Strozier v. HopperStrozier v. Hopper
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- Before:
- Hill
On petition for habeas corpus by Eddie James Strozier, the habeas court found validity in his contention concerning consecutive sentencing and remanded that matter to the sentencing court. Strozier appeals from the order of the habeas court which denied him the other relief he sought.
In 1971 Strozier was convicted of kidnapping, robbery and rape. He received twenty years each for kidnapping and robbery and a death sentence for rape.
In 1974 he filed a petition for habeas corpus and during his testimony at the habeas corpus hearing he raised additional allegations. The court heard testimony by Strozier and the written deposition of counsel who represented him at the original trial. After hearing, the court below found that since the jury had not specified whether the fifteen-year sentence for kidnapping was to run consecutively or concurrently, it must run concurrently. However, the habeas corpus court found the remainder of petitioner’s contentions to be without merit.
On this appeal Strozier enumerates the following as error: (1) erroneous admission at the second sentencing trial of the allegedly unverified transcript of testimony of the rápe victim from the original trial; (2) erroneous admission at the second sentencing trial of his previous convictions; (3) ineffective assistance of appointed counsel rendered in the original trial, in the resentencing trial, and on appeal; and (4) lack of consideration by the habeas court of all the alleged errors cited.
1. Of the alleged errors which Strozier raises, those numbered 1 and 2, above, were reviewed and ruled upon by this court in the earlier appeal. Strozier v. State, supra. Once considered on appeal, the same issues will not be reviewed again on habeas corpus. Elrod v. Ault, 231 Ga. 750 (204 SE2d 176). “The appellate courts exist to review appeals. It is not the function of state habeas corpus courts to review issues already decided by an appellate court and it is not the function of this court to review, on denial of the writ of habeas corpus, issues previously decided on appeal.” Brown v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 809, 811 (213 SE2d 672).
Therefore we will not reconsider these previously decided enumerations of alleged error.
2. Strozier raises the issue of effective assistance of
The record from the original trial as well as the habeas corpus hearing give ample evidence that the trial counsel from the public defender’s office rendered effective assistance. At the habeas hearing there was evidence that he, along with an investigator from his office, contacted Strozier immediately after his appointment by the court and that he found Strozier extremely uncooperative. Later after several pre-trial conferences with the district attorney and the assistant district attorney in which he learned of Strozier’s prior convictions, including assault with intent to rape among other offenses, and of the strong case the prosecution had against Strozier, he recommended a plea of guilty with a life sentence rather than risk a verdict of guilty which he judged could result in a death sentence. Strozier refused to so plead and again refused to help in his defense. The trial record shows active representation by counsel; in fact, his objection to certain evidence later served as the basis for the new trial granted as to sentencing. The contention that counsel refused to call alibi witnesses is not
Strozier complains that he told his first and second attorneys that he did not want them as his counsel and that they urged him to plead guilty. An indigent has the right to have counsel appointed and to reasonably effective assistance from such counsel. He does not, however, have the right to pick and choose his appointed counsel. McClure v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 45 (214 SE2d 503). The fact that Strozier did not approve the appointment of counsel made by the trial court does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, the mere fact that appointed counsel recommends entering a plea of guilty is not evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. The most effective assistance counsel can give may be a well-founded recommendation to plead guilty in expectation of a lighter sentence.
Strozier’s contention that his second attorney was ineffective in that he allowed four prior convictions to be admitted in the second sentencing trial, and that he should have insisted on live witnesses but agreed to the admission of the allegedly unverified transcript of testimony of the rape victim, are both without merit. The four prior convictions had been introduced at the first trial and, hence, the requirements of Code Ann. § 27-2534 had been met as to the second sentencing trial. Counsel’s decision to agree to the use of the transcript of the victim’s testimony, as opposed to having the rape victim testify in person at the second sentencing trial, was in the best interest of the defendant. (We do not decide whether his counsel could have successfully objected to the use of the transcript, because when a new trial is granted as to sentencing, the state may have a right to use the original trial transcript. Whether such right exists, we do not here decide.) Finally, as to this second attorney, there is no evidence to support Strozier’s assertion that the transcript of testimony of the victim did not bear the court reporter’s certificate.
The Ross decision is equally applicable to federal habeas corpus relief, which also is granted by federal, not state, statute.
The court below did not err in denying Strozier’s claims based upon alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
3. Strozier contends that the habeas corpus court failed to consider all of the issues he raised. After reviewing the petition filed by Strozier and combing the transcript of the habeas hearing, the only issue we find not mentioned in the habeas court’s order concerns the makeup of his jury. At the habeas hearing Strozier made references to there being no blacks on the jury at the original trial and that he had said something about this to the judge at the end of his trial. Whether or not such a casual mention during the habeas corpus hearing is sufficient to raise this issue does not have to be decided here. Even treating the issue as raised, it is without merit because there is no evidence of jury discrimination. Strozier offered no evidence at trial or to the court below to show that the selection procedures were not racially neutral. Pass v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 192 (200 SE2d 720); Mitchell v. Smith, 229 Ga. 781 (6) (194 SE2d 414).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.