47 Iowa 42 | Iowa | 1877
Appellants contend that in the construction of this section the words for the appropriation or. payment of money must be regarded as qualiiying-the words ordinances and resolutions as well as the word orders, so that under-this section , only
Upon the other hand appellee insists that the words for the appropriation or payment of money qualify only the word orders, and that all ordinances and resolutions, whatever may be their object or purpose, require for their passage the concurrence of a majority of all the trustees. This construction the court below adopted. The question is not at all free from difficulty. The mere grammatical arrangement admits, perhaps equally, of either construction. The punctuation employed would require the construction contended for by the appellee. But in the construction of a law courts pay but little regard to the punctuation employed, and will always disregard it when it is not in harmony with the intention of the legislature as gathered from the entire act. Shindly v. The State, 23 Ohio St. Rep., 139; Randolph v. Bayne, 44 Cal., 366. For a proper construction of this section we must read it in connection with other parts of the same statute, and we must, if possible, put such construction upon it as will make it harmonize with, and give force and efficiency to, all the other parts. Section 493 of this statute is as follows: “ On the passage or adoption of every by-law or ordinance, and every resolution or order to enter into a contract hy_any council of any municipal corporation, the yeas and nays shall be recorded, and to pass or adopt any by-law, ordinance, or any such resolution or order, a concurrence of a majority of the whole number of members elected to the council shall be required * • * *.” It is to be obseiwed that this section requires the concurrence of a majority of the whole number of trustees for the adoption of any ordinance, and for the adoption of any resolution or order to enter into a contract. Now it is altogether unnecessary that this section should require a concurrence of a majority of the council for the adoption of any resolution to enter into a contract, if section 489, as appellee contends requires such majority for' the adoption of all resolutions It will further be observed that, in this section, the words resolution and order are both spoken of as referring to the
II. The objections that the resolution was adopted without having been read or propose^ at a previous meeting, and without dispensing with the rule at a previous meeting, that the subject of the resolution was not expressed in the title, and that, on the 19tb of May, the resolution was amended without adopting a new one entire, and without repealing the former resolution, are without force. The provisions of the statute, section 489, under which these objections are made, apply only to ordinances.
Reversed.