MEMORANDUM OPINION
This mаtter comes before the Court on the complaint to determine dischargeability
I.JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The Court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and General Rule 2.33(A) of thе United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)®.
II.FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The material facts of this matter are undisputed. The Debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition, schedules and statement of affairs on October 1, 1990. Although she listed various creditors on her schedules, she did not includе this Creditor. Her schedules also showed her employment by a subsequent bankrupt, Diversified Home Services, Inc. (“Diversified”). A Chapter 7 trustee was appointed, and notice of a meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 341 was sent out. The notice further indicated that the case was a “no asset case”, and instructed creditors not to file proofs of claim. It stated that creditors would receive subsequent notice if assets were later found upon which claims could be filed and dividends paid. The trustee filed a “no asset report” on December 19, 1990. Thereafter, a discharge order was subsequently entered on March 4, 1991. The case was closed on April 15, 1991.
Over a year later, in August 1992, the Debtor filed an application to reopen her bankruptcy case. The application disclosed that the Creditor was pursuing a claim against her in the Circuit Court of Sanga-mon County, Illinois. The Debtor asked to reopen the case solely to determine the dischargeability of the instant claim held by the Creditor. Over the Creditor’s objection, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350, the Court allowed the application in order to determine the dischargeability of the underlying claim.
Thе Creditor is the holder of the Debtor’s guarantee by which in 1989 she guaranteed payment of all charges due the Creditor resulting from credit extensions made by the Creditor to Diversified. The Debtor alleged and testified at trial that she had inadvertently omitted scheduling the Creditor’s claim under the guarantee because she was unaware of what she had admittedly signed. The Creditor principally defends on the ground that the underlying guarantee obligation owed by the Debtor did not arise until post-bankruptcy when judgment was entered against the Debtor in 1992. The Creditor argues that it was only after Diversified failеd to pay its debt that the Debtor’s liability accrued, thus resulting in the state court judgment against her totaling $31,996.00.
III.DISCUSSION
The ultimate issue in this matter is whether the Creditor’s unscheduled claim arising from the underlying guarantee in this no asset case has been discharged under 11 U.S.C §§ 524 and 727, or whether the claim and underlying debt are nondis-chargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). Resolution of this issue involves application of the instructive dicta from
In re Mendiola,
A minority of other courts permit case reopenings under 11 U.S.C. § 350 to allow amended schedules to be filed in the interest of completeness and accuracy, and because it also affords notice to the trustee who may subsequently find assets from which a dividend could be paid.
See In re Bilder,
The significance of
Mendiola
is in its extended discussion concerning the interplay between the discharge provisions under sections 524 and 727, and the operative text of the section 523(a)(3) exception to discharge. As analyzed in
Mendiola,
section 523(a)(3) does not end in the first paragraph of the text, but is limited by two sub-parts, (A) and (B). Sub-part (A) only protects a creditor’s right to file a proof of claim, nothing else, if the underlying debt is not of a kind specified in section 523(a)(2), (4) or (6). The right to file a proof of claim is only meaningful in an asset Chapter 7 because it is the creditor’s assertion of a right to participate in the distribution of assets of the estate.
The scope of sub-part (B) of section 523(a)(3) relates to claims based on underlying debts that would be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2) (claims arising from false pretenses, fraud, or use of false financial statements); section 523(a)(4) (defalcation by a fiduciary; embezzlement or larceny); and seсtion 523(a)(6) (willful and malicious injury). Sub-part (B) makes special provisions for these intentional tort claims which are subject to a strict time limit of sixty days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors within which a dischargeability complaint must be filed. Other exceptions to discharge are not sо time barred.
See
11 U.S.C. § 523(c); Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c). Creditors who have claims based on such intentional torts and who do not know about the bankruptcy case in time to file such complaints would be deprived of important rights to file such actions. Hence, Congress legislatеd the exclusions under
Mendiola
notes that there are three ways to litigate dischargeability after a case is closed: (1) if a creditor pursues a lawsuit on the claim, the debtor can assert the bankruptcy discharge as an affirmative defense and the court with jurisdiction over that lawsuit can determine the issue of dischargeability under section 523(a)(3); (2) under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(b) either the debtor or the creditor can move to reopen the bankruptcy case for the purpose of filing a complaint to determine discharge-ability; and (3) the debtor can bring an action in the bankruptcy court to enforce the discharge injunсtion against the creditor attempting to collect the discharged claim pursuant to section 524(a).
Some of the cases following
Mendi-ola
unfortunately tend to focus on the debtor’s state of mind with regard to the reasons why the claim was not scheduled prior to case closing. For example,
Tucker
notes that in a no assеt case intentional or reckless failure to schedule, or a fraudulent scheme, or intentional laches or other prejudice to the creditor should be considered.
The only remedy for intentional or other such omissions by debtors appears to be circumscribed within 11 U.S.C. § 727(d)(1). If a Chapter 7 debtor obtains a discharge through fraud and the party seeking to revoke the discharge did not know of the fraud until after the granting of such discharge, such party may seek revocation of the discharge within one year after such discharge is granted. 11 U.S.C. § 727(d) and (e)(1). As noted in
Bulbin,
the statutory scheme embodied in sectiоns 523(a)(3) and 727(d)(1) and (e)(1) does not violate due process or serve as an abuse of the congressional discretion.
The Court rejects the principal defense of the Creditor that its claim only arose post-petition. The Debtor’s pre-petition guarantee gave risе to a contingent claim as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) and buttressed by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A). Thus, at the time the petition was filed, the Creditor had a claim, even though not fixed or liquidated, as to any final balance due, even if the Creditor had never called on the Debtor pre-petition to honor the guarantee.
See In re Helen Gallagher Enterprises, Inc.,
The case authorities cited by the Creditor are inapposite and not controlling.
In re Eliscu,
Similarly, the other cases cited by the Creditor are inapposite because they involved application of the text of Section 17(a)(3) under the former Bankruptcy Act.
In re Davenport,
In re Swain,
The end result here is consistent with the operative text of sections 523(a)(3), 524 and 727. The Creditor’s claim against the Debtor has been discharged, and its subsequently obtained judgment against her is accordingly void under section 524(a)(1). Section 524(a)(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727. This result does not offend any constitutional due process concerns because both parties have had notice and an opportunity for hearing, followed by a trial on the merits on the underlying discharge-ability determination. Thus, the real essence of constitutional due process has been fulfilled.
In short, the Court is making the dis-chargeability determination nоw of a claim affected by the prior discharge order. This sequence of events which have occurred post-case closing is not the preferable route like that employed in most cases where the parties seek an earlier determination. The result, however, has not deprived the Creditor of its right to file a claim should assets be hereafter found in accord with the provisions of section 523(a)(3)(A), nor has it lost anything under section 523(a)(3)(B), as its underlying claim does not fit within any of the exceptions under section 523(a)(2), (4) or (6). For the Debtor’s omission in failing to timely schedule this claim and afford the Creditor the earlier notice her other creditors received, she has incurred and must bear the attendant court costs and attorney’s fees of maintaining this action. Such expense is a fair burden for her omissions, whether inadvertent or otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the fоregoing reasons, the Court finds the underlying claim of the Creditor has been discharged. The judgment subsequently rendered in favor of the Creditor against the Debtor by the Circuit Court of
This Opinion serves as findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.