13 App. D.C. 132 | D.C. Cir. | 1898
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The indictment in this case is for murder, found under Section 5339 Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides that “every person who commits murder within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place, or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, . . . shall suffer death.” This provision though found in the general revision of the statutes of the United States, and not in the revision of the statutes relating to the District of Columbia alone, is nevertheless in full force in this District. That has been decided
The appellant, William M. Strather, was indicted on the 31st day of December, 1897, for the crime of wilful murder, charged to have been committed in killing one Rosa Talbot, on the 15th day of October, 1897. To the indictment the accused pleaded not guilty, and he was duly tried by a jury, who rendered a verdict of guilty as indicted without more; whereupon he was sentenced by the court to be hung. He has appealed.
To the decision of the questions presented on this appeal, it is not necessary or material to recite the facts of the case, as set out in the bill of exceptions. The prisoner on the trial offered six prayers for specific instructions to the jury, which were refused by the court. The first four of these prayers related to questions of justification, and to provocation that would reduce the homicide to manslaughter. And the fifth prayer asked that the jury be instructed that they might qualify their verdict, under the statute, with the words “without capital punishment,” “no matter what they might find the evidence to be”; and the sixth prayer asked that the jury be instructed that if they should have a reasonable doubt whether the accused struck the fatal blow in cold blood and with malice aforethought, they should not convict of murder. The court was clearly right in rejecting all of these prayers, as they were greatly calculated to mislead the jury, if they had been granted.
The subjects of all these several prayers, however, were fully covered, and clearly explained, by the judge in his very carefully prepared charge to the jury. He stated fully what would constitute murder and what manslaughter, and what would be excusable or justifiable homicide, committed in self-defense, as defined by the authorities. Indeed, all the questions raised in the defense of the accused, were fully
There are two principal questions presented by this appeal on the charge of the judge to the jury. First, whether the act of Congress of the 15th of January, 1897, referred to in the charge of the judge, applies to this District; and, if applicable, second, whether the construction, and the terms of the charge as to the manner and circumstances of applying the statute, as given by the judge, were correct? If, however, the statute is not applicable to this District, it is quite clear the appellant was not prejudiced, nor in any manner affected, by either the charge of the judge as to the construction of the statute, nor by the finding of the jury under the charge; as the statute simply relates to a qualification of the verdict as to the punishment, after finding the party guilty of murder.
1. In the case of Fearson v. United States, 10 App. D. C. 506, the question whether the act of Congress of January 15, 1897, applied to this District, was raised in argument, but it was not deemed necessary to decide it. It is therefore an open question whether or not the act applies to this District.
The act of January 15, 1897, provides, “That in all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder or of rape under section fifty-three hundred and thirty-nine, or fifty-three hundred and forty-five, Revised Statutes, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment;’ and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life.”
This act is amendatory of sections of the Revised Statutes therein referred in, and it manifestly was intended to have a general application and to extend to all places and districts over which Congress has general and exclusive legislative
We conclude, therefore, that the amendatory act of January 15, 1897, is equally applicable to this District, as and with Section 5339 of the Revised Statutes, so far as the same relates to the crime of murder.
2. Then, the next question is, whether there was error in the charge given by the court below, as to the construction, and the circumstances of the application, of the amendatory act of January 15, 1897, where the party accused has been found guilty of the crime of murder. It is contended on the part of the appellant that, by reasonable construction,
If Congress had intended to abolish capital punishment for murder, without regard to the facts of the case, however atrocious in their nature, it would have done so without qualification. But Congress has not abolished capital punishment for murder, but has made the degree of punishment to depend upon the special circumstances of each case as they may be found by the jury. In many of the States, ks we know, if not in a majority of them, it has long since been deemed ¡proper and just to divide the common law crime of murder into first and second degrees, and to prescribe the punishment accordingly. This is done because it is common experience that the general common law crime of murder often includes different degrees of atrociousness, such as to make it just to discriminate as to the degrees
In no case has the question of the right of the court to instruct the jury upon the entire law of the case been more firmly met, and the principle more clearly and concisely stated, than by Mr. Justice Story in the case of United States v. Battiste, 2 Sum. 240, 243, 244. That was a trial for a capital crime under the act of May 15, 1820, Ch. 113, to suppress the slave trade; and it appears that counsel had insisted that the jury were the judges of the law, as well as of the facts. But the learned justice, in his charge to the jury, said: “But I deny, that, in any case, civil or criminal, they (the jury) have the moral right to decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure. On the contrary, I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the court to
The same question was most exhaustively considered by the late Mr. Justice Curtis, in the case of the United States v. Morris, 1 Curtis, 23, 52-58. In that case it was contended that the jury in all criminal cases in the courts of the United States were the rightful judges of the existence, construction, and effect of eveiy law that was material in a criminal case. But, in response to that contention, Mr. -Justice Curtis, among other things, said:
“It was evidently the intention of the Constitution that all persons engaged in making, expounding, and executing the laws, not only under the authority of the United States but of the several States, should be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States. But no such oath or affirmation is required of jurors, to whom it is alleged the Constitution confides the power of expounding that instrument; and not only construing, but holding
These decisions of the two distinguished jurists, who were at the time justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, but then presiding in the Circuit Court, have been fully approved and adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court, in Sparf & Hansen v. United States, supra, wrhere the whole subject has been most elaborately and ably considered in opinions of both the majority and minority of the learned justices sitting in that case.
In the present case, the justice at the trial below fully charged the jury both as to the law and as to his view of the facts; but leaving the facts entirely to the jury. And with respect to the amendatory act of January 15, 1897, the judge was explicit in charging the jury, that if they concluded that the accused was guilty of murder, it was their right, under, the act of Congress, to add to their verdict “without capital punishment.” He further said: “I
This, we think, was clearly right. If it was not the intention of Congress to abolish capital puuishment, but to leave the matter of degree of guilt to the finding of the jury, that must, in the nature of things, depend upon the facts of the case. We think the judge below was strictly right in the interpretation of the act of the 15th of January, 1897, and that there was no error in the terms of the charge to the jury. The jury were left entirely free, under the instruction of the court, to determine the question whether the circumstances of the crime charged were of a character to justify them in returning a verdict for the mitigated punishment, or such as was returned by them.
In several of the States of the Union statutes substantially similar to that of the act of Congress of January 15, 1897; exist, and in many of such States those statutes have been construed by the courts and given practical application; and, with but one or two exceptions, brought to our attention, those statutes have been construed and applied, under
Finding no error, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I am unable to conc'ur with my brothers in their construction of the act of Congress which provides that when an accused person shall be found guilty of murder, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding, “without capital punishment.”
In my opinion, the language of the act is plain and affords no room for construction—for appeal from its letter to its spirit.
Public policy in f'espect of the punishment of offenses is a matter within the exclusive control of Congress, and departures therein, whether to be regarded as wise or unwise, must be given effect to as declared.
To my mind, it appears plain, that whilst Congress did not abolish capital punishment for the crime of murder, it nevertheless committed the matter of its infliction to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury in each case.
If it had been intended that the exercise of this power of
Whethei’, in the exercise of an unlimited discretion, juries may or may not make distinctions between criminals, not justified by the conditions of their respective cases, or, in practice, virtually abolish the death penalty, is wholly beside the question. In the exercise of its own undoubted discretion in the premises, Congress has seen proper to commit the power to the jury, and to the jury alone.
In construing the statute to mean that the court may, without error, admonish the jury in respect of the grounds-upon which they may commute the death penalty by the addition to their verdict, it is not denied that he is compelled also to instruct them that it is their privilege to exercise the power notwithstanding.
With such instructions as were given in this case, no jury, composed of good citizens, accustomed, as it is their duty, to accept and apply the. law as given them in charge by the court, could have extended clemency to any one of these appellants.
After such an admonition, to such a jury, the further information that they might, nevertheless, commute the punishment was but a meaningless formality. It did not give the accused the benefit of the statute.
I can not accept as sound the argument that the purpose of Congress in this enactment was substantial^ the same as-shown in the legislation of the States, whereby the offense of murder has been divided into two degrees—murder of the first and murder of the second degree.
On the contrary, it seems to me that there is a substantial difference of purpose. Under the State statutes referred to, murder of the first degree consists of homicide committed in the perpetration of offenses like rape, robbery, arson and burglary, or by poison, starvation, torture, and so
In the enforcement of those statutes the courts are required to declare the law to the jury in application to the facts. Where the evidence shows plainly that the accused,, if guilty at all, is guilty of murder of the first degree and nothing less, it is the duty of the court to withhold from the jury the privilege of returning a verdict of guilty of' murder of the second degree. The court is not required to-submit the question of the degree of guilt to the jury, regardless of the evidence, as under the act of Congress it is-compelled to extend to them the privilege of commuting-the death penalty:
If the purposes of the two sets of statutes are the same, it would be more reasonable to hold that, under the act of Congress, the right to commute the death penalty should-not be accorded to the jury at all, unless the evidence should discover something tending to warrant the exercise-of clemency.
For the reasons given, I am of the opinion tha.t the judgment in each case should be reversed.
The judgment in this case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, to which court the case was-taken on writ of error, January 3, 1899.
This dissenting opinion applies as well to the cases of Smith v. United States, post, p. 155, and Winston v. United States, post, p. 157.