Strickland v. StateStrickland v. State
Shаna Strickland appeals the denial of her plea in bar based upon double jeopardy. She contends the imposition of certain bond conditions was punishment, and that any further criminal prosecution is prohibited under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm the trial court’s ruling.
“The appellate standard of review of a grant or denial of a double jeоpardy plea in bar is whether, after reviewing the trial court’s oral and written rulings as a whole, the trial court’s findings support its conclusion.”
Simile v. State,
Generally, “a defendant is not placed in jeopardy until, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, he has beеn arraigned, has pled, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn.”
Fletcher v. State,
In this case, Strickland was before the trial court on the State’s motion to amend the conditions of her bond imposed following a five-count charge of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe, driving under the influence of alcohol with an unlаwful concentration of alcohol, improper driving on a one-way street, impeding traffic, and disorderly conduct. After Strickland waived arraignment, thе trial court granted the State’s motion that showed Strickland had been convicted in Georgia three times for driving under the influence, and after her most currеnt arrest, she had a blood alcohol level of 0.326. The State’s motion sought to restrict her driving privileges to going to work, going to the hospital for substance abuse treatment, going to school, or going to court proceedings. The State further requested that Strickland only operate a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device and that she submit to a DUI court evaluation. After the trial court granted these modifications, Strickland filed a “Plea in Bar Bаsed Upon Procedural Double Jeopardy,” which was denied by the trial court.
Because “[t]he purpose of a pretrial bond is to prevent рunishment before a conviction and to secure the appearance of the [accused] in court for trial,”
Ayala v. State,
authorized to releasе a person on bail if the court finds that the person: (1) Poses no significant risk of fleeing from the jurisdiction of the court or failing to appear in court whеn required; (2) Poses no significant threat or danger to any person, to the community, or to any property in the community; (3) Poses no significant risk of committing any felony pending trial; and (4) Poses no significant risk of intimidating witnesses or otherwise obstructing the administration of justice.
OCGA § 17-6-1 (e). Moreover, trial courts have the inherent authority to impose conditions upon bail and the court may impose reasonable restrictions on a defendant’s behavior.
Clarke v. State,
In
Bozzuto v. State,
Accordingly, we find that the restrictions plаced on Strickland’s driving privileges and the requirements that she install an ignition interlock device in her vehicle and submit to a DUI court evaluation are not punishment. Considering Strickland’s three prior convictions for driving while under the influence, these measures are rationally related to an alternative purрose as they are designed to prevent Strickland from being a danger to the community by committing future acts of driving under the influence while she was awaiting trial.
Additionally, suspending a driver’s license or placing restrictions on it is, in fact, the revocation of a voluntarily granted privilege, which is a traditional attribute оf a remedial action.
Nolen v. State,
supra,
[I]n Georgia, a driver’s license is not an absolute right but rather is a privilege that may be revoked for cause. The right to continuе the operation and to keep the license to drive is dependent upon the manner in which the licensee exercises this right. The right is not absolutе, but is a privilege. While it cannot be revoked without reason, it can be constitutionally revoked or suspended for any cause having to do with public safety.
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. “ ‘The State of Georgia considers danger-i ous and negligent drivers to be a direct and immediate threat to the ' welfare and safety of the general public, and it is in the best interest ) of the citizens of Georgia immediately to remove such drivers from I the highways of this state.’ OCGA § 40-5-57.” Id.
As a trial court has inherent authority to place conditions on I bonds, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to determine 1 whether Strickland posed such a threat to the public that these conditions were required, and that decision will not be overruled : absent an abuse of discretion.
Clarke v. State,
supra,
Accordingly, conducting a hearing to modify her bond conditions and placing limitations upon Stricklаnd’s driving privileges, predicated upon the necessity to protect the welfare and safety of the citizens of Georgia from a recidivist offendеr of driving under the influence, is not punishment, nor was the hearing prosecution, for the purposes of double jeopardy, and we find no abuse of the trial сourt’s discretion.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
As Strickland’s bond restrictions imposed were connected to the criminal proceedings against her,
Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,