Stuart L. Platt v. Angela R. PlattStuart L. Platt v. Angela R. Platt
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- Before:
- Ross
Stuart Platt appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action brought under the federal wiretapping statutes,
*160 Stuart lived in Olivette, Missouri, while Angela lived with their then four-year-old daughter Theresa in Mexico, Missouri. The petition for dissolution of their marriage was pending. The Circuit Court of St. Louis County allowed Stuart and Theresa to maintain regular phone contact (three times per week). Stuart’s complaint alleged that Angela “installed a tape recording device on [her] telephone in order to intercept, monitor, and record telephone calls” made by “Stuart to [their] minor child” to gain an advantage in their dissolution proceeding. The complaint further alleged that Stuart did not authorize Angela to do so, nor did he ever expressly or impliedly consent to the installation of the recording mechanism.
Angela’s motion to dismiss stated that (1) she could not have violated
Angela’s memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss stated that Stuart’s allegations in essence, constituted only Angela‘s recording of her own calls. Stuart responded that
Anonymous v. Anonymous, supra,
558 F.2d at 677, reflects the minority view that
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court framed the issue as “the extent to which Title III applies to interspousal wiretaps used in preparation for divorce litigation where the alleged violator attaches a recording device to his or her own telephone.” The district court could not “conclude that federal law was intended to apply to a ‘purely domestic conflict’ involving the interception of a family member’s phone conversations.” It granted the motion to dismiss, finding the holding in
Anonymous v. Anonymous
dispositive of the issue without expressly relying on the extension phone exemption of
In light of Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir.1989) (Title III applies to domestic situation of interspousal wiretapping), recently decided by this court, it is apparent that the district court relied on a nonexistent interspousal immunity. Further, we do not agree, based on the record before us, with the district court’s ruling that Anonymous v. Anonymous is dispositive of the case.
In Anonymous, the court held that the facts alleged did not rise to the level of criminal conduct intended to be covered by the wiretap statutes. The defendant ex-husband had exclusive custody of the eight-year-old child, and had sometimes listened in on the child’s conversations with the plaintiff ex-wife through an intercom device that was part of the taping equipment. The court found the fact that the defendant “taped the conversations which he permissibly overheard” to be a “distinction without a difference” from simply listening in on the conversations. Anonymous, supra, 558 F.2d at 679. The Anonymous court did not specifically utilize the extension phone exemption, but rather cited the civil damage case of Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.) (Title III does not apply to purely domestic situations), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897, 95 S.Ct. 176, 42 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974), which was specifically rejected by this court in Kempf v. Kempf The court did not address the issue of consent.
*161 Here, the designated record does not reveal such facts as whether all incoming and outgoing calls were recorded, whether the machine recorded automatically, or whether a button on the machine needed to be turned to “Record” by the child (beyond a 45-second period of automatic recording as in Anonymous). There is nothing in the pleadings regarding the element of human supervision, i.e., whether Angela was present or listened in on the conversations that were taped.
A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.
Conley v. Gibson,
855 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Assuming for purposes of this appeal that the facts as alleged in the pleadings are true, then this case falls within the purview of Title III.
See United States v. Jones,
542 F.2d 661, 667, 668 (6th Cir.1976) (“language of
Kratz drew a distinction between wiretapping and eavesdropping by means of an extension phone which may be applicable to the present case. Extension phone eavesdropping requires a greater degree of human supervision, the presence of the eavesdropper. “Also, as should be obvious, detection is a real problem to the eavesdropper who uses an extension phone. All of this necessarily affects the product that can be realistically derived from [extension phone] surveillance.” Id. at 474 (quoting Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. of Tol.L.Rev. 185, 205-06 (1975)). In contrast, wiretapping requires only a minimum of human supervision as do some forms of recording. After installation, little maintenance need occur, and of course, the danger of detection is dramatically reduced with a recording device. “Therefore, extension phone eavesdropping has * * * less potential for violating the privacy of the targeted party.” Id.
Because we hold that interspousal immunity does not bar Stuart’s action, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings to develop the facts regarding the exact nature of the recording device itself as well as the method and manner of recording that took place, consideration of the extension phone exemption (if applicable), and of course consideration of the consent issue.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is reversed and remanded.