MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following the termination of her employment as an Administrative Assistant II in Defendant City of Laurel, Maryland (the “City”)’s Communications Department, Plaintiff Felicia Strothers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and claiming state-tort damages. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9, ECF No. 2. After the City removed the case to this Court, ECF No. 1, I dismissed all of Strothers’s claims except for the retaliation claim, ECF No. 21. The City now moves for summary judgment on the sole remaining claim, arguing that Strothers has failed to establish a prima facie retaliation case and that she failed to demonstrate that its legitimate non-retaliatory reason to terminate her employment for tardiness was pretextuaL ECF No. 56. The Motion is fully briefed, Def.’s Mem., ECF No 56-1; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 57; Def.’s Reply,. ECF No. 58, and no hearing is necessary, Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md.). Because Strothers’s complaints prior to her termination gave the City no notice that she was opposing racial discrimination, I will grant the City’s Motion.
Background
Strothers, a black woman, worked, on a probationary basis, as an Administrative Assistant II in the City’s Communications Department from October 2013 until March 2014. Offer Letter, J.A. 104; Termination Letter, J.A. 187-88; City of Laurel, Maryland Employee Processing Form, J.A. 103.
In light of this policy, when Communications Director Peter Piringer called to offer Strothers the job, she expressed concern about her ability to be in the office on
At some point, Koubek began to take issue with Strothers’s tardiness and started memorializing her arrival times in a document that she refers to as a journal. Koubek Dep. 59:13-18, J.A. 120 (“I created this document because I’d been having the tardiness issues, the attitude issues. It was getting worse as time went on, and I was directed by HR to document.”). Although the document is dated November 25, 2013 (i.e. two weeks after Veterans Day), the document tracks Strothers’s arrival times beginning on her October 7 start date. Memorandum from Carreen Koubek to Peter Piringer (Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Koubek Memorandum], J.A. 134-39. During the first month of Strothers’s employment, Koubek recorded two dates (October 21 and October 28) when Strothers arrived later than 9:05 A.M., and several days when she arrived before 9:00 A.M. Id. at J.A. 134-37. At her deposition, Koubek testified that she documented Strothers’s on-time arrivals as well as her late arrivals because she “wanted to be fair,” Koubek Dep. 64:19-65:5, J.A. 121-22, but the journal entries appear critical of any arrival time after 8:55 A.M., even during the grace period, see, e.g., Koubek Memorandum, J.A. 135 (“October 8, 2013—Arrival time computer stamped at 8:59am. From Journal Entry: Spoke with Felicia about her arrival time.... I told her that getting here at 9am or after can’t happen.”). Kou-bek also intimated that, despite what Strothers’s offer letter stated and despite being permitted to arrive by 9:05 until Veterans Day, she was expected to be at her desk by 8:50 A.M. or 8:55 A.M. at the latest. Id., J.A. 135 (“I told her that neither Pete [Piringer] nor myself set the start times for the day. That is the Administration and the Administration says if you are not at your desk by 10 minutes before your start time you were late. I told her I had spoken with [the City Administrator’s] Office and they had no problems with a 5 minutes prior to start time.”). City Administrator Kristie Mills testified in her deposition that she had “an expectation” that employees be at work five to ten minutes early. Mills Dep. 68:7-69:7, J.A. 95-95.
Strothers continued to struggle to arrive on time after Veterans Day. Koubek Memorandum, J.A. 137-39 (documenting arrivals after 9:00 A.M. on November 12-15,
The following month, Koubek verbally reprimanded Strothers in the hallway and within earshot of other employees for wearing pants on a Friday that she perceived to be leggings. Strothers Dep. 56:10-57:16, J.A. 15. Although City employees are permitted to wear jeans on Fridays, leggings are impermissible. Kou-bek Dep. 86:15-18, J.A. 127. Strothers insisted that the pants were in fact jeans and stretched the pants material to demonstrate its jeans-like properties. Memorandum from Felicia Strothers to Peter Piringer (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Strothers Feb. 26, 2014 Memorandum], J.A. 163; Koubek Dep. 90:7-8, J.A. 128. Without Strothers’s consent, Koubek grabbed Strothers’s pants to feel the fabric for herself and reasserted her belief that they were leggings. Strothers Dep. 60:2-5, J.A. 16; Koubek Dep. 90:8-19, J.A. 128 (“She did not [tell me to reach down and pull her cuff], no. No, but I figured—I wanted to feel the material. She was feeling it. I wanted to, you know.”). Upset by Koubek’s conduct, Strothers immediately called Piringer and left a voicemail about the incident and sent him a memorandum five days later in which she recounted the confrontation and said that she “did not feel welcome by [Koubek]” since the beginning of her employment and complained that “[t]he stress and harassment has become unbearable, making it difficult
One week later, the City terminated Strothers for tardiness. Termination Letter, J.A. 187-88. Shortly thereafter, Strothers filed formal grievance contesting her termination and requesting reinstatement under a different direct supervisor. Mar. 12, 2014 Grievance, J.A. 189-98. In the grievance, she again complained that Koubek had “harassed” her and recounted her efforts to notify Piringer about Kou-bek’s conduct. Id. at J.A. 196. She also indicated for the first time a belief that Koubek’s behavior towards her was motivated by racial animus. Id. at 197 (“No other employee of another race, also on probation was spoken to regarding their attire.... ”). The City treated the grievance as an “Appeal of Release from Probationary Employment” and held an appeal hearing attended by City Administrator Mills and HR Director Greene. Letter from Kristie Mills to Felicia Strothers (Mar. 25, 2014), J.A. 199-200. Mills and Greene upheld the release, reiterating that Strothers was terminated for tardiness. Id. at 199. Strothers appealed the decision to Mayor Craig Moe, Letter from Felicia Strothers to Mayor Craig A. Moe, City of Laurel, Md. (Apr. 15, 2014), J.A. 202-11, reiterating her charge of racial harassment, id. at J.A. 203, 206, and complaining of a “hostile environment,” id. at 207. May- or Moe upheld the termination and also emphasized that Strothers was released for tardiness. Letter from Mayor Craig Moe to Felicia Strothers (May 5, 2014), J.A. 212-13.
Having unsuccessfully appealed her termination, Strothers filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), EEOC Compl., J.A. 201, which issued Strothers a right-to-sue letter, EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights, Supp. Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 13-2. Strothers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and claiming state-tort damages. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 9. I dismissed the discrimination and tort claims, leaving only the retaliation claim, ECF No. 21, which is the subject of the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Def.’s Mem. 4.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates, through “particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see also Baldwin v. City of Greensboro,
Discussion
Section 704(a) of Title VII “prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action against any employee ‘because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,
Protected activity includes “participating in an ongoing investigation or proceeding under Title VII” or “opposing discriminatory practices in the workplace,” Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.,
It is clear that Strothers did oppose Koubek’s treatment of her prior to being terminated. See Jan. 9, 2014 Grievance, J.A. 157-59; Strothers Feb. 26, 2014 Memorandum, J.A. 163-65. But she provides scant evidence that she believed that Kou-bek’s behavior towards her was rooted in racial animus or that such a belief would have been reasonable. It certainly appears that Koubek was on Strothers’s case from the beginning of her employment. Despite acknowledging that Piringer allowed Strothers to arrive by 9:05 A.M. for the first month of her tenure, Koubek Dep. 57:2-10, Koubek meticulously documented any time Strothers arrived after 8:55 A.M. but before 9:05 A.M. in addition to two instances during the first month when she arrived after 9:05 A.M, Koubek Memorandum, J.A. 134-37. On at least one occasion, Koubek reprimanded Strothers for arriving at 8:59 A.M. during the grace period. Id. at 134. Koubek also confronted Stroth-ers about her attire in an inappropriate manner, impermissibly touching Stroth-ers’s clothing without her consent. Koubek Dep. 90:8-19, J.A. 128. Not unreasonably, Strothers characterizes Koubek’s admitted conduct as battery. Pl.’s Opp’n 17; see also Robinson v. Cutchin,
But Strothers’s only evidence for a racial motive for this conduct is that Piringer told her that Koubek favored a white candidate named Mary Blankenship for the position that the City ultimately offered to Strothers, information that led her to conclude “that it was because of my race that [Koubek] was hostile to me.” Strothers Dep. 47:6-11. But Koubek testified in her deposition that she preferred Blankenship because she “had been working with the City for a number of years” and because she believed Blankenship to be “a better applicant.” Koubek Dep. 20:13-14, 17. A hiring decisionmaker’s preference for one candidate who happens to be white over another candidate who happens to be black, by itself, cannot support a reasonable inference of racial bias, and Koubek articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her preference—namely, Blankenship’s prior work for the City and her belief that Blankenship was a superior candidate for the position. Strothers attempts to bolster her inferential reasoning by offering a Declaration from Teresa Lewis, another black woman who was once supervised by Koubek. Lewis Deck, J.A. 242-43. Lewis declares that Koubek was “very rude and short-tempered” towards her and “treat[ed] other employees of col- or poorly” but did not “act rudely to ... white employeefs] or treat any white employees poorly.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6, J.A. 242. But Lewis’s conclusory observations about her time working with Koubek shed little light on whether and why Strothers believed that Koubek’s actions were racially motivated at the time that she complained.
But even assuming that Stroth-ers established the first element of her
Strothers’s complaints failed to notify the City that she was opposing conduct outlawed by Title VII rather than merely generic unfair treatment. Although her post-termination grievance specifically alleges racial harassment, Mar. 12, 2014 Grievance, J.A. 197 (“No other employee of another race, also on probation was spoken to regarding their attire.... ”), neither of her pre-termination grievances do, see Jan. 9, 2014 Grievance, J.A. 157-59; Strothers Feb. 26, 2014 Memorandum, J.A. 163-65. Plainly, her post-termination grievance could not have been causally related to her release. Nor can it serve to retroactively put the City on notice that Strothers’s pre-termination complaints were based on a belief that Koubek’s conduct was the product of racial animus. Strothers contends that her complaint about the leggings incident described Kou-bek’s conduct towards her as “harassment,” which she argues gave the City notice that she was complaining of unlawful discrimination. Def.’s Opp’n 17, 20 (quoting Strothers Feb. 26, 2014 Memorandum, J.A. 165).
In my Memorandum Opinion addressing the City’s Motion to Dismiss, I held that Strothers’s allegation that she complained of “harassment” to superiors stated a retaliation claim for pleading purposes by reference to Fourth Circuit case law in which generalized complaints of harassment qualified as protected activity. Strothers v. City of Laurel, Md.,
In Okoli, the plaintiffs supervisor propositioned her, inquired about her underwear, regaled her with stories of his past sexual exploits, fondled her leg under a table, forcibly kissed her, and asked her to sit on his lap and join him in a Jacuzzi, among other things.
In Burgess, Ginger Cruz supervised the plaintiff and her administrative assistant, Patricia Redmon, both black women.
Even if I assume that Strothers reasonably believed that Koubek’s actions towards her were rooted in racial animus, I cannot conclude from the evidence before me that the City knew or should have known that Strothers intended to engage in protected activity by opposing conduct prohibited by Title VII. And the City could not have terminated Strothers for engaging in protected activity if it was unaware that she intended to do so. Accordingly, Strothers has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and the City is entitled to summary judgment.
Conclusion
Because Strothers has failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, I will GRANT the City’s Motion. Judgment will be entered in the City’s favor, and the Clerk will close the case.
A separate Order follows.
Notes
. Citations to J.A. refer to the Joint Appendix that the parties submitted in the case, which appears at ECF No. 59-1.
. The record contains much discussion of dissatisfaction among Koubek and other City employees with Strothers’s work. But the City does not assert Storthers’s substantive job performance as a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for her dismissal. Def.’s Mem. 5 ("The City consistently has stated the reason Ms. Strothers was released was because of her excessive tardiness. Other reasons, including poor work performance and insubordination, arguably would have justified her release as well, but were not the reasons stated by the Ci1y.”). Accordingly, I will not recite the facts pertaining to her job performance that are unrelated to her tardiness.
. The City also disputes that Koubek was Strothers's supervisor as defined by Vance v. Ball State Univ., — U.S. —,
. Strothers also argues that the' City’s asserted reason for terminating her employment— tardiness—was pretextual because, by the City's count, she was tardy at least 38 times prior to her termination, but the City did not give her a written warning or suspend her prior to terminating her, as its disciplinary policies dictate, and finally decided to terminate her just over a week after she filed her complaint about the leggings incident. Pl.’s Opp’n 23-24. I find Strothers’s argument persuasive, but because she has failed to establish a prima facie retaliation case, it does not matter that the City has offered what appears to me to be a pretextual reason for terminating Strothers’s employment.