124 Minn. 517 | Minn. | 1914
Lead Opinion
Plaintiff’s action to recover damages for personal injuries was dismissed at the close of his evidence, and this is an appeal from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff entered defendant’s passenger train at a station in this state, for the purpose of assisting a lady passenger, himself, however, not intending to take passage, but to leave the car as soon as his errand thereon was accomplished. Entering the front end of the car, they proceeded to a seat near the middle, when, observing the train was in motion, he hastily passed to the rear vestibule, intending to alight, but finding this closed hurried back through the car to the front end, attempted to alight, fell and was injured.
Plaintiff’s case, however, is not grounded on common-law negligence, but depends upon defendant’s failure to comply with the statutory duty — which under the evidence was for the jury — to stop “a sufficient time, not less than one minute, to safely discharge and receive passengers,” prescribed by G. S. 1913, § 4399; while defendant’s contention, adopted by the trial court, is that plaintiff’s right of recovery, if otherwise sustainable, is defeated by section 9010, which reads as follows:
“It shall be unlawful for any person other than a passenger or employee to get on or off, or attempt to get on or off, or to swing on, or hang on from the outside of, any engine or car or any electric motor or street car upon any railway or track, while such engine, car, motor, or street car is in motion, or switching or being switched. Every person who shall violate any of the foregoing provisions shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten dollars, and any sheriff, constable, or police officer finding any person in the act of violating any such provision shall arrest, take before a proper court or magistrate, and make a verified complaint against him for such violation.”
It may be conceded that, if plaintiff is without the former statute or the exception of the latter, he cannot recover; (for defendant’s duty, if any, lay in the first, and the second would constitute a bar under the doctrine that where one’s violation of law contributes directly and proximately to his injury he is remediless). The question, then, turns upon the inclusiveness of the term “passengers,” employed in both sections, as indicative of their scope and intended operation. The ordinary rules governing construction of civil statutes should be applied to the first, while the second, being penal, must be strictly construed. We think it clear that plaintiff was within the protection of the provision first quoted. It would violate ordinary rules of construction and be an unwarrantable assumption of legislative intent to hold — especially in view of the universal practice of persons assisting passengers in boarding trains, acquiesced in
In this connection we cannot be oblivious of the fact that, if this statute is to be read literally, it is openly and hourly violated. In East v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 195 N. Y. 409, 88 N. E. 751, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 513, it was held that a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to get “on any car or train while in motion for the purpose of obtaining transportation thereon as a passenger,” did not apply to persons in good faith intending to take passage, but only to those endeavoring to obtain transportation contrary to the rules of the company.
“It is contended,” said Mr. Justice Gray, at pages 411, 412, [88 N. E. 752, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 513] “that the second subdivision of this section is applicable to plaintiff’s conduct. If this contention is correct, then an act of such common occurrence as to be almost a characteristic trait of our human nature, without distinction of class,
So also in Diddle v. Continental Casualty Co. 65 W. Va. 170, the court, construing a statute similar to ours, declared, at page 177 [63 S. E. 962, 966, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 779] :
“The statute is aimed at trespassers. It is penal and ought to be strictly construed. Passengers and employees are expressly excepted, because they are on the premises by invitation of the railroad company, and have right and frequent occasion to board trains.”
Authorities are cited in some measure supporting defendant’s contention. See Raben v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. 74 Iowa, 733, 34 N. W. 621; Young v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 100 Iowa, 357, 69 N. W. 682, (construing an Illinois statute). But it is to be noted that the terms of the statutes there construed are of broader inclusion than ours, not even excepting passengers from their operation. They are not directly in point, and even if they were we would not be content to follow them.
Order reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the order granting a new trial, but do not concur as to the ground upon which the order is based.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground that the act of plaintiff in stepping from a train in motion was forbidden by statute, and held that the violation of the statute conclusively established negligence on his part. It appears to me that this was error. Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, it is well settled in this state that’, where a statute or ordinance is made the basis of personal duty to secure safety, its violation is not conclusive evidence of contributory negligence, but only a circumstance to be considered in connection with all the evidence in the case. In my opinion the question of plaintiff’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury. Ericson v. Duluth & Iron Range R. Co. 57 Minn. 26, 58 N. W. 822; Oddie v. Mendenhall, 84 Minn. 58, 86 N. W. 881; Day v. Duluth Street Ry. Co. 121 Minn. 445, 141 N. W. 795, and the order of dismissal should be reversed on this ground.
I cannot, however, concur in the conclusion reached in the opinion that the statute mentioned does not apply to a person not a passenger, who accompanies a passenger to a railroad station. The statute makes it unlawful for “any person other than a passenger or employee to get on or off” a car while in motion. A person accompanying a passenger is neither a passenger nor employee. He is accordingly within the terms of the statute. It is said there was an intent to except from the operation of this statute persons who have a lawful right to go upon a train or who are lawfully upon it. The legislature expressed no such intent. It expressly excepted pas
It is true that exceptions from general terms of a statute will sometimes be implied. It has been said: “If there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are with regard to those collateral consequences void,” as where a legislative act gives a man power to try all causes that arise within the Manor of Dale, yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is a party, the act is to be construed as not to extend to that case, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel. 1 Blackstone, (Cooley’s Ed.) 91.
This rule has been applied in this state and it has been said: “The general terms of a statute or ordinance may be subject to implied exceptions, founded in the rules of public policy and the maxims of natural justice, so as to avoid absurd and unjust consequences ; for it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend such results.” Start, C. J., in State v. Barge, 82 Minn. 256, 84 N. W. 911; Duckstad v. Board of Commrs. of Polk County, 69 Minn. 202, 71 N. W. 933.
But this court has always been extremely reluctant to construe into a statute, by the application of this rule, an exception not written therein. In Gollnik v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N. W. 292, the question arose whether an exception could be made in our statute relating to descent of property, so as to exclude from its benefit an heir who had murdered his ancestor. Even in that extreme case the court refused to construe an exception into the statute. The reason was well stated in the opinion, written by Justice O’Brien, as follows:
“AYe are now asked to add to a clear and unambiguous statute an exception, and, while the demand in this instance appeals to every normal person’s sense of justice, it would establish a rule of construction, the limitation of which no one could foresee.”
In Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 182 U. S. 438, 21 Sup. Ct.
It seems to me that this case is not within the rule which justifies a court in implying exceptions not expressed in a statute. There is nothing absurd or contradictory to common reason in prohibiting any person from jumping off a moving train. If the construction placed upon this statute in the opinion be correct, then the statute, as applied to the act of getting on a car, simply prohibits acts of trespassers, which would be unlawful without any statute, and as applied to the act of jumping off a ear simply means that a trespasser, after he once succeeds in getting on a car, shall ride thereon until the car comes to a full stop.
The practice of people accompanying friends and relatives to a railroad station is universal. The practice of their getting on the train is common. The practice of their remaining until the train starts is common enough, and has resulted in many disasters. A statute prohibiting such persons from getting off while the car is in motion, appears to me to be wholesome and reasonable. The prohibition of such practice is within the plain language of this statute. A court has no right to say that the prohibition of this practice should be excepted from the terms of the statute as an absurd or unjust consequence, contrary to common reason, or that such exception is demanded by the rules of public policy or the maxims of public- justice.
It appears to me that neither the West Virginia nor the New York case cited is in any sense decisive of the question here involved. In the West Virginia case the statute construed was similar to ours, but the question was whether a shop employee was an employee within the meaning of the act, and it was held that he was. The statute in the New York case forbade only the act of getting on cars in motion, and the construction was affected in some measure by the