241 Pa. 560 | Pa. | 1913
Opinion by
This was a proceeding in equity to compel the operator of a mine to leave certain solid pillars of coal in an
The following excerpt from the opinion of the learned court below well states the appellants’ position: “The plaintiffs claim that under this clause of the lease ‘the lessors have the power to direct pillars of coal to be left at all such points as may be designated by them, which may be necessary for the protection of the present and future workings of the mine.’.......There are two veins of coal involved in this dispute. The one is the overlying, commonly called Seven Foot Yein, the other is the Buck Mountain Vein. It is conceded that it is not feasible to work the Seven Foot Yein alone at this mine, and it can only be worked to advantage in connection with the Buck Mountain Vein. The Buck Mountain Yein having been worked a considerable distance below the Seven Foot Yein, the plaintiffs claim that no pillars should be taken out of the Buck Mountain Vein until the Seven Foot Yein is worked out. That to draw the pillars from the Buck Mountain Yein would let down the Seven Foot Vein, or, at least, make it too dangerous and expensive to mine.”
The plaintiffs notified the defendant not to remove or rob the pillars in a large area of the mine, but the latter refused to comply with the notice, taking the position that to do so, “would be an injury to all parties concerned, would do great damage to the defendant, would jeopardize the future working of the mine, would
The court below construed the 18th clause of the lease to mean, when taken in connection with the grant as a whole, that the lessors thereunder only had the right to insist that such pillars be left undisturbed as are “necessary, for the present or future workings of the mine”; and decided that the question of necessity, when brought into controversy, was one to be judicially determined; further, that no such necessity had been shown, and that to “insist upon the lessee leaving the pillars standing according to the notice of the lessors, as prayed for in the bill, would be unjust, arbitrary and in fraud of the rights of the lessee.” But the chancellor went beyond this, and found as a fact that the “gob system” of mining, which was being pursued by the defendant as a substitute for the “pillar system,” was the better and safer of the two, stating, “We have no hesitancy in saying that these two veins should be worked under the panel or gob system by which the overlying strata is supported by the falling debris or gob filling the entire area of space left after taking out the coal mined from the breasts and pillars; that to work them under existing conditions by the long run or pillar system, relying on the pillars now standing as the only support of the overlying strata for the entire
That equity had jurisdiction to entertain the bill may be conceded, but, under the law as defined by this court, it is clear that the facts in the present case would not have justified the issuance of an injunction. (See Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 220 Pa. 65.) The plaintiff neither averred nor proved irreparable damage, or danger of such in the future; and an injunction is never granted for the purpose of enforcing a mere right, contractual or otherwise, the breach of which can readily be compensated in damages. This
Tbe assignments of error are all bad in form. Tbe first fifty each fails to show tbe exception taken below or tbe court’s action thereon, in tbe manner required by tbe equity rules and decisions of this court, and tbe last one merely states tbe decree by reference, instead of transcribing it in totidem verbis: Prenatt v. Messenger Printing Co., 241 Pa. 267; Kane & Elk R. R. Co. v. Pittsburgh & Western R. R. Co., 241 Pa. 608. Since tbe assignments are all defective, we will not pass upon them separately; but we find no reversible error, and, for tbe reasons stated in this opinion, we will not disturb tbe final decree dismissing tbe bill.
The decree is affirmed at tbe cost of tbe appellants.