119 Minn. 325 | Minn. | 1912
Peter J. Stromberg died in Chicago, Illinois, whthe a resident therein, leaving him surviving his widow, the appellant, but no issue. He left no estate whatever in the state of his domicil, either in the way of household furniture or other personal property, except that he carried $2,000 life insurance payable to his estate. His brother was appointed administrator of the estate by the probate court of Goodhue county, Minnesota. He, having possession of the insurance policy, collected the full amount thereof. Resident creditors of the deceased presented claims against the estate which were duly allowed by said probate court, aggregating more than $2,000. Appellant, as widow, presented her petition for the statutory allowance of the equivalent for household' goods in money, and also for the sum of $500 out of other personal property. Her petition was denied in toto by the probate court and also by the district court on appeal. She appeals to this court from the judgment entered on the findings- and order of the district court.
We are clear that the trial court was right in holding that, where a decedent left no household goods, the widow is not entitled to have any allowance in lieu thereof. If there be household goods, she is entitled to select and keep such to the value of $500, but the statute, section 3653, R. L. 1905, does not allow her to select an equivalent in other property. Her right to the selection of certain specified articles ■of her deceased husband’s property is clearly confined to those articles, the household goods, not to exceed a fixed value. In regard to the additional allowance of $500, it is equally clear that she may select money or any other form of personal property of her deceased husband.
“Thé property so set aside shall be delivered by the executor or administrator to the person entitled thereto, and shall not be treated ■•as assets in his hands.”
The part the widow is entitled to is not to be included in the estate to be administered upon, and is not subject to the .expenses 'of administration or the payment of proved claims, and is no part of the residue to be distributed. All that the probate court is called uppn to do with relation to such property is to segregate it from the rest of the estate and order the executor or administrator to deliver it to the widow. Section 3653, supra, reads: “When any person dies owning personal property or any interest therein, the same shall be disposed of and distributed as follows.” Then comes first the allowance to the widow; secondly, the funeral expenses and expenses of .-administration, and thirdly, the distribution of the residue. The
Justice Mitchell, in the concurring opinion in Benjamin v. Laroche, 39 Minn. 334, 40 N. W. 156, in apt and terse language, expresses the true status of the personal property which the surviving-spouse takes under our law: “I concur, but would place the decision upon the ground that the right of a widow to the property allowed her by subdivision 1, § 1, chapter 51 [R. L. 1905, § 3653] is as absolutely vested the instant of the death of her husband as that to her distributive share of the balance of the estate, the only difference-being that in the one case the property is subject to administration,, and in the other not.”
That this is now the law appears clearly from the opinion in Simmons v. Higbie’s Estate, 103 Minn. 448, 115 N. W. 265, where Mr. Justice Brown says with reference to a widow’s right under this statute: “The clear intention of the legislature was to vest an absolute-right to the property mentioned in the widow; the only act remaining to be done after the husband’s death being the designation of the-particular property selected by her. * * * It was clearly not the-intention that the property so ‘allowed’ should enter into the administration of the estate at all.”
The fiction of law that the situs of the personal property of a-nonresident decedent is in the state or country of his domicil is only for the purpose of distributing the residue of the estate, subject to the expenses of administration and the rights of creditors, in the state-
“A state within whose borders personal assets of a decedent are found has the power to grant an exemption or allowance to the widow out of those assets, irrespective of the domicil of her husband at the-time of his death. * * * Generally, however, the local statutes-on the subject are not explicit with respect to the effect of the residence or domicil of the deceased in another state at the time of his-death; and in such situation the well-established principle of private-international law, that the distribution of the personal estate of a decedent is governed by the law of his domicil is allowed to control.”'
Even when such statutes are not explicit a restricted construction has not been given. Jones v. Layne, supra, and In re Estate of Gill, 79 Iowa, 296. In Kapp v. Public Adm. 2 Brad. (N. Y.) 258, upon facts similar to those here involved and under a statute much like our own, the rights of the widow to certain personal property of her deceased husband were not limited by the fact of decedent’s domicil in another state.
The judgment must therefore be reversed and the case remanded with direction to the court below to modify the conclusion of law so-that judgment conforming to the views herein expressed may be entered.
Reversed and remanded.