387 S.E.2d 619 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1989
This appeal is from appellant’s conviction for operating a vehicle with defective equipment in violation of OCGA § 40-8-26. The evidence at trial showed that the turn signals on appellant’s vehicle were not operative and that it was struck from the rear while making a left turn which appellant had signaled by use of a hand signal.
According to appellant, there is a conflict between OCGA §§ 40-8-26 and 40-6-124 (b) in that the former requires the maintenance in good order of signal devices on all motor vehicles and the latter excuses from that requirement vehicles of a certain size. He concludes, then, that since his vehicle was excused by § 40-6-124 (b) from the requirement of being eqiupped with signal lamps, he could not justly be convicted of violating § 40-8-26. We find that argument unavailing for the simple reason that its basic premise, that there is a conflict between the statutes, is incorrect.
“ ‘Penal laws should be construed strictly, but they should not be so construed as to defeat the obvious intention of the General Assembly.’ [Cit.]” Gazaway v. State, 9 Ga. App. 194, 197 (70 SE 978) (1911). The obvious legislative intent of OCGA § 40-6-124 was to require that large vehicles use signal lamps to signal turns rather than using hand signals which might not be seen. Even construing the statute strictly against the State, we do not find it susceptible of the interpretation appellant has advanced. Limiting the use of hand signals in no way impacts on the requirement in OCGA § 40-8-26 that turn signals be maintained in working order. There being no conflict between the statutes, and the evidence demanding a finding that appellant operated his vehicle in violation of OCGA § 40-8-26, there was no error in finding appellant guilty. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed.