138 N.W. 957 | S.D. | 1912
Appeal from an order of 'the circuit court of Lyman county denying defendant’s motion to vacate a-judgment against appellant. The complaint in the allegation alleges the breach of an agreement by- defendant to sell and convey to plaintiff certain farm lands situated in Lyman coünty,- and demands damages in the sum of $300, with interest. The defendant is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of this state. The summons 'and complaint were served by one Phillips,- a deputy sheriff of Lyon county, Iowa,- b}r delivering to and leaving the same with one Charles Shade; the treasurer of' said corporation, á resident of Lyon county,- Iowa, on the 7th day of February, 1908, in Lyon county,-Iowa. N'o appearance or answer was made in the' action, and the- summons, complaint, and return
It is respondent’s contention, on the other hand, that section no of the Code of 'Civil Procedure authorizes such service in an action against a domestic corporation, and that such service constitutes due process of law. Section, no provides: “The summons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof as follows: 1. If the action be against a private corporation, to the president or other head of the corporation, secretary, cashier, treasurer, a director or managing agent thereof; but such service can be made in respect to a foreign corporation only when it has property in
None of the other provisions of the section affect the question involved in this appeal. It seems plain to us that the clauses of file section above quoted are intended to distinguish broadly between domestic and foreign corporations as to the mode of service of summons. It will be observed that as to domestic corporations service may be made upon “the president or other head of the corporation, the secretary, cashier, treasurer, a director or managing agent thereof”; while as to foreign- corporations 'such service can -only be made upon “the president, treasurer, secretary or duly authorized agent thereof.” The section also- expressly provides that as to foreign corporations such service shall be made within this state, personally, upon the officers named; while as to domestic corporations the statute does not say that service shall be made within, the state. It is almost universally held that service of -process within the state upon officers of a foreign corporation, pursuant to statutory enactments, is sufficient to bring the foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of the state court, and to authorize the entry of judgment against such corporation in any case; and such statutes are upheld ‘by an overwhelming weight of authority.
If service upon an officer of a foreign corporation within this state may be deemed due process of law, we see no1 reason why service of proceess upon an officer of a domestic corporation residing in a foreign state may not likewise be deemed due* process as well. A domestic corporation is necessarily resident within the state, and cannot remove itself therefrom, either permanently or temporarily. Such corporation is at all times to be deemed an inhabitant of the state, and never beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its courts. A natural person may voluntarily remove from the state, either temporarily or permanently. Where the removal is temporary, the statute prescribes a mode in which process may be served and jurisdiction of the absent defendant obtained by leaving a copy of the summons at the usual dwelling place, with a member of the family over 14 years of age — a mode of substi
- . -The .purpose of such a statute is-not to bring -the nonresident officer of the corporation, within -the -jurisdiction- of the court,- but to bring the domestic-corporation within its jurisdiction. It does not seek to have the process ' of. the court affect the personal or property rights of- a person or corporation -resident- in another ■state; and therefore is not an attempt to ■ extend the process of the court beyond the territorial limits of the state within which it i-s established. It' follows, that the only. question really involved is whether or not .such service constitutes - due process of -law within -the state. The fundamental lorinciple involved-in “due process of lawl’ is that it shall give sufficient notice of. the pendency of the action or proceeding, and a reasonable- opportunity to1 a defendant to appear and assert his rights before, a tribunal legally constituted to adjudicate such rights. And whenever a statutory mode of service is reasonably designed to accomplish that end service in -accordance therewith constitutes due process of law, and confers jurisdiction on the state court.
The order and judgment of the trial court are therefore affirmed.