History
  • No items yet
midpage
Straub v. B.M.T. Ex Rel. Todd
626 N.E.2d 848
Ind. Ct. App.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 STRAUB, Appellant Edward Below),

(Respondent TODD, friend,

B.M.T., Francine By next Below). (Petitioner

Appellee 10A04-9302-JV-53.

No. Indiana, Appeals of

Court District.

Fourth 30, 1993.

Dec. 11,

Rehearing Denied Feb. *2 paternity sup-

to establish obtain expenses.1 spite In port and medical pay ordered agreement, the court Straub per week child the sum of $130.00 Todd medical $1005.00 and awarded the child. relating to the birth of costs 1) now claims that: the trial court Straub by holding that reversible error committed agreement was void as a matter 2) that the public policy; and indemnify him serve to should brought by Todd.2 support claim Mattox, Mattox, New Mattox & We affirm. Frank S. appellant.

Albany, for Evans, Mullins, Jr., Bishop, Mas- Earl C. FACTS Clarksville, Mullins, appellee. ters, & dating in 1985 began and Todd Straub ele- were teachers at same when both MILLER, Judge. 1986, Todd dis- mentary school. In late 1986, Straub, Edward December On a child with cussed her desire to have with Fran- have intercourse agreed to her doctor informed her Straub after Todd, 33, long signed as she so cine not work. insemination would artificial hold Straub harm- that would told Todd that he did want and financial for emotional less family due to his responsibility of another might result from their sexu- a child already he had chil- age and the fact that signed a hand- relationship. After Todd al However, previous marriage. dren from a felt satisfied his note that Straub written relation- Todd threatened to end their when conditions, began engaging in couple try impregnate ship, agreed he intercourse which re- sexual unprotected harmless” sign would a “hold providing she on of B.M.T. November sulted the birth 15, 1986, Straub agreement. On December 27, 1987. agree- holographic presented Todd with a hold harmless purporting ment raising B.M.T. with- years After three support of a Straub, financial and emotional January from any support from out couple’s might result from the friend child which suit as B.M.T.’sbest Todd filed part: lowing persons: A A (a) a litem, (c) Ind.Code 31-6-6.1-2 jointly. petition ther of an unborn tant mother biological logical (1) person (3) person (2) her child’s petition A any person alleged The The A child. A man or next every [******] who is otherwise under the father, mother and a man if he is mother, through father case, biological alleging and a man friend. or competent except or age of her unborn that he is the child. that he is the child’s expectant may father, guardian, guardian provides alleging eighteen to be the father incompetent be filed the child’s alleging mother. that he expectant (18) may child, for his that he is pertinent may mother, the fol- expec- is the filing age. bio- file file fa- ad 2. Straub did We also note riods for states file necessary parties ed). Ind.Code competent." case, incompetent reaches name because more court’s after the child lack of a visitation order tion issues later. over this petition “may Todd that the mother custody twenty the trial court has 31-6-6.1-6, parents and children. Subsection date of B.M.T.’s birth. file a could not on his not raise as error within two Subsection (20) award is born to file an action. case, petition eighteenth birthday, years the action. the statute of than two provides different time Straub could raise of B.M.T. to (or father) bring an action in her years for Straub. at (b). continuing any age. years after he becomes (Emphasis add- In the either the trial time before he has two If the child is limitations, had jurisdic- he instant passed or the years these may The pe- (a) agree- signed the Law Todd Conclusions relations. sexual Their nature took its course. ment and Straub, respondent, Edward years three after relationship continued for biological the natural father of B.M.T. ended when Todd B.M.T.’s birth common-law, has Edward statuto- paternity, *3 bring suit to establish decided to moral, ry, sup- and societal had married someone though Straub even port daughter. his minor else. away Francine cannot contract the findings of court entered fact The trial rights of the B.M.T. perti- of that found conclusions law and right illegitimate child 6. The of an part: nent and have a trial interest of

court determine the best Findings Fact away. child cannot be contracted of compel- 7. The State of Indiana has a ending rela- 8. Francine considered ling assuming pri- and at- tionship with Edward [Straub] mary obligation illegiti- of through pregnant tempting to become par- mate children natural falls did man. not another Edward [Straub] taxpayers not of ents and on the agreed relationship to end want State. Francine after attempt impregnate purported agreement 8. The between sign agreed to a document which he she pertains Francine and Edward as in his own hand. drafted support of B.M.T. is void as matter document, 8,# Exhibit That Petitioner’s entirety follows: reads in its as Supp.R. 2-5. it may “To concern Whom filed Straub then a motion to correct error mind & fore I Francine Todd in sound claiming: he issues raised three marry, thought have not to but decided (1) distinguish by failing the court erred my baby like to own. would have a pre-conception post-con- between emotionally, support financially & To (2) children; ception rights of minor men who approached several will have parties’ agreement is a valid and enforce- financially or responsible held (3) agreement; able indemnification emotionally names will be who’s [sic] finding paternity sup- court’s was not kept secret life. by probative R. 3-6. ported evidence. Signed Todd Francine trial court denied his motion. Dec. 1986” court, To this now raises two Following the execution [of (1) issues: whether the trial court commit- agreement] Francine and Edward [Todd] holding that ted reversible error in began unprotected sex to have [Straub] voluntary parties’ agreement was void as Francine became and March against public policy; and whether the period pregnant. During this Francine enforceable indem- parties’ is an sexually testified that she active agreement by and between Ed- nification generally any other man. Edward with Todd. Straub’s ward Straub Francine acknowledged such. Brief at 1. During pregnancy she Francine’s sexually active. and Edward were DECISION [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] I. IS THE AGREEMENT AGAINST INDIANA’S POLICY? PUBLIC to have sexual 12. Edward continued argues trial court committed after the relations with Francine child’s finding the relationship error but did not establish a reversible birth pub- a matter of seeing and unenforceable as stopped child. Fran- void with the He Here, i.e., of law. policy, lic a matter after she this action.... cine filed are A child dispute are not in and we born out of wedlock who the facts estab pure question of law. We will timely faced with lishes fashion has findings and conclusions of the trial affirm rights father, certain inherit they clearly erroneous. court unless 29-l-2-7(b), Ind.Code as well as certain Indianapolis Dept. City Williams rights to claim other economic benefits (1990),Ind.App., 558 N.E.2d Public Works upon the death of the father. S. v.V. 52(A). denied; Ind.Trial Rule trans. Bellamy The Estate James A. Ind.App., 579 N.E.2d 144. rights, These long recognized the Indiana has ob addition to the to receive child ligation of both support, are of constitutional dimensions (1991),Ind.App., v. Elbert children. Elbert protection and are entitled to under the *4 In N.E.2d 102. Matter M.D.H. 579 of equal protection clause of the United 119, 126, (1982), Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d the States Constitution. Mills v. Habluetzel provi statutory court noted that current (1982), 1549, 456 U.S. 91 S.Ct. 71 [102 support legiti relating sions to orders for L.Ed.2d 770]. illegitimate virtually children are mate and stated, parent’s The court identical.3 light In of the interests involved and the “[A] child, legiti his minor purpose the statutory manifest of illegitimate, recog is a mate or basic tenet promote scheme to the the welfare of provide nized in this state statutes may child ... an action where a child [in against parents and criminal sanctions civil establishing rights be barred from its duty 127 neglect such ...” Id. at who judicata ground] res ... hold [that] added).4 addition, (emphasis In there is a rights] this result loss of the child’s [the duty common-law and obli well-established only justified can where the Child was gation of a to assist the father clearly party prior named as a in the of his children. Holderness v. Holderness proceeding. (1984), 1157, 1160, Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d added). (emphasis Id. at 831-832 (1982), Ind., Taylor Taylor v. 436 citing, (1972), 56; Ind.App. N.E.2d Bill v. Bill 155 addition, the court noted in Matter of 749; 65, (1965), 290 N.E.2d v. Crowe Crowe (1992), 227, Ind.App., 599 N.E.2d S.L. 51, 164; 247 Ind. 211 N.E.2d v. McCormick legislature recognized, adop- also has (1937), Ind.App. N.E.2d Collard 105 10 parental rights pro- tion and termination of 742. ceedings, that the interests of the State of the child are neces- and interests not noted, the inter As this court has sarily identical. Id. at 230 n. 3. necessarily ests of children are not legislature “enacted several statutes which those of their mother. Kieler v. same as appoint permit direct or the court a (1993), Ind.App., 616 by Trammel C.A.T. representative the children involved in Although securing support 38. N.E.2d proceedings. 31-6-4- such See Ind.Code expenses and education for children is the 31-6-4-13.6(c)(l) 10(g) [1980], and Ind.Code action, paternity a primary purpose of 31-6-5-4(d) [1991], and Ind.Code the children are not limited to interests of Id. [1989].” N.W.S., support. v. J.E. S.L.S. (1991), Ind.App., N.E.2d 582 831. J.E. legislature apparent It is that our of question judicata involved a res public policy strong has created a current brought on behalf of the one) (and ancient merely maintained an finding child. In that the child’s interests object protecting rights Judge with the separate parents, were parents of their explained: children from the whims Rucker (Dissolution knowingly intentionally person A who fails Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-12 of Mar- (Paternity). provide support dependent riage); to his Ind.Code 31-6-6.1-13 nonsupport a Class D commits of a 35-46-l-5(a) felony. provides: Ind.Code illegitimate by for the welfare of children As noted the state.5 power and financial court, making placing to avoid undue order supreme “[t]he taxpayers. its policy, no matter how burden on changing of legislative, intentioned, a primarily is well provide neces- duty “The Boles judicial function.” Matter not a care, sary support, and maintenance “The Ind., children, although arising out of the to uphold judicial officer obligation of relationship, may of their be rested fact them, laws, defy apply the parens of the state as upon not to enact them.” Id.6 community patriae of children and of the large preventing them from becom- at that “fundamen first claims burden, is, therefore, ing him con allow principles” tal contract themselves, to the duty not but common-law statutory and tract his around duty This the same public as well. is at daughter. duty provide legal obligation, and natural time as inheri ignores rights, such He other consistent S.L.S., N.W.S., by su tance. enforcement of See J.E. equally well-being essential to the argument fails be pra. state, community, the morals contracting away to the cause amounts *5 development the individu- and right support. It is daughter’s of of his 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child al.’’ cannot, parent by his that a well settled added). (emphasis 51§ legal contract, of the relieve himself own support minor children. obligation to his Straub contends that the doc (1980), 398 Ind.App., Brokaw v. Brokaw equitable estoppel trines of laches and also (1991), Schage Ind. N.E.2d Ort v. 1385. preclude support. Todd’s for Howev claim 335, held that an App., N.E.2d we 580 er, Pickett, supra, estoppel in as stated forego court ordered child party asserting defense will a from bar a exchange in for even benefit support. a claim for child (social security payments) to the child is parent has no because a (a party) unenforceable if it be said “Even could that right away a child’s contract denying from the ex- estopped should be also, 336-337; Id. at See Pickett benefits. agreement, agree- of an such an istence 751, (1984),Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d v. Pickett It held ment is unenforceable. has been and in Although 754. Pickett Ort parent having in such custody that the in ac legitimate volved children divorce proceeding trustee merely as this is tions, legiti no there is distinction between support payments, therefore, of and in illegitimate regard mate children and away would have no to contract support. their to child Pickett, cit- the trust.’’ benefits of (1981), Ind.App., ing, Reffeitt Reffeitt Although goal pa of a primary 999, 1003, quoting, 419 N.E.2d Grace v. ternity action is to secure and edu 371, (1971), 276 Quigg Ind.App. 150 children, legiti illegitimate cation “a 594, (emphasis original). N.E.2d action, subsidiary goal this same mate however, protect private agreement, as the one is ‘to interest such us, gen- by preventing illegitimate relieving parent child from before of either ” duty support is provide state.’ der of the child becoming a ward Matter of unenforceable, M.D.H., estop- consequently, an supra, v. C.J.E. citing, J.E.G. (1977), pel preclude Ind.App., 360 1030. Public defense would not an award of argu- support. Regarding laches policy considerations mandate that ment, providing active we note Ind.Code 31-6-6.1-6 allows a state take an is, therefore, Additionally, gender-neutral place policy not the of this court this It people apply whenever two have sexual long-standing policy should intercourse having situa- in this abandon parent with a toward either view opinion, by acting as tion a barometer resulting custody of child to the sole urge Judge us to do. dissent would Conover’s physical and financial exclusion the other.

853 requirements of no medical any time We know “at bring an action such —or program any sperm donor contin- twenty years of of he reaches before —that injections after the guardian give insemination child’s ues to as the age.” brought pregnant. support, donee becomes the child’s trustee timely man- of B.M.T. on behalf Finally, in this action are not con- ner. rights any alleged contractual cerned with argues Finally, Straub parents paternity actions Indiana — en signed by Todd should be establishing pater- are concerned with merely as a acting he was forced because rights of the child. nity and with argues that we should donor.” He “sperm public policy, as created Indiana’s jurisdictions from other cases follow legislature, is clear. The trial court did not intent of the pre-conception look to the finding agree- Straub’s and Todd’s err en deciding whether to involved parties ment void because it Brief at agreement. Straub’s force Indiana’s (1993), Tenn., citing Davis Davis v. 25-27 588, nom. cert. denied sub 842 S.W.2d II. INDEMNIFICATION — 1259, -, (1993), 113 S.Ct. 122 U.S. argues that he should be indemni- 657; (1989), In re Interest R.C. L.Ed.2d 1) against any support fied claims because: Colo., 27; McIntyre P.2d v. Crouch capable supporting Todd is the child on (1989), Or.App. 780 P.2d review own; 2) injury” the “economic denied, 495 U.S. cert. denied to her of contract” Straub due “breach 109 L.Ed.2d 288.7 We 110 S.Ct. $100,000.00. would exceed Because this persuaded. argument merely pub- seeks circumvent First, note, course, arguing policy, lic it too must fail. We first *6 void, parties relationship agreement between the that and Todd’s Straub’s ignores contract to sperm a donor and donee there is no enforceable breach. that of Second, undisputed present ability that Todd’s to care for the facts. It is Straub affair, ongoing one which the child on her own and the cost of the Todd had an change the preg support Todd decided to become to Straub do not law— began before years provide ended three after must his share his nant and Straub daughter’s support a as determined B.M.T.’s birth when she decided to have Guidelines, take Straub had trial court under the which second child Straub —after Secondly, par parent’s into account both incomes.8 married someone else. testified, found, Third, clearly agreement trial that itself is not an ties and the court agreement barely co- Todd continued to have inter indemnification Straub and —it Finally, kept part her of the pregnant with herent. Todd course after Todd became bring action in her relationship bargain continued for did not an B.M.T. and their —she pater- timely name in a manner to establish years a after B.M.T.’s birth. number away by parents, accept argument, her and to this not be contracted If we were to Straub’s However, arguably binding type variety be of contract would do so is a violation of example, couple a of situations. For every address factual while we are not able to child, having a but for some rea- desirous of exception may possibility, recognize an lie religious child or otherwise—feels the parent son— should be born in affluent as to where the custodial is so wedlock, could enter into a non-custodial render the contribution of the binding antenuptial agreement absolv- valid and parent’s irrelevant to the child’s life- income duty support ing parents to one case, lifestyle may style. In that the child’s Similarly, an the child after divorce. issue, might argued that the and it be be an (and marriage contemplation of after made contracting away parents the best would not be divorce) binding. would also be however, Here, interests of the child. salary only apparent is her for Todd's income be ever mindful of the best interests 8. We must school, appears typical teaching to be a case B.M.T. has a to more this child. lifestyle that to the wherein the child is entitled Specifically, basic necessities of life. than the parent’s incomes will of her the combination lifestyle parent's that her she has a right may afford. income will furnish. This combined during name impreg- us is condoms intercourse and action before nity—the already nate her. Straub had raised 5 chil- B.M.T. his own. willing help, dren of While court is af- of the trial judgment The neither Straub wanted to raise another firmed. obligations nor assume financial rearing. concomitant with child Straub CHEZEM, J., concurring in result with he if told Todd would accommodate her he opinion. separate obligation could be free of the CONOVER, J., separate dissenting with child-to-beand inseminator his name as opinion. Agreeing, remain secret. would employed capable support- teacher fully CHEZEM, concurring in Judge, result. ing signed a written Judge reached in the result I concur prepared. that effect that had there exists opinion. In this state Miller’s thereafter, things the normal course of paterni- statutory protection9 against no pregnant. Todd became sperm his action for a man who donates ty insemination, born, years whether the purposes of Three after the child was bank, mind, through sperm changed made Todd filed a donation be recipi- against Straub, ultimate directly to the and was successful. physician, father, him, correctly trial established trial court as ent. The court ordered pay support per determining our paternity. rules support. believe, however, the contract I assumption by treated as an should be appeals majority and the affirms support. Todd of Straub’s policy grounds. declares con- It harmless for agreed Todd hold Straub of the obli- tracts relieve obligation to B.M.T. Straub’s gation offspring are void cannot en- support obligation to B.M.T. against policy. am him Todd herself is forced unless public policy convinced conventional obligation. pay the means to without support and nur- regarding statements ture of children of wedlock are born out jurisdiction for a The trial court retains exception un- subject narrowly-drawn ability provide determination Todd’s *7 the facts with we are here con- Support der which Indiana Child support based fronted. Guidelines, of custo- determinations

dy and visitation. Today, general public almost univer- approv- sally understanding looks with CONOVER, dissenting. Judge, single upon al woman’s desire bear and for the reasons respectfully I dissent nurture a child male interference. without stated below. woman, financially responsible A modern option, unqualified right has an to do simple facts here and without at her are so, words, perceives. adult it our decla- conflict. an unmarried female other teacher, subject currently incor- a child but did not rations on this wanted have remarry accomplish They policy that rect. reflect which has been end. want they Accordingly, medically advised artificial dead since 1960’s. When she view, case, changed, my in her in insemination would not work must be Straub, in subject public’s to the will such her current lover 56 are she asked teacher, using to cease matters. year old adult male Parentage approved by not father of a child Act was as if he were the natural

9. The Uniform (Alabama, thereby Eighteen conceived.” states the National Conference of Commissioners on California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, 5(b) Uniform State Section Laws Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Kansas, Parentage provides Act "The donor Uniform Dakota, Ohio, Mexico, Jersey, provided physician New North New of semen licensed Island, Wyoming) Washington, have artificial a married wom- Rhode use in insemination of adopted the Act. an other than donor’s wife is treated law vaga- ARTICLE I of the no statement I find better this: policy than public ries of DECLARE, SECTION WE That all described as has been policy Public equal; people they men are created varies will-o’-the-wisp of the law which by are endowed their CREATOR with interests, habits, changes with the among rights; certain inalienable sentiments, of the needs, and fashions life, liberty, pursuit these are and the generation one public policy of day; the (emphasis supplied) happiness; ... conditions, not, changed under may Thus, the public policy of another. sections of our constitution contain Other public poli- is very reverse of that which changes accomplish gender similar neu- public policy may cy at one time become Thus, trality. our constitution now man- Hence, no fixed rules time. at another equality people, dates absolute for all to determine what given by which can be just men. These amendments removed the for all time. When an public policy vestiges disability contractual last due to any given public policy on alteration of womanhood, any if still existed actually tak- general interest has point I, under Art. Sec. an Indiana wom- is indicated place, and such alteration en age an in this modern has had an inalien- long-continued change of conduct on any able to contract in manner she and has part people affected pursuit happiness, chooses in the of her universal, practically the court become case the of a child she birth could raise recognize the fact and declare the may interference, and nurture without male public policy accordingly. changes since 1983. While other in federal policy What the is must be ... and state law abound which articulate cur- from a consideration of the determined area, public policy rent in this the amend- constitutions, laws, and state federal I, my opinion, ment of Art. 1 in is the Sec. courts, the decisions of. the and the justify demonstration of we need to administration, vary- course of policy the restatement of ing opinions laymen, lawyers, or believe must be made. judges, as to the of the inter- demands equality comes with absolute public. ests of the responsibility concepts absolute under our Contracts, 258, Lawyers 17A Am.Jur.2d § the last law. Since obstructions to con- Accord, (1991). Cooperative Publishing Co. equality tractual due to womanhood have methods, public policy determination removed, irrevocably women are now been Russell v. 220 Ind. Johnson perform obligations they incur bound 225-226. contracting just when as men are. Courts change public policy I believe this power have neither the nor the in the readily Following discernible. Russell’s public policy simply name of to intervene *8 guidelines, simply highest turn to our contracting because the woman the with document, governing the Indiana Constitu- hindsight determines she has benefit any questions tion. To eliminate concern- bargain by entering made a bad into a ing equality Indiana, the in of women our contract of this kind. The courts now must 383-1983, legislature 1983 enacted P.L. parties they leave the find them in where “Clean-up so-called Amendment” to the such cases. Among things, Indiana Constitution. other it passages gender rendered certain therein my opinion, ques- the contract by striking neutral “men” from the word- tion is valid and enforceable because it is ing replacing “people” with conversant with current striking substituting “man” and “person.” Todd had an absolute to contract with Undoubtedly here, purposes did, absolutely she and is bound significant most changes of those appears obligations she incurred under that I, reads, Article Section 1. It now Quite simply, contract. bargained she part away to file a

856 publicly and to name him as Opinion at undoubtedly 852. While Exculpatory agree- the child’s father. policy statement of is correct when the agree in ments which advance one is child in fact needs the financial under no of care for another and for its nurturing upbring- liable future actionable conduct ing, that is not the case here. In other long recognized. have been Weaver v. words, B.M.T. will not want for either nec- (1972) American Oil 257 Ind. Co. 276 essaries or during minority. education 144, 148; N.E.2d County LaFrenz v. Lake gainfully employed Todd is fully capa- Ind.App. Fair 172 Board 360 providing ble of for all the needs of the 605, 607; Loper N.E.2d v. Standard Oil desperately child she so wanted. Under Ind.App. 211 Co. N.E.2d public policy, current the contract she 800-801. signed here is valid and enforceable. Nei- legislature ther the judiciary nor the can voiding As the second reason for impair obligations act to she incurred here, majority says contract at issue thereunder because the record demon- Although primary goal pater of a strates the child will never become a ward nity action is to secure and edu of the state. children, illegitimate legiti cation for “a action, subsidiary goal mate of this same I would reverse and remand with instruc- however, protect is ‘to judgment tions to set aside the and dismiss by preventing illegitimate child from petition. ” becoming a ward of the state.’ Matter of M.D.H., supra, citing, J.E.G. v. C.J.E.

(1977), Ind.App., 1030. Pub- policy

lie considerations mandate that the in providing

state take an active interest illegitimate

for the welfare of children placing

order to avoid an undue financial taxpayers. its

burden on

Case Details

Case Name: Straub v. B.M.T. Ex Rel. Todd
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Dec 30, 1993
Citation: 626 N.E.2d 848
Docket Number: 10A04-9302-JV-53
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.