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Stuart v. State
801 P.2d 1216
Idaho
1990
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*1 801 P.2d 1216 STUART, Gene Francis

Petitioner-Appellant, Idaho, Respondent.

STATE

No. 17014.

Supreme of Idaho. 16, 1990.

Oct. Orofino, Kinney, petitioner-

Robert E. appellant. Jones, Gen., Thomas, Atty. Lynn E.

Jim Boise, respondent. (argued), Sol. Gen. DENIAL OF PETITION FOR ON REHEARING March Opinion No. issued hereby and this withdrawn therefor. is substituted *2 BAKES, Chief Justice. person who abused and misused women and children. The Matteonis’ affidavits al- appellant, Stuart, ap- Gene Francis leged experience that their with Stuart indi- peals the district court’s denial peti- of his gentle, cated that he was loving a and post tion for conviction relief. Stuart was caring person. Ms. Matteoni’s affidavit de- degree convicted of first by murder torture 1975-76, clared that in sepa- while she was three-year-old Miller, Robert committed husband, rated from her spent she consid- September on 1981. He was sentenced erable time with an informal rela- to death. His conviction and sentence were tionship. She stated that her appeal. young affirmed this Court on two direct Stuart, daughters spent See State also time with Stuart and (1985). June, 1986, P.2d 833 they Stuart filed extremely were fond of Stuart. petition post a conviction relief with the The affidavit further stated that Stuart petition district court. The claimed twelve cared for both of the children while Ms. separate grounds for relief. Matteoni against worked and that he was spanking discipline. children for She fur- In December of the district court “allegations ther states that the of abuse opinion rejecting petition issued an [against made Vicki Nelson have gave Stuart] Stuart notice that the court intended part by been related to me in Gene’s attor- petition pursuant to dismiss the to I.C. ney. my experience From with Gene opinion rejected 19-4906. The the vast Stuart, grounds signs he bulk of Stuart’s for relief because showed no whatsoever of any type those issues had been decided on direct of abusive me behavior toward or appeal, children, rehearing my no had been very much in contrast to the filed, they judicata. and thus were res testimony of Vicki Nelson as the same was The district court went find that Finally, related to me.” Ms. Matteoni ex- grounds, judica- three other while not res plains charges that she was unaware ta, legal any ques- did not raise issue or and trial and was therefore unable to come tions of fact which would entitle Stuart to testify forward and at that time. Ms. Mat- legal either relief. daughter teoni’s Katrina’s affidavit stated years age that she was 5 when Stuart reply Stuart filed a to the district court’s dating her mother. She stated that he notice of intent to dismiss which included them, punish took care of did not them and counsel, hospital affidavits greater willing testify that she was Simmons, employee Lynn David Matteoni to her detail recollections Stuart. daughter her Katrina. Each of these alleged four factual matters re- affidavits attorney filed an affidavit which Stuart’s lating pre- to evidence which had not been attempted to set out a foundation as to the viously presented and which felt precluded the Mat- circumstances which evidentiary was sufficient to warrant an during original testifying teonis from hearing. (1) proceeding. The affidavit indicated that Simmons, of David an ac- The affidavit investigative Stuart was denied sufficient Stuart, quaintance related that Stuart trial, (2) prior to due to assistance sought concerning him had advice from he was insufficient assistance unable discipline upbringing of the victim. until a considerable contact the Matteonis lay that Simmons’ The trial court concluded attorney’s the trial. The affida- time after he knew opinion given to whom attempts Lynn to contact vit described his newly dis- only casually, did not constitute “all to no avail.” The Matteoni which were require as would covered evidence such he final- goes point affidavit on to out that hearing. ly put in contact with Ms. Matteoni of 1986 and that he her mother October related. The The other affidavits were to contact Ms. Matteoni Janu- was able and her Lynn of Ms. Matteoni affidavits Additionally, Stuart’s attor- ary of 1987. contradict daughter purported Katrina forth certain back- ney’s affidavit set by the wit- testimony given at trial State’s allegation ground regarding Stuart’s as a facts portrayed nesses which judgment Pleadings plea bargaining negotiations that certain 19-4906. pleadings.— ... arbitrary. being resulted satisfied, (b) on the ba- When a court is considering response After Stuart’s mo- application, the answer or sis order, court’s December tion, record, applicant is that the *3 opinion a court issued second district post-conviction relief and not to entitled opinion again May of 1987. That reviewed by any served fur- purpose no would be grounds post for conviction two of Stuart’s may indicate to proceedings, ther first opinion relief covered in the and addi appli- parties its intention to dismiss newly tionally dealt the claim of dis doing. so its for cation and reasons out covered evidence set in the affidavits. given opportunity to applicant an shall opinion, In this second the district court reply days proposed 20 dis- within (1) preliminary hearing held that the use of light reply, or on de- missal. In testimony was lawful and thereof, may fault the court order that, therefore, allegation petitioner’s grant application dismissed or leave required legally insufficient and no application, or direct file an amended (2) hearing; was not proceedings that Stuart’s sentence that otherwise continue. manner; (3) Disposition pleadings on the and record and arbitrary imposed an a if exists material proper is not there allegation newly discovered that the fact. issue of proffered by the affidavits evidence was Drapeau appropriate not meet the standard set held it is did This Court has post State, (Ct. application dismiss for conviction 103 P.2d 546 an v. Idaho 651 evidentiary affording an relief without App.1982), in that it failed to raise sub statute, hearing, allega- if under this prob question of fact which would stantial uncontroverted, tions, though do not entitle sentence, change ably the conviction or State, applicant to relief. Clark hearing. requiring evidentiary thus an case, (1969). In P.2d 54 this Court, appealed to and on Stuart this memorandum deci- the district court’s two 10, 1989, opinion March we issued our af- complete In sions are and well reasoned. firming the denial of district court’s correctly opinion the district court the first petition post Stuart’s for conviction relief. substantially all of observed that Stuart’s peti- petitioned rehearing, for appeal, in the direct claims had been raised granted on June 1989. After tion was State v. briefing reargument, additional we (1985), judicata. thus res Of were not district court did err conclude that the remaining, those issues post denying petition for convic- they legally Stuart’s insufficient. found that were newly relief, claim Specifically regarding district court’s tion and affirm the evidence, stat- the district court discovered dismissing petition for judgment Stuart’s whole, new “[cjonsidered ed that as a this 10,1989, post relief. Our March conviction questions material evidence does raise withdrawn, opinion and this fact, against the especially when viewed substituted therefor. overwhelming evidence backdrop of sure, this produced at trial. To be evidence con- not have affected the probably re- sentence.” We have viction or the trial court’s In from the whether viewed the record to determine petition post conviction dismissal of material fact existed genuine question relief, argues trial court did we that the district court conclude dismissing petition his summarily erred petition for dismissing err Stuart’s evidentiary hearing conducting an without relief. We review each post conviction decision The district court’s on the issues. separately below. Stuart’s contentions petition evi dismiss Stuart’s without hearing was based on I.C. dentiary II 19-4906(b), which reads: § separate three argues district court

grounds existed for the grant hearing on his post formal contemplated by I.C. conviction grounds (A) 19-2516, relief. Those are may the court reach its sentenc- § the use of preliminary hearing by receiving decision the unsworn for- purposes (B) of sentencing; sides, mal presented by Stuart’s statements both rights claim that together were by plea presentence report violated with the bargaining negotiations; (C) arguments respective newly counsel.” dis covered evidence which district court was raised noted that Stuart did not make explicit request four affidavits submitted to for a formal the district hearing contemplated 19-2516, court. I.C. rehearing granted by and that Stuart himself rely Court on June Stuart raises for “intend[ed] on trial testimony argument, and was first time the issue of whether or not *4 demanding compliance strict there was with the proper weighing mitigat of the testimony formality live ing of I.C. 19-2516.” against circumstances ag each of the § We conclude that under v. gravating State Osborn required circumstances as in our Coutts, 4, 1989, prelimi- State v. the use of a April opinion in State v. Charbo nary hearing transcript neau, 129, the sentenc- (1989). 116 Idaho 774 P.2d 299 ing/ aggravation/mitigation hearing was We will deal with each of these in turn.

not error sentencing where no formal hear- ing provided in I.C. 19-2516 had been A. requested.1 Preliminary Hearing Testimony Use of B. argues Stuart the trial court by considering preliminary hearing erred Bargain Plea testimony sentencing hearing. at the This Next, Stuart has contended that issue was not raised Stuart in his direct State offered not to recommend the death Stuart, 163, appeal, 110 State v. Idaho 715 penalty if pleaded guilty Stuart to first (1985). Nonetheless, alleg P.2d 833 degree murder rejected torture. Stuart es that the error is “fundamental” and can According the offer. follows raised time. that, trial, by exercising right to a

The penalty imposed trial court this case considered the arbitrarily, death was testimony transcript from the pre- appellant’s rights and in violation of the liminary hearing, relying upon our decision under the fifth and fourteenth amendments 405, Osborn, Constitution, in State v. 102 Idaho 631 P.2d to the United States art. (1981), I, 13, upheld prelimi- 187 the use which 7 and of the Idaho Constitution. §§ contention, nary hearing testimony sentencing rejected in a The district court penalty pointing petitioner death case. The out that it was first Court Osborn who plead guilty manslaughter based its decision on our earlier decision offered to Coutts, 110, 113, rejected by v. 101 Idaho 609 was the State. The State which (1980), hand, State, P.2d 645 which held that “in on the other offered to with- explicit request request penalty for a death for a the absence of an for the draw the post ing contesting from our decision in Stuart I our 1. The trial court in its conviction decision claim, specifically stipulated pointing was at the sen- also denied Stuart’s statement tencing hearing that ”[i]t original sentencing out that in Stuart’s Court, direct to this that when the defen- Stuart, present- v. 110 Idaho dant the court would consider evidence 715 (1985), preliminary hearing along and trial this Court had held that ed at investigation report." stipulated sentencing hearing presentence at the with the was ”[i]t sentencing the defendant the court State v. 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at that when pre- presented We need not decide whether it is now too would consider evidence at the question post liminary hearing along pre- the trial court’s and trial with the late for Stuart to finding stipulated investigation report.” it was at the In Stuart conviction sentence sentencing hearing appeal, validity that the court could consider of Stuart’s death sen- direct Court, hearing. presented preliminary and no issue evidence tence was considered hearing prior regarding preliminary our decisions in State v. Osborn Under the use Coutts, sentencing proceeding and State v. the trial court did not err in in the hearing testimony. petition considering did file a for rehear- raised. Nor State, murder, him to relief. Estes v. plea degree first guilty Thus, (1986). analyzing a nego- rejected by Stuart. while 725 P.2d into, relief, arrangement post no conviction to deter- tiations were entered noted the required, ever made. trial court or not a mine whether 11(d) expressly in I.C.R. must provision which a district court the standard prosecuting attorney State, and the permits Cooper follow was set out “engage in (1975): defendant to discussions P.2d 1187 view charged ney for a (4) arrangement. is not bound to tions, cites no relevant trict court’s had been violated. We that there contention make will ... toward further noted that I.C.R. his constitutional particular offense ... it clear that the entering was no merit to the that, analysis make a recommendation ... reaching Thus, the court concluded accept any such *5 by sentence____” contrary authority. of a entering of I.C.R. right agree with the dis- plea prosecuting sentencing court agreement into 11(d)(2)and 11. Stuart petitioner’s a guilty to a negotia- attor- 96 Idaho new trial based added). dence were set out proceedings, or tion without the trial disproved by the ing. application are insufficient for the would not entitle When as a matter of relief when [1] 685, ... The 551 court 545, Allegations requirements for alleged holding an P.2d 972 upon 531 P.2d at may [2] law. in record newly State v. do not facts, dismiss applicant (1976), contained they evidentiary 1190 discovered evi- even if justify Drapeau, are obtaining where (emphasis original applica- clearly grant- relief, relief hear- true, 97 a Court, Wright, 2 Federal quoting from C. C. Criminal 557 Practice & Procedure: § New Evidence (1969), stated: Finally, argues newly discov- exacting Accordingly, rather standards evidence, him at the ered not available to developed by the courts for have been trial, has created a material issue time of A on of this kind. motion based motions affect the conviction of fact which would newly evidence must disclose discovered imposed him. The and/or the sentence on (1) newly discovered that the evidence was contained in the four new evidence defendant at the unknown to the and was above, affidavits, were summarized trial; (2) that the evidence time of reject- to the district court. submitted material, im- merely cumulative or court relied ing Stuart’s claim the district (3) probably pro- that it will peaching; State, Drapeau 103 Idaho v. (4) that failure to acquittal; duce an stating the rule as (Ct.App.1982), P.2d 546 lack evidence was due to no learn of the analyzing produc- “In the evidence follows: part of the defendant. diligence on the evidence, this ed trial with this new P.2d at 978. Based 97 Idaho at whether a substan- court must determine standard, the district foregoing upon the question tial of fact exists which claim denying in Stuart’s court did not err sentence, change probably the convictionor allegations upon his hearing to a based thus, hearing.” requiring evidentiary an set out in the newly evidence as discovered opinion goes on to re- The district court’s affidavits. in detail produced the evidence at trial view whole, that “as a this new evi- and holds affidavit Simmons questions of not raise material dence does indicated The Simmons affidavit affected fact ... and would have ... that, Miller killing of Robert before agree. or sentence.” We the conviction on a casual Simmons knew Stuart basis, They originally beginning in 1981. post petitioner in a conviction body shop conjunction met in with Stuart’s prov proceeding has the burden relief Orofino, Idaho, evidence, and later also business ing, by preponderance lived in a local cafe. Simmons entitle visited he contends allegations Orofino, as did Stuart. thought Simmons was em- his counsel the evidence ployed Hospital at the State North Orofi- might helpful. have been The trial court no. rejecting did not err in Stuart’s claim that the Simmons affidavit contained either Simmons stated his affidavit that in newly discovered evidence or evidence August early September, late less probably which would changed have than one month before killed Robert sentence, requiring conviction or thus an Miller, during one of their conversa- evidentiary hearing. As this Court stated Cafe, tions at the Lumbermen’s “Mr. Drapeau, requested my concerning advice dis- (1976),quoting Wright, P.2d 972 2 C. cipline Miller, upbringing Robert Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal young girlfriend child of Mr. Stuart’s (1969): residing.” whom he was Simmons further stated, having “Stuart indicated he was Although defendants are tireless seek- difficulty determining the extent to which ground newly new trials on the discipline young he could Robert Miller evidence, discovered motions on this inflicting physical without harm.” Sim- ground are not favored courts mons also indicated that Stuart had told great are viewed with caution. No court he, Stuart, him had been raised jail wishes a defendant to remain in if he extremely strict and stern father who used showing has discovered evidence that he physical alcohol and who inflicted abuse guilty, is not but after a man has had his Mr. Stuart and other members of his fami- court, tried, fairly day and has been ly- proper give there is a reluctance to him a refusing The trial court did not err in second trial. grant based the Simmons 97 Idaho at 551 P.2d at 978. The *6 The affidavit on its face shows affidavit. matters contained in Simmons’ affidavit therein that the evidence contained was not to the defendant at the were not “unknown newly discovered and that it could have trial,” that time of and the trial court found been obtained before trial with reasonable probably produce evidence would not diligence. party Stuart himself was change Ac- acquittal or the sentence. discussions, presumably was well these cordingly, allegations did not meet those and could aware of what Simmons said decision in Dra- the test of this Court’s he produced have that evidence at trial had did not err in peau, and the trial court thought it to to his case. Sim- be beneficial upon the affidavit denying a based town, in the same mons lived and worked supported of David Simmons Orofino, as the defendant and his counsel counsel. affidavit of Stuart’s they easily to them if and was accessible testimony been had felt his would have The Matteoni affidavits No show- either admissible or beneficial. Lynn from Mat The other affidavits of made in either the affidavit teenage daughter Katrina teoni and her or in affidavit Stuart’s counsel Simmons' Matteoni, by the affidavit of supplemented a witness. why he was not contacted as counsel, toward were directed Stuart’s he was in his affidavit that Simmons states at trial to show the Stuart’s efforts charged mur- aware that Stuart was or not an abuser of women that he was torture, death of arising from the der affidavits, executed their children. These Miller, request- and because no one Robert February concerned a relation of a witness he did ed his assistance as Matteoni, daughter her ship Lynn between from the serious come forward. Aside Katrina, years earlier and Stuart twelve lay opinions admissibility problem 1975, through period August, during the Stuart, all given by and advice Simmons December, and Stuart had 1976. Matteoni were known of those conversations place acquainted at their common in become personally participated since he Lynn Matteo At that time employment. all times them, was at and the witness separated ni and her children were testify had the defendant available to husband, girlfriends. On and her states that evidence of ex-wives and her affidavit during regularly stayed 1976 she is of the contrary, home, stayed at at her either Stuart’s he at sur- that of the evidence trial most they living home. After commenced to- acts commit- rounded the actual tortuous gether, employment Matteoni ceased where A suffi- by petitioner ted on the victim. employed and employed Stuart was became cient of this factual evidence review required her to work as bartender Supreme opinion, provided in the Court’s evening. late in until Matteoni’s affida- 165-167 110 Idaho at [715 pick up vit describes how Stuart her would 833], repetition not merit here. and does home, daughters parents’ at Matteoni’s victim, say a tod- Suffice it to that during taking care of who were them dler, very subject depraved, to some Lynn day, and take them home until Mat- demoralizing physical and brutal and got The teoni off work. older two mental abuses. Most of evidence years age children at the time was 5 or 6 upon the nature of the trial centered younger year old.2 approximately and the many injuries and the manner in victim’s Lynn stated that The affidavit of Matteoni This they were inflicted. evidence very strong children she her felt the main issues of torture and focused on Stuart, and no time did he bond toward causation. give her indication whatsoever that he girl- of ex-wives and anyone. would strike or harm She further in- friends was offered on issue of opposed spanking stated he children tent. The new evidence is offered spank and that “he me to allow testimony. cor- contradict state presence, children in his and often indi- rectly points out that the evidence at trial parent cated that if a had to resort petitioner’s pattern indicated spanking he or she lost control began complete he had abuse after Matteoni in her situation.” stated affidavit and domination of the woman or control they separated December children he was with. It evident that marry her because Stuart wanted to petitioner, although Matteonis lived with though she refused. She stated that even it was not under the same conditions physically she had been abused both Indeed, testified to at trial. control as mentally by her former husband she was presented to the evidence was bring unable to herself to commence di- *7 petitioner court that had at against proceedings her husband. vorce relationship least who one with woman She also stated that she was fearful that he Matteonis’ affida- did not abuse. The relationship change with her Stuart would to support vits even tend the state’s theo- they marry. stated her if were to She ry petitioner’s actions. reticence was not caused conduct on part of Stuart. opinion, in its As trial court noted concluding

In that the affida- petition- Matteoni all of the at trial was that evidence newly every vits did not contain discovered evi- he er abused woman with whom an probably produce ac- dence came There evidence of in contact. was sentence, change not, or the trial quittal others that he did and Matteonis’ court stated: experience only have with Stuart would cumulative of other evidence. As exception been this

Initially, court takes Drapeau, in 97 this Court held State v. petitioner’s conviction re- conclusion that (1976), evidence, totally from the testimonial sulted almost Matteoni, age her typed exe- than 17. That would have made of Katrina 2. The affidavit 21, 1987, acquaintanceship with defen- February she was time of her states that cuted variously years. years age, February dant and 6 in between 4'/> then 17 years August years age Since affidavit was executed after in of 1975 when her her 5‘A events, lapse young age dating of time began her defendant Stuart. mother first However, handwriting con- were factors for the court to in corrected relevant the affiant name, deciding weight given sider to be spelling of her in affidavit both as to age years, rather affidavit. also her corrected discovered, though newly Drapeau, even which is 97 Idaho 551 P.2d 972 merely impeaching, (1976). cumulative or is not justify granting sufficient to a new trial. above, For the reasons set out the trial The trial court’s conclusion that the infor- denying not err in a hear- court did affidavit, mation contained in the Matteoni newly evi- on his claim of discovered years which occurred five to six before the found, dence. As the trial court that evi- killing, required did not meet the standard cumulative of evidence at trial dence was probably producing acquittal, an is not probably produced an and would not have considering erroneous the entire record in sentencing, fur- acquittal change this case. ther, inadequate showing there Regarding the issue of whether the Mat- locating diligence due the Matteonis. “newly discov-

teoni affidavits constituted evidence, ered” the affidavit of Stuart’s III only counsel states that he was able to Lynn rehearing argues locate Matteoni as the result of an now On to me October letter “written time that the trial court erred the first Everson, Lynn Pearl the mother of Matteo- weighing mitigating circumstances ni, requesting that I contact her.” How- aggravating col against the circumstances ever, Lynn Matteoni states relying the affidavit of lectively, separately, rather than they during the time in 1975-76 when recent of this Court State v. decision periodically living together were at one an- Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299 homes, pick up my Stuart “would other’s (1989). held that I.C. In we Charboneau my parents’ home and girls after work at 19-2515(e) requires mitigating daily on a basis take them his weighed against house] [to circumstances must be got The affidavit demon- until off work.” separately, aggravating circumstance each acquainted with strates that Stuart against aggravating circumstances all parents the location of their Matteoni’s correctly recites collectively. While Stuart Nothing in in the Seattle area. residence Charboneau, we conclude holding our what, any, if ef- the affidavits describes case there was no that on the record Matteoni made to contact forts were mitigating/ag improper weighing of the effort de- through parents. her gravating circumstances. re- counsel’s affidavit scribed Stuart’s 4(G) findings, paragraph Lynn Matteoni was garding the location that: district court held address “personally went to an that he nothing mitiga- The court could find her the location of by us to be believed analyzing this defendant and in fact tion residence, was unable however [Matteoni’s] nega- mitigation produces a in search for telephone attempted I also locate her. defen- respect to this history tive contact, several futile *8 to no avail. After all dant. Seattle, presumed I that in efforts while paragraph 5 that The court concluded not or did not Lynn Matteoni either could find has indicated it could “as the court in the defense of this to assist us wish out- mitigation which would nothing in had been fact that Stuart case.” Given the circumstances weigh aggravating the regular on a parents’ home of to Matteoni’s the Since crime and this Mat- basis, that it was given the fact and defendant.” mitiga- “nothing in court found district Everson, mother, who ulti- Pearl teoni’s tion,” unlike the situation the case is counsel, there is mately contacted Stuart’s Charboneau, trial court found where the failure to showing that the inadequate an circumstances, improperly mitigating due to a lack was not the Matteonis contact cir- against aggravating weighed them the part of the defendant diligence on the of case there collectively. In this cumstances the names regarding advising his counsel process performed be- weighing was no the parents, Matteoni’s of and addresses “nothing in court found the trial & cause Practice Wright, 2 Federal C. Eversons. under Consequently no issue mitigation.” (1969); v. 557 Criminal Procedure: §

873 bargain. of The facts stated affidavit violation I.C. and no Ckarboneau attorney have been con- in this case. Stuart’s should 19-2515 has occurred of being of purpose true for the sidered as deny- of district court judgment peti- to determining whether dismiss the dismissing petition post ing 545, State, 542, 96 Cooper v. Idaho tion. is affirmed. conviction relief 1187, (1975). 531 P.2d 1190 McDEVITT, JJ., concur. BOYLE and view, my plea bargain a proposed In proposes not seek prosecutor a to JOHNSON, Justice, concurring and must be treated differ- penalty the death dissenting. plea bargain. ently proposed than other majority concerning concur with imposition the state seeks Where preliminary hearing testimony use penalty impose we the strict- death should concerning allegations sentencing to standard of review determine wheth- est newly evidence. dissent discovered rights has er the state violated the majority’s affirm the from the decision to impose a penalty Death cases defendant. portion trial court’s dismissal held duty on This court has special us. post petition in which he Stuart’s conviction that we must review death sentence to alleges that the state offered not recom- our “qualitatively different than review penalty plead if would mend the death he ordinary criminal sentence.” State degree guilty to first murder torture. 387, 380, 110 716 P.2d Scroggins, agrees majority with the trial court’s 1152, (1985). Justice O’Connor there was no merit to conclusion recently Court has Supreme United States that, by entering Stuart’s contention into pointed out: negotiations, right jury his constitutional to Amendment, Eighth the death Under the trial was violated. The for both rationale penalty differently from has been treated majority’s the trial court’s decision and the See, punishments. e.g., all other Califor accept is that Stuart did not Ramos, 992, 998-999, nia v. 463 U.S. plea bargain proposed and that the sentenc- 3451-3452, 9, n. n. 103 S.Ct. have court would not been bound (1983). Among most L.Ed.2d accept plea bargain any event. important in this and consistent themes view, my prosecutor when offered not penalty jurisprudence Court’s death penalty, im- seek death Stuart was special care and need deliberation permissibly forced to choose between exer- imposi may lead to the decisions cising right his constitutional to a tion of that sanction. The Court has proceeding the pros- accordingly unique imposed series ecutor’s recommendation that he not be procedural restrictions substantive and By choosing sentenced to death. to assert designed capital punish to ensure that right, penal- his constitutional Stuart was imposed ment is not without serious prosecutor ized when the recommended ought precede and calm reflection penalty following his death conviction. gravity finality. any decision such support In his affidavit in of Stuart’s Oklahoma, Thompson v. 487 U.S. post conviction review Stuart’s 108 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d attorney stated that on several occasions (1988). While these cases did not address re- prosecutor offered withdraw his *9 penalty rights jury to death defendant’s quest imposition penalty the if death law, process trial and to due we should agree plead guilty to a Stuart would to apply degree special same care degree by torture. charge of first murder determining rights have whether those prosecutor In response his unverified been violated. stated that to the best of his recollection Jackson, In v. 390 U.S. United States this offer was never made. Because it was 570, 1209, (1968), form, 88 20 re- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 138 not verified or affidavit Supreme struck death sponse allegation of Court down the did not controvert the provision Kidnaping concerning proposed plea penalty of the Federal petition 874 penalty

Act because death could need be to research the Statute. had not imposed only if the defendant exercised the prior finding Transcript done that to —.” right jury 973, to trial (the and was convicted. It at v. 14865 No. imposed could not be if the defendant appeal). prosecutor subsequent- direct right jury pled waived the to trial or guilty. ly request filed a notice intent to The Court stated: sought penalty penalty death the death sentencing. power Congress the time of

Whatever to im- pose penalty a death for violation of the I would reverse the trial court’s dismis- Act, Kidnaping Congress Federal cannot post sal of the conviction as impose penalty such a in a manner that allegation relates to prior to the trial needlessly penalizes the assertion of a prosecutor offered to seek the not right. constitutional plead if penalty guilty death Stuart would 583, 1217, 390 88 U.S. S.Ct. at 20 L.Ed.2d degree to first murder I would torture. at 147. hold that if the trial were to allegation convinced after a on this involving

In a later case not the death prosecutor that the had in fact made such penalty apply the Court to declined Jack- offer, an trial have son to invalidate a court should resen- penalty more severe considering any tenced imposed because the Stuart without rec- defendant chose to doing prosecutor of the jury have a trial. In so the ommendation the im- Court pressures forgo position “the death penalty. said that to trial and of the plead charge to to the are not ... what penalty death Where the issue the they were Jackson.” Corbitt v. New prosecutor agent state as of the should 212, 217, 492, 495, 439 U.S. 99 Jersey, S.Ct. penalize be allowed the defendant (1978). 466 The Court L.Ed.2d focused having recommending death after forced penalty that “the the fact death ... defendant choose between the exer- ‘unique severity irrevocability,’ in its right cise jury of the to a trial and the 153, 187, Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. opportunity go to with the 2909, 2931, (1976).” S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 859 prosecutor of the for life recommendation Id. imprisonment. prosecutor To allow the 357, Hayes, Bordenkircher v. 434 U.S. rights do so would violate defendant’s (1978), 98 S.Ct. 54 L.Ed.2d 604 under both the federal and state constitu- process Court held that the due clause of jury process tions to trial and to due of law the fourteenth was not amendment violated deprived being before of his life. prosecutor when out a carried threat Justice, during BISTLINE, dissenting. plea negotiations to have made reindicted more accused serious appeal, I refers to Stuart’s direct if charges, plead guilty he did opinions S.Ct. No. 14865. Court originally offense which he was found at Stuart I ave charged. penalty The death was not in- II, P.2d 833. S.Ct. No. re- volved in Bordenkircher. Jackson of this opinions fers to the March 1989 pen- if the convince me that death Corbitt the district Court on Stuart’s alty been involved in Bordenkircher post court’s relief. denial conviction would have that the actions held However, opinion was the March 1989 with- prosecutor did violate the defen- drawn, opinion was also is- a March process. and due rights dant’s withdrawn, sued and and now October apply principle to this case. opin- II stands the Stuart majority. Opinion No. filed Following the this case the ion for the verdict in 10, 1989, at 89 requested March can be found ISCR prosecutor trial court to ad- 245; Opinion No. filed March court whether would seek the vise the he *10 at 90 In both sentencing. of can be found ISCR 375. penalty death at the time II, rehearings Stuart were judge: “I antic- Stuart and prosecutor told the granted, case your requested and the rear- possibility, Honor. and ipate that as a supporting brief was counsel. A in a first Stuart’s gued, and each the Court issued raised five is- filed. The brief opinion. and thereafter second sues, issue which the variance one of the Court abundantly It clear that is now set for out just mentioned. Counsel saga its of will issue final portion the Amended Infor- charging the of Stuart, mur- Idaho’s first torture State alleges: It mation. affairs, being the of der case. Such state Orofino, Stuart of That Gene Francis the benefit prologue written Idaho, Sep- of day the 19th on about brethren, respected as an aid for my of Orofino, County in of the tember system in federal who will judges those the Clearwater, Idaho, then and State of preside endeavors at obtain- over Stuart’s being, and there unlawful- there did then ing just courts a more treatment in those being, kill a ly feloniously human My in system. than dealt him this application the tor- intentional purpose of comments are offered the of being, to wit: that to said human ture counterparts to better enabling our federal Stuart did strike the said Gene Francis way through many pages the of wind their Miller, being, a human record, and hit Robert transcript, and briefs. Added to intent cause repeatedly with the opinions written on the direct are the suf- incli- (Stuart I), satisfy or to some sadistic fering on denial of now Stuart, (Stuart II). of the said Gene Francis post-conviction relief nation bodily injury thereby inflicting great THE AND VARIANCE mortally upon wound- Robert Miller PROCEDURAL DEFAULT Miller, ing Robert which wounds Miller, year the Robert three old said in My opinion I called the atten- County in boy, died the of sickened and of tion of the other four members Clearwater, Idaho, State of 19th highly prejudicial error Court to day September 1981. of Unquestionably trial court’s instructions. contrary All of which is to Section 18- is a variance between the there fatal 4001, 18-4003 of the Idaho Code. charge of Amended Information and jury: to the the trial court’s instruction R., 14-15, (Stuart I), S.Ct. No. 14865 charged (emphasis added). with the fa- The defendant was Amended Information striking boy giving tal with the intent to no objection made Counsel pain, inflict or with the intent to Jury extreme in the exact Instruction satisfy charge spelled some sadistic inclination language of the out defendant, but the court instructed the Information: Amended jury that ‘It also be torture to shall INSTRUCTION NO. being on a human extreme and inflict irrespective prolonged brutality acts of Jury, you Ladies Gentlemen proof suffering’— intent to cause are of Idaho has instructed that State 18-4001, is found in language which against a criminal information filed wholly included but which was Stuart, defendant, charg- Francis Gene charge defendant was ing Degree alleg- him with First Murder put to trial. was committed as crime State v. follows: (1985)(Bistline, dissenting) J. Orofino, That Gene Francis Stuart of (emphasis original). justices Those day Sep- Idaho on or about the 19th least aroused majority were not 1981, Orofino, tember, County variance, which can being alerted to Clearwater, Idaho, then and read I wrote and they mean that what being, there did then and there unlawful- it, or, ignored they did not bother to read it. feloniously being, kill a ly human response. no For certain there was application of torture with the intentional being, human to wit: that said opinions issued in said were did strike and hit rehearing filed Gene Francis Stuart *11 Miller,

Robert a being, human repeatedly ly caused his primary issue, death. The with the intent to suffering cause or to considered both at trial and on Appeal, satisfy some sadistic inclination of Appellant’s actions, not but his state Stuart, thereby said Gene Francis inflict- September 19, 1981, of mind on day ing great bodily injury upon Robert Mil- acts these were As committed. the Trial ler, mortally wounding Robert Mil- pages Court indicated on 449-450 of the ler, from which wounds the said Robert Transcript, quoted Trial by this Miller, year a boy, three old 3, 1985, sickened and in May its Opinion at County Clearwater, died in the of pages 11-12: Idaho, of day September, on 19th of particular COURT this ... ‘[THE In] 1981. case, the Prosecutor must convince charge, defendant, To this Gene your the trier client was of fact Francis plead guilty. has not engaged in a course torture. And of R., 53, death, However, produced I. this child’s the district neces- gave sarily jury intending only another death but instruction in- language tending charge case, inconsistent torture And so with the of ... great extent, going to a Amended Information: is to turn jury going what thinks was on in INSTRUCTION NO. 18 your during client’s mind that interval ’ when he dealt with this child ... killing

Murder is unlawful of a being above, human aforethought parties malice As noted all were or the application question intentional charge of torture aware could being, to a supported human results by showing a in- of being. death of human part is on the Appellant Torture tent of to cause intentional infliction pro- suffering of or satisfy extreme to some sadistic in- longed pain Indeed, with the intent to cause suf- clination. this element of intent fering. It shall also be torture to in- was considered the Trial Court to be important being a human so admittedly extreme and that it allowed flict prolonged brutality irrespective prejudicial presented acts evidence to be of proof concerning events, intent to suffering. cause Trial unrelated to the of of charged victim, The death being human crime caused to its and which such allegedly (10) torture is murder irrespective of occurred as distant as ten proof prior specific kill; years intent to torture the date of ROBERT MIL- causing equiv- Jury shall death. death be deemed the LER’S Instruction Number alent of any necessity intent kill. which obviated a finding intent suffering, to cause R., 55, (emphasis added). Stuart I Counsel if extreme and prolonged acts brutali- aptly wrote: existed, ty were have ex- found Bistline, As noted Justice this In- tremely improper given specific lan- struction jury relieved the re- guage Amended Information. It sponsibility proof to find intent that, equally apparent if such intent suffering. cause permitted It also proven, propriety need not be al- finding guilt if found extreme lowing admittedly prejudicial evidence prolonged acts of brutality have intent, purposes establishing existed, despite the fact that such acts seriously questioned. If intent to cause charged were Infor- Amended suffering need proven, not be it cannot mation, supported by any nor reasonable probative be said value of this construction events which oc- outweighed highly preju- evidence its September Appellant curred dicial effect. that, readily acknowledged at September young poked Appellant’s Support he Memorandum in of Pe- chest, spanked (filed Rehearing ROBERT MILLER in the tition 3-5 him, 1985) added). July (emphasis and struck the blow which ultimate-

877 said, pen- ‘Death legislature has it. The rehearing granted limited to A but different,’ whatever Jury alty cases are giving error in the the issue of nothing / reason, finality if else. on the appropriate 18. An order was Instruction your perceive really accept Iwhat don’t a brief directing entered the State to file be, apply argument to we are brief, to that responsive only but to Stuart’s penal- a procedural rule in death issue, default single allowed to file and Stuart was appellant ty for the because counsel case brief. reply a point in the initial did not raise Thomas, General, Lynn E. The Solicitor briefing has raised on it but brief, five page the State’s authored I you why tell me shouldn’t it Now now. “pro- gist which was that Stuart was way, Mr. Thomas. think that cedural default:” Well, in context of MR. THOMAS: question The failure to raise constitution, if I can start the federal procedural appeal default there, Supreme States the United here, precludes raising issue times emphasized several seems to have proceedings, Wat post-conviction procedural as rules are as far State, 101 v. kins concerned, any difference it doesn’t make courts, (1980), the federal or capital is a case whether the case Sykes, Wainwright v. 433 U.S. important It’s kind of case. another (1977). 97 S.Ct. 2497 L.Ed.2d right have the to enforce its the state to Respondent Response to Peti: Brief of Otherwise, these cases procedural rules. (filed Rehearing tion for in Stuart procedural go can on forever. From a 21, 1985). argument, “pro At oral October point view there isn’t difference again urged to default” was cedural capital another between a case and Supreme ran into an obstacle in Court but capital legislature, kind case. Shepard: person of Justice .the cases, to review the has asked the Court So, I think the Court [MR. THOMAS]: sentence, procedural nice- but not a defaulted should consider this be aspects procedural of the case ties or the claim. brought raising appeal an is those unless Thomas, let JUSTICE SHEPARD: Mr. questions specifically. I don’t the believe say you I don’t to believe me this. want legislation procedural dis- creates it, arguing give I that I’m but want pro- to create a tinction or was intended moment, you my impression at the capital cases cedural distinction between you I’m you then either comment if think just It is kinds of cases. other go I wrong, ignore what said or insist that important capital in a case to point, your next which I assume precluded from interminable liti- one be you’re do. to me that about to It seems thought up after the gation of new ideas legislature its wisdom or lack adversely down decision comes Court, to this ‘Thou thereof has said say, is As I there a real defendant. if case, penalty shalt review death reliability re- question about appeal there be an or not’ whether sult, finding accuracy Right? innocence, problem may guilt or sentence is MR. THOMAS: death addressed, Wainwright under even whether this to be reviewed proce- under this Sykes and even Court’s not, questions. rule, but not other dural rules. The fundamental error example, permit that even if it legislature SHEPARD: The JUSTICE procedural Court, But the rules will examine were defaulted. to this ‘You has said relitigation claims that prevent do imposition of a death sentence and reliability doubt on the proportionate do not cast whether it determine to us that is as it cases.’ result and seems imposed in other sentences other Otherwise, capital will expect be. cases certainly don’t should Something that we it, on forever when counsel they if did we’d be carried to do and trial courts theory doing comes forward with another say they in error in probably were wasn’t might used at trial but be success- says defendant appeal. don’t want an ful this Allowing time around. that kind executed, want to be Gary such as Gil- *13 undermining of finality of these more did. The Court isn’t off the hook cases seems to only possible me as one review, terms of sentence but it isn’t result, and that is public to undermine entitled in those go circumstances to into confidence in ability of the courts to procedural evidentiary aspects So, enforce the law. legal both from a the trial. policy perspective, and a I think it would you’re JUSTICE BISTLINE: cor- If abe bad idea. rect, why require, then would we Thomas, JUSTICE BISTLINE: Mr. require, assuming we do ap- there’s no would I your understand from response himself, peal by the defendant why do we Shepard’s to Justice question is that if require transcript proceed- trial defendant, we had a like sometimes as ings? not, Creech is and sometimes as he is Well, transcript MR. THOMAS: says ‘okay, convicted, I’ve been I don’t proceedings lays facts, the trial out the appeal,’ want an we still have to do the gives background the factual mandatory bit under legislative di- crime. It tells all the relating details rection. We have to do our review. And the crime important and that’s an con- if lawyer Creech did not have a and we passing sideration in sentence because doing review, were our you saying are is, course, the nature of the offense a not, that we reviewing would besides capital aggravat- consideration under the sentence, look to ascertain to see that ing factors that aggra- are set out in the he impartial had a trial? fair vating list the statute. In fact that’s yes, MR. absolutely, THOMAS: Oh premise aggra- the fundamental of those Your Honor. Sentence review is sen- factors, vating how the crime was com- capital tence review in the context of mitted and culpability the defendant’s cases. The Court is to determine wheth- the crime. er, assuming finding guilt that the you JUSTICE BISTLINE: So accurate, the sentence prop- of death was effect, say, in that when we have an iner the facts and circumstances of the appeal in a ease where the death sen- case. But I don’t believe that was an imposed, tence has any been mem- go invitation proce- Court to into ber of the Court—and there is counsel questions ques- dural or other kinds of defendant, making for the and we’re relating admissibility tions of evi- mandatory review—that member of impact dence of whatever that do not impose particu- the court’s Court who concerns himself with a decision to a question lar sentence. as to fairness of the trial brought up by that hasn’t been the de- JUSTICE BISTLINE: I’m not sure I just being fendant himself is sort of an you understand. Are saying that we intermeddler, busybody? my- a Such as would or would not search the record self. proceedings of the trial to see if had had a trial? that, MR. defendant fair THOMAS: Not Your MR. THOMAS: It think that’s correct. Honor, you saying but I think are ‘and I think that the automatic review— said, finally, forget what I have because

JUSTICE BISTLINE: What's correct? going this case is over to the federal That we would or would not? they’ll any- court and make the decision way.’ really you Because that’s what do

MR. THOMAS: You would not have you when don’t insist on adherence to the authority go beyond sentence re- procedural state’s rules. And I only thing specified don’t view which is the idea, good really think that’s a because automatic review in the context of the you’ve got on collateral capital case. It’s almost inconceivable review a feder- going that there’s not to be an al court is at least twice removed case, capital let us assume the the facts. The record becomes more at- a fair and a trial The chance of factual error defendants tenuated. greater and obvi- the defendants that due greater jury, becomes and denies ously finality guaranteed by interest is attenuated 14th process law as well. United States Consti- Amendment tution.’ 231-33, I, 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at (Bistline, (some dissenting) J. 901-03 em- Cole, S.Ct. at 516. 333 U.S. added). phasis original; emphasis some Here, majority has of this Court decid- justices majority who comprised ed not consider the merits Stuart’s upheld both the conviction and *14 Stuart Jury 18 Instruction varied contention by part in on the relying the death sentence substantially Amended Informa- with the They procedural talisman of default. have also majority tion. The must have decided grips come yet therefore to to with the important message to the not consider by error egregious most committed the tri- Supreme sent to the United States Court error may al court. The have been unin- state courts back in 1948: supreme however, considered, tentional; all things it process principle procedural No due likely Simply more than was intentional. clearly is established than that no- more put, at end of a week trial three specific charge, tice and a chance jury court’s to included an instructions to be in a trial the issues raised heard ground alternate which had conviction desired, by charge, among if are pleaded been in the Amended Informa- rights every in constitutional accused tion. courts, proceeding a in all state criminal granted rehearing a This Court after the federal____ It a is as much violation I opinion specifically Stuart issued to to to process due send accused given Jury address the issue Instruction prison following charge of a conviction rehearing, 18. After the the Court stood on which he was never tried as would might opinion. on its old Whatever have upon charge him convict that was majority been the mind of the still never made. there, majority because the addressed noth- rehearing.3 on 201, Cole, (cita- 333 U.S. 68 S.Ct. 517 omitted); quoted approval tions The majority’s treatment of the Stuart Smith, 891, 117 Idaho 792 P.2d 916 State v. rehearing is similar to the treatment af- (1990) (Bistline, specially concurring). J. petitioners by forded the the Arkansas Su- Arkansas, preme Court Cole State of 196, 514, 333 U.S. 68 S.Ct. 92 L.Ed. 644 FAILURE TO AND INSTRUCT OBJECT

(1948). Cole, supreme the state court suggested procedural As above default petitioners’ had affirmed the convictions occupied major- must have the minds invoking charge not included infor- I, ity deciding Stuart because that mation. The defendants were tried Cole challenge jury how initial Stuart’s violating and convicted of state § summarily instructions was treated: supreme upheld their convictions un- appellant’s accept- counsel 1 note that der of Act 193 the 1943 Arkansas [W]e court, error, legislature. compound given by ed To the instructions as objection state he court: and noted that had no to the give. instructions the court intended to petition rehearing in later denied a Thus, failing error instruct ‘To sustain a petitioners argued: offense], charge included grounds charged in lesser conviction on [of exists, if one invited jury had no indeed error information which the deprives appeal. not be opportunity pass upon, will considered counsel, majority opinion adhere to views and continues to full text following rehearing "A expressed issued is this: reached in the conclusion granted rehearing I, in this matter was and the opinion." Stuart 110Idaho at 715 earlier reargued. cause has reviewed the P.2d at 897. arguments presented record and considered the Lopez, State v. 100 Idaho Supreme P.2d Idaho Court. The outrage which (1979). experienced he in Deshazer had to do with litigation civil which had protracted been 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at 840. over seven and years. one-half The relief however, Lopez, my discussed in Deshazer sought injuries was for to his opinion, under the section titled arm. Shepard Justice closed his INSTRUCT,” “FAILURE TO 110 Idaho at that case remarking that “this case 188, 715 P.2d at 858. See also State v. great demonstrates the truth contained Eisele, 695 P.2d statement, simple ‘justice delayed is (1985)(“I.C.R. 30 as amended does not ” justice Deshazer, denied.’ 93 Idaho at preclude assignment of error in instructing 274, 460 P.2d at (Shepard, J. dissent- where the defendant in a criminal case fails ing). object in question.”). instructions is not a civil case. The Moreover, stakes at instructing in lesser in- issue here are higher somewhat than in cluded offenses is not discretionary with Here, Deshazer. the statement Justice court, where the evidence would rea- Shepard referred to in *15 may Deshazer sonably support such a conviction on a worded thusly: injustice, “Justice denied is lesser included offense. As our Court of injustice and dealt out carelessly is out- Appeals has made clear: rageous enough totally destroy all sense 19-2132(b) Idaho Code states: ‘The § of inertia.” It has been conceded that court shall instruct jury on lesser Stuart, Gene defendant, Francis was included offenses they sup- when are responsible for the death of Robert Miller. ported by any reasonable view of the It has been conceded guilty that he is evidence.’ In Lopez, State v. 100 Idaho manslaughter. crime of It has been 99, 102, (1979), 593 P.2d 1006 our established jury that a convicted him of Supreme Court stated: ‘It is clear that degree first torture murder. It has been 19-2132(b) I.C. duty makes it the equally well-established that judge, the trial court to jury instruct now office, retired from such long ago sen- lesser included offenses they when are tenced Stuart to death. It is now a histori- supported by a reasonable view of the cal fact that on the appeal direct the convic- evidence, even if the court request- is not tion and the sentence were both affirmed. ed to do duty so.’ The same exists even What has not been established and is not defendant, if a reasons, for tactical ex- true is that Stuart had a fair trial on the pressly requests that no instruction on a issue of his conviction and on the issue of lesser given. included offense be imposed death sentence. As Justice Atwood, 315, 318, v. 105 Idaho 669 Shepard written, has also the law does not (Ct.App.1983). perceived guarantee person an accused perfect tri- procedural defaults no doubt flavored the al, guarantee but it does a fair trial. entirety of the majority opinion, Stuart II I, on the direct chal- making it more justices difficult for the lenging the conviction sentencing, Jus- majority atbe all concerned with the Huntley tice separate wrote a concurrence variance between instruction and register in order to his view that: the information. capital sentencing Idaho process is [T]he PROPORTIONALITY TOUCHED UPON respects: unconstitutional in two (1) provide It does not for utilization of Twenty-one years ago Shepard, Justice jury, inis violation of recently departed, now both expressed the view United States constitu- appellate “ordinarily dissent occurs tions; and only outrage when a Justice’s sense of (2) overcomes his sense of sentencing inertia.” Deshazer proceeding, as con- Tompkins, 93 Idaho 460 P.2d ducted the trial courts with the (1969). year court, That was his first approval by permitting of this occupancy of a presentence seat on the bench of the the admission of the inves- kidnapped, raped, was

tigation report hearsay and other evi- but dignity human objection vestige the accused robbed of dence over yet, Worse before she murdered. deprives right the accused helpless girl was made to handcuffed witness- cross-examine confront knowledge going suffer the that she was es. Obviously, killed. where there is to be 110 Idaho at P.2d at 847 murder, it a crime as torture such concurring (emphasis (Huntley, specially) J. appearance than Scroggins more added). Huntley’s The second Justice was here. been constitutional views should have Similarly with the Windsor case. everyone’s concern. Scroggins Here the distinction between Following rehearing I a in the fact that the Windsor issued, second Court was child, victim in the latter not a sen- full text of was these two man an older who had befriended his rehearing tences: “A torturers, captors, and killers. granted and rear- matter was the cause legislature Because the has insisted on gued. has the record The Court reviewed proportionality, and the Court heretofore arguments presented by considered proportionality analysis made its counsel, and continues to adhere having case without the benefit of the expressed views and the conclusion reached proportionality analysis shortly it would opinion.” Stuart, in the earlier make in and Scrog- thereafter Windsor (on rehearing P.2d at 897 Feb- and the district court at gins, 20, 1986). ruary There discussion was no *16 in was also without the benefit of Stuart variance, the whatever of which issue my opinions, those was tendered vote importance Court had deemed sufficient evenhandedly as as treat Stuart being to merit reheard and reconsidered. justice Scroggins and Court dealt year produced that one interval which Windsor. case, nothing in Stuart’s more death two 228, 110 Idaho 715 P.2d at Stuart at penalty decisions emanated from this (Bistline, dissenting). J. Court, Windsor, namely State v. 110 Idaho opinion II, initial in The Court’s Stuart (1985); 716 P.2d 1182 and v. State any post- issued on March denied 110 Idaho Scroggins, 716 P.2d opinion, Today’s conviction relief. (1985). case, penalty In each was death none, reason, with- whatever and know of resentencing reversed and remanded for opinion year ago.4 that of one draws penalty majority, less than death. The has majority now the benefit of the views however, saw no reason reconsider the dissenting opinions (Justice Johnson of two proportionality light of Stuart’s sentence myself), and by an excellent brief of those two decisions. That a sad com- (Robert attorney Kinney). E. Stuart’s mentary, because: reasoning The Court’s in its Windsor DEFEN- THE FACADE THAT THE opinions equally appli- Scroggins DANT STIPULATED In Scroggins cable in the child Stuart. years but a few than the In Part IIA of the March 1990 and to- killed was older Court, victim, by by day’s opinion II child killed Stuart. The Stuart being older, very only majority reason of has taken note of Stuart’s conten- was considering killed in a manner more brutal than tion that the trial court erred opin- my My attention effort has been anees made in a vacuum. March 1989 Most of 4. and, confronting effort, opinions which have represents directed at ion considerable one Court, by opinions, least, in this been issued whim of the which opened display the at it fallacies view majority But can withdrawn. majority opinion now which has been although majority perhaps cannot withdraw opinions in Stuart withdrawn. So II uncertain, my opinion, point which I am understood, readily I have attached as are more successfully what I as- can withdraw have my opinion. Appendix B March 1989 sailed, my writings render into utter- and thus preliminary hearing testimony at the in the sen- March 1990 edition of the majority tencing hearing, deny any opinion but continues to II is this:6 post-conviction proceedings: relief in sentencing hearing That a 1st, 1982, held on pursuant December The trial court denied claim Stuart’s notice to counsel for the defendant and in preliminary hearing error in the use of presence of the defendant the Court testimony sentencing, specifically at heard aggravation relevant evidence in pointing original out in Stuart’s mitigation and argu- offense Court, direct to this State Further, ments of counsel. it was 715 P.2d agreed and understood both (1985), this Court had held that and the the Court defendant that stipulated sentencing ‘[i]t rely upon, part sentencing hear- when hearing that the defen- ing, dant the court would consider evidence hearing and the trial. presented preliminary hearing presentence along and trial with the in- R., 220-21, Findings of the Court Consid- vestigation report.’ I). ering Penalty the Death For {Stuart certain Judge finding, Schwam wrote that added). (emphasis II March 1990 Stuart perpetrating, in doing ap- so was doubting accurately no There is parently may perpetuating, what well be Judge Schilling’s5 ruling, describes the most history insidious untruth Judge Schilling was based on what jurisprudence. There criminal read issued stipulation. no such Court, and which was written Chief expend- Much and much time effort were majority. Finally Justice Bakes for the in pointing ed to the other out members face to face majority comes with what it the Court7 in the March 1989 II so, concerning declared to be opinions, sentencing hearing: that at the nothing could have been further from the truth: witness, put After on one the State had *17 jailer, that he who testified had ob- stipulated sentencing It was at the hear- part, served no remorse on defendant’s ing sentencing that when the defendant Judge ruled that he Schwam would dis- court would consider evidence so completely count and did strik- [it] presented preliminary hearing testimony. all jailer’s The along presentence with the investi- presented State no more witnesses. The report gation following place: took then I, 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at 847 Stuart THE Does the defense have COURT: added). (emphasis This did misstatement any witnesses? unnoticed, go immediately but was Honor, light MR. KINNEY: Your questioned my dissent to the March 1989 presented fact has that the State no However, in II. the March 1990 Stuart to, aggravation in addition witnesses majority opinion Stuart II Chief Justice course, testimony, we to the trial tend now, belatedly, much Bakes attributes rely argument. also the trial and Judge to the misstatement Schwam. findings sentencing Okay. gather THE I Judge COURT: it’s the Schwam’s right penalty position con- that it has death are State’s excerpt rely upon from all the tained in the record. intends to cross- Judge findings relied elicited either Schwam’s now examination ago presided membership year Judge 5. 7.The did not include Schwam over the trial Judge Schilling presided sentencing. Boyle over Justices and McDevitt. post-conviction proceedings. placed passage. Explicit reliance is on this II footnote 1 to the March 1990 Stuart See opinion for the Court. point in (See on this my discussion opinion. the tri- Preliminary Hearing or peti- denial of dissenting on the al; my opinion that correct? immedi- rehearing, follows Yes, sir, tion for that is cor- MR. CALHOUN: one exam- opinion.) When ately this after rect. however, conjec- Osborn, ines State Okay. THE COURT: validity. highly doubtful ture becomes moment, MR. KINNEY: Just 408, 631 to 102 Idaho at only need turn One please? . discover that: P.2d at THE Yes. COURT: I’ve so stat- MR. believe presentence CALHOUN: re- of a After submission I filed. paperwork in the ed hearing port, aggravation-mitigation an prosecutor’s statement hear- 19-2515. At that held. I.C. testi- rely upon preliminary nor defense prosecution ing, neither position. that, just mony was State’s advised The state called witnesses. stipulation certain it was not For we do ‘because think the court that it to opinion elevated which this Court’s of what tran- good record have a—a on the appeal apparently direct on the hearing — instead preliminary in the spired finding Judge basis of Schwam’s sole calling today, witnesses choose] [I anyone stipulation, such a without testimony presented at rely on the making independent exami- this Court Similarly, ap- hearing____’ preliminary record in order to ascertain nation of the upon the facts counsel relied pellant’s finding.8 validity Judge Schwam’s hearing brought preliminary forth II, (Bistline, dissent- March 1989 J. court, reports and called and in the added). ing) (emphasis original; footnote witnesses, although ap- no additional majority opin- The author of the Court’s in his own pellant did address the court why speculated ion has wondered behalf. appears the issue of (insertion origi- Osborn, and deletion Id. utilization of the Schwam’s nal). plead guilty to first de- Osborn transcript not raised on the most that can be made gree murder. The He surmises in the I. the defendant is that counsel for of Osborn majority opinion II March 1990 Stuart the same state entertained and for the that: gained might be thought some favor —that raising for not the issue on The reason if he were not judge appeal was no doubt because direct having to hear live witness- burdened Court, sentencing, had at the time of crime.9 regarding commission of the es *18 Osborn, previously held in 102 (1981), holding, to be attributable to Os- P.2d 187 that the A said transcript sentencing hearing as preliminary hearing formal use of a “that no born sentencing/aggravation/mitigation re- the in 19-2516 had been provided I.C. § error, in and that no hearing was not holding, only a quested” not a but was provided in sentencing hearing as formal purporting justify what reason for requested. had been I.C. 19-2516 use of a holding in that the the Osborn not, un- hearing transcript was preliminary mirrors the II. This March 1990 Stuart preju- present, II der the circumstances there today’s majority’s statement Stuart place. responsibility first my is not mine in the in the the in footnote 3 to dissent 8. As stated gross prejudicial perceives misstate- II: When one March 1989 Stuart majority opinion, answer is in a naturally rely ments things By we the nature of get get kitchen. work or out of the either to upon justice has drawn the case to who Otherwise, correctly portray all the record. defendant, addressing in his the court The painstakingly read all us would have to five of behalf, exercise of his tradi- did so own transcripts ex- appeal records —an right and not as a witness. of allocution tional do not allow. which time constraints ercise occasion, right is now contained in the of allocution The may have been noted that It one, notwithstanding promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule 33. is I do so which this Nevertheless, (emphasis add- utilizing II n. March Stuart dicial error.10 Os- born, ed). Quaere, out of majority rules Stuart will this cause wonderment court: experienced among judges the trial and the now, First, he did not criminal it was practitioners claim law?

Stuart’s sentencing hearing stipulate at the that defense counsel had initially declared preliminary hearing testimo- the use thought when that stipulated, so but have late. Stuart should ny, comes too discarded, claim became that Stuart rehear- by petitioning issue raised the rehearing for a on first should have moved the direct of our decision Stuart opinion that he had seeing May in the not err in appeal. The trial court did unfair, manifestly stipulated. This so post claim rejecting Stuart’s conviction Bakes was the first Chief Justice because preliminary use of on the issue of the ever to write Supreme Court Justice sentencing. hearing testimony at First, stipulated. had Stuart’s counsel added; (emphasis II March 1990 Stuart misstatement had been Judge Schwam’s omitted). footnote Bakes at face accepted by Chief Justice there majority longer insists that no value, showing of resort with no That is under- stipulation. was such Second, the transcript. reporter’s per- majority’s author stood. Instead convo- and somewhat record is voluminous holding that Stuart for- switches to force luted, is not all that difficult but requesting a re- that issue feited third, why it that the read- And peruse. opinion re- hearing the initial Stuart inference from the left with the er has been 3,May 1985: leased on did not majority opinion that Stuart parties holding in I that Our proper reme- rehearing, to be the for a said prelimi- ‘stipulated’ to the use so, did do is that Stuart dy? answer hearing testimony nary very issue Chief Justice he raised the finding proceeding was based should have been later asserts Bakes in the December of the trial court A.) (See Appendix raised. hearing 1982, sentencing in which March appears that the Court’s It now ‘Further, found, agreed it was trial court opinion has been withdrawn II 1989 Stuart the state and the by both and understood glaring sight the to erase from in order rely court would defendant never was. stipulation which untruth of the sentencing hearing, part of the upon, as cannot strike withdrawing opinion But testimony at the nothing apparent, indif- memory There is and the trial.’ erase from or ever that Stuart demonstrate record to with which the carelessness ferent finding, time, either before questioned the but This is not fun was written. reconsid- way motion for trial court these While to some business. serious eration, to this Court being a bit on across as thoughts may come opin- issuance of our After the I. side, help stand cannot strong one held, in which we based ion happening would be wholly aghast at what finding, that the upon the trial court’s J., too, Bistline, gone were here if the use of stipulated to parties had Shep- along with Justices appellate scene *19 in sen- testimony hearing preliminary Donaldson, Huntley. ard, defendant Stuart tencing proceeding, the has, lot, by inherited Bakes Justice Chief rehearing petition Court for did appeals. It is dishearten- all of Stuart question the trial either in order to telling an of position ing placed to be holding finding Court’s or this court’s justice capable appellate experienced stipulated of to the use that Stuart had regard for had more have that he should testimony at the hearing preliminary practicing no By comparison, record. sentencing hearing. preliminary of a to the admission Iated little. An aberra- stands for at best 10. Osborn tion, transcript. case a second such not been there has implicitly stipu- sentencing where counsel at Rehearing granted, but could attorney handling criminal defenses I. (at personal and any great done more part.] have in cost) Kinney in than did financial Robert seeing attempts

his Ill fairly. Kinney at- with Mr. least dealt get the tempted to Court concerned about JUDGE IGNORED THE SENTENCING misuse Judge Schwam’s of the IDAHO THE MANDATE OF CLEAR away hearing testimony but turned IN UTILIZING SECTION 19-2516 CODE ef- empty Continuing handed. that same FOR EVIDENCE AS A BASIS HEARSAY fort, Kinney post-conviction in relief Mr. THE DEATH PENALTY. IMPOSING proceedings presented district court to the assignment of absolutely irrefutable 19-2515(f) states: Idaho Code Section not, by person error that Stuart had in or following (f) statutory aggravat- are counsel, stipulated prelim- use of circumstances, (1) one of ing at least transcript. inary hearing Again defense beyond must be found to exist Judge Schilling away. counsel was turned sentence of reasonable doubt before a Bakes, three read that Chief Justice imposed: (emphasis can be death ... justices opinion, in joining his had ruled added) stipulated. I that Stuart had so .Because of the doctrine of the law of the provides Idaho Code 19-2516 as follows: case, powerless the district court was INQUIRY INTO CIRCUMSTANCES— otherwise,11 say though even the fact of EXAMINATION WITNESSES.— OF plain pro- the matter was as to see as the presented circumstances must be {The Dooley’s Attached verbial nose on face. testimony examined by witnesses of A Appendix as Part III of Mr. hereto Court), except when a wit- open Kinney’s supporting petition for brief ness is so sick or infirm as to be unable rehearing timely in Stuart which he did attend, deposition by may be taken Appendix copy my file. B is a true Court, Magistrate County, out opinion attempt March 1989 wherein an upon party such notice to the as adverse was made to dissuade the other members may or heaping the Court from as much or more the Court direct. No affidavit Mr. representation error on Stuart than was visited testimony, or augmen- him the district court. It is kind, written, verbal or can be offered my response today’s tation October Court, or received or a Court, opinion for the contains an thereof, aggravation mitigation or analysis equally pertinent which is to this punishment, except provided as day’s Court. Attached as section, preceding (emphasis this and the Appendix my isC dissent to this Court’s added) opinion. Appendix March 1990 Attached as clearly duty It is excerpts opinions D majority are from the capital cases to receive Court March March and October open concerning aggravating sight which have been removed from mitigating under Idaho Code circumstances with- questionable expediency Sentencing At Hear- Section 19-2515. drawing opinions, then reis- the entire December the State held suing the same modified. (1) witness, presented one who was the APPENDIX A County Jail His Clearwater Administrator. presented attempt testimony was in an [Being excerpt appellant’s brief rehearing of had not support of his demonstrate defendant Smith, remanded) *20 County Highway 113 after 11. Ada Dist. v. case which has been See 497, disregard (Ct.App.1988), liberty are not at 749 P.2d lower courts Idaho citing higher any question upon approval to Bank which the with Suitts v. First Sec. answer to N.A., 15, 21-22, Idaho, higher spoken The court court has ruled. of 1374, (1985). operation The the doc- not so constrained. A district 1380-81 of itself is (in independent thoughtful. requires proceedings in a be so trine further cannot had been

tory aggravating circumstance doubt. The proven beyond a reasonable incarcerated and shown remorse while concerning sentencing Judge’s comments striking testimony of awaiting Trial. In all hearsay at this stated of use of evidence witness, Judge sentencing deemed as follows: proceedings, are set forth improper. testimony irrelevant like to make one THE I would COURT: Sentencing Hearing, page (Transcript of recess. at this time before we comment Thereafter, 27). Appellant was called Pre Sentence report This does contain—a witness, attempt in an the defense as a hearsay report statement contains cooperated he had with illustrate that child. I am the defendant’s natural investigation police in the of ROBERT I must find that because convinced no other death. There were MILLER’S demon- aggravating circumstance Sentencing who testified at witnesses beyond a doubt it strated reasonable 1, Hearing held December re- inappropriate me to would be stricken the testimo- After the Court had unchallengeable kind sort to that of witness, presented by the State’s ny aggravated determining an hearsay in clearly its under- indicated the defense determining the When circumstance ... rely only standing that the State particular of a or nonexistence existence argument upon testimony and Trial in- mitigating circumstance that often support of presented at the in- negative the consideration of volves statutory aggravating cir- its claim that formation, negative to the defendant understanding is This cumstances existed. But I think positive information. well as transcript the December reflected in those circum- inappropriate even 2, 1982, Hearing page 28 as follows: damaging me to consider stances for that, light your MR. CALHOUN: produced in a hear- negative information Honor, has no further witness- the State purpose report for the say fashion es. question which is determining this Defense have THE Does the COURT: beyond a rea- supposed to be determined any witnesses? facts And that is the sonable doubt. Honor, light KINNEY: Your MR. imposition of support the necessary to presented no has the fact that the State (Transcript of De- Penalty. Death to, aggravation addition witnesses 1982, Pages Hearing, cember course, testimony, tend to Trial we 89). argument. the Trial and rely also negative statement Despite his clear Sentencing Judge, At the direction of and would hearsay could not comments first, in an ef- argued Appellant’s counsel Death imposition of the support be used impos- against persuade the Court fort to Judge acted exact- Sentencing Penalty, the (Transcript De- Penalty. ing Death comments. opposite to his own ly 35). 1, 1982, Hearing, pages 34 and cember change of clearly this Transcript reflects argued attorney Appellant’s after part of Schwam on the attitude Trial could introduced at taken outside that (2) cir- aggravating two he had determined at the Sentenc- aggravation used as not be applicable: to be cumstances (Transcript of December Hearing. Now, interest- has raised some defense 7, 8, 9, 10, and lines Hearing, page 46 ad- I think should ing questions which however, 11). Attorney, Prosecuting the fact that has raised dress. Defense alleged to arguing incidents insisted gives me testimony which much of the Hearing, Preliminary at the have occurred background into this defendant’s insight (Transcript of at Trial. and not admitted for a at Trial legitimately admitted 70). Hearing page December has ar- And defense purpose. limited that testimo- only use gued that I should com- were arguments of counsel After for a demon- limitation ny the same it would indicated that pleted, the Court the de- part intent on stration unfavorable hearsay evidence consider offense time of the fendant a statu- determining whether defendant *21 proportionality of the issue of the Sen- case, imposed tence in this both in re- question. disagree with the defense. sponse to Mr. contentions Stuart’s that And I my have not limited that use of imposed provi- violated the Sentence testimony____ And I don’t feel that of Eighth sions Amendment to the inappropriate that illegal it is me for Constitution, in United States accord- to use that evidence for all in purposes duty imposed by with the ance Idaho considering aggravating these circum- In doing, Code Section 19-2827. so this mitigating stances and the circum- adopted finding Court the Trial Court’s Furthermore, stances. those observed stipulation that a was entered into be- I, testify witnesses once myself, of parties concerning tween the use of the course, testimony read prelim- at the preliminary hearing testimony at sen- inary hearing, utterly and it would be (State 163, tencing Idaho justice system require cruel for this (1985)). [715 833] those return women to a third time to Following the of Decision this Court in testify. ruling And I would make 3, 1985, May issued appellant (Tran- require such a result. Rehearing. Petition filed a Subse- script 1, 1982, Hearing of December quently, July on a Memorandum 109). pages 108 and in Support Appellant’s of Petition for The Sentencing Hearing re- Transcript Rehearing was filed. That Memorandum arrogance flects cold the fact separate ap- set forth five issues which believing defendant was misled into pellant requested that the Court consider hearsay ag- evidence would not be in used rehearing. Appendix on As in A noted sentence, gravation of and that the Court Dissenting Opinion of Justice Bistline totally ignored the mandate in most recent Decision this Court Section per- Code 19-2516 which does not 12, 1990, Appellant’s March issued Mem- mit aggravating circumstances orandum in Support of Petition for Re- through shown other than testimony hearing, filed after in the decision Stuart presented Open in Court. I, directly alleged ‘stipula- addressed the Support Memorandum in Petition concerning tion’ use of hear- Rehearing, 9-12, July filed S.Ct. ing testimony sentencing. The Memo- (Stuart I) added). (emphasis No. in Support randum Petition for Re- hearing, filed appellant July on That issue was further addressed 1985, stated: support peti- Stuart’s counsel in of another After court had stricken the testi- rehearing tion for after Stuart’s mony presented by the state’s wit- post relief conviction was denied with- ness, the clearly defense indicated its evidentiary hearing. out an In this Court’s understanding that the state would opinion affirming that denial was to be said rely only on argu- properly upon stipulation, based Kin- Mr. presented sentencing ment ney, May nicely laid out how support of its claim statutory ag- stipulation that never came to be: gravating circumstances existed. This Appellant that, readily acknowledges understanding is reflected the tran- appeal, direct the finding 1,1982, script of the December that appellant stipulated Schwam page 28 as follows: hearing testimony use of preliminary that, light your MR. CALHOUN: In sentencing, the time specifi- was not honor, the state no has further wit- cally phrased ap- Although as an issue. nesses. pellant challenged hearsay the use of THE COURT: Does the defense have testimony by any witnesses? brief, opening specific question of a purported ‘stipulation’ honor, light was not therein KINNEY: MR. Your Decision, raised as an presented issue. its initial fact that the has state 3,May issued aggravation Court addressed no witnesses addition *22 888 1, 1982,

(Transcript of December Sen- 102, tencing p. 16-18). Hearing, Is. to, course, testimony, of the trial we (in)tend rely Support After the in upon the Memorandum to also filed, argument. Rehearing for Petition had been granted Rehearing this Court an under {Appellant’s Sup- in Memorandum 1985, 20, September dated con- Rehearing, Order port filed Petition for 10). only 8, cerning the issue of instruction July p. 1985— 18. The issue raised on Rehear- number 8, 1985, July Appellant’s Memoran- alleged ‘stipulation’ ing concerning the dum, support filed in of his Petition for preliminary hearing testimony the use of Rehearing, attention directed Court’s sentencing, and the Trial Court’s re- at sentencing hearing portions upon hearsay finding liance evidence transcript for Mr. wherein counsel beyond statutory taken outside reasonable doubt contended existed, aggravation aggravating trial could not be used as circumstances (Memorandum sentencing permitted argued Rehearing not to be on Rehearing, filed Support Petition I. 11). p. July This memorandum 1985— noted, appellant earlier As acknowl excerpts from sen- also referred to ‘stipulation’ edges that the nonexistent tencing hearing Judge transcript wherein precisely phrased not as an issue on he initially indicated that Schwam was, however, appeal. directly It direct hearsay consider unfavora- evidence Sup to in the Memorandum referred determining whether ble to defendant Rehearing port of Petition for filed statutory aggravating circumstance July on 1985. To maintain Mr. Stuart beyond a proven had been reasonable that this issue was not raised now excerpts Also noted were doubt. over sub is to exalt form direct hearing transcript indicat- in direct violation of well estab stance subsequently ing that the Court acted ‘qualitatively providing rules lished exactly opposite Judge Schwam’s ear- penalty review of death cases. different’ comments, prelimi- and considered lier 380, 387, v. Idaho Scroggins, State objec- nary hearing testimony over (1985); State v. Os (Appellant’s of the defense Memo-

tion 405, 410-11, born, 631 P.2d Re- Support randum Petition for (1981); Sivak, 105 Idaho 11-12). pp. hearing, July filed 1985— (1983). 674 P.2d 396 will illus- the Record this case As 12, In its Decision entered March trate, file a Mr. Stuart indeed did Petition majority Court erred in con- of this challenging purported Rehearing raised, in cluding that Mr. Stuart had not prelimi- concerning ‘stipulation’' use Rehearing from Stuart his Petition for sentencing. nary hearing testimony at improper pre- use of concerning an issue ap- Rehearing filed The Petition for by the liminary hearing testimony Sen- pellant also noted the fact that noted, tencing As hereinbelow Court. hearing testimo- upon preliminary relied for the defense, in if this were raised first even issue ny objection over proceed- post relief conviction finding beyond a doubt that time reasonable 19-4901, Section aggravating ings, circumstances Code statutory two written, inapplicable to this proven. presently As further illustration had been however, remains, oc- stipulation no the fact that such case. fact purport- di- attention also addressed appellant curred Court’s Rehearing following ‘stipulation’ words in his Memo- rected ed Schwam, sentencing: 8,1985, time of was denied July at the filed randum argument in present an opportunity prosecutor is correct that I think the Rehearing support of issue at the pre-

must consider evidence ultimately held. liminary hearing the trial. law,

place statu- of all other common *23 tory, other remedies heretofore or II challenging validity of for the available It shall be the conviction or sentence. APPELLANT NOT PRECLUDED IS exclusively place in of them. used THE FROM ADDRESSING ISSUE OF 1986, 1, present the amend- July On IMPROPER USE OF PRELIMINARY 19-4901(b) ment of Idaho Code Section HEARING BY THE TESTIMONY written, presently As the took effect. IN SENTENCING COURT POST language: following statute contains RELIEF CONVICTION PROCEED- WHOM INGS. 19-4901. REMEDY—TO AVAILABLE—CONDITIONS. In the of this Court issued (b) remedy is not a for This substitute 10, 1989, subsequently March withdrawn any remedy nor it affect incident does replaced by Opinion and entered court, in the or proceedings to the trial 12, 1990, majority March of this or con- appeal of an from sentence allega- indicated that Mr. Stuart’s Court Any issue which could have viction. concerning improper prelimi- use of tions appeal, been raised on direct nary hearing testimony by the Sentenc- not, may not be con- is forfeited provi- forfeited under the Court were post proceed- sidered in conviction 19-4901(b) of Idaho Code Section sions court, appears ings, it to the unless 17014, State, Slip Op. No. v. No. {Stuart factual on the basis of substantial 1989, 8). 10, (Sup.Ct. p. Incor- March affidavit, showing by deposition or to be porating appears what the same otherwise, the asserted basis for reasoning, of this in majority Court about relief raises a substantial doubt most recent Decision entered March reliability finding guilt 12, 1990, indicated that ‘Stuart is fore- not, in the due exercise of could raising closed from the issue of the use diligence, presented earli- have been testimony preliminary hearing sen- in Except provided as otherwise er. tencing our decision in because of act, comprehends it and takes 17014, (Stuart State, Slip Op. I’ No. law, place statu- of all other common 12, 1990, 6). (Sup.Ct., p. No. 35 March tory, heretofore or other remedies noted, appellant in- previously As did challenging validity of available improper raise use of deed the issue or sentence. It shall be conviction preliminary hearing by the them, place exclusively used Sentencing Court, seeking rehearing added). (emphasis I. As hereafter of the Decision Stuart reflect, Mr. As Record will illustrated, however, if even the issue 19, 1981, and September on was arrested raised, had never been Mr. Stuart is not charged with crime of subsequently raising procedurally from this is- barred 1, murder on 1981. torture October post proceedings. sue conviction conviction, Mr. After his trial 19-4901 was initial- Idaho Code Section 1, to death on December was sentenced It has ly enacted in 1967. thereafter appeal was then taken 1982. His direct 1, 1975, July amended effective been 3, and, May Supreme Court July July 1986. Until sen- the conviction ultimate 19-4901(b)read as follows: Section Code appeal. tence of death were affirmed 19-4901. REMEDY—TO WHOM Relief, Post Conviction His Petition for AVAILABLE—CONDITIONS. concerning allegation which included tes- (b) remedy improper is not a substitute This use Court, remedy timony by Sentencing it incident does affect nor court, Accordingly, the filed proceedings June Mr. Stuart of convic- Record illustrates that appeal the sentence well sentenced, convicted, charged, provided Except as otherwise tion. decided, post conviction act, direct comprehends and takes Schwam, Findings of Andrew Imposing Penalty. the Death filed, prior to the time relief all written, 19-4901(b), The amended information presently I.C. allege any put Stuart was on trial did not

took effect. part such criminal conduct on the Support Pe- Appellant’s Memorandum charging part defendant. The of the infor- Rehearing, May filed tition mation was this: 8-14. Orofino, That Gene Francis Stuart of *24 APPENDIX B Idaho, Sep- day on or about the 19th J., Bistline, Opin- dissent in the 1989 1981, Orofino, County tember at in the 28, filed March deals with ion No. Clearwater, Idaho, State of then and (a) by the district court at the use made being, there and there unlaw- did then of the testi- feloniously being, fully kill a human mony of women in of defendant’s abuse application of torture with the intentional earlier; Washington years over ten state being, human to wit: that the said to said (b) circumstances and events in the actual Francis did strike and hit Gene Coutts, 101 Idaho 609 P.2d v. State Miller, being, repeated- a human Robert Osborn, (1980), v. and State suffering the intent to cause ly with (1983), P.2d 1111 did not establish satisfy some sadistic inclination no limits on precedent that there were thereby Francis the said Gene could consider at sen- what a district court bodily injury upon inflicting great (c) system- a chronicle of the tencing; and wounding mortally Robert Miller and district court which con- atic efforts of the Miller, wounds the Robert which making conduct ex- inappropriate sisted of Miller, boy, year a three old Robert said the efforts of Stuart’s tremely difficult County of Clear- sickened and died trial, i.e., obtaining fair no counsel water, Idaho, day State of on the 19th penurious mone- investigator, money, no September 1981. reward, grossly wrong orders and tary Stuart, supra, Idaho] [110 rulings: added). Judge (emphasis P.2d] [715 deny- judgment of the district court guilt on finding of defendant’s Schwam’s post dismissing ing and charges at- totally the two unrelated is affirmed. conviction relief woman, drowning of one tempted strong clearly rape another was J., HUNTLEY, SHEPARD, C.J., and imposition of a supported his factor which concur. clear, Equally the defen- death sentence. courtroom the Judge Schwam’s dant I, J., JOHNSON, in Part Part concurs being tried on not was presence 11(C), as to 11(A) Part and dissents murdering the charge of just the filed 11(B). Part charges child, on the non-filed but also J., concurring BISTLINE, specially against the committed aggravated assaults concurrence, Part was dissenting. [The his had been of whom two women—one parts of the dissenting with the not for- the defendant Not wife. JOHNSON, authored J.] anywhere by information mally charged assault, but acts of criminal those two II. PART charged in Idaho. have been he could not pur- shows that such evidence The adduced beyond evidence demonstrates “The judge acts, by although found ported at- defendant doubt reasonable beyond a rea- “proved to have been alone a means of tempted woman as to drown a entirely in the doubt,” place took sonable inflicted this defendant and that torture western Washington, and state of wife and beatings upon second brutal then thereof, years and over ten part hospital raped her while she past. distant accident.” recovering from an automobile IT AT THE SEN- WAS STIPULATED Judge Findings recited in his HEARING THAT WHEN Sehwam TENCING relied in so THE DEFENDANT that the evidence which he SENTENCING pronouncing guilty defendant of the two THE COURT WOULD CONSIDER EV- beyond doubt was PRESENTED AT THE PRE- assaults a reasonable IDENCE transcript him in LIMINARY AND TRIAL first found HEARING preliminary hearing, Judge had THE ALONG WITH PRESENTENCE prior presiding read at trial. INVESTIGATION REPORT. Supreme Appeal, per on Direct Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Bakes, J., 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at 846.

Relief, D, accurately Part assesses that: time-consuming through A search Vol- findings is evident from the It Court’s appears ume 5 of the record to have testimony presented at the Prelimi- produced “stipulation” nary Hearing accepted as factual entered into. Sehwam declared been entirety, despite in its the fact that Peti- *25 appears Bakes in turn to have uti- Justice tioner had not then even commenced finding opin- Judge lized Schwam’s his discovery proceedings, nor was he later put ion.2 After the State had on one wit- able to cross examine these witnesses ness, jailer, the who testified that he had concerning allegations. these part, observed no' remorse on defendant’s Relief, p. Petition for Post Conviction 6. Judge he Sehwam ruled that would dis- D, particularly said Part the defendant striking completely count and did so all challenged Judge finding, a No. Sehwam jailer’s testimony. the The State agreed presented no more witnesses. The follow- It was and both understood ing place: the then took state and the defendant the rely upon, part Court would as THE COURT: Does the defense have sentencing hearing, testimony the any witnesses? preliminary hearing and the trial. Honor, light MR. KINNEY: Your presented the fact that State has no Following Judge Schwam’s retirement to, aggravation witnesses in in addition bench, Judge Schilling presided from the course, testimony, the trial we tend to post-conviction proceedings. In enter- rely argument. also on the trial and summary judgment denying a defen- any relief, hearing Judge dant or Okay. THE gather COURT: I it’s the Schilling in his written decision turned first right that it a STATE’S POSITION has opinion to this Court’s on defendant’s first rely upon to and intends all appeal, appeal, and stated: “On direct cross-examination illicited Supreme Court noted that USE OF Preliminary Hearing either at the trial; THIS TESTIMONY WAS STIPULATED is that correct?

TO, AND WAS PROPERLY BEFORE Yes, sir, that is cor- MR. CALHOUN: reading Judge Schilling’s THE COURT.” rect. ability making was not at fault Okay. THE COURT: Unfortunately, statement. as it is now dis- moment, MR. KINNEY: Just a covered, authoring Justice Bakes please? by Judge opinion Court’s was misled THE COURT: Yes. Sehwam, and in turn misled the other four I written MR. CALHOUN: believe I’ve so stat- of us as to the actual content of the paperwork ed in the that I filed. record.1 Justice Bakes wrote: because, rely solely By things naturally made rea- we 2. The search was the nature of correctly appearances justice case son of the three defense counsel who has drawn the Otherwise, argument portray has made at oral in this defendant’s record. all five of us sincerity beyond appeals, verity painstakingly are read all of would have question, transcripts and he has assured us that he made no exercise records —an stipulation. do not allow. such which time constraints 892 [SIC, TRANSCRIPT]

RECORD OF prosecutor’s statement that the State THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. ...3 rely upon preliminary testimony Although opin- author of the Court’s that, position. just For certain State’s by utilizing ion in honored me Osborn stipulation it was which this Court’s goodly share previous- of that which had appeal— it to on the elevated direct case, undoubtedly ly written in the same apparently Judge the sole on basis of important more than what was borrowed finding stipulation, such Schwam’s was not which had written which making anyone without on recycled. myself The Osborn author independent examination of the record in my opinion, one narrow Osborn the validity order to ascertain made like “We point, these statements. finding. Schwam’s today hold those cases in Osborn, anything in Nor is there imposed repre- penalty may death be do not (1983), 104 Idaho 663 P.2d 1111 ” ‘ordinary sent circumstances.’ gives sentencing authority any carte Bistline, J.) (per 631 P.2d at 206 authority blanche to resort to recognize death “We that cases where the hearing transcripts acceptable evidence may imposed ‘ordinary are penalty question imposing at a ” circumstances.’ Idaho at or death. does not sentence life Osborn McFadden, But, J.)4 there (per P.2d at 638 that. is a amount of do There considerable meanderings wishy-washy parted. in the Court’s we the author of Unlike Idaho, through opinion, pp. then, my opinion, view Court’s Osborn [of *26 P.2d], but in pp. through 194 631 penalty more fortified more and death proposition it to the of law essence distills review, cases came was that under Publishing which West found therefrom Court should insist adherence and set out in Headnote 2: by legislature, with- procedure set out hearing transcript preliminary Use of the judicial improvising. out by sentencing aggravation-miti- State at Following pen- the statement that death hearing instead of gation live present ordinary circum- alty cases do not pled was not error where defendant stances, my opinion statement trial, guilty prior to at no time did [and] expanded: pro- to object either State or defendant infrequency of a sen- gravity and manner, AND DE- ceeding ... in such neces- tence of death are such that it is IN- FENDANT RELIED UPON ALSO sary procedural be IN all formalities CONTAINED FORMATION sides, by together presented both opinion on the direct statements 3. Footnote 4 to the Court’s 412, 194, appeal, presentence report arguments 631 P.2d at sets 102 Idaho with the Publishing observed what West respective out to be the basis of counsel. holding: 412, Osborn, As at 638. 102 Idaho at P.2d object to appellant's conceded, counsel did not While questions not identi- were there cal, transcript, is but, use object the suffi- noted ciency he did indeed analogy persuasive. Where we ... find the therein. of the evidence disclosed agrees impliedly expressly or the defendant Thus, preliminary hearing upon the he relied formality possible dispense under with the mitigating arguably circum- record to show statute, i.e., presentation all statements facially the absence of stances and to statutory aggravating show oath, orally allows and instead under beyond a reason- factors evidence, through prior presentation of facts doubt____ able counsel, argument reports, presentence objection sequitor. An A remarkable non like, prima error due no facie we find into reliance. transformed such use. McFadden, J., entirely majority, relied for the Osborn, supra, 638]. P.2d at [631 at 412 State v. an which he had written. identity had been of: Coutts lack of consisted Coutts, (1980), 609 P.2d 642 101 Idaho term; Osborn’s 14-year indeterminate handed a that, proposition decidedly term of determinate sentence was a explicit request of an absence ... by This is a distinction execution. death by hearing contemplated I.C. Sec. the formal without difference. 19-2516, may its the court reach receiving unsworn formal decision describing being merely pro- also it as may cess whereunder the state deter- followed with the utmost care. Such a proceed mine if it further wants proposition need be belabored. against the accused. 87 Idaho at Our conclusion is buttressed our 392 P.2d at 547. regard pre- decisions with to the use of reasoning applies The same to the case liminary hearing testimony at trial. at bar. a sentence of death can Before regard, we have noted that the 19-2515(f) imposed, requires I.C. § preliminary hearing function of a is to aggravating that at least one circum- determine whether a crime has been com- proven beyond stance must be a reason- mitted probable and whether there is able doubt. A PRELIMINARY HEAR- cause to believe that the crime was com- ING SIMPLY IS NOT DESIGNED Ruddell, mitted the accused. v. State INTENDED NOR TO PRODUCE EVI- (1976); 97 Idaho State DENCE BE- ESTABLISHING FACTS Haggard, v. 94 Idaho 486 P.2d 260 DOUBT; A A YOND REASONABLE (1971). preliminary hearing At a neither DEFENDANT WHO PLEADS prosecutor not the defense counsel GUILTY, AND go HENCE HAS NO TRI- great lengths has incentive to AL, case, presenting IS ENTITLED TO A his or cross-exam- PROCEDURE ining the other side’s AND RELIABLE witnesses. The AS SEARCHING AS preliminary hearing usually held at A TRIAL BEFORE IT DETER- IS early stage in proceedings so that the MINED THAT HE BE SHOULD PUT defense counsel has had little time to TO DEATH. prepare, having prepared, sees no rea- Osborn, 405, 424-425, or, display, son to in some hand— added). (emphasis 631 P.2d 205-206 may situations well realize that the ex- abundantly It has been shown that amining magistrate is not inclined to Schilling, although himself not in error any testimony merely

hear raises relying upon the misstatement of the *27 questions magistrate of fact. A does not opinion appeal, Court’s on direct pass upon guilt, and there seems to be thereby, was led into error but and some view in the state that issues of fact faulty his blameless but reliance on Stuart ought passed upon not be either. summary there was no sound basis for a fact, State, in Freeman v. 87 Idaho judgment away pen- which turned a death (1964), put 392 P.2d 542 the the alty any hearing. without It defendant is wholly matter at rest: apparent Judge Schilling rather that did ‘ preliminary “A examination before brought not have to his attention the so- committing magistrate a is in no “stipulation” actually called as it took purpose sense a trial. The is to obtain Hence, place. Judge Schilling noted that judgment magistrate of a “petitioner rely did intend to on trial testi- that a effect crime has or has not been mony argument.” regard In that committed, and if committed that there correct, Judge Schilling entirely was be- ground is that reasonable to believe said, cause that is what defense counsel person guilty accused is of commit- and which counsel has never denied. The ting expect- the crime. It is not be to statutory sentencing hearing scheme for a ed, required, is it the same nor may provide testimony does trial formality precision must be problem utilized. There is no whatever in required examination as regard. Bilboa, at trial.” 33 Idaho State But, is, big Judge Schilling it 190 P. 248.’ 87 Idaho at added). (emphasis

P.2d at 546 Bakes’ conclusion that de- utilized Justice stipulated fense counsel had quoted opinion Later in the the Court —which so, Judge Schilling added a bit of Supreme Minnesota for an al- Court of “However, gloss justified: that was not prelimi- to a most identical statement as trial, petitioner rely nary hearing being in no sense a is clear that did intend 894. precise question

... raised ... testimony whether the live mandate testimony argument, and was displaces I.C. 19-2516 the discretion § compliance demanding strict with the granted proceed to the state how testimony formality I.C. live hearing, i.e., whether the statute ab- phrase, emphasized final 19-2516.” § solutely open requires live above, whatever, support no and at has aggravation-mitigation court at the hear- best to no more than sheer sur- amounts ing. Yet, Judge Schilling mise. it is crucial. considerably Having plain rewritten the looking at 19-2516 when he should § liking, language of the statute to his own looking at the statute both have been same punch line: he delivered his “We decide defendant, counsel, state and for Osborn, quotations all that it does not.” at, looking 19-2515. Said stat- were I.C. § 631 P.2d at found at specifically ute states that: “EVIDENCE no statute allocates to such AT SHALL BE CON- ADMITTED TRIAL sentencing Nor to the court. discretion. AND NEED BE RE- SIDERED NOT judges feel Unfortunately, district HEAR- PEATED AT THE SENTENCING holdings no apply this Court’s bound ING.” unsubstantiated, no how and matter matter Schilling following page of Judge on the result-oriented, how and no matter whether only sentence of mentioned one rewriting indulged in this Court has 19-2515(d), incorporated which was I.C. § statutory law or the Constitution itself. addressing the into the final sentence of his What Justice McFadden wrote Osborn transcript prelimi- use issue disadvantage by was used to Stuart’s hearing testimony: important- nary “More Schilling, and unless curbed concluded that ly, Court Osborn will to be Court of its own volition continue preliminary hearing testi- use of relevant prejudicial error in the district a source mony proper and desirable sentenc- courts ing, especially where Here, preju- greatly to defendant’s evi- all relevant is mandated consider attempt gain by post- relief dice in his Osborn, 19-2515(d). under I.C. dence Judge Schilling proceedings, obe- conviction at 410-413 [631 187].” McFadden, applied tamper- J. diently case, McFadden, with J. In the Osborn im- ings statutory process: “More Donaldson, Bakes, J. concur- J. concluded portantly, the Court in Osborn wide latitude ring,5 extremely also took preliminary hear- use of relevant *28 converting sen- literary license testimony proper and desirable ing 19-2515(e): tence I.C. § sentenc- sentencing, especially where the and the defen- hearing, such the state At all is mandated consider rele- present all dant be entitled to shall I.C. 19- under section relevant evidence mitiga- aggravation vant evidence 2515(d). Osborn, Idaho at 410-413 tion, McFadden, J. extended P.2d 187].” [631 desire: of his own a transformation into with this the ultimate Osborn himself to speaks the entitlement The section statement: present whatever evidence parties to the While, admittedly, speaks of the section aggravation-mitigation they desire trial, light prior the from evidence hearing. statute, the see no we purpose the require- statute a transmuting to read into the need point, of vantage From considered, previously ment that other the into Justice’s “relevant” the statute’s prelimi- from the 19-2515(c) information as relevant "whatever,” he I.C. saw unless is to excluded hearing be nary parties" creating an “entitlement of testimony. again by live presented once stating: first after Court, unstated. for reasons opinion but dissented join for the Shepard, J. did not responsibility misguiding Judge Schill- Osborn, 187], ing. supra, at 412 The [631 considered, previously in- “other relevant thought expressed, proceed With that we preliminary hearing,”

formation from the post-conviction proceed- to the decision in questions, by raises “Considered ings. ” whom, purpose? what The an- and for hardly supplied. swers should need ’Tis PART III. judge not the district who considers highly important, integral Because it is a evidence, preliminary but rather ’tis the sentencing, a Judge element of Schwam’s is, magistrate purpose who does so. The IIA second look at Part of the Court’s pointed my as was well out in Osborn opinion mandatory-review/direct-ap- on the dissent, to determine whether a crime has peal is merited. Part IIA dealt committed, been and if probable there is admissibility of the two determining ap- cause for that the accused women who testified to assaults suf- pears perpetrator.6 to have been charge fered each—but for which no opinion gave Judge This Court’s Osborn delving was ever made. Before into the Schilling precious opportunity little to hold issue, admissibility author of did, though obviously other than he even stage by Court’s first set the ex- clearly violation of a written statute. plaining prosecution’s problem: “To ob- any justification There was not degree tain a first murder con- torture source for Schwam to have con- viction, required prove the state is preliminary sidered the hearing transcript pain defendant had an intent to cause sentencing as admissible evidence at the suffering.” prosecution’s so- hearing in quota- this case. Add to the last however, was, problem prose- called McFadden, tion above set forth that which making. previous cution’s In the own last say very point: J. went on to on the child-abuse death case which came before certainly appel- This is true where the us, prosecution experienced no trouble (defendant) lant relied the infor- satisfying that the 8-month old mation contained in the record of the head, child “died from blows to the a mini- blows____ preliminary hearing, as occurred here. probably mum of two and three Testimony injuries indicated could Bakes, 102 Idaho at 631 P.2d at 194. accidentally not have been inflicted point J. cannot where at the (the child) the activities of herself.” State case, in this reliance Aragon, 107 Idaho 690 P.2d placed by the defendant on the (1984). hearing transcript. quite The fact is Nonetheless, Bakes, contrary. opin- J. charge degree in that was first case direct-appeal/mandatory-review, ion on the murder, in the usual form. An instruction documented, as has been herein above in- gave jury the the homicide definition of dulged in the misstatement there was which the defendant there was convicted stipulation transcript to the use of that degree of: “Murder in the first is defined *29 relevant evidence. perpe- murder this case as all which willful, If forthcoming display by any there were a of a trated kind of deliberate and integrity, premeditated killing.” reasonable amount of intellectual Idaho opinion only charge this could be discontinued at this 690 P.2d at 297. That was the point, majority degree explained and the I would now reverse of first murder. As poor Judge Schilling. prosecution But such reversal would made a error, charging a not be for his own but because those choice in not also Stuart with deliberate, willful, majority candidly premedi- assume the count for and perform high public opinion 6. When an issues out of this Court do- and defense counsel would damage statutory provisions, as by joining presenting legisla- as much to remedial service McFadden, Bakes, and ac- Justices Donaldson legislature. to the tion Osborn, attorney complished prosecuting purpose nature extraneous evidence, opinion to Court’s moved on killing. to, tated previously As alluded admissibility real under Idaho issue— having on this review Stuart’s final ef- precedential candidly law. was case First fort obtaining a fair trial in the Idaho CONCEDED THE GENERAL INADMIS- judicial system, reason of those evidence, SIBILITY of such but then was many transcripts pro- reviews of the of the exception prove noted the where to ceedings having my obtained own sense offered motive, for two cases cited were prosecutor capable in this was ease Needs, v. 591 P.2d 130 State conscientious, as well as I am more and (1979), Wrenn, State Idaho more inexorably drawn to the conclusion (1978). Sally 584 P.2d 1231 was Needs poor charging choice torture degree killing murder, that, of first murder for only made convicted person higher some other in officialdom. her husband—an unwitnessed homicide. death, Approximately two weeks before his I opin- The author of the Court’s Stuart according testimony eye-wit- of an ion, noting charge after that the was tor- ness, she assaulted the then hus- had live ture murder then rationalized that the an- joined with a knife. an band butcher ticipated charge defense to that would be opinion upheld unanimous the admis- to show the that the homicide resulted sibility testimony. opinion of that Our discipline. from an over-abundance of Be- stated, “Specifically, in as- homicide and defense, anticipated such cause of spouses, involving cases courts sault spoke “The opinion Court’s then to: state’s defense, allowed to a defendant’s have chance refute that other spouse showing prior than the deceased severity treat- assaults on victim, would be to introduce ment illustrate the mental attitude the ac- might tend to show other evidence which spouse and to cused toward the deceased appellant’s this victim treatment of prove motive.” 99 Idaho at discipline.” purposes other was for than at 140. Stuart, supra, 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d case, v. Wrenn was not a homicide added). (emphasis at 840 leaving why me it was cited to wonder yet opinion, having not held The Court’s a along Perhaps, with because Needs. admissible, such evidence de- extraneous “string” impressive cases is more two tailed its value: single defendants citation. The two than case, presented state an abun- charged convicted of were Wrenn concerning appellant’s dance of evidence robbing previously an itinerant unknown their minor abuse of other women and complained The itinerant authori- them. with he had lived over children whom him at defendants robbed ties that two treat- period years. Appellant’s of ten had been seen to- gun point. The three persons was sub- ment of these other gether by defendants other witnesses. stantially appellant’s treatment similar to itinerant, being at trial admitted Thus, evidence was victim. robbery. The two defen- denied the appellant relevant to show Billings, apprehended dants had been discipline in his than that of intent other Montana; alleged to have crime was he treat- because treatment the victim Pocatello, place Idaho. taken him in a similar persons close to ed other (there no majority joined It also relevant show manner. dissent), remanded be- nature, which reversed and support- thus sadistic appellant’s *30 theory appellant’s on an officer’s judge, that the based the state’s cause trial torture, in- the victim was testimony of the the automobile treatment vehicle, inclinations satisfy the sadistic to a stolen flicted drove was two defendants appellant. of defen- that the gave jury the an instruction indicative flight could be considered dant’s Idaho at supra, 110 [715 and Needs. much guilt. to of So Wrenn set as stage thus well theWith 833]. directly point are not

These cases here, they all dealt with issue as precedential case in the Court’s The third by the commission facts that reflected upholding relied In crimes. this defendant of other extraneous, wholly the admission eighteen death of an involving the case unrelated, testimony of history ancient boy, there was evidence old month purportedly women from the two assaulted disci- times had the defendant at various Sanchez, Washington was western as well as the other plined the decedent (1971). It 483 P.2d 173 94 Idaho evidence that There was children. introductory re- preceded by these first by the defen- imposed discipline been marks: his hand slapping the children with dant case, argues that appellant also this occasion, and on other occasions out prejudicial effect of this evidence evi- There was also use of a belt. relevancy, thus it should weighs its im- discipline this had been dence that In cases where evi have been excluded. only the consent of posed not highly prejudicial, claimed to be dence is mother, that she had ex- children’s but where the balancing test is conducted discipline the children pected him to value of the evidence is bal probative respect their they gain order that prejudice to the defen against anced interjected step-father. This evidence Here, already dis dant. as we have case, this i.e. whether another issue into cussed, relevant the evidence was employed was ex- corporal discipline appellant in his treat the intent of show of The trial court was aware cessive. of the victim. State v. San ment See probative problem of whether (1971) chez, 483 P.2d 173 outweighed prejudicial value of it case, bad beating child evidence {in of position. In this effect on defendant’s beating defendant, in acts form of involving abuse of a small type of case children, to show other relevant defen unraveled, child, easily the facts are not children). The toward dant’s attitude a most diffi- is faced with state support the existence evidence tended to prove ex- problem attempting cult suffering. pain cause of the intent to con- place. take It is the actly what did type this The inclusion or exclusion of that in such a situa- clusion of this court is a matter for the exercise evidence properly admitted tion the trial the trial court. the sound discretion of give evidence order in the home picture the situation full Regretfully, I submit that the au- must recog- tragedy It is occurred. where I should have been better thor of Stuart might have testimony nized that It was not acquainted with Sanchez. ju- inflame the minds of tended to the treat- evidence of wholly extraneous rors, where children especially wholly connected ment of other not-at-all are age those involved here tender readily This is discernible children. concerned, pro- testimony was of yet this briefly opin- reading very the Sanchez bring the attitude of out bative value ion, the fact that Sanchez produces step-children, towards his the defendant charged at the time of the and his wife the deceased child. and towards included had a household which homicide children, youngest and the who Sanchez, four 483 P.2d old, of the homi- (1971). strong was the victim There was circumstan- 18-months given by placed the defendant had cide. At the tial evidence that dryer, as to testified electric clothes of witnesses who the infant number admitted discipline by the defendant stains on the shown blood prior acts victim, much doubted dryer but the door. It is young evidence against not opin- challenge the Sanchez one would in the household. other children of invol- holding affirming the conviction such was ion of the Court conceded It is much more conduct, manslaughter. untary never- of criminal not evidence legally minds educat- that mature doubtful theless admissible: *31 then, nated in making any ruling, and when ed use the he did authority changed would Sanchez case as venue was not to some validity District, upholding place for the of the out of the Second to Moscow, allegedly Idaho, of only the two women assaulted is not district, poles judicial The two cases are same apart. Stuart. but is an environment public- closer to the source of the notorious opinion for the Yet the Court states: “In Orofino, ity than where the homicide oc- presented case the evidence appel of curred, happened place the but also to be relationships prior lant’s two women [the Judge Moreover, Schwam’s residence. it in Washington years ten was intro earlier] counsel, required practition- sole defense a specific purpose showing duced for the Orofino, residing er temporary to find appel sadistic intent and frame mind of Moscow, quarters in which would in an lant time the commission ordinary criminal trial be a substantial acts directed toward victim [Robert defense, handicap. In a murder would “Bobby” 110 Idaho at 170 Miller]. [715 so, more be and in Idaho’s first torture logical That rationale is as 833]. spectacular obviously pro- murder a case— opposite angles proposition are well-nigh impossible duction—it a would be unequal, logic neither common sense situation. that the Add to all of bizarre discussed Idaho nor the three cases sustain defense counsel circumstance that would opinion in the Court’s as the eventually against defending find himself passage goes say, on to above “Thus charges the two to long-ago assault evidence was admissible under our rule.” the two Washington women from western admissible, If necessity the rule is one of a prosecution. testify on behalf of to made therein order assure that counsel, Defense he ably even had been capital conviction of Idaho no murder will assistant, staffed with an with investi- overturned, although on rare occasion gator, and the funds which are neces- interfering find reasons this Court will prosecu- sary engage to with the combat imposition penalty, with the death tion, might thrown in as well have put perceived judge error to district However, made of towel. he was sterner Osborn, resentencing. See State v. su stuff. Windsor, pra; Although pathos great deal of is (1986); Scroggins, P.2d 1182 and State v. spoken lost in the from the transition word (1986). P.2d 1152 just printed printed page, even PART IV. message to spell word will out a members opt of the bar to undertake such a who argument gave a Defense counsel at oral mission as that here undertaken. many obstacles cogent synopsis placed path attempting prepare in his to following is defense counsel’s state- anticipated, judge’s but never for the trial ment of frustrations visited him declared, the two client attempt provide determination allow in his with a Washington western to testi- defense a fair trial: women from True, fy. considered on the direct this was issue, MR. KINNEY: To address component one small appeal, at is presenting we are primary issue per- necessity and of a picture, overall necessary juncture, it at this throughout proceedings all of the surrounding meates go the facts through a bit of complaint charged since Stuart was ultimate Mr. conviction and sen- Stuart’s to stand trial after over is aware bound tence. As the Court of, synopsis record, con- preliminary hearing. That convicted was Mr. Stuart was in this any member of trial bar the first state vincing person convicted by torture. Mr.' not able to obtain murder counsel was crime of defense ultimately sentenced death My separate trial. of a fair semblance conviction, how, and several matters on a after his reported in Stuart preparation significance in trial arose change of venue because motion espe- feel are during trial which procrasti- publicity Schwam undue *32 in this case. of the evidence consideration time, myself period of In that interim not dally here and which were relevant state, for the Mir. Cal- and then counsel appeal earlier. matters raised on direct houn, by the Attor- were contacted U.S. record, by reflected Mr. Stuart As ney corre- in turn received who had by myself stages all represented Smith, spondence Leila from one his initial arrest proceedings since Lynn Matieoni. Mrs. Smith mother of through including present date. and Lynn had heard Matieoni advised me, has charged, Mr. excuse death sen- Mr. conviction Stuart’s murder charged with the crime of been present had evidence to tence and by The state’s counsel torture. sugges- anyone would listen at the who preliminary hearing conceded that tion, receiving correspon- after prove that offense without could not Attorney, and both from the U.S. dence testimony girl friends and use myself Mr. wrote to Leila Calhoun defendant, up alleging events wives of Smith, I in turn was able to contact have prior one decade to the event. We Lynn Lynn Matieoni. relevance previously litigated the issue of whether testimony overwhelming Matieoni’s have or not that should been sup- Lynn point. Matieoni has at this argue it at admitted at trial and will supplemental pe- plied in our affidavits point. The central issue we are now post relief to the tition for conviction presenting to the Court is whether August of that refusing court erred in to allow that in district effect virtually evidentiary hearing post con- year on the she until October proceeding by filed Mr. viction relief with Mr. on a full time basis resided by myself. you, her affidavit does Mind Stuart. together say they as man post lived petition for convic- Mr. Stuart’s couple, relief, supple- her affida- petition his initial wife or as a tion they one David clearly says mented the affidavit of were either vit virtually every psychiat- Mr. was a Simmons. Simmons one or the other’s home Hospital daugh- at State North ric technician night. Lynn Matieoni had two year Mr. Katrina, oldest, Simmons Orofino her ters at that time. early Sep- that in stated his affidavit five. Mr. Stuart cared was then 1981, he was August or late tember daily basis. Mr. Katrina on a Mr. asked Mr. approached by Stuart who man who was characterized surrounding appro- questions Simmons being as a a torturer Schwam Miller, discipline of Robert priateness of murderer, children, Mr. women who died and is concerned the child only Lynn Matieo- cared for not in his proceedings. Mr. Simmons these in a fashion but did so ni’s children Mr. indicated that he instructed affidavit according exemplary her which was discipline, appropriateness of Stuart as to affidavit. circum- given do under what he should JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT meeting place that the took stances and interrupt you a Kinney, if I could Mr. Miller’s prior to Robert only three weeks moment. only Mr. originally submitted We death. Certainly, sir. MR. KINNEY: if supplementation, affidavit Simmons’ JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT will, post convic- to our you motion for you filed the At the time original petition was That tion relief. trial, assistance, did prior to investigative hear- district court without denied locating Lynn Matieoni. in mind you have Then, the court’s response in a ing. Yes, Your Honor. KINNEY: MR. denial, in the interim between so. Very much original petition our time we filed JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT de- the court’s relief and post conviction By name? light, a mat- it, a matter came nial of Yes, sir. Yes. And. MR. KINNEY: critical to this Court’s I feel is ter which *33 telephone

attle directories. The sheriff's department gave me a set of Seattle di- (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT rectories. The trial court then instructed me, you your tell Can I’ve reviewed up night, in me to come district court affidavits, matter, in this what other evi- chambers, County in Clearwater Court- you seeking dence were that time house, telephone many people, as through investigative assistant. by telephone, reach if I could. them MR. KINNEY: I’d like to address following, Then at our law and mo- that, if I I could. And think that a day County every tion Clearwater investigative motion for assistance is es- Thursday, following other law pecially relevant here. Mr. Stuart had day reported I him motion to special relationship informed me of a he by telephone. I had made He contacts had with an individual the name of it, then authorized and that was $300 Lynn during preparation. Matieoni investigative expenses. That was $300 At all times I of her name. was aware compensate intended to me for air- my At the time I filed motion for inves- plane ticket to and motel and Seattle assistance, tigative seeking we were not car— rental Matieoni, only to find Ms. if she were to JOHNSON): (JUSTICE exist, THE seeking COURT we to find were also your specific purpose going That who in the was witnesses resided Wooden- ville area who could contradict the tes- Lynn to to seek Matieoni? Seattle Jacobsen, timony-of Nel- Theresa Vicki things, among MR. other KINNEY:— son, Dally concerning and Sharie Your Honor. events which occurred Seattle. JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT Please, and I ask the Court to remember things? What other filed, in limine we was that the motion things The were MR. KINNEY: other requested filed because the trial investigate witnesses in the Wooden- to in limine so that he that we file a motion area, ville where Mr. Stuart had resided. prelim- portions us what would tell testify could to events Witnesses who ah, testimony, hearing transcript, inary alleged to have occurred which had been he at trial. He denied would allow allegations by Theresa Jacobsen. motion, prior to. as I recall ten weeks allegations beating drowning, the Immediately after his denial of our trial. right when she left of Theresa Jacobsen segre- him to asking in limine in motion neighbors, Mr. I interviewed Stuart. hear, I gate portions he would friends, Mr. Stuart and ex-roommates of assist- investigative filed the motion allegations. Some of contradict those to then faced ance because we were We were my efforts were successful. addressing each and ev- prospect at trial consist- get four witnesses able presented at the ery issue which believe, roommates, I ex-room- ing of hearing. were there mates of Mr. who JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT Lynn during day prior to and you specify to At that time did Matieoni, Matieoni, ah, Theresa Lynn investigative ef- exactly what Schwam Jacobsen left. you pursue. forts wanted JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT Honor, I’m Your KINNEY: MR. you intended any leads that Were there recollection. my trust going afraid I’m investigative assist- pursue through its, response to me in The court directed ance, originally requested, you had investigative my I motion when filed Lynn Matieoni location of other than the to file assistance, me the court directed you unable daughters, that were and her I setting what wanted forth an affidavit grant complete through $300 that affi- not recall whether to do. do provide court did assistance the the other Lynn Matieo- mentioned specifically davit you? mentioned name, specifically ni Oh, Your Honor. yes, MR. KINNEY: court, trial to contact. who I wished multitude there were a I feel that to Se- court, I have access directed apprised, I was

tion became trial, when, until apprised, never I feel I unable to matters which what witnesses he would allow ah, complete, being I couldn’t track prelimi- taken at the what relatives down several Mr. Stuart’s permit. he nary area. had lived Woodenville who (JUSTICE JOHNSON): I THE COURT period using days, for a of five was there *34 being you assumed he assume cautious personally a look my vacation as time to permit all of would it. people, try these or to find them. after Yes, And because MR. KINNEY: sir. People who had moved out of the Wood- effort, very we made a strenuous of that living and were south of enville area could, as I uncover the wit- as much Tacoma, I couldn’t I feel that an find. everything that would nesses contradict investigator could have uncovered evi- hearing. that was said of, Mr. relatives dence that Stuart knew JOHNSON): (JUSTICE THE COURT him had seen with Theresa Jacob- who any investigative ef- Were there other Nelson, sen, had seen him who with Vicki anyone any by you or to locate forts else Sherry had seen him Lee and who with during that or other witnesses evidence specifically But Nelson and Dallie. Vicki period of time? Theresa Jacobsen. Only my telephone KINNEY: MR. (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT Honor, calls, nightly Your made almost you trip, returned When from that did from the courthouse to the Seattle vicini- you report your any form to efforts me, if ty, helping and I had no one else Judge Schwam? your question. that's certainly MR. KINNEY: did not We (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT report we found. file written of who you. Thank that we What we advised the court was (JUSTICE BISTLINE): I THE COURT ulti- found some witnesses that we would two, Kinney. or question have a Mr. any mately call at trial. I have don’t Yes, MR. KINNEY: sir. my specific report recollection of a (JUSTICE BISTLINE): THE COURT efforts. practitioner? You’re a sole (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT time, KINNEY: but at MR. Not at this your investiga- you Did renew motion for was, I Honor. certainly time Your tive assistance at that time? (JUSTICE BISTLINE): THE COURT KINNEY: I I MR. don’t recall And where? did, no. I don’t I did. recall that KINNEY: In MR. Orofino. (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT (JUSTICE BISTLINE): THE COURT you Did feel satisfied the results in this And where was the trial held investigation? your case? KINNEY: time did I. MR. No. At no MR. KINNEY: Moscow. (JUSTICE JOHNSON): THE COURT BISTLINE): (JUSTICE THE COURT you anything put do the court

Did else to you long practiced? have How had been on notice assistance practiced MR. KINNEY: I’ve you was now granted to not sufficient? years. Honor, KINNEY: we did MR. Your (JUSTICE BISTLINE): THE court, COURT effort “we not take the to tell investiga- you private were Before that enough witness- don’t think that we have tor? because testimony,” counteract es to sir, No, I KINNEY: never MR. I didn’t know what area. any experience trial. would allow until Schwam BISTLINE): (JUSTICE us he not rule fact, he told’ THE COURT business, which, he you appointed to any past the time were And at if defense, suppose, I trial. you, And would allow trial until handle this were keep up your ques- obliged, you trying to for me were it’s hard to answer so county provide does not secretarial assistance, any up other it is to the indi- private practice stay afloat budget vidual who contracts the office to might put? all that himself. very apt MR. KINNEY: That’s a char- public acterization. The office (JUSTICE BISTLINE): defend- THE COURT County, presently er inis Clearwater you any thoughts you’ll Do have on what part-time position. is a What remnants judge you do next time some asks my private practice were left —after capital undertake case? trying keep Mr. Stuart’s case —I was Honor, MR. KINNEY: Your I have no with, up guess way is the best to char- do, doubt what would would assure working acterize it. I was Mr. Stuart’s past, this Court as I have in the that I do time, average case on an of half half a person not think that should under- every day, evening day hours *35 capital single handedly. take case I every and weekend. The rest of the time tough undertaking any think its a for keeping my practice I tried to dedicate to people, my it was rendered in two but alive. opinion, my opinion, in strenuous almost (JUSTICE BISTLINE): I THE COURT I impossible in these circumstances. rec- think, County, you Ada have no- unlike ognize budget- that small counties have assistance, legal body, no no assistance constraints, ary recognize I that and on this case? person any type when a bids of contrac- all, MR. KINNEY: None at Your Hon- comes, employment you tual take what further, might I or. And add that that, willing accept ready and I’m to Orofino, public defender7 in contract and I’m not here to whine about the fact today, longer I’m no as far as I know representing in Mr. that I was alone defender, public quit I after the Stuart respectfully I but submit case, contract still is such that complied here. matter. The 19-8528 was not with privately it’s a contracted (a) proceedings Payment.— A provides commitment Idaho Code 19-861 as follows: § 7. — needy being by person detained a law who is Employ- 19-861. Public defender’s office— officer, (a) who is confined or is enforcement Compensation—Facilities.— If an of- ees— established, proceedings pursuant subject hospitalization public of been fice of public defender has 66-322, 66-326, 18-212, 18-214, may employ, the manner and by 66- defender in to sections 66-409, Code, compensation prescribed of the board or who is under at the county or commissioners, committed, public many being charge having assistant as or is formal defenders, clerks, stenographers, of, crime, investigators, a serious detained under a conviction persons considers neces- and other as the board is entitled: carrying responsibilities sary under out his (1) represented by attorney an to be person employed this section this act. A under having person his own extent as a same public pleasure defender. entitled; serves is so counsel (b) public has been defender If an officer (2) necessary provided servic- be with the established, county commissioners the board of (including representation es and facilities of shall: preparation). investigation and other (1) (including appropriate facilities Provide services, attorney, facilities and the books, furniture, post- space, equipment, office age, supplies, provided public ex- shall be at court costs interviewing facilities in is, person pense that the at to the extent public jail) necessary carrying de- out the need, unable to time the court determines act; responsibilities fender’s under provide payment. for their (2) grant public an allowance defender (b) rep- needy person to be A who is entitled place of those facilities. (a) attorney under subsection resented an (c) defending attorney to use the is entitled A entitled: evi- evaluation of state facilities for the same stages (1) at all counseled and defended to be county prosecutor. available to the dence as are beginning time with the earliest the matter impractical, the court If he considers their use person providing own counsel when a private may fa- the use of concerned authorize represented be be entitled to would attorney tion; by the paid order be for on court cilities to proba- including revocation county board of commissioners. any appeal; provides (2) represented follows: Idaho Code 19-852 to be (3) post-convic- represented in other needy person— Right to counsel 19-852. proceeding post-commitment tion or stages criminal and Representation all court, court, open then file a motion that we Schwam directed meaningful as- given any We were not instruct, limit. asking him to limine sistance, or otherwise. We financial read the He then for, it; every step we asked asked for conjunction transcript, apparently, only time we had denied. The we were had, and after motion we with another expertise psychi- any professional believe, 29th, I ten July reading that on tes- psychiatric and ultimate atric trial, the motion denied prior to weeks trial, then the bill timony at and even point at this he couldn’t limine and said ques- psychiatrist submitted testimony he would which of decide severely. tioned allow. green light’s going on. my I see case, and I entire just, There is BISTLINE): (JUSTICE THE COURT this, this entire case can’t over-stress taken question. more I’ve have one hostility and an at- permeated your time. some Mr. hatred to mosphere of intense right. quite KINNEY: That’s all MR. years in 12 I have never Stuart. BISTLINE): (JUSTICE THE COURT that was conducted practice had a trial things I’d like to know. are These environment, and we an emotional such you say that the thought I understood people who can contradict now have in li- a motion judge you asked to file produced the state’s witnesses *36 mine. The, and convict Mr. Stuart. evidence to Yes, did. MR. KINNEY: he important especially because I feel its BISTLINE): (JUSTICE THE COURT Schwam, opinion,in his find- in his Judge he denied it? And then under aggravating circumstances ing of Yes, he did. MR. KINNEY: 19-2515, he said that defen- found BISTLINE): (JUSTICE THE COURT doubt had a reasonable beyond dant why, something in say he was there girl by Did attempted to kill his friend reasoning explains his the record that beyond a rea- drowning, he that found something, you to do compelling raped doubt the sonable defendant denying it? then were hospital. Those in a his ex-wife pre- at a were discussed minutes re- matters which MR. KINNEY: The court defendant had court, ah, liminary hearing when the I’m sure flect that the line apprised of what this, never even been the trial court asked record reflects take, ah, because, going to testimony was in limine at us to file the motion preliminary given at the the, appellant’s going to be hearing after the a at then, And what, given. it was hearing, if until questioned arraignment, initial Judge does is take Schwam and what any, preliminary evidence again discusses quantum leap and never in mind allowed. Please bear would be trial, sen- at the time of during hearing evidence that that the defen- says, “I find that tencing he rape a allegation an consisted doubt, tried to dant, reasonable beyond a allegation hospital, it consisted an a friend, raped girl kill ex-wife—his he at- his girl his said that one of friends hospital. is sheer in a Which his ex-wife in a lake in tempted to drown her And it was stuff psy- and utter nonsense. area, also a and there was Seattle prelim- even rebut that we couldn’t who opinion by an individual chiatric at not allowed inary hearing and was those And Mr. Stuart. had never seen recognize We position. That’s our me, trial. so asked very troublesome were (c) right under needy person's to a benefit appro- needy A attorney person considers or having (a) (b) proceed- his is unaffected in which the or priate, unless the court subsection expense, is not a brought provided determines benefit at his own a similar person it, with ade- stage. proceeding that a reasonable having earlier at an his waived bring willing his at quate would be means pro- expense is therefore frivolous own ceeding.

attempted to drown a woman as a means of torture that this defen- Osborn, sentencing State v. beatings upon dant inflicted brutal his court can preliminary hearing hear testi- raped second wife and her while she mony. This case deviates from that hospital recovering an degree substantial in the sense that the accident. automobile beyond court found a reason- able Mr. doubt that Stuart had commit- Judge referring Schwam was to the testi- alleged ted these acts. Jacobsen, mony girl- of Theresa a former Nelson, of Mr. friend and Vicki Moscow, argument Idaho, Oral at April his wife. The Ms. former concerning the alleged Jacobsen drown- Thereafter the Court was furnished with ing attempt Preliminary was taken at the supplemental briefing defense counsel’s Hearing, pages and contained on 151-154 responses which both Bench clarified Preliminary Hearing Transcript. questions argument provided at oral us thorough After Trial review of the with citations to the records: Transcript I find Ms. Jacobsen testi- Argument At the Oral held this cause concerning briefly fied incident at 7, 1988, Moscow, April several of Trial, however did not offer the expressed concern Justices over trying Mr. Stuart to drown findings considering Schwam testimony relating her. Trial to this Her penalty the death under Idaho Sec- Code pages incident is contained on 616-617 of Specifically, tion 19-2515. Court con- Transcript. the Trial findings of sidered certain the Trial involving respect With to the incident testimony presented Court based alleged rape of defendant’s former Preliminary Hearing Trial. not at *37 spouse hospital while she was the re- purpose correspondence this is to of accident, covering automobile specific portions set forth the Judge referring the testi- Schwam is to findings the record which illustrate en- Nelson, only mony at of Vicki taken Schwam, by Judge tered and the location Preliminary Hearing. the Her testimo- Preliminary in the any data relevant ny concerning appears matter in the Hearing Transcript. This let- and Trial Transcript Hearing Preliminary on only you, ter is mailed to intended Trial, pages At Nelson tes- 222-224. Ms. provide who to assistance Clerks the commencing page at 636 of tified reviewing the as a are no doubt record testimony on Transcript, Trial with her Argument. result of Oral our concluding page at direct examination finding Judge specific Schwam permitted to 651. was not at Trial She the Oral which raised at time of was concerning hospital testify alleged Argument page at is located rape to at which was earlier testified Transcript Appeal. on original Clerk’s Preliminary Hearing. No reference record, Trial point that in the At anywhere to is contained that incident finding pursuant Ida- a Court entered Transcript. Trial 19-2515(f)(8) de- that the ho code Section fendant, in the commis- by prior held, conduct Argument At was the time our Oral at hand had exhibited sion of the murder me I did before the first Clerk’s not have which propensity commit murder a Appeal Transcript on which contained continuing a probably will constitute Also, Preliminary findings. Court’s Judge com- society. Schwam’s threat Tran- Transcript and the Trial Hearing ments, part, are forth as pertinent set script not before us for reference. were follows: transcripts, and the Upon of both review specific language Judge Schwam beyond a demonstrates The evidence finding pursuant to Idaho entering the defendant reasonable doubt attempted to drown her—found fact doubt, and proven beyond a reasonable 19-2515(f)(8), appears Code Section on also relied the Nelson involving that the incident Ms. Jacobsen be raped hospital she was —found Trial, testified to at was indeed however doubt. proven beyond been reasonable detail without the or conclusions drawn Preliminary Hearing. actually has estab- at The incident What been now involving beyond dispute cavil alleged Ms. Nelson and her lished— —is findings sole- judge-made such were based rape hospital clearly at the hearing preliminary ly on a cold written part Testimony, having Trial her admittedly long Judge read Schwam presented Preliminary been Hear- Moreover, prior that trial com- to trial. ing. Preliminary Hearing Since the Judge proceeded menced and without Magistrate, taken before any ruling on making Schwam whatever any Schwam did not at time hear live coun- the in motion filed defense limine testimony concerning this incident. judge’s sel at the direction. Kinney’s fully Mr. assertions are sub- One of the main thrusts of defendant’s stantiated record. At the post-conviction proceeding, as also well the witness Theresa argument, stated in his narration at oral testify Jacobsen did not that the defendant frustrating impossibility of ade- lake, had tried to drown her mur- quately preparing capital for trial of a rather that at a she time thereafter charge knowing der without whether the making considered a statement to such judge keep out or in all of allow person adjoining in a she car car preliminary hearing testimony parked defendant were while at a 7-11 charge properly was extrinsic to the filed Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. store. i.e., Idaho, Bobby life taking that of County Miller in 19th Clearwater give any testimony did She day September, 1981. To which must pre- related way trial which handicap inadequate added the assist- liminary testimony concerning any “at- funding ance which to combat tempted drownings,” other than charges took unlaid of incidents which some unidentified trial there had testi- been place away in western five hundred miles mony sobriety as to her state of *38 Washington years prior charged ten the to incident, evening of lake the “... Gene homicide. he me the lake said threw to [defendant] up me sober ... was not drunk.” Trial the in which Unfortunately, manner Tr., Judge the has p. 634. On direct examination she had Schwam conducted trial troublesome, made if not appellate review prosecutor purchased told the that she had brief, supplemental short difficult. consump- Lancer’s wine for two bottles of instance, supra, set out defense counsel by tion her the Vicki Nel- defendant. testimony, to Nelson “She states as the testify son did at permitted testify to con- was not Trial raping she him me to what would “consider cerning alleged hospital rape ...” hospital in the bathroom room.” Why permitted do she was not so is Tr., Preliminary Hearing p. At in the record. The reason reflected jury no such was trial before this, inexplicable happen- trial other given. ings Judge sponte Schwam’s sua point foregoing out the serves ruling proce- that on all matters of limine briefing. accuracy of counsel’s It defense approach dure the bench counsel would that, extremely important is as has been put jury rather to the exercise than seen, utilized Schwam being returned to the room. While gospel being ingratiating courtesy as he remembered as ex- what indeed an i.e., jurors, it left court testimony, that defendant tended to local the Jacobsen

ty. Rather that defendant was tried and charge very convicted on a of robbery. reporter out in the cold as well. The that, much believe had the defendant record replete is bench-attorneys with dis- Wright be convicted murder and sen- cussions held “off the record.” Nowhere death, tenced to at least one and more in the record any suggestion is there found three, likely justices two or who prosecutor and defense counsel comprised majority swung would have both statutory waived requirement, I.C. Bakes, to the views of Justice and there 1-1103, reporter that the is required § would have been a retrial. take proceedings down all in a criminal brings point Which to the making me case. Wright, See State v. regarding two observations the trial court’s (1975), (“appellant P.2d 63 contends conducting manner, i.e., such a the failure of the district court unrecorded bench discussions as as well require the reporter closing record unrecorded made decisions with counsel arguments of counsel was error and con- deprived chambers has the members of this trary to the requirements of I.C. 1-1103. § Court performing statutory our obli- agree.”) We See also same case the gation independent of whether the defen- — dissenting opinion Bakes, of Justice con- dant appeal, chooses or declines to of mak- by McQuade. curred in then Chief Justice mandatory required review by I.C. Justice McQuade Bakes and Chief Justice 19-2827: strongly disagreed the majority’s with con- Review of death sentences —Preserva- clusion that the failure the trial court to (a) tion of records.— Whenever the comply statutory requirement with the penalty imposed, death error, harmless and that it was not funda- judgment becoming final the trial mental or constitutional error which en- court, the sentence shall be reviewed titles the defendant to a new trial: Supreme record Court of Ida- When this Court unable to review court, ho. The clerk the trial within the proceedings of the lower court be- (10) days receiving ten after the tran- cause, in violation of the statues of this script, shall transmit the entire record state, those proceedings record of and transcript Supreme preserved, was not properly taken and attorney general togeth- Idaho and to the and due to the record’s deficiencies we prepared er with a notice the clerk are unable to whether determine a defen- report prepared judge and a the trial judgment dant’s of conviction has been setting findings required by forth the proceeding obtained in a tainted 19-2515(d), Code, section Idaho and such error, then apply fundamental we must concerning other matters the sentence State, the rule of Ebersole imposed may required by the Su- (1967), 428 P.2d 947 where we stat- preme Court. *39 ed: legislative requirement Appellant’s dilemma was not of his Court conduct an automatic a review of statutory provisions making. own penalty irrespective death case of the de- requiring recording pro- of oral is, so, fendant appealing properly an ceedings reporter by the court ... are expression legislative intent that no protect fairly designed to a defen- ... person penalty suffer the without extreme very dant situation from the now be- safeguard judicial of review of the en-

fore this Court. transcript. Up tire record and until this time penalty all death sentences have been Wright, 97 542 P.2d Idaho at appealed by representing the counsel de- Ebersole, quoting supra with to approval fendants. (Bakes, dissenting). Wright J. was not a however, where was at risk a day, case the defendant One there will be the de- appeal, to prosecutor’s penal- for the death fendant who elects not as has candidate

907 judge trial where counsel was hands of the midway through any deprived until happened that chances elsewhere. When ruling prosecution to to allow whether itself happen Court will find inde- to this by testimony of ease altercations bolster its reviewing the record and tran- pendently of two women which alleged abuse guidance briefing script without the past. On Thurs- place years ten took counsel, naturally has been of 7, 1982, shortly before ad- day, October great value. recess, noon the fourth journing for the past have had the aid Because in the we trial, a day pressing for under continued counsel, representing the State ruling, finally the court verbalized one: prac- defendants, safely it can be said all, all, aware State tically of our focus THE COURT: am absolutely if not appeal procedure and none trying has been on the in to bears an enormous burden mandated the statute. review anyone any crime because it convict belief, My own has been mentioned must the trier of the fact that convince walls, heretofore within these marble every beyond true a material element is obligation have an in is we death particular doubt. In this reasonable delve to penalty into the record cases case, the Prosecutor must convince satisfy ourselves that it is free error your trier of the fact that client was regardless briefing in of and addition torture. And engaged a course of of counsel. death, produced not necessar- this child’s majority, If I command a rul- were to only intending ily intending death but ing day made that in would be And in alone I’ve torture. that sentence case, not penalty death where we do have ‘intending’a use the word number record, i.e., complete report- clerk’s ease, great And so of times. proceedings, transcripts er’s of all as re- extent, going to turn what the 19-2827, quired I.C. 1-1103 and both §§ jury going your client’s thinks was new trial result in reversal for a will ac- during mind that interval when he dealt espoused cordance with the views Jus- yourself you with And as this child. Wright “The tice Bakes case. stat- said, have the surface evidence indicates followed,” per utes are there to be Justice However, discipline. an the evi- effort to Goldman, Donald Burnett State v. allega- isme that that dence before such (Ct.App.1984) Idaho P.2d 599 say, of implication, tion or I should disci- Toohill, pline very questionable. point At this (Ct.App.1982). The are far too stakes if suspect jury I would time look high penalty death cases to deliberate, determining had to whether noncompliance we way other where see engaged your client in disci- not statutory requirements. ordering pline by and a half to a two eating year three old conduct CONCLUSION precise punish- such and then manner comply, him time not each he could thorough A review the record think for me to complete very it would be difficult my satisfaction that establishes extremely diligent de- responsi- and conscientious that the assume could power, attorney fense did all in his bly discipline. decide that that was *40 devastatingly within insufficient finan- That of more serious that was form means, trying obtain fair cial toward to words, teasing or in other torture. That deserve, trial which all defendants but es- process by to that was a emotion- penal- face extreme pecially those who boy. process. ally punish that The whole ty of death. jury I could that with think the conclude they But I think this evidence alone. particular my In were with the concerns it was an could also conclude that effort treatment defense counsel received at may he prove fact be able to beyond a reasonable And I am doubt. aware from to train him to in a way. eat certain reading preliminary hearing tran- words, other I think that the intent is not script present that the witness suffered clear at this time. If I felt the intent noticeably those less than other women overwhelmingly clear in either di- life, in his especially the more recent words, rection—in other that either the ones, although go it did back as much as totally Prosecutor had failed or had suc- years. ten think And I the Prosecutor ceeded to demonstrate his case at this has the opportunity prove to or should point probably I very would be hesitant opportunity prove have the to the state to past allow evidence behavior which your alleges mind he client to have will in prejudicial fact be to this case. and that in fact it this became child’s role IBut feel in what we fact have in is an suffering to do for the benefit of unclear and I think situation that your client. And I think that’s his basic your evidence of these other women in intention. He’s in effect said it and I directly client’s life does bear on the un- think might he has the evidence that derlying state of mind he has while he’s allow the the fact trier of to conclude acting respect boy. with to this beyond that doubt reasonable that that going your what’s client. Now, I’m not convinced that all I read preliminary hearing from each of If I exclude all of this evidence from those witnesses bears on that. And that then, proceeding, this I leave this difficulty creates for me I some as real- trying your to determine the status of ize the position uncomfortable for your if virtually client’s mind with no evidence you object every single have to ques- subject. available on the When in fact tion attempts the Prosecutor that’s the this great ask the heart of case to a present extent. impose others And I don’t think I can witness or he will call. I that situation on Prosecutor simply have already cautioned the Prosecutor your because so much what client did that I’m troubled this situation. And of. past in his which indicates status of his your presence indicated that at no time mind in dealing rep- with this child were prepared did I think I was to admit rehensible acts. It is unfortunate for everything out in prelimi- that came your reprehensible client that his acts that, nary therefore, hearing. And there dealing show the status of the mind in adopted have to be some means prejudicial with this child.9 And as as past to—if I let behavior in to be, they giving will I think the status of way structure the in which it comes in so the law proving on Prosecutor’s death that we can control incidences that torture that the does Prosecutor have to you we deal with having ap- without very clearly show was not a disci- pear engaged process in a trying pline situation. the intent That was in prevent everything reaching jury. fact to I think torture. And I put you don’t think I want to in that through preliminary Prosecutor has position. demonstrated substantial I reading pre- am convinced from highly amount of evidence which is rele- liminary hearing transcript that the Pros- your vant to state of mind. client’s So as ecutor’s that he feels he can assertion go I reluctant as am to into these mat- prove your to a trier of the fact that they ters and as much understand as torture, client simply needs someone to lengthen proceedings will these as well something whipping boy, like a for his possibly prejudice jury against client, pleasure actually something your own I would in think effect be not, hearing. judge already 9. Whether he it or He had understood here his mind demonstrated that was closed on decided the fact. *41 question reading transcript the from his of the allegations are not involv- these

because highly laden with deceased are the depriving highly the of relevant State you must accused against the emotion it so that over- evidence which is relevant credibility carefully each weigh the of might it any prejudicial comes effect every giving the benefit of such witness being of its admissible. have terms viewing critical- doubt to the accused Although great a deal the trial court said his possible prejudice of ly motive or the motion, readily not ruling there is the accuser. advanced seen therein that Schwam hamstrung defense counsel only Not any having reason for not arrived by the court’s preparation in his efforts midway earlier than conclusion much unacceptable de- totally unreasonable and Yet, inescapable is the trial. mid-trial, making ruling until lay in the not read the Judge’s own mouth that he had monstrosity proposition but the of hearing transcript and knew preliminary any meaning- offer found in the failure to testimony of the women would that the two judicial display a explanation ful for such in a prejudicial to the defendant trial on be obduracy. killing a charge a small child did, however, attempt make an judge torture, wholly unrelated to the infliction hypothesis upon he explaining true, as to two women. incidents if wholly he rule in could rationalized exception- acknowledged the The trial court alleged mistreatment evidence of unrelated high prejudice ally potential extreme witnesses, female of the two when he instructed mid-trial— —in judge Nelson. The found a Jacobsen and special instruction:10 single with a isolated “continuum,” fine-sounding word which testimony will hereaf- Some recently have practitioners we older presented by ter be the State concerns clerks, although it has learned from law allegations by the De- of acts committed yet way its into Black’s Law not made people than against fendant other Robert ed., defense counsel’s Dictionary, 5th To in no way Miller. And are the basis of key preliminary that that assertion against any charge the Defendant. Not- “comes testimony of those two witnesses withstanding the fact prior years as far as ten back directly any way does relate death,” responded the judge child’s with Miller, permit death of Robert I will II., hypothesis. p. Tr. Vol continuum single it for present purpose 1. 21: or intent attempting show motive course, Of I famil- THE COURT: have part on the Defendant torture I iarity evidence State’s because the deceased. It not to be considered preliminary hearing tran- reviewed the by you proof as evidence or on whether script. position he is in a feel or not the Defendant committed oth- such that demonstrate continuum af- aspect element er material pos- he has the ter that demonstration may only It be con- charged. crime jury beyond sibility convincing bearing on by you sidered as evidence simply your doubt client reasonable motive of the Defendant on the intent or way in a and that that behaves certain nineteenth, You are September explains his towards this child. behavior allegations these instructed that con- he this in a contin- Since I can do feel involving the deceased present cern acts he is entitled to uum feel they occurred which if occurred at all totality that continuum because presence of the Defendant that continuum would end final That the State’s case is what For this reason and child. and his accuser. anywhere are not found the court and 10. As with the conferences of chambers, and bench counsel in discussions, off-the-record record. given at the end of the instructions *42 earlier, As noted judge the district con- familiarity ceded his with the contents of is and think his evidence works in that transcript. So, fashion. yes, prepared I am to let go him well back because I feel it’s all a Being entirely satisfied with the accura- continuum of behavior which culmi- cy of defense counsel’s assertions made in explains nates this your child and the colloquy between the court and counsel argument, client’s expla- point, intent. At least an oral offers at this for the benefit Court, of other nation which members of the would allow and because on the direct none of conclude beyond a reasonable doubt this was opinions, discussed in the it is what was motivating your intent of reproduce believed pertinent order to client at the acting time he was towards supporting portions from clerk’s this child. ISo realize some of record: evidence is very remote in time from part this incident is but because it a hearing This held hear defense of continuum I don’t think —that there’s a Motion to Dismiss Information. Court give reason me to a rendered it’s on preliminary cutoff date decision transcript and found the say years five evidence sub- is reasonable or—and sev- stantially supports allegations not, years en is years or seven is reason- by the death was torture and that the years not, able and nine is it's all a person responsible for the is death continuum, it’s either all reasonable or defendant. Court denied the Motion to all I’m unreasonable. not convinced that Dismiss Information. point appro- we’vereached a that it is all priately on admitted of issue in- Information, Motion to Dismiss Min- tent11 25, 1982, Record, utes March p. Clerk's 20. In some minds a continuum jumps which NOW, COMES the above named defen- gap years may ten acceptable. Not dant, by through attorney his mine, Collegi- however. Webster’s New record, KINNEY, ROBERT E. and re- Dictionary, Merriam, ate published by sug- spectfully moves this Court for an Order gests that a continuum is akin to continui- setting scope forth the and extent of ty, “something absolutely and is continu- testimony and presented evidence to be homogeneous, ous and ... unintentional by DALLY, SHARIE LEE THERESA But, sequence.” ordered if reasonable and NELSON, JACOBSEN and wit- VICKI legally trained minds can differ on the prosecu- nesses called on behalf continuum, judge’s observation it sim- preliminary tion hearing held in ply judge justified cannot be 4, 6, this matter November requiring year a half almost 10, 1981. would, he fashion rationale brought Motion This in accordance mid-trial, declare that Court, with the directive of follow- hearing testimony Jacobsen and Nelson held on Mo- defendant’s repeated jury. could be to the “live” tion filed, argued to Dismiss heretofore preliminary hearing transcript was com- presented. pleted reporter certified Limine, May Motion in dated December, 1981, pages 10th all Record, added). (emphasis p. Clerk’s spanning days testimony. five At that longer time the case no before the NOW, COMES GENE FRANCIS preliminary hearing magistrate, STUART, but in dis- through attorney record, KINNEY, transcript trict court was filed. ROBERT E. and re- where the Sanchez, (1979), interrupted year a ten This continuum over State v. 94 Idaho span hardly supported by (1971). weeks con- two 483 P.2d 173 Needs, in State v. 591 P.2d tinuum

9H for hear- on states this matter The Court Investiga- for Motion ing the defendant’s order this Court for an spectfully moves Mr. filed this date. tive assistance public permitting expenditure his support mo- Kinney was heard investigator for private funds to hire CONCURRED MR. CALHOUN tion. infor- discovering purposes of facts TO DEFENDANT WAS THAT IF will im- mation which defendant believes TRIAL, HE AN NEEDS HAVE A FAIR prosecution wit- peach the INVESTIGATOR. preliminary hear- testifying nesses grant motion prepared Court is cause, expected and which are in this submit an addi- requests defendant but testify at scheduled for Octo- trial now it be and Affidavit on who will tional ber 1982. investigation is to reveal and what provi- is based This Motion Kinney he would need why. Mr. stated Code Section 19-852 and sions of Idaho his demonstration prepare time to some counsel upon the Affidavit of defendant’s writing can send it annexed hereto. Schwam. July, day DATED this 29 July Clerk’s Court Minutes Kinney added). E. Record, Is/ Robert p. (emphasis ROBERT E. KINNEY present in court with at- Defendant was Attorney for Defendant repre- torney, Kinney. Mr. Kinney Swayne. gave Mr. by Mr. sented Assistance, Investigative for Motion request for specifics the court the Record, p. 28. Clerk’s investigation for defendant payment of present in Defendant not court but was he of those felt listed the names attorney, Kinney. Mr. represented by Dally, Jacobsen impeach witnesses represented Mr. State was Calhoun. Nelson. Limine, by Mr. Kin- A motion in filed all findings were that not these Court presented argument. ney, was for investigator____ required witnesses in- denied this Motion. Court Court prefers attorney at- the defense Court structed that Prosecutor and tempt witnesses first tele- to contact investigation may Sheriff undertake investigator at phone. denies an Court criminal records of all witnesses used defendant proposes this time preliminary hearing. give pos- information attorney all the Kinney Mr. informed the court and State (on prospective wit- the location of sible psychiatric report from Dr. authorities____ used) to the nesses to be had not been received but when Wetzler sign will an order that authori- The court arrives, copy all will receive a cooperate to locate these individ- ties will report. effort must not include uals but their Kinney Mr. is to make actual contact. JURY TRIAL for Court set date for contact; prepare & Order. MONDAY, 4, 1982 at 9:00 OCTOBER to have all A.M. and advised the defense involved Kinney Mr. asks that the house way by legal matters out of the 9-1-82. provide investigated to in one incident be Jury Trial will be place for defense. Court allowed information at a later date. announced photo- and that the house be located investigation. graphs be taken July Clerk's Minutes Court added). Record, (emphasis p. August Clerk’s Minutes of added). Record, p. (emphasis present in court Defendant attorney, Kinney. Mr. but was represented by present Defendant attorney, Kinney. by his Mr. present represented on behalf of Mr. Calhoun represented by Calhoun. Mr. State was the State. quests Kinney that Mr. submit his state- expenses ment of investiga- incurred in Mr. Kinney advised the court he had tion County to the Board of Commission- one, contacted all witnesses but who County ers of payment Clearwater request- had an unlisted number. Court *44 denied, and if grant the Court will request unpub- ed that Mr. Calhoun payment motion for from District Court lished number that Mr. Kin- witness. Funds. ney moved he be to allowed to travel personally Seattle to contact the witness- 30, 1982, September Court Minutes of expense. objection by es at court No Record, p. added). (emphasis Clerk’s grants up State. Court and authorizes to (The caprice judge in regard this expenses $300.00 allowance for of Mr. exposed to public view in Stuart I on direct Kinneg dags. for a few appeal, opinion. but in majority not trial, Court announced the is set 860.) See 715 P.2d at 4, 1982, for October will be held in One would like to think that when the County Change Latah of Venue. prosecuting attorney courage had the to objected Kinney Mr. to the location and judge advise the that defense counsel could greater for moved a location dis- obtain a fair trial for his client without tance from Denied. Orofino. investigator, prose- the assistance of an prepare Mr. Calhoun to the order on the spoke. cutor knew well that of which he Change of Venue location. persist to denying For court in defense August Court Minutes of Clerk’s request, joined prosecu- counsel’s Record, added). (The p. (emphasis list tor, displays quality judicial arrogance Kinney of witnesses Mr. referred to he had likely country that has not been seen this earlier said would be to judge. sent King George Eng- since III chose his own judge did not make it of record. Obvi- or, judges yet lish colonists worse Matieoni, ously Lynn who surfaced crimes, serious those American colo- after trial and after conclusion of the direct charged capital against nists offenses list.) appeal, was not on the transported England. the Crown That present Defendant in court with attor- quality arrogance prevailed same also Kinney. ney, represented Mr. State was changed, belatedly, when venue was this by Mr. Calhoun. Orofino, Idaho, Moscow, case from Ida- Court advised a Motion to Dismiss on for ho, previously when discussed this Court hearing today. Kinney Mr. was heard appeal. had the direct defendant support of his Court motion. denies. publicity pre- only did not avoid the Kinney Mr. jury moved that the in the motion, cipitated change as in but forthcoming sequestered. be of being jury lost the benefit tried before a Court denies and advised defense peers. of his jury picked, can renew after defense may reported There be another case again. the motion Court will rule where defense counsel so much short- time. changed by judge crimi- presiding in a petitions in Court advised of file concern- transpired, nal case as here com- and as payment of witness fees for a wit- pletely undermined his efforts to render all jury ness trial. Petitions were defendant, dedicated service to an accused by Judge signed Haley. Mr. Calhoun brought been atten- my has not explained to the reasons Court. tion. grants signs Judge petitions and Schwam Judge Haley’s signature, over indi- Order sum, only if there are three members cating his ratification of same. willing are their this Court who close .of defense, Judge can Schill- eyes, affirm payment Motion for of costs to defense, ing’s denying any hearing re- order on the filed was heard. Court legis

The law amended until lature, prior thereto and as it had been post re- defendant’s conviction prior jury did not allow even statehood Judge lief. well documented is Too after separate case to murder finding, prominent in Schwam’s his written them. cause was submitted to decision, that defense counsel judge to the first take Schwam stipulated could make use of change advantage of the in the law which contained just and 19 transcript. became effective two months days homicide in this case. Un before the Moreover, type as to same of testimo- jurors doubtedly his announcement ny which the court allowed the to hear *45 high him in The law placed favor. which trial, it must be also remembered that however, jurors, he did not declare to those linch-pin upon imposition was the of which placed upon judge exercising the of onus penalty the death was fastened. matter, discretion such a circumstance taken, Note should also be as it was also heretofore discussed. su my opinion on the the direct from 110 pra, Idaho at at 863 sentence, conviction and the that the trial (Bistline, dissenting). J. judge right cut off defense counsel’s to request sequestration jury in his however, therein, Not discussed opening panel pro- remarks to the entire of legislature, majority blithely the the after spective jurors: point had held this that there was “no fact, probably good is as a time any juror exposed to indication that any explain type to that this is of publicity prejudicial during the course of case the request in which Defense can trial,” very ensuing the next ses- jury sequestered. be That grant judicial sion withdrew that of discre- during means all the trial is whoever “in where the tion causes defendant has jury chosen to be on the have to charged degree first been with murder.” be all under the control of the bailiff at 145, 1987 Idaho Sess.Laws 289-290. Ch. placed you’d times. That means be in a legislative clearly The in a sense was that you motel saw and whatever or heard capital penalty case where the awesome of away would be censored. You’d be from imposed jury may execution be must be families, your you eve- wouldn’t have sequestered. that translates is What into nings any to deal with matters business simply jurors being of this: The risk taint- is, words, you have. might It other well-meaning people ed the comments of go-

enormous inconvenience. That’s not ing to happen jury great, especially this ease. The is too all of is where those going be sequestered. to I am no too, people probably jurors, are longer required to do by law that. being exposed publicity, media to very Stuart, ordinarily the nature of the beast is supra, State v. 110 Idaho at Except 715 P.2d at 403. attuned sensational.13 daily separate- pages thoroughly devastating gree charges, 12. See murder which is treated sentences, reporting by papers ly by two local which were avail- two consecutive first however, jurors, "Provided, able to kith and kin of the and friends all sound: acquaintances as well. charged causes where the defendant has been murder, may degree jury with first not be Obviously, charged where defendant is with 13. separate permitted to after submission of the murder, legislature degree first fulfilled its jury permitting separate cause. Before intent, readily apparent because of a clerical submitted, been after the cause has court readily mistake what will seen as a clari- left permit place objections, any, shall counsel if ambiguity. fied presence jury.” on the record outside Laws, Sess. second sen- give continues 1981 Amendment separating felony to deal tence intended before discretion in case allow kept appears, separate, together. submission. Where the word "after" or to be however, case, "Any” first de- the word "before” was intended. Thus is does include Justice,

BISTLINE, dissenting. Idaho, gap, legislatures Territori- abundantly It is now clear that the Court State, recognized al and have that in such saga will issue its final degree emotional cases as first murder a State v. Idaho’s first torture mur- may very procedural defendant see little of affairs, being der case.1 Such the state of process jurors due unless the are isolated prologue is written not for the benefit improper influences. In Idaho’s cele- brethren, my respected but as an aid for case, brated first torture murder so much judges system those in the federal who will opportunity worse was prejudicing preside over Stuart’s endeavors at obtain- the accused. just in those courts a more treatment system. My than that dealt to him in this shot, parting A the statement which the purpose comments are offered prosecutor judge: made to the MR. CAL- enabling counterparts our federal to better HOUN THAT IF CONCURRED DEFEN- way through many pages wind their TRIAL, DANT WAS TO HAVE A FAIR record, transcript, and briefs. Added to HE NEEDS AN In- INVESTIGATOR. opinions that are the written on the direct stead, per discretionary generosity *46 I), appeal and now on denial of {Stuart court, investigator the trial no was allowed II). post-conviction relief {Stuart expense money and for Mr. $300 Kinney to travel to the Seattle area for a days investigation few of on his own. This THE VARIANCE AND compliance is not even a scintilla of PROCEDURAL DEFAULT statutes, legislature’s I.C. 19-852 §§ My opinion in I called the atten- 19-861, 26, 27, p. and supra, and 28. If the tion of the other four members of this judge in actions of the trial this case did highly prejudicial Court to the error deprive procedural the defendant of Unquestionably trial court’s instructions. process due then there will never be such a there is a fatal variance between

case. charge of the Amended Information and

APPENDIX C jury: the trial court’s instruction to the charged The defendant was with the fa- Bistline, J., Opin- dissent to the 1990 striking boy tal with the intent to 12, 1990, ion No. filed March which pain, inflict with the intent to extreme Opinion states on its face: “1989 No. satisfy of some sadistic inclination 10,1989, hereby issued March withdrawn defendant, the court instructed the and this is substituted therefor” jury that ‘It also be torture to shall (a) place deals with: the variance that took being on a human extreme and inflict proce- and the claim of defendant’s State’s prolonged brutality irrespective acts of default, (b) place; dural which did not take proof suffering’— intent to cause of of majority’s conclusion that Stuart was 18-4001, language which is found responsible as to the for invited error wholly but which was not included instructions; (c) proportionality court’s charge upon which the defendant was (d) majority; considered put to trial. stipulated to use facade that defendant testimony given preliminary hear- State v. of (Bistline, (1985) dissenting) P.2d J.

ing: opinions continuity ensuing of on Stuart’s with the sentence March 1989 this Court achieved requires post-con- the court to hear from counsel of court’s denial of the district exercising II, before discretion. viction relief. In both Stuart I and Stuart rehearings requested granted, and the were appeal, S.Ct. 1. Stuart I refers to Stuart’s direct reargued, and in each the Court issued a case opinions Court in Stuart No. 14865. The opinion. first and second 163-234, I are found at 110 Idaho II, 17014, refers to the S.Ct. No. 833-904. was committed as ing that the crime justices in (emphasis original). Those follows: majority were not in the least aroused Orofino, Francis Stuart That Gene variance, can being alerted day about the 19th Idaho on or they read I wrote and only mean that what Orofino, in the September, it, or, they did not to read it. ignored bother Idaho, Clearwater, County of response. certain there was no For being, there did then then and opinions were issued Stuart unlawfully feloniously kill a there rehearing was filed ap- intentional being, human with the supporting A brief was Stuart’s counsel. human be- plication of torture to said filed. The brief raised five is- thereafter Francis ing, to wit: that the said Gene sues, issue one of which was the variance Miller, did strike and hit Robert out just Counsel for Stuart set mentioned. being, repeatedly with the a human charging portion of the Amended Infor- satisfy suffering to cause or to intent alleges: It mation. inclination of the said some sadistic Stuart, thereby inflicting Orofino, Francis Gene That Gene Francis Stuart of Miller, Idaho, great bodily injury upon Robert day Sep- 19th on or about the Miller, 1981, Orofino, County mortally wounding Robert tember Idaho, Clearwater, State of then and the said Robert from which wounds being, Miller, did then and there unlawful- year boy, there a three old sickened feloniously being, Clearwater, ly and kill a human County and died in the application with the intentional tor- Idaho, day the 19th State of being, to said human to wit: that ture *47 September, 1981. the said Gene Francis Stuart did strike defendant, charge, To this Gene Miller, being, a human and hit Robert Stuart, plead guilty. has not Francis repeatedly with the intent to cause suf- added). R., 53, (emphasis How- fering satisfy or to some sadistic incli- ever, gave jury anoth- the district court Stuart, nation of the said Gene Francis language with er instruction in inconsistent inflicting great bodily injury thereby Information: charge of the Amended mortally upon Robert Miller and wound- Miller, ing Robert from which wounds Miller, year a three old the said Robert NO. 18 INSTRUCTION County boy, and died in the of sickened killing of a Murder is the unlawful Idaho, Clearwater, of on the 19th State aforethought being human with malice day September of 1981. application of torture or the intentional contrary 18- All of which is to Section being, a human which results 4001, 18-4003 of the Idaho Code. being. is the death of a human Torture I),

R., 14-15, S.Ct. No. {Stuart pro- infliction of extreme and intentional added). (emphasis Amended Information longed pain the intent to cause suf- objection made no to the Defense counsel fering. be torture to in- It shall also was in giving Jury of Instruction being on a human extreme flict charge spelled language exact brutality irrespective prolonged acts of out in the Amended Information: suffering. intent to cause proof of of being caused The death of a human INSTRUCTION NO. irrespective of such torture is murder kill; proof specific intent to torture Jury, you Ladies and Gentlemen of equiv- causing death shall be deemed Idaho has are instructed that the State of intent to kill. alent of against the filed a criminal information added). R., 55, (emphasis Counsel defendant, charg- Gene Francis aptly remarked: alleg- for Stuart Degree him with First Murder necessity which obviated finding suffering, intent cause if Bistline, As noted this In- Justice prolonged extreme and acts brutali- jury any re- struction relieved the existed, ex- ty were to have was found sponsibility proof to find intent tremely improper given specific lan- suffering. permitted cause It also guage It Amended Information. finding guilt if the found extreme apparent that, equally if such intent prolonged brutality acts of to have proven, of al- propriety need be existed, despite the fact that such acts lowing admittedly prejudicial evidence charged were in the Amended Infor- intent, purposes establishing this mation, supported by any nor reasonable seriously questioned. If to cause intent construction of which oc- the events suffering proven, need not be it cannot September 19, Appellant curred probative said that the value of this that, readily acknowledged at trial outweighed highly preju- evidence its September poked young he dicial effect. chest, spanked ROBERT MILLER in the Appellant’s Support of Pe- Memorandum him, and struck which ultimate- the blow (filed Rehearing tition for 8-5 issue, ly primary caused his death. The 8, 1985) added). (emphasis July Appeal, considered both at trial and on rehearing granted A but limited to actions, Appellant’s was not but his state giving Jury of error in the issue September day of mind on appropriate Instruction 18. An order was these acts were committed. As the Trial directing entered to file a brief pages indicated 449-450 of the Court brief, responsive to Stuart’s Transcript, quoted by Trial issue, single to file Stuart was allowed 3, 1985, Opinion in May its reply brief. pages 11-12: General, Thomas, Lynn The Solicitor E. particular COURT ... ‘[THE In] brief, page the State’s authored five case, the Prosecutor must convince “pro- gist was in of which that Stuart your the trier client of fact cedural default:” And engaged in a torture. course of *48 death, question not neces- The failure to in the produced child’s raise this procedural appeal was a default sarily only in- intending death but here, raising only precludes the issue not case, And so this tending torture ... post-conviction proceedings, but Wat extent, great turn going to a State, v. kins going on in what the thinks was courts, (1980), and in federal your during client’s mind that interval ’ Sykes, Wainwright v. 433 U.S. he this child ... when dealt with (1977). L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. 2497 above, parties were As noted all Respondent Response to Peti- Brief of question could charge aware that (filed Rehearing tion for in Stuart supported showing in- only be 21,1985). “pro- argument, At October oral part Appellant to cause tent on again urged by cedural default” in- suffering satisfy or to some sadistic but he ran into an ob- Solicitor General Indeed, of intent this element clination. person Shepard: of Justice stacle to be by the Trial Court was considered So, I think the Court THOMAS]: admittedly [MR. important so that it allowed a defaulted should consider this to be presented at prejudicial evidence to be claim. events, concerning unrelated to Trial victim, charged and which Thomas, crime or to its let SHEPARD: Mr. JUSTICE (10) as ten allegedly occurred as distant say you I don’t to believe me this. want it, give MIL- arguing I years prior to the date of ROBERT that I’m but want moment, you my impression at the Number Jury LER’S death. Instruction believe the questions specifically. don’t legislation procedural distinc- creates you you if I’m then either comment think proce- intended to create a tion or was go wrong, ignore or what I said and capital distinction between cases dural your point, next which I assume just It is as and other kinds of cases. you’re about to do. It seems to me that important capital in a case to insist that legislature its wisdom or lack liti- precluded from interminable one be Court, thereof has to this ‘Thou said thought up gation of new ideas after case, penalty shalt review a death adversely decision comes down whether there be an or not.’ say, As I there is a real defendant. if Right? reliability the re- question about the MR. THOMAS: The death sentence is sult, accuracy finding ap- to be reviewed whether there is an innocence, problem may guilt or that not, peal questions. other addressed, Wainwright even under proce- legislature Sykes and even under this Court’s JUSTICE SHEPARD: The rule, Court, dural rules. fundamental error has said to this ‘You will examine example, permit that even if it imposition of a sentence and death procedural were defaulted. But the rules proportionate determine whether it is prevent relitigation do of claims that imposed other sentences in other cases.’ reliability do not cast doubt on the Something certainly expect we don’t result and it seems to us that that is as it it, they trial courts to do and if did we’d Otherwise, capital should be. cases will probably say they doing were in error in be carried on forever when counsel said, legislature pen- it. The has ‘Death theory comes forward with another different,’ alty cases are for whatever might wasn’t used at trial but be success- reason, finality if nothing on the else. Allowing ful this time around. that kind really accept perceive your don’t what I undermining finality of these argument be, apply that we are to possible me cases seems to one procedural penal- default rule in a death result, public and that is to undermine ty appellant case because counsel for the ability confidence in the of the courts to point did not raise the in the initial So, legal enforce the law. both from a briefing on it but has raised policy perspective, I think would you why I it now. Now tell me shouldn’t be a bad idea. way, think Mr. Thomas. Thomas, JUSTICE BISTLINE: Mr. Well, MR. in the context of THOMAS: your response would I understand from constitution, the federal if I can start Shepard’s question is if to Justice there, *49 Supreme the United States Court defendant, we had a like sometimes as emphasized seems to have several times not, is sometimes as he is Creech procedural that far as the rules are convicted, says ‘okay, I don’t I’ve been concerned, any it doesn’t make difference appeal,’ still to do the want an we have capital the case is a case or whether mandatory legislative di- bit under important another kind of case. It’s rection. do And We have to our review. right the state to have the to enforce its lawyer if did not have Creech a we Otherwise, procedural these cases rules. review, doing saying were our you are go procedural can on forever. From a not, reviewing that we would besides

point any view there isn’t difference sentence, to ascertain to see that look capital between a case and another impartial he had a trial? fair legislature, capital The kind case. cases, asked the yes, absolutely, has Court review MR. THOMAS: Oh sentence, procedural but not the nice- is sen- Your Honor. Sentence review aspects capital procedural ties or the of the ease tence review the context of appeal brought raising is to determine wheth- unless an those cases.

vating list in the In fact that’s statute. aggra- premise the fundamental of those er, finding assuming guilt that the factors, vating how the crime was com- accurate, prop- the sentence of death was culpability in mitted and the defendant’s er in the facts and circumstances of the the crime. case. But I don’t believe that was an you JUSTICE BISTLINE: So would go proce- invitation to the Court to into effect, say, in when we have an questions ques- dural or other kinds of appeal in a case where the death sen- relating admissibility tions to the of evi- imposed, any mem- tence has been impact dence of whatever that do not there is counsel ber the Court—and particu- impose the court’s decision to a defendant, making the for the and we’re lar sentence. mandatory review—that member of I’m I JUSTICE BISTLINE: not sure with a the Court who concerns himself you saying we understand. Are question as to the fairness of the trial would or would not search the record brought up by hasn’t the de- been proceedings of the trial to see if just being fendant himself is sort of an had had a trial? defendant fair intermeddler, busybody? my- Such as self. I think MR. THOMAS: that’s correct.

I think that the automatic review— that, MR. Not Your THOMAS: Honor, you saying I ‘and think are JUSTICE BISTLINE: What’s correct? said, I finally, forget what have because That we or would not? going federal this case is over to the MR. THOMAS: You would not have they’ll any- make the decision court and authority go beyond sentence re- you way.’ really Because that’s what do only thing specified view which is the you when don’t insist on adherence in the context of the automatic review I procedural rules. And don’t state’s capital It’s almost inconceivable case. idea, good really think that’s because going that there’s not to be an you’ve got on a collateral review a feder- case, capital but let us assume the al court is at least twice removed from says appeal. defendant I don’t want an more at- the facts. The record becomes executed, Gary such as Gil- want to be error tenuated. The chance of factual hook in more did. The Court isn’t off the greater greater and and obvi- becomes review, terms of sentence but it isn’t finality is ously the interest in attenuated go entitled in those circumstances to into as well. procedural evidentiary aspects of 231-33, 715 P.2d at the trial. (Bistline, (some dissenting) em 901-03 J. you’re BISTLINE: cor- JUSTICE If added). original; emphasis phasis in some rect, why require, which then would we majority comprised the justices who assuming ap- no require, do there’s we upheld the conviction and both himself, peal by why do we the defendant relying part on the death sentence require transcript proceed- They procedural default. have talisman of ings? grips yet to come to therefore *50 Well, transcript of MR. THOMAS: by the egregious error committed tri- most facts, proceedings lays the trial out unin- may have been al court. The error background gives the factual however, considered, tentional; things it all relating to crime. It tells all the details Simply intentional. likely more than important con- the crime and that’s trial the end of a three week put, at the because passing in sentence included an jury sideration to the court’s instructions course, is, a had ground the nature of the offense for conviction which alternate Amended Informa- capital aggravat- pleaded in the consideration under the not been aggra- in the tion. ing factors that are set out

919 in a raised be heard trial of issues preme Stuart I been there, because the majority addressed noth- forded the treatment af (1948). rehearing is similar to the on its initial address the 18. After the This U.S. majority’s Court Cole v. State of rehearing.2 the mind of the majority is still opinion 196, petitioners by Cole, issue of opinion. granted rehearing, treatment of the was issued the state S.Ct. 514 given Whatever a rehearing the Arkansas Su Jury the Court stood [92 supreme specifically might Instruction Arkansas, L.Ed. after the court have 644] State v. ring). tions [916] Cole, be to on which he by prison following never made. of due constitutional a criminal or federal.... 333 U.S. at (1990) (Bistline, omitted); quoted convict Smith, charge, process proceeding was never tried as would him [117] rights 201, if It to send an accused to upon charge conviction of a desired, 68 S.Ct. at 517 J. as much a violation in all specially every [891, are courts, approval among accused 792] that was concur- charge state (cita- petitioners’ affirmed the convictions FAILURE TO AND INSTRUCT applying charge not included in the infor EFFECT OF OBJECTION OR mation. The Cole defendants were tried WITHDRAWAL 2, violating and convicted of but the state § supreme upheld their convictions un suggested As procedural above default der 1 of Act 193 of the 1943 Arkansas occupied major- must have the minds of the legislature. Compounding error, ity deciding I, because state court: challenge how Stuart’s initial jury to the later denied a rehearing summarily instructions was treated: petitioners argued: ‘To sustain a appellant’s note accept- counsel [W]e grounds charged conviction on court, ed given by the instructions as information and which the had no objection and noted that he had no opportunity pass upon, deprives give. instructions court intended to defendants of a fair trial and a trial Thus, any in failing error to instruct on jury, and denies the defendants that due charge offense], a lesser included [of process guaranteed by of law the 14th exists, if indeed one was invited error Amendment to the United States Consti- appeal. will not be considered on and. tution.’ Lopez, State v. 100 Idaho 593 P.2d Cole, (1979). 333 U.S. at S.Ct.

Here, majority of this 110 Idaho at Court has decid- Stuart 715 P.2d at 840. ed not to consider the merits of Stuart’s however, Lopez, my was discussed in Jury contention that Instruction 18 varied opinion, under the section titled substantially with the Amended Informa- INSTRUCT,” “FAILURE TO 110 Idaho at The majority tion. must have also decided 188, page my 715 P.2d at 858. On important message not to consider the complete chronological laid out the Supreme United States Court sent to the history of Rule 30. See also State Ei supreme state courts back 1948: sele, 695 P.2d principle procedural process (1985)(“I.C.R.

No due 30 as amended does not clearly is more preclude assignment instructing established than that no- of error in specific charge, tice of the and a chance where the defendant in a criminal case fails counsel, majority opinion 2. The full text of the and continues to adhere to the views *51 following rehearing issued is this: "A expressed and the conclusion reached in the rehearing granted in this matter the I, 227, opinion.” earlier Stuart 110 Idaho at 715 reargued. cause The Court has reviewed the P.2d at 897. arguments presented record and considered the 920 great truth contained in

demonstrates statement, simple ‘justice delayed is question.”). object to the instructions to ” Deshazer, justice Idaho denied.’ 93 Moreover, instructing jury in- lesser 274, 409 (Shepard, 460 P.2d at J. dissent- discretionary offenses not cluded is ing). court, the evidence would rea- where sonably support such a conviction on a a civil Stuart is not case. The stakes at our higher lesser included offense. As Court of issue here are somewhat than in Here, Deshazer. statement Justice Appeals has made clear: Shepard may referred to Deshazer be 19-2132(b) Idaho Code states: ‘The § thusly: injustice, is worded “Justice denied jury shall lesser instruct on carelessly dealt out is injustice out- they sup- included when offenses are rageous enough totally destory all sense ported by any reasonable of the view It has of inertia.” been conceded that In Lopez, v. 100 Idaho evidence.’ State defendant, Gene Francis 102, 1003, (1979), 593 P.2d our responsible the death Miller. of Robert ‘It is Supreme Court stated: clear that guilty has is It been conceded that he 19-2132(b) duty it the I.C. makes manslaughter. It has been the crime of the jury the trial court to instruct him jury that a convicted established they when are lesser included offenses degree first torture murder. It has been supported a reasonable of the view judge, equally well-established that evidence, is re- even the court not if office, long ago now from such sen- retired quested duty to do The same exists so.’ a histori- tenced to death. It is now reasons, defendant, if a for tactical even appeal cal the convic- fact that on direct requests no expressly instruction affirmed. tion and the sentence were both given. be a lesser included offense and is What has not been established had trial on Atwood, true is that Stuart a fair v. 105 Idaho issue of issue his conviction and on the The (Ct.App.1983). perceived P.2d death sentence. As Justice imposed no doubt flavored the procedural defaults written, Shepard law does not has also majority entirety opinion, II person guarantee perfect tri- an accused justices in making it more for the difficult al, guarantee a fair trial. but it does majority to at all concerned with the instruction and variance between on the chal- direct information. sentencing, Jus- lenging the conviction and Huntley separate

tice wrote a concurrence TOUCHED UPON his that: register PROPORTIONALITY view order sentencing process capital Idaho [T]he years ago Shepard, Twenty-one Justice respects: in two unconstitutional recently expressed the view departed, now (1) provide for utilization of It does appellate “ordinarily occurs that an dissent of both jury, which in violation outrage only when Justice’s sense constitu- Idaho and United States his sense of inertia.” Deshazer overcomes tions; and Tompkins, (1969). year his That was first (2) sentencing proceeding, as con- the bench of the occupancy of a seat on with the ducted the trial courts outrage Supreme Court. court, by permitting of this approval do with experienced in he Deshazer presentence inves- the admission protracted litigation had been hearsay civil evi- tigation report other years. The relief objection over seven one-half of the accused over dence injuries his sought right the accused deprives Deshazer witness- Shepard closed cross-examine arm. Justice confront ease es. by remarking that “this that case *52 Obviously,

to be where there is killed. I, 177, murder, 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at 847 Stuart such a crime as torture it was (Huntley, concurring specially) (emphasis J. in it appearance Scroggins more in than added). Huntley’s The second of Justice was here. constitutional views should have been Similarly case. Windsor everyone’s concern. Scroggins Here the distinction between Following rehearing I a only that the Windsor is fact issued, opinion second was for Court child, but victim in the latter the full text of which was these two sen- had an older man who befriended rehearing “A tences: in this torturers, captors, and killers. granted matter was and the rear- cause legislature has insisted Because gued. The Court has reviewed the record proportionality, and the Court heretofore presented by arguments and considered the analysis in this proportionality made its counsel, and continues to adhere to the having the of the case without benefit expressed and the conclusion views reached shortly proportionality analysis it would Stuart, opinion.”

in the earlier 110 Idaho Scrog- thereafter make Windsor and 227, (on rehearing at 715 P.2d at 897 Feb- court gins, and the district at 20, 1986). ruary There was no discussion without Stuart also was the benefit variance, of the which whatever issue opinions, my those vote was tendered importance of sufficient deemed evenhandedly treat Stuart as as the being to merit reheard and reconsidered. justice Scroggins Court dealt year produced In that one interval which Windsor. case, nothing in Stuart’s two death more 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at 898 penalty decisions emanated from this (Bistline, dissenting). Court, Windsor, J. namely State v. (1985); 716 P.2d II, opinion The Court’s initial in Stuart Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152 any post- issued on denied March case, (1985). In penalty each the death Today’s opinion, conviction relief. resentencing reversed and remanded for reason, none, whatever and I know with- penalty majority, less The than death. year opinion ago.3 draws of one however, saw no reason to reconsider the majority the benefit of the views now has

proportionality light sentence in Stuart’s (Justice dissenting opinions of two Johnson those two That is a decisions. sad com- myself), and an excellent brief mentary, because: (Robert attorney Kinney). E. Stuart’s reasoning The Court’s in its Windsor opinions appli- Scroggins equally Scroggins

cable in In the child Stuart. THE THAT THE DEFEN- FACADE years older than the killed was but a few DANT STIPULATED victim, by child killed Stuart. today’s II Part IIA of older, being was not very reason of Court, majority note for the has taken killed in a more brutal than manner of Stuart’s contention the trial raped, kidnapped, but was considering erred dignity human any vestige robbed sentencing hearing, yet, she murdered. Worse before deny any post-convic- relief in continues to girl helpless was made to handcuffed proceedings: knowledge going that she was tion suffer the fort, least, and, opened my one view at and effort has been 3. Most of attention display majority opinion opinions confronting have the fallacies which directed Court, opinions, by now been withdrawn. So that has been issued readily opinions are more under- majority But in Stuart II can be withdrawn. whim stood, Appendix my opinion. My B the with- majority have attached withdraw cannot opinions. opinion represents drawn March 1989 considerable ef- March 1989 *53 sentencing hearing

3. That a 1st, 1982, pursuant held on December claim The trial court denied Stuart’s and in notice to counsel for the defendant preliminary hearing in the use of error presence of the defendant the Court sentencing, testimony specifically at aggravation heard in relevant evidence original in pointing out Stuart’s mitigation argu- and and of the offense Court, to this direct State Further, ments of counsel. it was 715 P.2d agreed and understood both State (1985), this Court had held that and the defendant that Court would stipulated sentencing at ‘[i]t sentencing rely upon, part as hear- sentencing the defen- hearing that when preliminary ing, evidence dant the court would consider presented preliminary hearing hearing trial. and the in- along presentence with the and trial R., 220-21, Findings of the Court in Consid- vestigation report.’ (Stuart I). ering Penalty For the Death added). (emphasis Majority Op., 1218-1219 Judge finding, certain Schwam wrote accurately doubting that this There is no ap- doing perpetrating, and in so was ruling, Judge Schilling’s4 describes may well be parently perpetuating, what Schilling Judge was based what history the most insidious untruth by this opinion read in the issued Stuart jurisprudence. criminal There was Court, written Chief and which was stipulation. no such majority. Finally Justice Bakes for expend- Much effort and much time were with what it majority comes face to face pointing members of ed in out to other so, concerning which declared to be II in the March 1989 Stuart the Court6 further from the nothing could have been sentencing hearing: opinions, that at the truth: witness, put on one After the State had sentencing stipulated hear- It was at the that he had ob- jailer, who testified sentencing ing the defendant that when part, no remorse on defendant’s served consider evidence the court would Judge ruled that he would dis- Schwam presented at the along presentence completely and did so strik- investi- with the count trial [it] gation report testimony. The jailer’s all of the presented no more witnesses. 715 P.2d at 847 110 Idaho at Stuart place: following then took added). did (emphasis This misstatement unnoticed, immediately go but was defense have THE Does the COURT: my to the March 1989 questioned in dissent any witnesses? However, today’s II Stuart II. Honor, light Your MR. KINNEY: now, Bakes Justice majority opinion Chief presented no the State has the fact that the mis- belatedly, attributes much to, aggravation addition witnesses Judge Judge Schwam. statement course, testimony, tend to we findings in Schwam’s argument. trial and rely on the also are contained penalty of death Okay. it’s the gather THE COURT: Judge excerpt from Schwam’s record. right that it has a position State’s final edition upon in the findings now relied cross- rely upon all the intends to II opinion majority testimony elicited either examination this:5 membership year ago not include did 6.The presided the trial Judge over Schwam

4. Boyle Schilling presided over the and McDevitt. sentencing. Justices proceedings. post-conviction passage. placed Explicit reliance today's Stuart II 1 to footnote See the Court. sentencing/aggravation/mitigation error, that no hearing was tri- Preliminary Hearing or the sentencing hearing provided formal al; correct? is that *54 requested. had I.C. 19-2516 been § Yes, sir, that is cor- MR. CALHOUN: Op., 1219-1220. Today’s Majority II Stuart rect. Osborn, how- one examines State v. When Okay. THE COURT: highly ever, conjecture becomes turn to validity. only need moment, One doubtful KINNEY: a MR. Just 190, to dis- 631 P.2d at 102 Idaho at please? that: cover THE COURT: Yes. re- presentence a After submission of so stat- Mr. I believe I’ve CALHOUN: hearing aggravation-mitigation port, an paperwork that I filed. ed in the At that hear- I.C. 19-2515. was held. § the prosecutor’s that The statement prosecution nor defense ing, neither rely upon preliminary testi- State The state advised called witnesses. that, position. mony just State’s that I think we do the court ‘because stipulation it was For certain tran- good a—a record of what have it to this Court’s elevated preliminary hearing which in the instead spired today, appeal apparently calling direct witnesses on the choose] [I — testimony presented at finding rely on the Judge sole basis of Schwam’s hearing____’ Similarly, ap- preliminary anyone on stipulation, a and without such upon the facts pellant’s counsel relied making exami- independent this Court hearing preliminary in the brought forth record in ascertain nation of the order to court, reports to and called and in the Judge finding.7 validity of Schwam’s witnesses, although ap- no additional II, Opinion No. S.Ct. Stuart address the in his own pellant did 19-20, (Bist- filed March No. behalf. line, dissenting) original; (emphasis in J. (insertion Osborn, origi- and deletion id. added). footnote nal). pled de- guilty had to first Osborn opin- majority author of the Court’s The made murder. The most that can be gree why speculated as to ion has wondered the defendant counsel for Osborn appears the issue same the state entertained the and for preliminary utilization of the Schwam’s gained might some thought favor —that transcript on the hearing was not raised sentencing if he were not judge today’s appeal I. He surmises Stuart having hear live witness- burdened majority opinion II that: Stuart the crime.8 regarding the commission of es raising issue on The reason for to Os- holding, A said be attributable appeal was direct no doubt because hearing as sentencing formal “that no born Court, sentencing, time had at the re- had been provided in I.C. 19-2516 Osborn, 102 only held in previously holding, quested” was not but was (1981), purporting justify what was P.2d 187 reason for use of a transcript holding that the preliminary hearing Osborn use of gross perceives prejudicial my misstate- When one stated in footnote 3 to dissent 7. As majority opinion, II: Stuart answer March 1989 ments in a get naturally rely get of the kitchen. By things either to to work out the nature of we justice case to upon correctly portray the who drawn the has Otherwise, defendant, addressing all the court in record. 8. behalf, painstakingly have read all of us would five did so in of his tradi- the exercise own transcripts ex- records right and not as a witness. of allocution tional —an time do not allow. constraints ercise right contained in of allocution is now occasion, of may have been noted that on It promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule one, notwithstanding that I do this is so place. responsibility is first not mine in the rehearing did not this Court for question in order to either the trial preliminary not, hearing transcript un- holding finding court’s or this Court’s present, preju- der the circumstances there stipulated use of Nevertheless, utilizing dicial error.9 Os- hearing at the born, majority rules out sentencing hearing. court: n. 1 Today’s Majority Op., II now, Stuart’s claim that he did not added). Quaere, (emphasis will this cause stipulate among judges wonderment the trial preliminary hearing the use testimo- *55 experienced practitioners the of criminal have ny, too late. Stuart should comes First, initially that law? it was declared by petitioning raised rehear- the issue for stipulated, defense counsel had so but ing of our decision the direct Stuart discarded, thought that the claim when err appeal. The trial court did not that should moved became Stuart have rejecting post claim Stuart's conviction rehearing seeing May on first the preliminary on the of the use of issue opinion stipulated. that had so This is he hearing testimony sentencing. at unfair, manifestly because Chief Justice (em- Today’s Majority Op., Supreme II Stuart Bakes was first Court Justice the omitted). added; had phasis footnote to write that Stuart’s counsel ever First, stipulated. Judge mis- Schwam’s longer there majority no insists that accepted by Chief Jus- statement had been stipulation. That is under- was such a value, showing tice Bakes at face with no per- majority’s the author stood. Instead tran- any reporter’s resort the court holding for- force switches to that Stuart Second, record script. the is voluminous a re- requesting that not feited issue convoluted, not all but it is and somewhat opinion re- hearing of initial Stuart the third, why is peruse. that difficult to And 3,May leased on 1985: that the reader has left with been_ parties holding Our that the Stuart majority opinion that inference from the prelimi- ‘stipulated’ of the use rehearing, said did for a not Stuart sentencing nary testimony hearing in the remedy? proper The answer to be finding upon the proceeding so, was based raised the do he that Stuart did December of the trial court later asserts very issue Chief Justice Bakes Appendix sentencing hearing in which the raised. should have been {See found, ‘Further, A.) agreed it was trial court by both state and and understood March appears now Court’s It rely the court would defendant opinion has been withdrawn 1989 Stuart II hearing, upon, part as of the sight glaring from in order erase hearing preliminary testimony at the never was. stipulation untruth nothing in the There is trial.’ opinion cannot strike withdrawing an But ever that Stuart record to demonstrate memory the indif- apparent, or erase finding, before questioned the either opinion with which the ferent carelessness for reconsid- by way of motion trial court time, but written. This is fun eration, this Court appeal to or on these While to some business. serious opin- our After the issuance of I. being Stuart may across a-bit thoughts come held, based I in which we side, help ion Stuart stand strong cannot one finding, happening court’s wholly aghast the trial at what Bistline, J., too, from the gone use of were stipulated to the if

parties had here Shep- along with Justices testimony appellate in the sen- scene hearing preliminary Huntley. Donaldson, ard, tencing the defendant proceeding, stipulated aberration, sentencing implicitly counsel at An stands little. 9. Osborn at best transcript. hearing preliminary of a where admission such case has been second there opinion of March issued a new parts Today being Those it is withdrawn. has, lot, inherited Chief Justice Bakes II changed are Part which have been appeals. It is dishearten- all of IIA, part has been Part and a new placed position telling in the ing to be added is Part III. experienced capable appellate justice regard majority’s that he should have had more March 1990 By practicing added. As written comparison, the record. no Part III was today’s Opinion Part III of March 1990 attorney handling criminal defenses could majority opinion is identical. October 1990 (at great personal and have done more cost) Kinney in financial than did Robert PART II IIA of the March seeing attempts that Stuart was opinion read: fairly. Kinney at- least dealt with Mr. get tempted to the Court concerned about II Schwam’s misuse away turned but was argues separate three *56 Continuing ef- empty handed. that same for the district court to grounds existed fort, Kinney post-conviction relief Mr. post hearing petition on his grant a court proceedings presented to the district (A) grounds relief. Those are conviction absolutely assignment of irrefutable hearing testimony preliminary the use of not, by in person error that Stuart had (B) sentencing; purposes of Stuart’s counsel, prelim- stipulated to the use of the rights were violated claim that his inary hearing transcript. Again defense (C) negotiations; and plea bargaining Schilling away. Judge turned counsel was evidence which was newly discovered Bakes, three read that Chief Justice with by the four affidavits submitted raised

justices joining opinion, had ruled in We will deal with the district court. stipulated. I that Stuart had so Stuart in turn. each of these the doctrine of the law of the Because of case, powerless district court was A. otherwise,10 though the fact of say even plain pro- the matter was as to see as Hearing Testimony Preliminary Use of Dooley’s Attached verbial nose on face. he raised a argues first that Stuart Mr. Appendix A is Part III of hereto im- relating of fact material issue Kinney’s supporting brief preliminary hearing testi- proper use of timely rehearing in which he did Stuart the time of mony by the trial court at file. First, we note that under sentencing. Proce- Post-Conviction Idaho’s Uniform APPENDIX D relief actions post Act all conviction dure Being highly perti- an illustration of how statu- brought pursuant to the must be opinion parts majority of the nent 19-4901. tory grounds set forth I.C. § (Petition re- for Post-conviction II provides that specifically The statute changed, thereby lief) drastically have been which could have been “[a]ny issue not, challenges to circumventing appeal, Stuart’s on direct but was raised may The ever-changing opinions. forfeited and not be considered majority’s ap- it 10, proceedings, unless post A conviction March 1989. first was issued court, on the basis of pears to the the Court year later was withdrawn remanded) Smith, appeal after has been County Highway 113 case which Dist. v. See Ada liberty disregard 878, 880, (Ct.App.1988), lower courts are not 749 P.2d 499 Idaho higher question which the answer to approval Sec. Bank citing to Suitts v. First higher 15, 21-22, court N.A., spoken Idaho, has and ruled. P.2d court Idaho A district (1985). itself is not so constrained. operation of the doc- 1380-81 thoughtful. independent (in proceedings cannot be so in a requires further trine 12, 1989, granted by this on June basis [115] I.C. substantial diligence, guilt and could about the deposition or for relief raises a substantial Idaho 19-4901(b). have been reliability factual [208, otherwise, not, 766] showing by in the exercise of See State presented earlier.” P.2d that the asserted [678] finding v. affidavit, Beam, (1988). doubt due with each of opinion in ho stances as of whether or not there was weighing against 129, 774 P.2d 299 raises for the first time the issue each required these in turn. mitigating circumstances v. Charboneau, 116 Ida in our (1989). aggravating April We will deal 4, 1989, circum proper preliminary See also the time of (1979); raised, the use of the [114] held 631 P.2d 187 mony in the his direct 1988). 100 Idaho sentence was considered In this case the 602 P.2d 539 635 P.2d 955 no doubt because State Hernandez v. Palmer v. appeal, [612, hearing sentencing, had sentencing proceeding was v. (1981), preliminary Osborn, 102 Idaho 759] (1979); Potter v. (1981); transcript at the sen- validity of Stuart’s Dermitt, 102 Idaho no issue that State, P.2d Kraft [903] the use of a hearing testi- this Court *57 previously regarding Court, at (Ct.App. State, State, 405, this Court had trial court out ny preliminary mitted fundamental proven to this lated at aggravating circumstances had been 163, 176, the use that in Stuart’s Uses of Court, beyond sentencing, argues 715 P.2d denied Stuart’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony State sentencing a reasonable held that hearing, A. original direct 833, v. specifically pointing error the trial court com Stuart, 110 Idaho hearing testimo 846 ‘[i]t claim of error hearing doubt. The (1985), considering was statutory finding, stipu that that hearing tencing/ aggravation/mitigation defendant the court sentencing the when Accordingly, presented the trial court at the error. evidence is not would consider along with evidentiary hearing and trial denying preliminary an not err did investigation report.’ presentence claim that error hearing on Stuart’s upon Furthermore, relied the trial court preliminary hear- in the use of committed Osborn, 104 Ida v. our decision State sentencing. ing testimony Stuart’s (1983), in which P.2d 1111 ho 663 Osborn, 631 P.2d State v. preliminary use of upheld the this Court (1981). 187 sentencing in a testimony in hearing opinion 1990 IIA of the March Part II and Furthermore, case. penalty death read: petitioner noted district court trial testi rely himself ‘intended] not de and was mony argument, II live with the compliance manding strict separate three argues Stuart 19-2516.’ formality I.C. testimony § court to the district existed for grounds Coutts, Idaho v. post petition for hearing on his grant a (1980)(‘[I]n absence of (A) are grounds relief. Those conviction hearing request for the formal explicit testimony hearing preliminary the use 19-2516, the by I.C. contemplated (B) sentencing; Stuart’s purposes for sentencing decision its may reach by rights were violated state claim that formal receiving the unsworn by (C) sides, together negotiations; bargaining by both plea presented ments argu report presentence evidence newly discovered (Em respective counsel.’ submitted ments affidavits by the four raised reasons, omitted.)). these For all rehearing phasis In the court. district sentencing hearing, testimony at hearing and the trial.’ There is rejected the district court Stuart’s claim nothing record to in the demonstrate that finding, questioned Stuart ever either be- of fundamental error in the use by way fore the trial court sideration, of motion for recon- preliminary hearing testimony. appeal or on to this in Stuart agree We with the district court that opinion J. After the issuance of our in Stuart I held, in which we based the trial court’s raising Stuart is foreclosed from the is- finding, parties stipulated that the had to the sue preliminary hearing of the use of preliminary hearing testimony use of the in the sentencing because of our sentencing proceeding, the defendant Stuart did petition rehearing this Court for in order to decision Stuart I. question finding either the trial court’s or this appeal, direct the validity of Stuart’s holding stipulated Court’s that Stuart had death sentence was considered preliminary hearing testimony use of the at the Court, regarding and no issue the use of hearing. preliminary hearing testimony Part II and IIA of the October 1990 sentencing proceeding was raised. Nor read: petition rehearing did Stuart file a contesting from our decision in II finding stipulated our ‘[i]t sentencing hearing that when sen- argues separate three tencing the defendant the court would grounds existed for the district court to presented consider pre- evidence grant post on his liminary hearing along and trial with the (A) grounds conviction relief. Those are presentence investigation report.’ State preliminary hearing testimony the use of 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d at (B) purposes sentencing; Stuart’s raising 846. The reason for not the issue rights claim that his were violated on direct was no doubt because (C) plea bargaining negotiations; and Court, sentencing, at the time of newly discovered evidence which was Osborn, previously held in State v. raised the four affidavits submitted (1981), 631 P.2d 187 that the rehearing the district court. In the *58 preliminary use of a hearing transcript at 12, 1989, granted by this June the sentencing/aggravation/mitigation Stuart raises for the first time the issue error, hearing was not and that no for- proper of whether or not there was a sentencing hearing provided mal as in weighing mitigating circumstances requested. I.C. 19-2516 had been § against aggravating each of the circum now, stipu- claim Stuart’s that he did not required April in stances as our sentencing hearing late at the for use Charboneau, opinion in v. 116 Ida State preliminary hearing testimony, comes (1989). ho 774 P.2d 299 We will deal too late. Stuart should have raised the these in turn. with each of by petitioning rehearing issue of our in appeal.1 decision Stuart the direct A. rejecting in

The trial court did not err post Stuart’s conviction claim on the is- Preliminary Hearing Uses of hearing preliminary sue of the use of Testimony testimony sentencing. argues Stuart that the trial court erred hearing by considering preliminary testi- holding parties in Our Stuart I that mony sentencing hearing. This at the preliminary 'stipulated' to the use of the hear not raised in his issue was ing testimony sentencing proceeding was in the finding the trial based court Stuart, appeal, direct State v. 110 Idaho 1, 1982, sentencing hearing which December (1985). Nonetheless, 715 P.2d 833 found, ‘Further, agreed the trial court it was ‘funda- alleges that the error is understood both the state and the defen and mental’ and can be raised at time. rely upon, part as dant that the court would Court, regarding and the use no issue hearing testimony preliminary in the sentenc- The trial court this case considered ing proceeding was raised. Nor did Stuart file rehearing petition for from our decision testimony transcript pre- from the contesting Stuart I our statement “[i]t liminary hearing, relying upon our deci- hearing stipulated sentencing at the that when Osborn, sion State v. sentencing the defendant the court would con- (1981), upheld presented preliminry 631 P.2d 187 which the use sider evidence hear- along presentence and trial with investi- preliminary hearing testimony in sen- report.” gation State v. 110 Idaho at tencing in penalty a death case. The 176, 715 P.2d at 846. We need not decide Court Osborn based its decision on our question whether it is now too late for Stuart finding post it the trial court's conviction Coutts, earlier decision State v. stipulated sentencing hearing that (1980), presented at the court could consider evidence held that ‘in the absence of hearing. prior our deci- Under Coutts, request explicit hearing for the formal v. sions in State v. Osborn and State considering pre- court did not err in 19-2516, contemplated by I.C. § testimony. liminary hearing may reach its decision by receiving the unsworn formal state- BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting on sides, presented by together ments both Rehearing. Denial of Petition presentence report argu- with done far too often in As the Court has respective ments of the counsel.’ past, again opin- once it has buried court noted that did not district earlier, ion six months delivered request any explicit for a formal make opinion. ago, replaced it with a new 19-2516, hearing contemplated by I.C. § are sent to opinions This Court’s West that Stuart himself ‘intended] Publishing Company publication until argument, rely on trial final, meaning completely that either demanding compliance strict and was or, expired, filing petitions has time for testimony formality the live of I.C. granted upon rehearing has been We conclude that under 19-2516.’ § has As a conse- which the Court acted. Coutts, v. Osborn State quence practice, the trial bench and preliminary hearing transcript at of a use Idaho, the federal courts which bar of sentencing/aggravation/mitigation corpus in habeas will review our decisions no not error where formal kept as how proceedings are uninformed sentencing hearing provided in I.C. evolved and decision this Court’s final requested.1 been 19-2516 had errors have grossly prejudicial what been achieving inevitable re- committed *59 1 post conviction deci- trial in its The court penalty routinely affirming death sult— claim, specifically also denied Stuart’s sion sentences.1 ap- original direct pointing out that in Stuart’s Stuart, Court, 110 Idaho peal to this State v. required auto- statutorily appeal and 176, 833, 163, (1985), this Court 715 P.2d 846 imposed death review of the sentence matic stipulated at the sentenc- that was had held “[i]t commenced some months upon Stuart sentencing hearing the defendant ing when that presented at consider evidence 3, 1985, majority the court would day the May before hearing along with preliminary and trial the penalty. upheld the ultimate this Court investigation report.” In presentence the has been days that Stuart The number of I, validity appeal, the the direct Stuart awaiting solitary confinement isolated by this was considered death sentence Stuart’s District, now Judge Judicial and of the Third exceptions v. were State 1. Two aberrational 410, (1985), Windsor, the District 1182 States District 110 716 P.2d United Idaho Idaho, recusing Scroggins, 716 P.2d 110 Idaho himself v. he wrote in and State in which (1985). why I use the word “aberra- As to case after participation in either further from tional,” dissenting opin- my see one need which he im- the sentences reversed this Court But, convincing of more in those cases. ions Scroggins posed case and in Windsor needed, read one should persuasion, if such case. Lodge, District opinion Hon. Edward along presen as of stands at 1970.2 and trial with the hearing execution this date report.’ investigation on the Further The Court’s initial direct tence more, deci published at 110 trial court relied our Court, Osborn, in upholding Therein the P.2d 833. sion v. State sentence, (1983), and the found no the conviction this Court 663 P.2d 1111 sentencing hearing in the trial court’s use at upheld preliminary error the use of presented at the sentencing penal evidence which had been testimony in in a death hearing: preliminary Furthermore, court ty case. the district ‘in petitioner himself noted that stipulated sentencing hear- It was at the testimony and rely on trial tend[ed] sentencing when that defendant demanding strict argument, was not court would consider evidence compliance testimony for with live hearing at the presented preliminary v. mality I.C. 19-2516.’ State along presentence with the trial investi- Coutts, 101 Idaho 609 P.2d report. gation (1980) explicit (‘[I]n the absence of an 110 Idaho at 715 P.2d request hearing formal contem for the My in the March at 847. dissent 19-2516, may plated by the court I.C. § opinion pointed out that there was Stuart receiving sentencing reach its decision stipulation, clearly such a which was present the unsworn formal statements directly contrary sentencing sides, together pre ed with the both (and Court’s) judge’s assertion. This report arguments sentence stipulation, Court held there was a omit respective (Emphasis counsel.’ stipulation main predi- relied on such as a ted.)). reasons, district For all these opinion. cate of the Court’s funda rejected Stuart’s claim of Today, approximately years five or 1970 prelimi mental in the use of the error later, days longer indulges Court no testimony. nary hearing restating stipulation, assertion of agree We district court although ago it six short months did so: raising the is- Stuart is foreclosed from hearing preliminary sue of use of sentencing our testimony at because of A. decision in I. Stuart Preliminary Hearing Testimony Use of appeal, validity direct of Stuart’s death sentence considered argues that the trial court com- Court, regarding no issue the use of by considering mitted fundamental error hearing testimony in the preliminary testimony finding, preliminary hearing sentencing proceeding was raised. Nor statutory sentencing hearing, rehearing did aggravating circumstances been file contesting decision Stuart I our beyond proven a reasonable doubt. stipulated at finding our ‘[i]t claim court denied er- Stuart’s hearing that when sen- ror in the use of tencing the defendant the court sentencing, specifically *60 presented pre- the consider evidence at pointing original out that in Stuart’s hearing along the liminary and trial with Court, v. direct to this State investigation presentence report.’ State 833, Stuart, 163,176, 715 110 Idaho P.2d 176, Stuart, at P.2d at v. 110 Idaho 715 (1985), that this Court had held 846 raising issue 846. reason for not the at the sentenc- [ijt stipulated was appeal was no because on direct doubt hearing sentencing the that when Court, sentencing, time of at the consider evi- the court would defendant dence Osborn, 102 previously held State v. presented preliminary the at 24, 1990, days is September number the of 2. As

930 405, (1981), (1980),

Idaho 631 P.2d 187 that the held that ‘in the absence preliminary hearing transcript use of a at explicit request hearing an for the formal sentencing/aggravation/mitigation 19-2516, contemplated by I.C. § error, hearing was not and that no for- may sentencing reach its decision sentencing hearing provided mal by receiving the unsworn formal state- I.C. had been requested. 19-2516 § sides, presented by together ments both now, stipu- Stuart’s claim that he did not presentence argu- with report sentencing hearing late at the for the use respective ments of counsel.’ hearing of preliminary testimony, comes district court noted did not that Stuart too late. Stuart should have raised request any explicit make for a formal by petitioning rehearing issue of our 19-2516, hearing contemplated by I.C. § appeal. decision in Stuart direct and that Stuart himself ‘intend[ed] The trial not err in rejecting court did rely testimony argument, on trial post Stuart’s conviction claim on the is- demanding compliance strict preliminary hearing sue of the use testimony formality with the live of I.C. testimony sentencing.3 at under 19-2516.’ We conclude that § Coutts, State v. State v. Osborn (footnote omitted) March 1990 Stuart II preliminary hearing transcript use at of a added). (emphasis sentencing/aggravation/mitigation Today, pattern changes. no Claim is hearing not error no formal where longer stipu- made that Stuart’s counsel hearing as in I.C. sentencing provided preliminary hearing lated to the use of the requested. 19-2516 had been Instead, testimony sentencing. at the testimony sup- 867-868, (with- use of that is said to At 801 P.2d at 1218-1219 draws ported Opinion 12, case Osborn Coutts 1990 No. filed March 1990) (footnote omitted). Today says following: case. the Court properly never

Osborn and Coutts have stood, now, for the proposition until A. transcript preliminary hearing use of at Preliminary Testimony Use sentencing appropriate whenever the Su- finding preme makes erroneous argues the trial court erred In parties stipulated such use. that the hearing testi- considering preliminary fact, obvi- if one reads Osborn it becomes mony sentencing hearing. This agreed parties ous to the use that both in his issue not raised transcript. preliminary appeal, direct v. State And, Coutts, realize if reads one will one Nonetheless, (1985). 715 P.2d 833 discusses, men- let alone that Coutts never alleges the error ‘funda- tions, transcripts hearings preliminary raised at time. mental’ and can be hearings. preliminary case The trial court considered Coutts, sen- the Court held that the transcript pre testimony from the unsworn tencing judge may consider “the part] upon liminary relying hearing, [in sides, presented by formal statements both Osborn, 102 Ida our decision in report and together presentence (1981), upheld ho 631 P.2d 187 arguments respective counsel.” preliminary hearing use of P.2d at does Idaho 645. Coutts penalty death case. sentencing in a a tran- proposition that for the not stand its decision The Court in based Osborn hearing may be Coutts, script earlier decision State v. on our consent used without the *61 dissent, upon con- by irrefutable my based need raised that contention Stuart not have reading tran- the flowed from rehearing of clusion which petition in view the fact that rehearing. script. a did file Stuart already inserted into the case issue had been the

931 requires proof no an intent to defendant, and the citation to Coutts which the of (“It also be suffering! shall torture way change in no fact. cause by does this Osborn being human extreme to inflict on a finding by Like the Court that the the irrespective of brutality prolonged acts of stipulated the parties to use suffering.”) cause proof of intent to at sentenc- “evidence” Court, in the face majority For a finding jury that the must ing, the Court’s Jury language plain contained of to have that Stuart intended concluded jury to “find” that Instruction suffer is less than credible. make victim possessed requisite found Stuart As the Court stated: murder, preposterous. is intent torture not by murder torture does [Although presented to According instructions kill, require showing an intent to a no need for them jury, there was require making unique, crime it does part of Stuart. All find intent on torture, or the showing a of the intent to that Stuart in- they needed to was find suffering great pain and intent to inflict acts prolonged bru- extreme flicted case upon jury the victim. The However, charge tality. was present, such an intent was found put he was of the information by finding supported and that factual life at stake. This to trial where his competent evidence. substantial glaring error the most was fundamental (emphasis at 846 110 Idaho at reasons. kind—for three obvious added). First, required by finding no was ever by in- required their jury jury that intended deceased con- to find such intent before structions contradicted the directly to suffer. This mur- victing degree of first torture jury in this assertion Court’s “[t]he jury plainly der. As one instruction to such an intent was case found that Second, already high- states: present____” as was lighted: legislative of intent its abolition [T]he INSTRUCTION NO. murder tor- definition of alternative killing of a Murder is unlawful clearly in with the first ture is conflict being aforethought human with malice definition, properly which was application the intentional of torture

or adopted Supreme from California being, Court, which results human headlong conflict with and also being. of a human Torture is death every public ‘In crime or I.C. 18-114: § pro- intentional infliction of extreme union, joint must exist a offense there longed suf- pain with the intent cause intent, or criminal operation, of act fering. in- It shall also be torture to following sec- negligence.’ Under the being human extreme and on a tion, 18-115, may be intent or intention § flict brutality irrespective circumstances, acts prolonged has but it established suffering. proof cause of intent required. always been being caused The death of human (Bistline, 716 P.2d at irrespective such murder torture Third, charged dissenting). J. kill; torture proof specific intent with Information commit- by the Amended causing equiv- death shall deemed the murder, i.e., intending “to ting torture intent to kill. alent of suffering satisfy or to some sadistic cause inclination____” (Bistline, R., 14-15, at 857 S.Ct. No. 715 P.2d 110 Idaho 833). added). (Stuart in- 715 P.2d (emphasis This dissenting) J. 18-4001, charge not coincide patterned I.C. This does struction is after were at variance instructions which statutory of murder. definition Similar to charge the information. of torture includes definition definition *62 O’Neill, the defendant in v. 118 Ida (1990),

ho P.2d 121 Stuart was instructions) (by

held to answer

something distinctly different than he was

charged information.4 Stuart’s grossly

conviction resulted from erroneous

instructions, clearly necessitating a second hopefully any

trial which will be free of replete in prejudicial

such numerous errors error gross

this record. Such fundamental crimi

should not be allowed to stand trial, especially capital

nal not in a case.

801 P.2d 1283 STUART, Francis

Gene

Petitioner-Appellant, Idaho, Respondent.

STATE

No. Idaho.

Supreme Court of 28, 1990.

Nov. got jury. never guilty, that case plead so opted to 4. Unlike O’Neill

Case Details

Case Name: Stuart v. State
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 16, 1990
Citation: 801 P.2d 1216
Docket Number: 17014
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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