188 P. 1063 | Okla. | 1920
This action was instituted in the district court of Osage county to partition 1,315.66 acres of land in said county. The trial court held that plaintiffs in error had no right, title, or interest in or to said lands, and rendered judgment accordingly. Complaining of this ruling, plaintiffs in error have brought the case here for review.
The material facts out of which the controversy arose may be briefly stated as follows: Charles Coleman, a white man, who was the heir of certain Osage Indians, on February 24, 1909, executed a deed conveying his interest in the land in controversy to the Levindale Lead Zinc Mining Company, and in March of the following year he commenced an action in the district court of Osage county to cancel said deed and quiet his title to said land. This cause proceeded to judgment in the district court in favor of Coleman, which judgment was affirmed by this court on appeal. Levindale Lead Zinc Mining Company *82
v. Coleman,
The judgment of the district court of Osage county quieting Coleman's title against the mining company was entered December 20, 1910. It was affirmed by this court on May 12, 1914, and the mandate was received and filed in the district court of Osage county on May 14, 1914. Proceedings in error to the Supreme Court of the United States were commenced December 28, 1914. The claims of plaintiffs in error may be classified as follows: First, McLaughlin's and Farrar's claim is based on a judgment rendered November 22, 1910, and upon a mortgage executed June 11, 1912, to secure said judgment, and upon a judgment rendered September 12, 1914, foreclosing said mortgage; second, Minnie Coleman claims through a deed executed on March 15, 1913, to her by her husband, Charles Cole-man, to 80 acres of the land in controversy; third, D.B. Horsley claims by deed of conveyance executed to him by Charles Coleman on September 20, 1915; and fourth, Charles Stuart claims title by virtue of two deeds from Coleman, one executed March 31, 1914, and the other July 23, 1914.
The validity of plaintiffs in error's claims depend upon whether they were purchasers pendente lite. Under our lis pendens statute, where the title to real property is involved in an action, a purchaser pendente lite of said property from a party to the action acquires no greater right in the property than his grantor had, and is bound by the judgment against his grantor. Guaranty State Bank of Okmulgee v. Pratt et al., 72 Oklahoma,
This leaves for consideration whether the deed from Coleman to Stuart, executed July 23, 1914, and the judgment against Coleman procured by McLaughlin and Farrar on September 12, 1914, which were obtained after the decision of the Supreme Court of this state and after the mandate had been filed for record, and prior to the commencement of the proceedings to review in the Supreme Court of the United States, affected the title of the mining company.
Some of the authorities hold that where a decree has been rendered affecting the title of property, the purchaser in good faith under the decree before any appeal or writ of error is prosecuted will be protected, even though said decree is afterwards reversed. Wingfield v. Neall,
"Where the law gives a right of review to an appellate court, all persons are necessarily charged with notice thereof, and it would seem reasonable to hold that the operation of lis pendens ought to be adequate to give a litigant protection until he can pursue all the remedies to which he is entitled in the action, and therefore, though a judgment or decree final in form has been entered, the cause ought still to be deemed pending while the right to prosecute it further by appeal remains."
The case of State National Bank v. Ladd, 65 Oklahoma,
It is also contended that the lis pendens does not apply because the supersedeas bond was not given within the time fixed by the district court of Osage county to stay execution. We do not think there is any merit in this contention. In McClung et al. v. Hohl,
It appears that after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in favor of the Levindale Lead Zinc Mining Company, and during the pendency of the instant action, the mining company conveyed its interest in the land in controversy to defendants in error Levin and Aaron, and it is insisted by plaintiffs in error that this conveyance is champertous. We do not think plaintiffs in error are in a position to raise this question. The action was instituted by the Che-she-wal-las to partition the land, and in order for plaintiffs in error to prevail it was incumbent upon them to show that they had some right, title, or interest in the land. This, we have held, they failed to do, and having no interest whatever in the land in controversy, they will not be heard to contest *84 the title as between the mining company and its grantees, since their only claims to title are based upon instruments executed pendente lite. They could have no greater rights than their grantor, Coleman, had.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
OWEN, C. J., and PITCHFORD, JOHNSON, McNEILL, and BAILEY, JJ., concur.