murder, “ was feloniously, wilfully, unlawfully, and of his malice aforethought, present, aiding, helping, abetting, comforting, assisting and maintaining the said Samuel Mattox in the-
~We believe that this objection would be fatal at Common Law; for it is well settled by the standard writers on Criminal Law, that in addition to the description of the offence in the body of the indictment, there must be an express allegation in the conclusion, that the principal feloniously murdered the deceased — the word murder being considered a term of art which cannot be supplied by any other. Long’s case, 5 Coke, 245. 1 Chitty’s Crim. L. 239 to 244. 4, Black. Com. 306 to 309. 3 Bac. Abr. 554. Dyer, 304. No paraphrases or circumlocution whatsoever, says Hawkins, will supply these words of art, which the law has appropriated for the description of the offence ; - as murdravit in an indictment for murder; lepit in an indictment for larceny; mayhemiavit in an indictment for mayhem; felonice'm. an indictment for any felony whatever, &c. 2 Hawkins’ Pl. Cr. 224.
Indeed this doctrine is not controverted by the State’s counsel; but it is argued that while this is the rule in an indictment against the principal in the first degree, it does not obtain in an indictment against an accessory or principal in the second degree. No authority has been read in support of this distinction, and it would soem to us not warranted by principle. The precedents in Chitty and other works on Criminal Pleading, do not sustain it. See 3 Chitty’s Crim. L. 763, et passim. The indictment must be quashed, therefore, unless there be'some provision in the Penal Code which will save it.
The first section of the 14th division declares, that “ every indictment or accusation of the Grand Jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct, which states the offence in the terms and language of the Code, or so plainly that tho nature of the
This provision was obviously intended to sweep away all technical exceptions to indictments; and such is the character of the one under discussion. It is so denominated in the books. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Dias vs. The State, 7 Blackf. R. 20, call it a “ technical allegation.” And while, under the Common Law, they very properly hold that it is indispensable to the indictment, yet they use this language : “ The law is well settled, whether wisely or otherwise we need not stop to inquire, that such description of the offence in the body of the indictment is not sufficient in a charge of murder.”
Can we, then, give effect to our own Code, and sustain this objection! By reference to the definition of murder, it will be found that the offence is stated in the very terms and language of the Code. But were it otherwise, is it not stated so plainly that the nature of the offence charged may be easily understood by the Jury! After charging the defendant with the offence for which he is prosecuted, as is usual in the beginning of indictments, it proceeds : “ For that one Samuel Mattox, on the seventh day of September, in the year eighteen hundred and forty-three, with force and arms, in the County aforesaid, in and upon one William Slaughter, in the peace of the State then and there being, feloniously, unlawfully, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, then and there did make an assault; and that he, the said Samuel Mattox, a certain riflo gun, of the value of twenty dollars, the property of Manuel Studstill, then and there being found, the said rifle gun then and there being charged with gun powder and a leaden bullet, which rifle gun he, the said Samuel Mattox, in both hands then and there had and held at and against and upon him, the said William Slaughter, then and there feloniously, unlawfully, and of his malice aforethought, did discharge and shoot off; and that he, the said Samuel Mattox, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, out of the rifle gun aforesaid, so by him, the said Samuel Mattox as aforesaid, discharged and shot off, him, the said William Slaughter, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said William Slaughter, then and there feloniously, unlawfully, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike and wound, giving to the said William Slaughter, then and there, with the le'aden bullet aforesaid, out of the said rifle gun, so
„ And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say, that the said Manuel Studstill and the said Jonathan Studstill, on the said 7th day ofSej>tember, in the year aforesaid, in the County aforesaid, and State aforesaid, then andtherefeloniously, wilfully, and unlawfully, and of their malice aforethought, were present, aiding, helping, abetting, comforting, assisting and maintaining the said Samuel Mattox in the felony and murder aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, to do and commit,” &c.
Can any man of ordinary understanding listen to the reading of this indictment, and not comprehend rightly the nature of the offence charged 1 Not only would the Jury understand the crime of murder to be charged against Samuel Mattox, but it is apparent that no other offence could be intended; for it is alleged everywhere throughout the indictment, that tho killing was done with malice aforethought. And it is this ingredient which distinguishes this species of homicide from every other.
But the Code goes further, and prescribes the forth of every indictment or accusation. And in this statutory form the identical allegation is omitted — the leaving, out of which, it is insisted, is fatal to the indictment. After stating tho offence, together with the time and place of committing the same, with sufficient certainty, that is, in the terms and language of the Code, or so plainly that the offence charged may be easily understood by the Jury, the indictment concludes, “ contrary to the laws of said State, tho good order, peace and dignity thereof.” The complaint is that it does not, as at Common. Law, contain the repetition, “And-the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say, that the said Samuel Mattox and the said Manuel Studstill and Jonathan Stud-still, him, the said William Slaughter, in manner and form afore
And we are thoroughly persuaded that these admirable provisions of our Penal Code, like many portions of our Judiciary, have 'not received that liberal interpretation of which they are susceptible, and which was no doubt intended by their framers. The age is past for the civil and criminal justice of the country to be defeated by the absence or presence of one or more “ absque hoes,” “ then and theres,” “ videlieits,” &c. And for one, I rejoice to see edifices built, although they may be “ with the granite of Littleton, the cement of Coke, the trowel of Blackstone, and the masonic genius of a hundred Chief Justiciaries, and covered with the moss of many generations,” swaying beneath the sturdy blows so unsparingly applied by the hand of reform. Why should the spirit of progress which is abroad in the world, and which is heaving and agitating the public mind in respect to the arts, sciences, politics and religion, halt upon the vestibule of our temples of justice ? Why not penetrate, fearlessly,, the precincts of the Bar and the Bench, and remodel the principles and practice of the old Common Law, to accommodate it to the enlightenment of a rapidly advancing civilization? Our Courts should co-operate cordially with the Legislature in building up s. modernized jurisprudence, upon the broadest foundations.
And which, I would inquire, are Juries most likely to comprehend, the artificial pleadings of the Common Law, or the simplicity allowed by the Code ? The former is felt by all to be a restriction upon the attainment of justice; and has just the excrescence which the Assembly designed to lop off.
The Judiciary Act of 1799 intended, unquestionably, to abolish all distinction in actions, and to make every writ sufficiently technical, which contained a simple recital of the material facts necessary to a proper understanding of the case by the Jury. And the defendant’s answer was to be of the same character, confessing what was true, denying what was otherwise, and altering anything which required modification. And upon the declaration and answer thus inartificially drawn, the case was to' be submitted. But this wise and beneficent system, so creditable to our
Upon the whole matter, the Court is of opinion, and doth decide, that judgment on said indictment ought not to be arrested, which is ordered tobe certified to said Superior Court.