3 S.W.3d 504 | Tenn. Ct. App. | 1999
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
FILED AT KNOXVILLE April 15, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt
Clerk BETTY JEAN STREET, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9710-CV-00488 ) Plaintiff-A ppellant, ) WASH INGTO N CIRC UIT ) v. ) HON . THO MA S J. SE ELE Y, JR., ) JUDGE ROBERT L. WADDELL, GARY ) WALTERS, TRUSTEES OF SALEM ) PRE SBY TER IAN C HUR CH, ) TRUSTEES OF SALEM ) PRESBYTERIAN CEMETERY FUND, ) RANDY HURST and RUTH ) TRIVETTE BRAY, ) AFFIRMED
) AND Defendants-Appellees. ) REMANDED BOB McD . GREE N, Johns on City, for Pla intiff-App ellant. M. STAN LEY GIV ENS and JAC K R. CAR RIER, Johnson City, for Defendants- Appellees.
O P I N I O N Franks, J. In this will contest case, the Trial Judge upheld a will without a jury, and the contestant has appealed. Edith Trivette, executed three separate wills over a period of approximately three years. The last will was executed on August 31, 1994, and devised $1,000.00 to the Salem Presbyterian Church in Washington County and a diamond engagement ring to her stepdaughter, Ruth Trivette Bray. It then divided the remainder of the estate equally between Robert L. Waddell, Betty Jean Street, and the Salem Presbyterian Church Cemetery Fund. Robert L. Waddell, as Executor, caused the will to be probated, and ultimately distributed the estate in accordance with the will. Some five months after distribution of the estate, Betty Jean Street, who had received $46,762.27 from the estate, filed a petition to contest the will, and upon an extend ed trial, th e Trial C ourt rule d again st the co ntestan t.
At trial, the con testant offered the depos ition of Dr. R alph Lee Mills in evidence to the effect that Trivette suffered from senile dementia. The doctor testified that he had treated Trivette from 1988 through 1992, and that “slowly over the course of time when I began treating her, she slowly developed progressively worse dementia.” Dr. Mills did not see Trivette in 1993 or 1994, although he expected that her m ental an d emo tional co ndition would have d eteriora ted dur ing that t ime.
The contestant, on appeal, insists that the burden of proof of testamentary capacity shifted from the contestant to the proponent of the will upon proof of a se rious perm anent m ental impa irment.
In this regard, the Tennessee Supreme Court has said: “While evidence regarding factors such as physical weakness or disease, old age, blunt perception or failing mind and memory is admissible on the issue of testamentary capacity, it is not conclusive and the testa tor is not thereb y rendered incomp etent if her m ind is sufficiently sound to enable her to know and understand what she is doing.” In re Estate of Elam , 738 S.W.2d 1 69, 171-2 (Tenn . 1987) ( citing Am erican Tru st & Bank ing Co . v. Willia ms, 32 Tenn . App. 590 , 225 S.W .2d 79, 83 (1 948) (em phasis supplie d.)
This Court, in the Amer ican Tr ust & B anking Co. case observed: Evidence of prior mental condition may have much, little or no probative value depending upon the nature and effect of the malady, whether general, habitual, continuous, chronic or progressive or due merely to temporary, superficial, accidental, occasional or intermittent causes or conditions. If the debility falls within the first category, evidence of the testator’s condition at a time other that the date of the execution of the will may shift the burden of proof and require the production of affirmativ e proof of h is condition a t the very tim e the will was executed.
2 225 S .W.2d at 84. In this re gard, Green v. Higdon, 870 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. A pp. 1993), considered the imp act of the deposition of a D r. Kaplan offered by th e contestant of a will. Th e docto r testified “His n iece tells m e he’s b een co nfused for mo re than a year. On examination he was obviously disoriented. He obviously has an organic mental state. In view of the history , it’s likely that he h as senile dem entia. I don’t th ink he is capable of looking after his own affairs as long as this present mental state detention continues. . . M y conclus ion is that he m ust have h ad this prim ary dem entia Alzheim er’s Diseas e for som e years. Th e exact nu mber of y ears, I couldn ’t be certain of. Based o n my ob servations o f him since 1982, I con clude that h is inability to handle his business affairs date back at least a year.” Id. at 522.
Upon considering Dr. Kaplan’s testimony, this Court said “No testimony is found that, on January 18, 1985 , the deceased lacked testam entary capacity. No eviden ce is found of any sp eech or action of dece ased from w hich a jury could properly find such lack of capacity.” Id. The Court then noted, “Less mental capac ity is requ ired to m ake a w ill than to carry o n busin ess trans actions genera lly,” and then stated, “it is clear that the testimony of Dr. Kaplan, quoted above, is not sufficient to justify a finding as a matter of la w that the d eceased w as incom petent to make a will at a ny tim e.
We conclude that the contestant’s evidence did not shift the burden of proof of testamentary capacity, but in any event, the proponent put forth sufficient evidence of testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will to rebut any presum ption o f incapa city that c ould ha ve arise n.
The contestant further argues that she offered proof of physical impairment of Trivette’s vision and hearing, and that the proponents failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Trivette was familiar with the precise provisions of the w ill at the tim e of exe cution.
3 Where the maker of the will is aged, sick and infirm or unable to read and write by reason of blindness or illiteracy, the proponent of the will is onerated with the burden of showing the testator comprehended the contents of the will at the time of execu tion. Burrow s v. Lewis , 24 Tenn. App. 253, 142 S.W.2d 758, 763 (1940). We agree with the contestant that the proponent had the burden of proving that Trivette knew the contents of the will. We conclude that this burden was met by a preponderance of the evidence. T.R.A .P. Rule 13(d).
Gene G aby, the attorney w ho prepa red the w ill, testified that he m et with Trivette on June 13, 1 994 and she expre ssly informed him then o f what sh e wanted in her will. He was satisfied that Ms. Trivette knew what property she had and the disposition she wanted to make of it, and he prepared the will accordingly. When Gaby met with Trivette for execution of the will on June 24, 1994, he reviewed the will with her, although he could not remember whether he read it to her, whether someone else read it, or whether Ms. Trivette read it. He was certain that one of the three too k place .
Gaby then went back to the nursing home on August 31, 1994, and went over the last will with Ms. Trivette, to the extent that he considered she knew what she was signin g. A M s. Gamm on was p resent wh en this final w ill, upheld by the C ourt, was ex ecuted , and sh e reme mbers Trivette discuss ing the w ill with h er attorn ey. Although Gammon could not remember whether the entire will was read aloud, she testified that at least part of it was read, and Trivette told Gaby she understood what she w as doin g in the w ill.
The contestant argues that Trivette could not have known the provisions in this latter will, because contestant contends that this will essentially resurrected the provisions contained in her “first will”. There is simply no proof in the record that Trivette was attempting to resurrect the provisions from the first will. The evidence
4 establishes by a preponderance that Trivette was familiar with the specific provisions in both the seco nd and third w ills whic h she ex ecuted in June and A ugust o f 1994 . The issue thus beco mes whether the evidence prepon derates against the Trial Cou rt’s finding the will valid.
The Trial Court held that the will dated August 31, 1994, was the last will and testa ment of E dith Trivette. T he standard of review in a case tried without a jury is de novo upon the record of the Trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of correct ness of the find ing, unl ess the p repond erance of the e videnc e is othe rwise. T.R.A .P. Rule 13(d).
The con testant offe red eviden ce that Trive tte had been diagnose d with senile dementia in 1991, and that such condition worsens with time. She introduced several hospital and nursing home documents indicating that Trivette was confused and disoriented at times. She a lso offered evidenc e of Trivette’s unusual b ehavior, and to being confused as to whom people were and forgetful. She offered evidence that Trivette h ad good days and ba d days, but did s he not off er any eviden ce as to Trivette’s ca pacity on the sp ecific day of th e execution of the will.
The proponent, on the other hand, offered evidence from five disinterested persons, that Trivette had the requisite capacity to make a valid will. The attorney Gaby testified that Trivette informed him of what she wanted in the will. She knew what property she had and how she w anted it divided. Other witnesses, including sta ff mem bers at the nu rsing hom e, testified to the ir opinions th at Trivette possessed the requisite c apacity to mak e a will.
The propone nts presented docum entary evidence that Trivette wa s alert and oriented as to time and place, and a psychologist did find that Trivette would get confused at times, but she would correct herself when that happened. The records reveal that Trivette scored below the range for dementia on a test given by the
5 psychologist. The evidence preponderates that Trivette was competent to make the will upheld by the Trial Judge.
Further, the Trial Court correctly found that there was no evidence of undue influence upon Trivette. The contestant offered no proof of a confidential relationship between Trivette and anyone. Nor was evidence offered of any suspicious circumstances warranting the conclusion the will was not Trivette’s free and ind epend ent act.
The evid ence prep onderates in favor of th e Trial Co urt’s judgm ent, which we affirm, and remand the cause with cost of the appeal assessed to the appellant.
__________________________ Herschel P. Franks, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________ Houston M. Godd ard, P.J. ___________________________ Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
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