102 Ga. 782 | Ga. | 1898
Stevens was' a detective in the employment ■of the S., F. & W. Ry. Co. - One Corbett reported to him that certain-persons had agreed to break into one of the cars of the
The mere fact that a person has been charged with a criminal offense, and has, upon trial therefor, been acquitted, does not give him a right of action against the prosecutor. He must go further and prove that the prosecution was instituted with malice and without probable cause. Unless he shows this, his action must fail. However innocent he may have been, unless he was prosecuted with malice and without probable cause, he can not maintain his action. If he shows a total want of probable cause, malice will be inferred without proof. Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear to our minds that the court did not err in directing a verdict against the plaintiff. It seems to us that the evidence showed strong probable cause for the institution of the prosecution. Hitch was the representative of the company in all its legal business in the city of Way cross. The detective testified that he did not sue out the warrant until he had submitted the evidence to Hitch. Hitch testified that the witnesses brought before him testified in the criminal case and in the trial of this case to the same state of facts which they gave him when he authorized the warrant to be sued out. If the statements made to him were true, or if at the time he believed them to be true, he was, in our opinion, fully justified in authorizing the prosecution, although the jury did, in the trial of the criminal case, acquit Stuckey. If a prosecutor is informed by credible witnesses of the commission of an offense against the laws of the State, and institutes a prosecution on the faith of this information, he can not be mulcted in damages because of the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case. As said by this court in the case of Rigden v. Jordan & Stewart, 81 Ga. 668: “Under the laws of this State, it is not required of a prosecutor to be fully satisfied of the truth of the charge; nor is it required of him to guarantee a conviction upon the charge which he makes against the person accused; if he have probable cause for an arrest, he is authorized by law to have it made.”
It is argued in this case, however, that the fact that Stevens, employed by the company as a detective, after the issuance of
The plaintiff having utterly failed to show either malice or a want of probable cause, and the defendant having clearly shown that there was no malice and that there was probable cause for the prosecution, the court below did not commit error in directing the jury to find for the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.