144 P. 1193 | Or. | 1916
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
“If the trial be by jury, judgment shall be given by the court in conformity with the verdict and so entered by the clerk within the day on which the verdict is returned”: Section 201, L. O. L.
“This clause of the statute was probably designed to create a lien as soon as possible after a verdict is rendered, but whether the provision is mandatory or ministerial is not deemed to be important, for the term ‘within the day’ evidently means within 24 hours, otherwise a verdict returned just before midnight would be ineffectual unless a judgment could be entered thereon before the close of the last moment of that day. Such a rule would be a travesty on justice. ’ ’
The notice was served within the time limited, and this being so, the motion is denied.
Motion Denied.
Opinion on the Merits
Affirmed March. 14, 1916.
On the Merits.
(155 Pac. 1195.)
Department 2. Statement by Mr. Justice Bean.
This is an action by plaintiff as administrator, for damages for the wrongful death of one Ed Wachter. The cause was tried before a jury, and resulted in a verdict for defendant. From a judgment thereon, the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant corporation operates a system of electric street-car lines over various streets and thoroughfares in and out of the City of Portland, Oregon, particularly from Oregon City and Milwaukee to Portland. Between the two latter towns there is a station by the name of Ardgour where a street or public thoroughfare which is much traveled crosses defendant’s railway track. South of Ardgour there is a sign which reads, “Six miles per hour,” indicating that it is the duty of one in charge of a car coming from a
The reply put in issue the new matter of the answer.
Upon the trial of the cause R. E. Maple, a passenger on the car at the time of the accident, after describing the 6-mile slow down sign, testified that there was no signal bell at the crossing at the time; that he did not hear any gong sounded as they neared the' crossing. Thereupon he was asked the following:
*530 “Has there been a bell installed or a signal installed out there, and if so, by whom, and on what part of the right of way?”
To this question an objection was interposed by defendant’s counsel and sustained by the court. Plaintiff’s counsel saved an exception thereto and assigns the ruling as error. No answer was tendered by plaintiff, and the record does not disclose whether or not the witness could testify in regard to the matter. Walter Grlisan, witness for plaintiff, who identified certain photographs of the premises, stated that he was on the golf links near the crossing in question at the time of the accident; that he saw the car just before the accident happened and turned and then heard the crash; that he heard no whistle sounded. During his examination the following question was asked him: ‘/Did you hear any block signals ringing out there [at] the crossing?” To this defendant’s counsel interposed an objection, which was sustained, and -plaintiff saved an exception thereto. Grlisan stated that the car made no safety stop at that time. In answer to the question, “Was there anything at the crossing?” the witness stated: “A little house, to the south, and a railroad crossing sign, and a post; * * that is all.” He was then asked: “Have they made such safety stops since then?” To this interrogatory an objection was made by defendant’s counsel which was sustained by the court and plaintiff’s counsel reserved an exception. The,court thereupon stated: “The court will not permit him to testify to anything subsequent to that accident.” No answers were tendered by the plaintiff to either of the questions to which objection was made. Aeeirmed.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. Leslie Craven and Messrs. Griffith, Leiter & Allen, with an oral argument by Mr. Craven.
delivered the opinion of the court.
The record shows that the condition of the premises where the accident happened, as they existed at the time of the injury, was plainly described to the jury by the witnesses and shown by the photographs exhibited, so that the jury could not have been misled in that regard. It was also shown that the cars in
It is a fundamental proposition that subsequent changes or repairs cannot be proved to show antecedent negligence; bnt, where the jnry have viewed the premises, evidence of any alteration made thereon since the injury is admissible: Foster v. University Lbr. & Shingle Co., 65 Or. 46 (131 Pac. 736, 742); Cameron v. Gypsum, 73 Or. 510 (144 Pac. 446). The ruling of the trial court clearly indicated that it was not intended to exclude any evidence as to conditions prevailing at the place of the injury prior to the event. If there was any error in excluding the evidence referred to, it was cured by the introduction of other evidence describing the conditions at the crossing.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed.