OPINION AND ORDER
This is a consolidated action pursuant to the civil liability provision of the Antiter-rorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (“§ 2333(a)”). Plaintiffs, over 200 individuals and estates of people who are deceased (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek to recover damages from Defendant Crédit Lyonnais, S.A. (“Defendant”) in connection
BACKGROUND
I. The Parties
Plaintiffs’ claims arise from 19 terrorist attacks that occurred in Israel and Palestine between approximately 2001 and 2004, which allegedly were perpetrated by Hamas.
Defendant is a financial institution incorporated and headquartered in France. Id. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Defendant conducted business in New York through the Crédit Lyonnais Americas New York Branch (Defendant’s “New York Branch”).
Among other customers, Defendant maintained bank accounts in France for the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (“Committee for Palestinian Welfare and Relief’) (“CBSP”), a nonprofit organization registered in France and self-described as providing humanitarian aid to various charitable organizations in the West Bank, Gaza, and surrounding areas. See Strauss II,
II. Procedural History
After initially commencing an action against Defendant in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Plaintiffs refiled the Strauss case in this Court in February 2006. The initial complaint, and every amended complaint thereafter, alleged that Defendant is subject both to general personal jurisdiction (“general jurisdiction”) and specific personal jurisdiction (“specific jurisdiction”) in the United States. (See Strauss FAC ¶ 4; see also Wolf Compl. ¶ 4.) Following its voluntary acceptance of service of process in February 2006, (Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 3), Defendant moved for dismissal of the Strauss action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), declining to contest personal jurisdiction at that time. (See Mot. to Dismiss, Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 10.) The late Honorable Charles P. Sifton, then presiding, denied the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant provided material support to an FTO and knowingly transmitted funds that financed terrorism, but dismissed Plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim, with leave to amend. Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A. (“Strauss I ”),
On February 6, 2014, Defendant notified the Court that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,
Citing the “new rule” on general jurisdiction purportedly announced in Daimler, (see Feb. 6, 2014 Friedman Ltr.), Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the alternative, Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims because, at most, it is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York only with respect to the five New York Transfers it executed through its New York Branch. (See Del’s Mem. at 15-25.) Renewing arguments from its prior summary judgment motion, Defendant contends that no reasonable juror could find that it possessed the requisite scienter to establish liability under the ATA when making those five transfers, nor could a reasonable juror find that its activities as of the date of those transfers proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
Plaintiffs oppose the instant motion, arguing as a threshold matter that Defendant waived a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise one in its prior motions to dismiss the Strauss and Wolf, actions then actively litigating this case for several years. (See Pl.s’ Opp’n at 4-11.) Plaintiffs further argue that Daimler is distinguishable from this case, and therefore, the Court may exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant even if it finds that Defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense. (See Id. at 12 n. 27.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant based on its contacts with New York and
On October 8, 2015, oral argument was held on Defendant’s motion. (See Tr. of Oct. 8, 2015 Oral Argument (“Tr.”)). Following argument, at the Court’s request, the parties provided additional information concerning the extent of the transfers Defendant made to the Charities on behalf of CBSP, and the portion or percentage of those transfers that went through New York or the broader United States. (See Strauss Dkt. Entry Nos. 391-97.) This decision followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Waiver
Taken together, Rules 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party that moves to dismiss an action, but omits an available personal jurisdiction defense, forfeits that defense. Even a party that complies with those rules may forfeit the right to contest personal jurisdiction if it unduly delays in asserting that right, or acts inconsistently with it. See, e.g., Insur. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant waived its personal jurisdiction defense by omitting that defense from its prior motions to dismiss the Strauss and Wolf actions, then actively litigating this case over the course of several years. (See Pis’ Opp’n at 4-11.) However, Plaintiffs’, argument is foreclosed by Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li (“Gucci II ”),
The same conclusion is compelled in this case. Under controlling precedent in this Circuit prior to Daimler, Defendant was subject to general jurisdiction in New York because it had a New York Branch through which it routinely conducted business. Gucci II expressly acknowledged that, in the wake of Daimler, contact of such a nature with a forum State, absent more, is insufficient to sustain general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. See Gucci II,
Other courts in this Circuit, relying on the Second Circuit’s application of Daimler in Gucci II, have held similarly. See, e.g., In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig.,
Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments are similarly unavailing. Plaintiffs contend that, if the Supreme Court narrowed the law on general jurisdiction, it did so three years before Daimler in Goodyear,
The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed that holding in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
Plaintiffs also erroneously contend that Defendant actually contested personal jurisdiction in this case as early as 2006, or at least could have, despite now asserting that its personal jurisdiction defense only became available after Daimler. (Pis’ Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiffs base their argument on representations by Defendant that it does not conduct business in the United States, which Defendant made in: (1) a November 2006 submission to the magistrate judge; and (2) Defendant’s December 2006 answer to the first amended complaint. (See Ex. A to the Oct. 16, 2015 Osen Ltr., Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 391.) Upon review, the Court finds that neither filing reasonably can be construed as asserting an objection as to personal jurisdiction.
In particular, in its 2006 submission to the magistrate judge, Defendant emphasized its lack of business activity in the United States only in the context of arguing that it would be unduly burdensome to disclose business records maintained in France. (See Def.’s Opp’n to Pis’ Discovery Motion, Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 61, at 22-23.) Although the magistrate judge’s order on the discovery motions at issue noted, in a footnote, that Defendant had waived a personal jurisdiction defense by not raising one in its answer, see Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A.,
Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant could have asserted a personal jurisdiction defense earlier in this case fares no better. The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that, if Defendant really conducted no business whatsoever in the United States, as it represented in 2006, then Defendant had a valid basis to contest personal jurisdiction even under pre-Daimler precedent. Nevertheless, as discussed, any argument by Defendant prior to Daimler that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York would have been futile because Defendant had a branch in New York during the timeframe relevant to the Court’s jurisdictional inquiry. See Gucci II,
Finally, Plaintiffs argue in passing that, even if an objection as to general jurisdiction was unavailable to Defendant prior to Daimler, Defendant still could have challenged the existence of specific jurisdiction earlier in this case. However, any challenge to that effect would have been purely academic because, regardless of the outcome, Defendant still would have been subject to general jurisdiction in New York under existing law at the time. To the extent Defendant failed to contest spe
II. Personal Jurisdiction
A. Legal Standard
Once personal jurisdiction has been challenged, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez,
To make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) proper service of process upon the defendant; (2) a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) that [the court’s] exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is in accordance with constitutional due process principles.” Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
In conducting this analysis, the Court distinguishes between general and specific jurisdiction. General or “all-purpose” jurisdiction is “based on the defendant’s general business contacts with the forum state and permits a court to exercise its power in a case where the subject matter of the suit is unrelated to those contacts.” Metro. Life,
B. General Jurisdiction
A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to hear any and all claims against it when the corporation’s affiliations with the forum State are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home there. Goodyear,
The Court has little difficulty concluding that the facts here do not present an exceptional case. Defendant’s alleged contacts with New York are nowhere near as substantial as those in Perkins, where the defendant corporation maintained a surrogate headquarters in Ohio, the forum State. Id. By contrast, Defendant in this case merely had a New York Branch, which it used just for that discrete element of its worldwide operations that required clearing U.S. Dollar transfers. See Brown,
Moreover, Defendant’s New York contacts fall far short of the contacts maintained with Connecticut by Lockheed Martin (“Lockheed”), the corporate defendant that was the subject of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Broim. For example, Lockheed continuously maintained a physical presence in Connecticut for over 30 years, ran operations out of as many as four leased locations in the State, employed up to 70 workers there, and derived about $160 million in revenue from its Connecticut-based work during the relevant timeframe.
Given the fact that neither Gucci II nor Brown amounted to an exceptional case, the instant case clearly is not exceptional either. Accordingly, in light of Daimler, there is no basis for the Court to exercise general jurisdiction over Defendant in New York. Plaintiffs nevertheless attempt to distinguish Daimler on the ground that it involved a foreign corporation with a subsidiary in the forum State, whereas in this case the New York Branch purportedly was a legally inseparable branch office of Defendant. {See Pis’ Opp’n at 12 n. 27.) However, that distinction hardly renders Daimler inapposite. As a central principle, Daimler held that it would be “unacceptably grasping” to permit general jurisdiction over a corporation in every State where it engages in continuous and systematic business. Daimler,
C. Specific Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(l)(A)
Rule 4(k)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal court to “exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent of the applicable [State] statutes.” Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
1. CPLR § 302(a)(1)
Pursuant to § 302(a)(1), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that “transacts any business within the state.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). This provision confers jurisdiction over a defendant if two requirements are met. First, the defendant must have transacted business in New York. Known as the “purposeful availment” prong of § 302(a)(1), this requirement calls for a showing that the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York ... thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks
In Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL ("Licci II "),
The Court of Appeals further explained that the nexus prong of § 302(a)(1) does not demand a causal connection between the defendant’s New York transaction the plaintiffs claim, but instead requires only a “relatedness ... such that the latter is not completely unmoored from the former." Id. at 339,
Turning to the instant action, Defendant’s relevant New York conduct is even more substantial and sustained than that of the foreign bank in the Lied cases (collectively, “Lied”). Whereas the bank in Lied maintained only a correspondent account as its sole point of contact in New York, Defendant had a New York Branch that was staffed with employees and licensed to operate under New York banking laws. Defendant routinely conducted business in New York through that branch, utilizing it as the exclusive clearing channel for U.S. Dollar transfers requested by its customers. {See Virgilio Deck ¶ 2; see also Tr. 20:22-21:6). In doing so, Defendant necessarily availed itself of the benefits and protections accorded to such transactions when carried out using New York’s dependable banking system, under the auspices of New York banking and
With respect to the nexus prong of § 302(a)(1), the relevant facts further demonstrate a close relatedness between Plaintiffs’ claims in this action and Defendant’s New York conduct. Most significantly, in executing the New York Transfers, Defendant allegedly used New York’s banking system to effect the very financial support of Hamas that is the basis for Plaintiffs’ claims. While those five transfers represent only a subset of the total transfers Defendant made to the Charities on behalf of CBSP, they integrally constitute part of Defendant’s alleged support of Hamas and its terrorist activities, including the 19 attacks in which Plaintiffs were injured. As such, the New York Transfers unquestionably are among the financial services underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. (See Strauss FAC ¶¶ 676-90; Wolf Compl, ¶¶ 407-25.)
That nexus would be too attenuated if, contrary" to the facts alleged here, Defendant routed transfers through New York just “once or twice by mistake,” or executed the New York Transfers at a time far removed from the attacks that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. Licci II,
Defendant nevertheless argues that the nexus required by § 302(a)(1) is foreclosed because Plaintiffs have not proven with respect to any New York Transfer that the beneficiary Charity actually received and took possession of the underlying funds. (See Def.’s Mem. at 10-11.) However, it is not Plaintiffs’ burden to adduce any such proof at this stage. Rather, Plaintiffs need only plead facts that, if credited, would establish jurisdiction over Defendant. See Metro. Life,
Defendant further argues that, even if each New York Transfer reached its intended beneficiary, those transfers do not support jurisdiction because they are de minimis in comparison to the many other transfers Defendant made to the Charities at CBSP’s behest. The parties generally agree that, in addition to the five New York Transfers, Defendant executed at least 280 other transfers to the Charities on behalf of CBSP that never went through New York or the United States.
While relevant , to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis, these facts do not foreclose jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). As a “single act statute,” even “one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction [under § 302(a)(1)].... so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.” Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs.,
However, the court further explained that the grants and donations composing that 1% of funding had no demonstrated connection to the trademark claims that were the subject of the action. Id. at *9. The court sharply contrasted Chloé,
Furthermore, the nexus between Plaintiffs’- claims and Defendant’s New York conduct is premised on more than just the New York Transfers. As an element of their claims, “Plaintiffs must show that Defendant knew or was deliberately indifferent to the fact that CBSP was financially supporting terrorist organizations.” Strauss II,
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege that the blocking of the El Wafa Transfer precipitated communications between Defendant and its New York Branch regarding CBSP’s banking activities. (See Ex. A to the Oct. 22, 2015 Osen Ltr., Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 397) (attaching list of communications). Those communications, in turn, allegedly renewed suspicions at Defendant’s home, office in Paris regarding CBSP, and led to discussions among bank officials there regarding stricter scrutiny of CBSP’s accounts, (See Pl.s’ Opp’n at 13 & n. 29.) Defendant nonetheless contends that those communications, potentially implicating what Defendant knew about CBSP’s ties to terrorism, are not relevant to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis under § 302(a)(1) because they do not give rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. (See Def.’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”) at 3, Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 372.)
However, Defendant too narrowly construes the nexus requirement of § 302(a)(1). The defendant in Chloé similarly misconstrued that requirement, arguing that counterfeit bags it shipped into New York bearing marks not registered to the plaintiff were irrelevant to a jurisdictional analysis, as the plaintiffs trademark claims necessarily did not arise from those particular shipments. The Second Circuit rejected that argument on appeal, explaining that those shipments were relevant to an analysis under § 302(a)(1) because they evidenced a “larger business plan purposefully directed at New York.” Chloé,
In any event, jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) is not determined by the quantity of a defendant’s contacts with New York, but by the quality of those contacts when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. Fischbarg v. Doucet,
2. Scope Of Jurisdiction Under § 302(a)(1)
A plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction with respect to each claim asserted. See Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald,
Because Plaintiffs allege injuries in connection with 19 different attacks, each associated with a distinct class of Plaintiffs, the Court disagrees that all of their claims can be aggregated into a single, unitary claim under the ATA for purposes of establishing specific jurisdiction. Even so, the Court concludes that Defendant is subject to jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1) with respect to claims made in connection with all 19 attacks. To explain why, it is useful to consider the result if Plaintiffs had pursued their claims in 19 separate actions, each premised upon a single attack. As previously noted, the first New York Transfer was in 1997 and the remaining four transfers all occurred in June and July of 2001, while the 19 attacks at issue in this action all took place between March 2001 and September 2004. (See Ex. A to the Oct. 16, 2015 Friedman Ltr.) Given the timing of those transfers and the substantial amount underlying them, Plaintiffs in all 19 actions legitimately could rely upon the New York Transfers as among the financial services and material support allegedly provided by Defendant in violation of the ATA.
That conceivably would not be the case if, for instance, one of the attacks for which Plaintiffs sought recovery occurred in 1992, five years before the first New York Transfer. Under such circumstances, the nexus between claims arising from the 1992 attack and a series of transfers that did not even begin to occur until five years later theoretically would fye too attenuated to support jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1). See, e.g., Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., No. 653506/2011, 2013 N.Y. Slip. Op. 32312(U), at *3-5,
Nevertheless, Defendant contends that the scope of jurisdiction the Court may-exercise in this action, where Plaintiffs assert their claims collectively, is narrower and does not permit adjudication of all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant’s position rests oh the assumption that, if the Court were to adjudicate all of those claims, it necessarily would be exercising specific jurisdiction not only with respect to the New York Transfers, but also with respect to numerous other transfers that never touched New York or the United States. (See Def,’s Mem. at 8-10) (“This Court cannot treat [Defendant’s] discrete wire transfers that touched New York as providing a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over [Defendant] in New York with respect to transfers that never touched the United States.”) According to Defendant, exercising jurisdiction over the latter category of transfers is impermissible in a “specific jurisdiction universe” because those transfers, which were not routed through the New York Branch, have no connection to Defendant’s New York conduct.
Defendant’s - argument is fundamentally flawed, however, as it erroneously assumes that the Court’s adjudicatory power over Defendant is defined according to which individual transfers satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of § 302(a)(1), rather than which claims satisfy those requirements. In fact, the two are distinct. Plaintiffs’ claims are that Defendant violated the ATA, causing injury, by providing material support to an FTO and knowingly financing terrorism. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B and 2339C. Those claims do not necessarily correspond one-to-one with particular transfers, but instead rest upon the millions of dollars Defendant allegedly transferred to Hamas front organizations in close temporal proximity to the 19 attacks in which Plaintiffs were injured. Because the New York Transfers were part of that allegedly unlawful conduct, the Court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to claims made in connection with all 19 attacks.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that those claims also may arise from other transfers Defendant did not route through New York, including ones performed after the last of the New York Transfers was executed in July 2001.
The Court, is not persuaded that a different result is compelled by Fontanetta v. American Board of Internal Medicine,
Here, while the transfers at issue vary in time and location to a degree, substantively they constitute a single course of conduct by Defendant that purportedly entailed violations of the same statute in the same manner with respect to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, whereas in Fontan-etta the plaintiffs claim did not relate to the written examination, the Court already has determined the all of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action relate to the New York Transfers. See Id. at 61-62 (similarly distinguishing Fontanetta and holding that jurisdiction existed under § 302(a)(1) with respect to a claim “sufficiently connected to defendants’ transaction of business in New York.”) As such, the Court’s finding that it may exercise jurisdiction with respect to all of Plaintiffs’ claims is not inconsistent with Fontanetta.
Defendant’s reliance on State v. Samaritan Asset Management Services, Inc.,
D. Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(l)(C)
Plaintiffs argue that Rule 4(k)(l)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an additional statutory basis for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court agrees. Under Rule 4(k)(l)(C), personal jurisdiction may be established through proper service of process upon a defendant pursuant to a federal statute that contains its own service provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(C) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant ... when authorized by a federal statute.”); see also 4B Wright & Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1125 (4th ed.) As relevant here, the ATA expressly authorizes nationwide sendee of process, thereby establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant properly served under the statute.
Here, Defendant does not dispute that it properly was served with process at its agency in Miami, Florida in connection with the original filing of this action in the District of New Jersey. (See Ex. A to the Declaration of Aaron Schlanger, dated May 1, 2014 (“Schlanger Decl.”), Strauss Dkt. Entry No. 370.) Furthermore, when the Strauss action was refiled in this Court, Defendant expressly agreed to accept service of the Summons and Complaint by stipulation of the parties dated February 17, 2006.
E. Constitutional Due Process
Having concluded that there is a statutory basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court must consider whether exercising such jurisdiction would comport with the due process protections provided by the United States Constitution. As articulated by the Supreme Court in International Shoe, the touchstone due process principle requires that the defendant “have certain minimum contacts [with the forum state] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“Licci III”),
Notably, after the Court of Appeals determined in Lied II that the defendant bank was subject to jurisdiction in New York under § 302(a)(1), the Second Circuit in Lied III considered whether exercising such jurisdiction would comport with due process. In concluding that due process was satisfied, the Second Circuit observed that it would be “rare” and “unusual” for a court to determine that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant was permitted by § 302(a)(1), but prohibited under principles of due process. Licci III,
1. Minimum Contacts
Where, as here, a court’s specific jurisdiction is invoked, “minimum contacts” sufficient to satisfy due process exist if “the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum and could foresee being haled into court there.” Licci III,
Because.this action arises under the ATA, a nationwide service of process statute, the appropriate “minimum contacts” inquiry is whether Defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.
Most notably, Defendant deliberately used New York’s banking system to execute the five New York Transfers. Given that similar recurring transfers routed through a New York correspondent account were sufficient to establish purposeful availment in Lied III, the New York Transfers demonstrate such availment a fortiori because they were executed through Defendant’s own branch in New York. As such, there is no question that Defendant purposefully availed itself of the “privilege of conducting business in [New York],” thereby subjecting itself to suit in the United States with respect to any and all claims substantially related to such conduct. Licci III,
Turning to the question of relatedness, the Second Circuit held in Lied III that the defendant bank’s use of an in-forum correspondent account to execute the very wire transfers that were the basis for the plaintiffs’ claims satisfied “minimum contacts.” As the Second Circuit explained;
[ W]e by no means suggest that a foreign defendant’s ‘mere maintenance’ of a correspondent account in the United States is sufficient to support the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction over the account-holder in connection with any controversy. In this case, the correspondent account at issue is alleged to have been used as an instrument to achieve the very .wrong alleged. We conclude that in connection with this particular jurisdictional controversy — a lawsuit seeking redress for the allegedly unlawful provision of banking services of which the wire transfers are a part— allegations of [the defendant’s] repeated, intentional execution of U.S.-dollar-denominated wire transfers on behalf of Shahid, in order to further Hizballah’s terrorist goals, are sufficient [to sustain jurisdiction].
Licci III,
Defendant attempts to distinguish Lied III on the ground that all of the wire transfers at issue in that case were routed through New York; whereas in this case only a fraction of the transfers at issue contacted New York. However, in Lied III, the Second Circuit did not hold, or even suggest, that due process was satisfied because the transfers at issue were routed exclusively through New York. That fact was not even made explicit in the Second Circuit’s^ opinion. Rather, per the Second Circuit’s express holding, “minimum contacts” were established by the defendant bank’s repeated and deliberate use of a New York correspondent account to effect the financial services underlying the plaintiffs’ claims. See Id. at 171-73; Wultz I,
The Court acknowledges that Lied III involved dozens of wire transfers through New York totaling millions of dollars, whereas in this case there were only five New York Transfers totaling $205,000. Nevertheless, if not for the New York Transfers, $205,000 would not have been provided to the Charities and thereupon purportedly delivered into the hands of Hamas during the same timeframe that Hamas allegedly carried out the attacks in which Plaintiffs .were injured. Contra 7 West 57th St.,
Nevertheless, Defendant asserts the same fallacy as it did with respect to § 302(a)(1), arguing that due process prohibits the Court from exercising “jurisdiction” over transfers that never went through New York or the United States. Defendant contends that this principle is exemplified in a decision recently reached by the Honorable Naomi R. Buchwald, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, in a multi-district litigation concerning alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”). {See Oct. 16, 2015 Friedman Ltr.; see also Tr. 44:12-25.) In basic terms, LIBOR is a set' of interest-rate benchmarks calculated on the basis of quotes from a panel of leading banks, each of which reports on a daily basis the rate at which it could borrow funds under certain stated conditions. See LIBOR,
Whatever basis in the facts and law that ruling had in LIBOR, no such basis can be found here. In that case, each purportedly false LIBOR submission at issue was alleged to have caused a distinct and identifiable harm that directly gave rise to a specific plaintiffs claim. The transfers at issue here are not comparable. Without rehashing the Court’s entire analysis concerning the scope of jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1), supra, Plaintiffs’ claims are that Defendant provided material support to an FTO and knowingly financed terrorism. Those claims rest upon the many transfers Defendant made to the Charities on behalf of CBSP in close temporal proximity to the 19 attacks in which Plaintiffs were injured. Due process does not require that the Court secure a basis for jurisdic
2. Reasonableness
At the second stage of the due process analysis, the party challenging jurisdiction bears a heavy burden to make “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Bank Brussels Lambert,
Here, in challenging jurisdiction, Defendant does not directly address the individual reasonableness factors. Having considered those factors anyway, the Court concludes that they support the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant. To begin with, Defendant has been litigating this action in this Court for the better part of ten years. Extensive discovery already has taken place, with the parties capably surmounting any obstacles presented by the fact that many of the pertinent witnesses and documents are located abroad. As such, Defendant cannot seriously contend that continuing to litigate this case in New York presents an unreasonable burden. See Licci III,
Furthermore, the claims in this action are predicated on the overall course of conduct by which Defendant allegedly provided financial support to a terrorist organization. To the extent Defendant’s use of New York’s banking system was integral to that conduct, the Court also may take into account “the United States’ and New York’s interest in monitoring banks and banking activity to ensure that its system is not used as an instrument in support of terrorism.” Id. Finally, although not a controlling factor, it is appropriate to consider the federal policy underlying Congress’ enactment of the ATA. Cf. 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068.1 (4th ed.) (“[W]hen Congress has
III. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs invoke the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction as an alternative basis for finding that Defendant is subject to jurisdiction with respect to all of Plaintiffs’ claims. (See Pl.s’ Opp’n at 19 n. 9.) In general, that doctrine permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction with respect to a claim for which it otherwise lacks jurisdiction, if that claim alises from the same common nucleus of fact as another claim for which the court properly has jurisdiction over the defendant. See 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.7 (4th ed.) However, within the Second Circuit, the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction primarily has been embraced to permit the adjudication of pendent state law claims that derive from the same common nucleus of fact as a federal claim for which the court has jurisdiction over the defendant. See, e.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann,
IV. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant alternatively moves for summary judgment on the basis that the Court can exercise jurisdiction only with respect to the New York Transfers, and Plaintiffs cannot prove Defendant’s liability in a case confined just to those five transfers. (See Def.’s Mem. at 15-25.) In other words, Plaintiffs purportedly cannot prevail on their claims because they cannot prove that as of July 31, 2001 — the date of the last New York Transfer — Defendant acted with the requisite scienter and proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. However, the
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this action, or in the alternative for summary judgment, is denied in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Citations to the “Strauss Dkt.’
. The Court assumes familiarity with the facts underlying this action, which are summarized more fully in the Court’s February 28, 2013 Opinion and Order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (“Strauss II’’),
. Hamas is an acronym for "Harakat al-Mu-qawama al-Islamiyya,” also known as the "Islamic Resistance Movement.” (Strauss FAC. ¶ 1 n. 1.) •
. Plaintiffs contend that the New York Branch was a "legally inseparable” corporate branch maintained by Defendant, rather than a subsidiary with an independent corporate existence. (See Pl.s’ Opp’n at 12 n. 26.) Nevertheless, the Court uses the term "New York Branch” as a matter of convenience only.
. See, e.g., Letter Brief of Bank of China et al., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China,
. No jurisdictional discovery has been ordered in this matter. However, in the course of merits discovery, Plaintiffs sought and obtained extensive disclosure concerning the relevant jurisdictional facts. As such, at oral argument in connection with the instant motion, the parties agreed that further discovery directed to the jurisdictional facts would be unnecessary. (See Tr. at 40:18-21; 41:22-42:8.)
. Lockheed also was formally registered to do business in Connecticut. Notably, the Second Circuit declined to interpret the Connecticut business registration statute as requiring foreign corporations to consent to general jurisdiction as a condition of registration. Brown,
. The Court notes that Defendant makes an apples-to-oranges comparison. In DH Services, Wo represented the proportional value of funds received from New York sources, whereas in this case 1.8% represents the proportional number of transfers executed through New York. Expressed in terms of value, and based on the figures generally agreed upon by the parties, the New York Transfers may have represented as much as 6.8% of the total funds Defendant transferred to the Charities on behalf of CBSP.
. Defendant notes that one of the attacks at issue occurred on March 28, 2001, at which point the only New York Transfer that had been executed was a 1997 transfer in the amount of $5,000. (See Def.'s Mem. at 23.) According to Defendant, the four remaining New York transfers necessarily could not have proximately caused that attack because they were performed after it occurred, in June and July of 2001. That argument presents a
. For this reason, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs should be required to prove their claims based on the state of affairs, and what Defendant knew, as of the date of the last New York Transfer. (See Def.’s Mem. at 10-11.) That argument is premised on the fallacy that the Court only may exercise jurisdiction over the individual New York Transfers, which uniquely give rise to specific claims that are not premised on any other transfers. That is not the case, however, as all of Plaintiffs’ claims arise more broadly from the many transfers Defendant made to the Charities during the relevant timeframe, of which the New York Transfers were a part. Moreover, the Court unequivocally rejects Defendant’s unsupported contention that personal jurisdiction limits the evidence Plaintiffs may use to prove their claims, confining it just to what existed at the time of the last New York Transfer. •
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2334 (providing for nationwide service of process "where[ever] the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent”); Licci I,
. At the time Defendant accepted service, the provision presently embodied by Rule 4(k)(l)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was in effect as Rule 4(k)(l)(D), which subsequently was renumbered pursuant to the 2007 Amendment to the Federal Rules.
. In Wultz v. Republic of Iran ("Wultz II"),
. See LIBOR,
. In Gucci II, the Second Circuit directed the district court to consider, upon remand, whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Bank of China would comport with principles of international comity. See Gucci II,