In this mеdical malpractice suit, a jury found for Ernest C. Rose, M.D. (Defendant). Plaintiffs appeal, charging the trial court erred when it did not grant Plaintiffs’ requests for a mistrial based on defense , counsel’s allegedly prejudicial misconduct during voir dirе. We affirm.
Steven injured his left hand in February 1992 and surgical treatment was indicated. Defendant, an anesthesiologist, and John Hansmann (Hansmann), a certified registered nurse anesthetist, administered an axillary block to Steven, thereby providing local anesthesia to his left arm. Later, Plaintiffs sued Defendant andHansmann, alleging that they injured Steven through their negligence in administering the axillary block.
During voir dire by John Oliver (Oliver), Hansmann’s defense lawyer, the following occurred;
[MR. OLIVER] “Mr. Belz [Plaintiffs’ lаwyer] was introduced to you. He is from St. Louis. Mrs. Carroll, I know you indicated that you had a lawyer from St. Louis, but I know down here we got cable T.V. ads and St. Louis channels. Would any of you answer a T.V. ad for a St. Louis lawyer, go to a St. Louis lawyer just beсause they are on T.V.?
MR. BELZ: “Object. I would like to make a record and make an objection later.
THE COURT: “Sustained.”
MR. OLIVER: “Any of you ever go to Arizona оr Colorado for a doctor? Anybody? You will agree with me that we have got pretty good doctors right here. If you agree that we have pretty good doctors right here—
MR. BELZ: “Object.
THE COURT: “Sustained. I think you are getting off a little bit of the normal voir dire questions, Mr. Oliver.”
After voir dire, during an in-chamber jury selection conference, Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial because of Oliver’s comments. Plaintiffs claimed that his remarks prevented them from getting a fair trial. The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.
At thе end of the first day of trial, Plaintiffs dismissed their suit against Hansmann. When the case was finally submitted to the jury, it was only against Defendant. The jury found for Defendant and Plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs present three points on appeal. Each pоint complains of the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial because of Oliver’s comments during voir dire; consequently, we consider them together.
In urging reversal, Plaintiffs rely on DeLaporte v. Robey Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
Plaintiffs contend that application of these rules to this case mandatеs reversal. They argue that the sole purpose of Oliver’s remarks was to arouse prejudice against Plaintiffs, that his comments were not within the scope of legitimate argument, and that what Oliver said to the jury was so impropеr and prejudicial as to require reversal. Continuing, Plaintiffs characterize Oliver’s comments as being nothing more than an appeal to “local prejudice[,]” specifically “prejudices against lawyers from the big city, and against lawyers who advertise, and against clients who answer their adsi,]” and against plaintiffs who use “out of state doctors.” Plaintiffs also claim that the challenged comments demeaned their lawyer and were designed to makе the jury believe Plaintiffs “had to go a long way to find a greedy lawyer who was willing to take this questionable ease.” Finally, they argue that even if we find that no single point constitutes grounds for reversal, we should order a new trial due to the сumulative effect of both remarks. See DeLaporte,
Defendant responds by first arguing that the motion for mistrial was untimely; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion. We agree. A request for mistrial “comes too late where it is not requested at the time the objеction is made.” McMillin v. Union Elec. Co.,
“The rationale here is the same as where a party fails to make a timely objection to statements made by counsel or witnesses .... [A] party [cannot] wait to evaluate the impact of the evidence on the jury or delay for any other strategic reason, without giving a clear intention to waive or abandon the request. If the objection is not made at the time of the incident giving rise to the objection, the objectiоn may be deemed waived or abandoned .... Similarly, failure to make a timely request for further relief when an objection has been sustained may be deemed a waiver or abandonment....
“The request here for a mistrial was not mаde until the end of defendant’s closing argument. The motion was denied. The bench conference which took place when the objection was made was extended and did not appear rushed. There was suffi*238 cient oрportunity for the attorney to have made his request at the bench at that time. His failure to request a mistrial at the time of his objection may be deemed a waiver or abandonment of that remedy.” (citations omitted).
Id. at 355[6-7],
In this casе, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not ask for a bench conference nor did he seek a mistrial when Oliver made the objectionable remarks. Instead, he merely stated: “Object. I would like to make a record and make an objectiоn later.” It was not until after voir dire was completed, a recess was declared for a conference on jury selection, and the trial judge and lawyers were in chambers engaged in the jury selection process, thаt Plaintiffs’ counsel first sought remedial action. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiffs’ counsel was being rushed at the time he objected to Oliver’s comments or that other reasons existed to explain counsel’s failure to seek remedial action after his objections were sustained. To the contrary, it appears that counsel had ample opportunity to ask for remedial action at that time. By the end of voir dire, Plaintiffs may have become disenchanted with this jury and moved for mistrial as a matter of trial strategy, not because of perceived prejudice stemming from the objectionable statements. Under the circumstances, Plaintiffs’ failure to request a mistrial at the time of his objections may be deemed a waiver or abandonment of that remedy. McMillin,
We choose not to rest our conclusions solely on Plaintiffs’ failure to preserve the alleged trial court errors fоr our review. A gratuitous review of the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion for a mistrial.
In “the ‘rough and tumble’ tactics of trial, zealous counsel may overstep the bounds of propriety in argument,” but not every indiscretion should “automatically result in a mistrial.” Gilmore v. Union Constr. Co.,
Improper comments made to a jury may be cured, in given circumstances, by withdrawal, reprimand, or admonition, or by an instruction to the jury. Id. at 956 (citing Gilmore,
Here, the trial court may have concluded that Oliver’s remarks, although improper, did not warrant the drastic remedy of mistrial. Such a conclusion was warranted from the fact that the improper remarks came early in the case, were never again alluded to or restated, and any harm done was minimized by opposing counsel’s prompt objection. See Missey v. Kwan,
In reaching our conclusion we have not ignored the Missouri cases cited by Plaintiffs but we find they simply do not support their position. Thus, in DeLaporte,
Finally, Snell,
We have also considered Plaintiffs’ claim that because of the cumulative effect of Oliver’s remarks, the trial court should have ordered a new trial. We find that this claim also lacks merit. Certainly, a new triаl can be ordered due to cumulative error, even without deciding whether any single point would constitute grounds for reversal. See DeLaporte,
As stated earlier, in this case the trial court apparently believed that its sustention of Plaintiffs’ objections sufficiently cured any prejudice arising therefrom. We find no abuse of trial court discretion in making that decision. Plaintiffs’ points are denied.
The judgment is affirmed.