105 Tenn. 666 | Tenn. | 1900
Tbe defendant in error boarded a car of tbe plaintiff in error, which ran north on Whiteside street, in Chattanooga. His point of destination was the intersection of that street with Lewis street. Wrhen this place was reached the
The trial Judge, after properly stating to the jury if they found that plaintiff and defendant were guilty of negligence which contributed proximately to the injury, or if they found the want of care on the part of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of the action, the action must fail,
It is obvious that the situation in which the defendant was placed just before and at the moment he received this injury, while such as to require prudence on his part, at the same . time imposed the duty of diligent attention upon the railway company to see that he received no injury from anything under its control. The conductor and motorman on the approaching car, seeing that the north-bound, car had stopped at the crossing, were bound to know that passengers were alighting from or getting on it.’ If alighting, they might well have anticipated the possibility that they would come out from behind the car to cross the street, and in doing so would be put in peril by the approaching car, unless it was under
On this question there is a conflict of authority, but we think the more reasonable view is that where a man who has traveled on a street ear steps from the car upon the street, this terminates his relation and rights as passenger, and the railway company is not responsible to him as carrier for the- condition of the street, or for his safe passage from the car to the sidewalk. Where a common carrier has the exclusive control or occupation of its tracks and stations, and can arrange and manage them as' it sees fit, it may be properly held that a person intending to take passage upon, or leave, a train sustains the relation of a passenger in leaving or approaching the car at a .station, but “one who steps from a street railway car to the street is not upon the premises of the railway company, but upon- a public place, where he lias the same rights with every other occupier, and over which the company has no control. His rights are those of a traveler upon the highway, and not of a passenger.”
If the limitation indicated in the foregoing paragraph was not adopted, it would he difficult to suggest one resting upon a satisfactory basis. Take the case at bar. If the passenger relation did not determine when the defendant safely alighted from the car, when would it ’ end? Would it continue only while he was crossing the -parallel track, or until he had reached a point of comparative safety on the far side of the street ? Or if, after reaching the ground, he had directed his steps to the other side of the street, would it have continued until he had reached the pavement ? We think that the Massachusetts Supreme Court was wise in adopting the rule that this relation terminated the moment the passenger descended to the street. This is a fixed point, free from all speculation or uncertainty.
In accord with this will be found the cases of Central Railway Co. v. Peacock, 69 Md., 257 (S. C., 9 A. S. R., 425); Busby v. Phil. Traction Co., 126 Pa., St., 559 (S. C., 12 A. S. R., 919); Platt v. Forty-second St., etc., Ry. Co., 4 T. & C. (N. Y.), 406.
We think the trial Judge was in error in announcing a different rule, and as this error may have materially affected the jury in their consideration of the case, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a new trial.