141 Mich. 686 | Mich. | 1905
This suit is brought by complainants to enforce specific performance of a land contract against the defendant Louise S. Mattern, individually, and also as administratrix of the estate of George E. Swain, deceased, and his widow and heir. Decree was granted in the trial court in favor of complainants and against Louise S. Mattern, as administratrix of said estate, and against the other defendants; but as to Louise S. Mattern individually the bill was dismissed, and from the decree dismissing the bill of complaint as to her individually complainants appeal. Defendants also appeal from the decree against her as administratrix of said estate.
Louise S. Mattern and George E. Swain were brother and sister, and resided in New York City. They owned, as tenants in common, the land in question in this suit, being two vacant adjoining lots on Spruce street, in Sault Ste. Marie, Mich. John G. Stradley, of Sault Ste. Marie, Mich., was agent for George E. Swain and Louise S. Matte'rn, in looking after these lots, paying taxes, etc., since 1895, and at one time procured a loan on the property from Mrs. Price for defendants. George E. Swain looked after the property for Mrs. Mattern, and handled her interest for her. In the latter part of the year 1902,
“Your letter of May 19th, inclosing draft for $200, was received May 21st, too late for Mr. Swain’s signature, as he died at 1:30 a. m. May 22d, after being unconscious for several hours. As Mr. Swain died without making a will, I ask you to advise Mrs. Mattern and myself regarding the sale of the property, as we wish it sold as soon as possible, as money is very necessary to us now. We do not feel able to maintain the property, and are most anxious to make this sale. Will you kindly inform us how matters stand regarding interest and taxes. Kindly advise us as soon as possible.”
On May 28th Stradley, replying, wrote direct to Mrs. Mattern, giving full details of the sale, and advised as how to proceed owing to the death of Mr. Swain, Mrs. Mattern handed this letter to an attorney for reply, and on the 19th of June he wrote Stradley, suggesting that the simplest way to convey the property to the purchasers would be by taking an assignment of the Price mortgage to some one there, and foreclosing it; to which Stradley replied, saying that to foreclose the mortgage would not be practicable, and stating that complainants were building on the property. Mrs. Mattern’s attorney then wrote Stradley, returning the draft, and asking that it be made to Mrs. Mattern, as she was half owner, and so she could get it cashed. Stradley had the draft indorsed to Mrs. Mattern and returned. Mrs. Mattern indorsed the draft and had it cashed. Some further
The case presents two questions: 1. Is the estate of George E. Swain bound by the contract ? 2. Should defendant Louise S. Mattern be required to convey her interest ?
It seems not to be questioned that the contract signed by Stradley in the name of Swain and Mrs. Mattern was sufficient in its terms to make a valid contract to convey the land; but, as respects its validity as against Swain and his estate, the contention seems to be that, as the name of the purchaser was not disclosed to Swain and Mrs. Mat-tern, the contract is insufficient under the statute of frauds. The case of Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100, is cited to support this contention. In that case there was no writing which fixed the identity of the party to the contract not signing. In the present case the purchasers were fully named in the contract signed by Stradley in the name of, and on behalf of, the owners. This was sufficient, under 3 Comp. Laws, § 9511, which recognizes the validity of contracts for the sale of land if signed by some person thereunto lawfully authorized by the owner in writing, unless we accept the view that the authorization must contain the name of the purchaser. We do not so understand the requirement. The authority may, and often does, extend to the making of a contract with any one who may become a customer on terms stated. In this case the authority to sell on terms first contemplated was given in unmistakable terms, and the slight departure from those terms was ratified by Swain promptly by telegram. See White v. Breen, 106 Ala. 159 (32 L. R. A. 127).
The question of ratification of the contract by Mrs.
The decree will be modified, and a decree entered for specific performance as against Mrs. Mattern in her individual capacity and also as administratrix, as well as against the other defendants. Complainants will recover costs of both courts.