Elizabeth Strickland and her husband, Christopher Strickland, were convicted of cruelty to children for depriving Mr. Strickland’s four-year-old illegitimate son of necessary sustenance and maliciously
1. Strickland enumerates as error the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict in her favor on Count 2 of the indictment. The facts of the case are set forth in her husband’s earlier appeal.
Strickland v. State,
In support of her contention that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal, Strickland claims that there is no evidence she inflicted the injuries on the child. However, she admitted both to a witness and in court that she “whipped” the child with a switch, although she denied that she whipped him hard enough to produce marks. There was medical evidence that many of the scars and fresh wounds on the child’s body were produced by a switch or similar thin flexible object. The child, while first identifying the father as the person who hit him, on further questioning stated that Mrs. Strickland hit him, too.
“A motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only when there is no conflict in [the] evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law. [Cits.] On appeal a reviewing court can consider all the evidence [cit.] and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. [Cit.]”
Jones v. State,
There is ample evidence in the record from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Strickland was guilty of cruelty to children by maliciously causing her ward excessive physical pain.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Strickland enumerates as error the denial of her motion to sever her trial from that of her co-defendant husband. The grant or denial of a motion to sever is clearly within the discretion of the trial court, and absent an abuse of discretion, its denial is not grounds for reversal.
Freeman v. State,
3. Strickland also enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of her motion for a continuance, made on the day of trial. She contends that the court should have allowed additional time for her to obtain an expert witness. She also contends that documents provided to her by DFACS through the trial court were illegible, and that the State did not identify certain witnesses to her until a few days before trial. She further contends that the failure of the State to comply with these requests violated her due process rights. A motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, OCGA § 17-8-22, and the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be reversed on appeal without a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion.
Rhodes v. State,
(a) Strickland first contends that a continuance should have been granted for her to obtain an expert witness. She asserts that such an expert was necessary to refute the testimony of a physician in the medical examiner’s office, who testified to the age and probable origin of the scars on the child based upon his examination of photographs. However, Strickland is not entitled to rely solely on information provided by the State for her pretrial investigation, and she must show the exercise of due diligence in order to obtain a continuance.
Davis v. State,
It appears from the record that Strickland had viewed the photographs from which the expert testified by February 1992. She has not shown that she was unable to obtain an expert to examine the photographs at an earlier date. The record does not demand a finding that Strickland exercised diligence. OCGA § 17-8-20;
Green v. State,
(b) Similarly, the record does not appear to include the purportedly illegible documents produced by DFACS, and Strickland has not shown how those documents would have assisted her in the preparation of her case. The record does not show that the documents were subject to disclosure under OCGA § 17-7-210 or § 17-7-211, that they were provided by the State, or that the State delayed their production in any way. There is no showing of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Strickland’s motion for continuance on this ground.
McMillan v. State,
(c) The final basis on which Strickland contends a continuance should have been granted was the State’s delivery of a supplemental witness list seven days before the trial began. However, the Georgia Supreme Court has found no error in the denial of a motion for a continuance where a supplemental list of witnesses was served “several hours prior to call of the case for trial,” as long as the defendant had the opportunity to interview the witnesses called by the State.
Saylors v. State,
4. Strickland also complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for mistrial, contending that a witness for the State testified as to the ultimate issue in the case. This contention has no merit. The witness testified that with respect to the child’s condition at the time of his examination, his diagnosis'was
“suspected
child abuse.” However, he made no comment as to whether Strickland was the person who inflicted the injuries. He therefore did not testify as to the ultimate issue in the case.
Karvonen v. State,
Judgment affirmed.