OPINION AND ORDER
This action arises out of the purported sale by defendant Cargill Financial Services Corporation, a Delaware corporation, of an equity stake in Teesside Power Ltd., one of the largest power plants in the United Kingdom, to plaintiff hedge funds Strategic Value Master Fund, Ltd. and Man Mac 3 Limited, Cayman Islands and Bermudan corporations, respectively. Plaintiffs allege that the parties entered into an oral contract, under which defendant promised to sell a 50% equity stake' in Teesside Power Ltd. to plaintiffs for £19MM. They further allege that the parties subsequently modified the contract orally, when defendant agreed to instead sell to plaintiffs a lesser equity stake of 35% for £13.3MM. Plaintiffs claim that defendant breached this contract when it refused to transfer the equity to plaintiffs. Defendant now moves for dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint on
forum non conve-niens
grounds, arguing that this dispute is wholly centered in England and, consequently, an English court provides the most appropriate forum. For the reasons
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
A. The Parties
Plaintiffs Strategic Value Master Fund, Ltd. and Man Mac 3 Limited are hedge funds incorporated in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 3.) Strategic Value Partners, LLC (“SVP”), a Delaware limited liability company and nonparty to this action, is plaintiffs’ investment advisor and manager. (Clarke Decl. ¶ 3; Khosla Decl. ¶¶ 1, 4.) SVP is registered to do business in New York; it maintained a principal place of business in New York at the time of the events giving rise to this action. (Khosla Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) SVP and plaintiffs are parties to a contract, under which SVP maintains full discretionary authority over plaintiffs’ investment activities, which authority includes negotiating and closing trades, entering into and enforcing contracts, deciding how the investment funds should be allocated, and pursuing investment-related litigation, all on plaintiffs’ behalf. (Khosla Decl. ¶ 6.) SVP has a “sub-advisory relationship” with Strategic Value Partners (U.K.), LLP (“SVP-U.K.”), an indirect subsidiary of SVP. (Khosla Decl. ¶ 10.) SVP-U.K.’s primary function is to research and analyze potential investment opportunities in Europe for SVP’s hedge funds. (Khosla Decl. ¶ 10.) Due to SVP’s exclusive relationship with plaintiffs, SVP-U.K. is prohibited from making any investments on behalf of plaintiffs without SVP’s express instruction. (Khosla Decl. ¶10.)
Defendant Cargill Financial Services Corp. (“CFSC”), a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Minnesota, is a full service financial services company with expertise in the investment in and trading of distressed assets. (Brice Decl. Ex. A.) Cargill Financial Markets Pic (“CFM”), an affiliate of CFSC, is an English company with its principal place of business in Cobham, Surrey, England. (Brice Deck ¶2.) CFM, like CFSC, operates in the high yield and distressed asset investment market, albeit in Europe. (Brice Deck ¶4.) CFSC and CFM are parties to a “Service Level Agreement,” dated February 1, 2003, under which CFSC is given the right to broker trades in distressed assets, and provide accounting and administrative services related to such trades, on CFM’s behalf. (Brice Deck Ex. A.)
B. The Power Plant
1. Equity
Teesside Power Ltd. (“TPL”), one of the United Kingdom’s largest power plants, was, at the time of the events giving rise to this action, privately held by five shareholders, all of whom are English: Teesside Power Holdings Ltd. (“TPHL”); Midlands Power (TPL) Ltd. (“Midlands”); Northern Electric Generation (TPL) (“Northern”); South Wales TPL Investments Ltd. (“South Wales”); and Western Power Investments Ltd. (“Western”).
1
(Brice Deck
The relationship of TPL vis-a-vis its shareholders, and the relationship among the shareholders themselves, are governed by TPL’s Articles of Association (“Articles”). (Davies Decl. ¶ 12.) Among other terms, the Articles include certain preemption provisions that restrict generally a shareholder’s ability to sell its equity to a third pаrty. (Davies Decl. ¶ 16.) A TPL shareholder can enforce the Articles’ terms against another TPL shareholder, or any prospective TPL shareholder that does not comply with the Articles’ requirements. (Davies Decl. ¶ 18.) The shareholders are also governed by an equity agreement that has been supplemented a number of times (“Equity Agreement”). (Davies Decl. ¶ 19.) The parties to the Equity Agreement are the shareholders, TPL itself, and the agent bank, which represents TPL’s bank lenders. (Davies Decl. ¶ 19.) Generally speaking, the Equity Agreement, like the Articles, imposes restrictions on a shareholder’s ability to transfer its TPL equity. (Davies Decl. ¶ 20.) Finally, the shareholders are parties to a shareholders agreement that imposes additional restrictions on the transferability of TPL equity (“Shareholders Agreement”). (Davies Decl. ¶ 26.)
2. Debt
TPL issued £795MM of debt to various bank lenders in order to finance the construction of the power plant. Today, the debt has a face value of approximately £500MM. (Brice Decl. ¶ 13.) After a downturn in the United Kingdom’s wholesale power generation market, and the collapse of Enron in 2001, a number of TPL’s debt holders sold their debt at discounted prices to, largely, hedge funds, including SVP-managed funds, and the proprietary trading desks of London-based investment banks. (Brice Decl. ¶ 14.) Because the debt holders’ rights are governed by a contract entitled the “Amended and Restated Credit Agreement,” the debt is commonly referred to as the “ARCA debt.” (Clarke Decl. ¶ 9.) The ARCA debt is syndicated to various entities by Bar-clays Bank Pic. (Brice Decl. ¶ 13.)
C. CFM’s Interest in TPL
CFM has an indirect interest in certain TPL equity. CFM’s interest in TPL stems from its purchase of certain notes issued by Teesside Power Finance Ltd. (“TPFL”), a Cayman Islands company, in July 1999 (the “Notes”). (Davies Decl. ¶ 31.) The Notes’ present approximate face value is £80MM. (Brice Decl. ¶ 8.) The Notes are securitized by guarantees from two English companies, Enrоn Europe Power 1 Ltd. (“EEP1”) and Enron Europe Power 3 Ltd. (“EEP3”). EEPl’s guarantee is supported by a first ranking charge over its 85% interest in TPHL; EEP3’s guarantee is supported by a floating charge over its assets, which includes its 15% interest in TPHL. (Davies Decl. ¶ 31.) Consequently, part of the securiti-zation of the Notes is a 100% security interest in TPHL. (Davies Decl. ¶ 31.) Because TPHL owned 50% of TPL’s equity at the time of the alleged contract formation,
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CFM maintained, and still maintains today, an indirect security interest in TPL. (Brice Decl. ¶ 5; Def.’s Mem. Law Supp.
D. TPL’s Shareholders and Creditors Seek to Gain Control Over All of TPL’s Equity
In 2004, the ARCA debt holders began negotiations with TPL’s shareholders to purchase their TPL stock. (Brice Decl. ¶ 16.) When these negotiations failed, the ARCA debt holders tried to procure the shareholders’ equity by attempting to exercise a power of sale of the equity by auction pursuant to the Equity Agreement — in essence, a forced debt for equity swap. (Brice Decl. ¶ 16; Davies Decl. Ex. E.) In response, TPHL, as a TPL shareholder, brought suit in the English High Court to stop the sale by auction and won. The court held that the ARCA debt holders could not bid in the forced auction or any subsequent auctions. (Brice Decl. ¶ 16.) Defendant claims that, after the court’s disposition of the matter, the ARCA debt holders created “additional trouble” by arguing that certain payments made to the shareholders pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement, and other governing agreements, were made illegally. (Brice Decl. ¶ 17.) While not much detail is provided, the relevant declaration states that court intervention was sought and the TPL shareholders won again. (Brice Decl. ¶ 17.)
The ARCA debt holders made an argument in the first trial that is relevant to the history of this case. (Brice Decl. ¶ 20.) The ARCA debt holders argued that extracting the equity from TPL’s shаreholders was necessary because TPL was not being managed properly, largely due to the fact that TPL, a project finance company with only three employees outside of its Board of Directors, was being ineffectively managed and governed by the shareholders vis-a-vis their representatives on the Board of Directors. (Brice Decl. ¶ 19.) While they lost the suit, the trial judge “noted and advised TPHL and CFM that they should address the management issues with the ARCA lenders to avoid further conflict given that the lenders were still owed a large sum by TPL.” (Brice Decl. ¶ 20.) Thereafter, CFM and TPHL began working on consolidating the TPL equity with the goal that TPL be managed and operated with a single voice. (Brice Decl. ¶ 20.)
CFM’s John Brice and Greg Belonogoff began contacting representatives of the various shareholders, and in so doing, learned that certain ARCA debt holders, including SVP, Goldman Sachs, and Deutsche Bank, had also contacted the TPL shareholders to discuss purchasing their equity. (Brice Decl. ¶ 21.) Notwithstanding the ARCA debt holders’ conversations with the TPL shareholders, defendant states that TPHL reached “agreements in principle” in March 2005 with the parent companies of Northern and Midlands to buy their respective equity stakes in TPL. (Brice Decl. ¶ 22.) Defendant also maintains that while TPHL had not yet reached an agreement with Western, discussions with that shareholder had been ongoing. (Brice Decl. ¶ 22.)
E. The Alleged Oral Agreement
On April 7, 2005, Rory O’Neill, a portfolio manager at CFSC,
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called Victor Khos-la, SVP’s Managing Partner, to discuss a potential sale of equity in TPL. (Khosla Decl. ¶ 11; Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 7.) (Messrs. Khosla and O’Neill had
The following day, Messrs. O’Neill and Khosla had a number of conversations, as evidenced by transcripts of the phone calls. In a preliminary phone call, Mr. O’Neill told Mr. Khosla that defendant had agreements with “two guys,” ostensibly Midlands and Northern, to purchase their TPL equity, and that defendant had backed out of any sale with Western. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 22 at 8.) Mr. Khosla communicated to Mr. O’Neill that he was not looking to purchase a controlling number of TPL equity, but, instead, only 10%-15% of defendant’s TPL equity. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 22 at 9.)
In a subsequent conversation, Mr. O’Neill conveyed to Mr. Khosla that, “no matter what happens” with the purchase of Western’s equity, defendant would have control of TPL. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 24 at 5.) He went on to say that he was in the closing process of entering into agreements with Midlands and Northern to purchase their equity, and that if either of those two sellers were to tell CFSC that it would not sell its equity to defendant because SVP had made a higher bid, defendant would not consent to the transfer of the sellers’ equity to SVP. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 24 at 5.)
In the final call between Mr. Khosla and Mr. O’Neill on April 8, 2005, Mr. O’Neill called Mr. Khosla again and stated that it was “our inclination ... to sell[,] you know[,] the whole ... 50%” of its interest in TPHL. (Krauss Ex. 6 at 2.) He went on to say that “we haven’t fully thought through the mechanisms and the ramifications in the structures and all that,” to which Mr. Khosla stated that “[t]he structures on this are pretty damn complicated.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 2.) Mr. Khosla then asked Mr. O’Neill, “can we kind of do a trade tonight subject to kind of working through the dots and so on and I think, you know, look we all do, we all know that we can work though those over time.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 3.) Mr. Khosla then asked whether this was too hard, and Mr. O’Neill said that it was, given that his colleague, Mr. Belonogoff, who was the “point” person on the deal, was unavailable. (Krauss Ex. 6 at 3.) The back and forth continued, and Mr. Khosla asked, “[s]o would you do all 50% tonight?,” to which Mr. O’Neill responded, “I think so.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 4.) Mr. Khosla then asked what the price would be and Mr. O’Neill cited a price of £5.75 million for “15% of the company.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 4.)
Mr. O’Neill then told Mr. Khosla that the TPHL structure is the “mechanism by which we own the economic interest in those shares.” (Barrett Decl. Ex. 25 at 5.) He then asked Mr. Khosla whether he “underst[ood] we don’t own them directly?,” to which Mr. Khosla said, “I do and I don’t.” (Barrett Decl. Ex. 24 at 5.) Mr. O’Neill explained that there was a pretty complicated structure, but that “we are the economic beneficiary of those shares.” (Barrett Decl. Ex. 24 at 5.) Mr. Khosla, in response asked, “[c]an you, do you have the benefit to kind of really do anything you want with the shares? In other words, there is nothing which restricts its ability to be a shareholder[,] so to speak[,] on it?,” and Mr. O’Neill responded by saying, “[n]ot really,” and that the shares were “held by a legal entity upon which Cargill has one board member.” (Barrett Decl. Ex. 24 at 5-6.) Mr. O’Neill further stated that “we are one board member of those entities” but that “we are clearly the economic driver behind much of what goes on there, but we don’t have, you know,
After referencing the litigation between the ARCA debt holders and the TPL shareholders, Mr. O’Neill confirmed that “we still own 100% of the bonds of this company called, you know, T[eess]ide Power Holdings Limited,” such that “our economic stake hasn’t changed at all.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 8.) He went on to state that “I can commit to you that Car[gill] will do best endeavors to make that trade go through. But, you know, don’t forget if that entity starts selling the other shares then the other shareholders.... You know, so it will be messy, but I think at the end of the day, you know, we can probably deliver them to you.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 9.) Mr. O’Neill specifically mentioned Western as a “difficult breed,” and that if TPHL is delivering the shares to SVP, “they’ve [i.e., Western] got consent.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 9.) Mr. Khoslá conceded that “how you unlock the equity in this, is a very, very messy[,] dirty proposition.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 10.)
The conversation went on and Mr. Khos-la stated, “Rory, 19 [million] pounds, we will buy it. What I would like to kind of do is on Monday we should just kind of work through the dots,” to which Mr. O’Neill responded by saying “[ojkay.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 14-15.) Mr. Khosla then stated that he recognized that the stock shares were pretty complicated, but that “come hell or high water, we will work with you,” noting “it is pretty hard to just buy it.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 15.) Mr. Khosla suggested that Jason Clarke, an employee of SVP-U.K., speak to someone at Cargill to follow through. (Krauss Ex. 6 at 15.) Noting that the equity “had all sorts of Enron claims and everything else,” Mr. O’Neill told Mr. Khosla that it would “seek to” sell to SVP the “direct shares.” (Krauss Ex. 6 at 16.) Mr. Khosla then agreed. (Krauss Ex. 6 at 16.) Messrs. Khosla and O’Neill final exchange was as follows:
Mr. O’Neill: Okay, so we’ve got an agreement in principal subject to figuring out the details.
Victor [Khosla]: Exactly, and we start figuring them out first thing Monday morning.'
Mr. O’Neill: We will start figuring them out Monday morning and Gage and Cargo will be calling and you are taking the 50% of the equity that we have indirect control over for 19 [million pounds], 19 [million pounds] even, there is the break.
Victor [Khosla]: Yes, I got 160,000 pounds off you.
Mr. O’Neill: Well it is for the advice you gave me.
(Krauss Ex. 6 at 45^46.)
F. Subsequent Conversations and the Alleged Amended Oral Agreement
On April 13, 2005, CFM discovered that Mr. Clarke, of SVP-U.K., had met with ■Northern representatives the day before for the purpose of discussing the purchase of Northern’s equity in TPL. Defendant argues that this meeting was in violation of plaintiffs’ prior agreement on April 8 not to pursue the purchase of either Northern’s or Western’s equity. (Brice Decl. ¶ 27.) CFM learned of this from a letter written by Northern informing CFM that it would not proceed with its sale to TPHL. (Brice Decl. ¶27.) Mr. Clarke states in his declaration that he was invited to a breakfast meeting on April 12, 2005 by Eric Connor of Northern, and that at the meeting Mr. Connor told him that it did not have an agreement to transfer its equity to Cargill, and then invited SVP to bid on Northern’s TPL equity. (Clarke
On April 13, 2005, Messrs. Khosla, O’Neill, Belonogoff, and Brice had a heated discussion in which the Cargill employees told Mr. Khosla that defendant had an “agreed deal” with Northern, including the price and terms of the deal (Barrett Decl. Ex. 27 at 5), but that they had received a letter that day from Northern saying the trade was off (Barrett Decl. Ex. 27 at 10). The Cargill employees went on to say that their understanding of the Shareholder Agreement gave them “the last look on the equity or we will be able to frustrate any person buying it who is not an existing shareholder.” They made clear that while this point was subject to debate, Cargill would be willing to litigate over it. (Barrett Decl. Ex. 27 at 4.)
Later that day, Mr. Khosla called Mr. O’Neill separately. Mr. O’Neill told Mr. Khosla that defendant’s sale of equity to plaintiffs was not off, notwithstanding SVP’s interference with the trade between defendant and Northern. (Krauss Decl. Ex. 9 at 5-6.) The following exchanged then occurred:
Victor [Khosla]: You still want to go on 35%?
Mr. O’Neill: What’s that?
Victor [Khosla]: You thought you had 35% when you sold me the 50.
Mr. O’Neill: Yes.
Victor [Khosla]: Here is the point, if you don’t get the Northern trade for whatever reason, right?
Mr. O’Neill: Yes.
Victor [Khosla]: You are going to take the 50% and move it down to 35%. If you get the Northern trade then you are just going to kind of[,] you know[,] do the 50% with us, is that fair?
Mr. O’Neill: I think it is fair. Let me think' about it, but, yeah.
(Krauss Decl. Ex. 9 at 6.) Mr. O’Neill then reiterated that it was not using any interference with the Northern trade to “back out of the trade with you.” (Krauss Decl. Ex. 9 at 6-7.) He then said, “let me think through it, because I’ve got like a million things going on right now, one of which being in a discussion with my boss about raising outside money.” (Krauss Decl. Ex. 9 at 7.)
II. Procedural History
Plaintiffs brought this action in a complaint dated October 5, 2005, seeking damages in an amount not less than $100MM USD and specific performance of the agreement or, in the alternative, the modified agreement. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-21, Wherefore Clause.) Defendant answered on October 25, 2005, admitting that Messrs. O’Neill and Khosla spoke by telephone on or about April 8 and April 13, 2005 (Ans. ¶¶ 10-11), denying the remainder of plaintiffs’ substantive allegations (Ans.lHI 9-21), and raising a number of affirmative defenses, including forum non conveniens (Ans. Affir. Defs. ¶ 2). Defendant brought this motion for forum non conveniens on January 27, 2006, and the motion was fully briefed on February 28, 2006.
DISCUSSION 5
I. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Standards
The doctrine of
forum non con-veniens
is based on the principle that “ ‘a
In furtherance of these general principles of law, the Second Circuit has crafted a three-step inquiry for its district courts to follow:
At step one, a court determines the degree of deference properly accorded the plaintiffs choice of forum. At step two, it considers whether the alternative forum proposed by the defendants is adequate to adjudicate the parties’ dispute. Finally, at step three, a court balances the private and public interests implicated in the choice of forum.
A. Step One: Determining the Dеgree of Deference Due a Plaintiff
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc in
Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp.,
Looking to Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit observed that, generally speaking, a court should defer to a plaintiffs choice of forum.
Id.
at 70;
see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
The converse of the heightened deference afforded a plaintiff suing in its home forum is that a lesser degree of deference is afforded a foreign plaintiff who brings suit in a United States forum.
Id.; see Piper,
The more it appears that a domestic or foreign plaintiffs choice of forum has been dictated by reasons that the law recognizes as valid, the greater the deference that will be given to the plaintiffs forum choice. Stated differently, the greater the plaintiffs or the lawsuit’s bona fide connection to the UnitedStates and to the forum of choice and the more it appears that considerations of convenience favor the conduct of the lawsuit in the United States, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to gain dismissal for forum non conve-niens.
Id. at 71-72 (footnotes omitted). The factors favoring denial of a motion for dismissal include
the convenience of the plaintiffs residence in relation to the chosen forum, the availability of witnesses or evidence to the forum district, the defendant’s amenability to suit in the forum district, the availability of appropriate legal assistance, and other reasons relating to convenience or expense.
Id. at 72. Conversely, where it appears that a plaintiff has chosen a U.S. forum because of forum-shopping reasons, less deference will be afforded plaintiffs choice and, consequently, the greater the likelihood of dismissal. Id. Such forum-shopping reasons include
attempts to win a tactical advantage resulting from local laws that favor the plaintiffs case, the habitual generosity of juries in the United States or in the forum district, the plaintiffs popularity or the defendant’s unpopularity in the region, or the inconvenience and expense to the defendant resulting from litigation in that forum.
Id.; see, e.g., Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
B. Step Two: Whether an Adequate Alternative Forum Exists
The second step of a
forum non conveniens
analysis requires a district court to determine whether a suitable alternative forum for the dispute exists.
Iragorri,
Where a district court cannot definitively determine the adequacy of the foreign forum, the Second Circuit advises that the court can still dismiss the case with the condition that the plaintiff be able to reinstate the ease if the alternative forum declines to assume jurisdiction.
Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l (OVERSEAS) Ltd. v. State Bank of Pak.,
[T]he district court may dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, despite its inability to make a definitive finding as to the adequacy of the foreign forum, if the court can protect the non-moving party by making the dismissal conditional. This case law does not, however, excuse the district court from engaging in a full analysis of those issues of foreign law or practice that are relevant to its decision, or from closely examining all submissions related to the adequacy of the foreign forum. If, in the end, the court asserts its “justifiable belief’ in the existence of an adequate alternative forum, it should cite to evidence in the record that supports that belief.
Id.
(footnote omitted). A district court might also condition dismissal on the willingness of the foreign court to hear the case, the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction in the alternative forum, and the defendant’s waiver of any statute of limitations defense that may have arisen since the filing of the case in the present forum.
Calavo Growers of Cal. v. Generali Belg.,
C. Step Three: The Balancing of Gilbert’s Public and Private Interest Factors
Assuming an adequate alternative forum exists, a district court must balance two sets of factors to determine whether adjudication is more appropriate in the
1. Private Interest Factors
The first set of factors, the private interest factors, address the conveniences to the litigants. They include
“the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.,
2. Public Interest Factors
A district court is further directed to weigh certain factors that concern the public’s interest, including (1) any administrative difficulties that may arise if an alternative forum is particularly congested with litigation; (2) the consideration that jurors should not be obligated to decide disputes with no relation to their community; (3) the fact that where a case affects many people, a forum that allows those affected to view the suit, rather than learn of it by report from a foreign forum, is preferable; (4) the forum’s local interest in having its own controversies decided at
In sum, depending on the facts of the case, while a plaintiffs citizenship and residence is helpful to a court in that it allows it to set the appropriate degree of deference due the plaintiff, the gravity of the private and public interest factors at stake may be determinative.
Iragorri,
II. Forum Non Conveniens Principles as Applied to the Parties’ Arguments
A. What Degree of Deference Is Plaintiffs’ Choice of the Southern District of New York Due ?
Plaintiffs argue that they satisfy the factors that evidence a forum choice based on true convenience. They argue that (1) while they are foreign corporations, plaintiffs can only act through their agent and investment advisor, SVP, who maintains its office in New York and entered into the subject agreement on their behalf from New York (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 9-10); (2) necessary witnesses and evidence can both be made available in this district (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 10); (3) defendant is registered to do business in New York and is thus amenable to suit in New York (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 10-11); (4) plaintiffs’ counsel is located in New York; and (5) litigation in England would essentially shift any inconvenience and expense that defendant will incur in this forum to plaintiffs (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 11). Before turning to these arguments, the Court first turns to a preliminary cоnsideration which it believes raises a strong inference that forum-shopping reasons motivated plaintiffs’ choice of forum. 7
Plaintiffs’ decision to bring their action against CFSC alone, then, was rational if they thought they had entered into a contract with CFSC. Facts borne out in the early stages of discovery, however, raise a strong inference that this was not the case. Plaintiffs have produced in discovery a draft “Trade Confirmation” document prepared by SVP after the alleged oral contract was formed. (Kahnke Deck Exs. F, G.) The document preliminarily memorializes the parties’ oral agreement subject to the subsequent execution of a final agreement containing all of the terms of the deal. The Trade Confirmation was drafted by a SVP employee and sent by e-mail to Jason Clarke at SVP-U.K. The document names “Cargill Financial Markets” as the seller and plaintiffs as buyers. This fact serves as strong evidence that plaintiffs believed, in at least May 2005, that they were contracting with CFM. 9 Because plaintiffs knew that they were contracting with CMF, it is more than reasonable to believe that they knew CMF was the holder of the Notes. In any regard, defendant has since produced in discovery copies of the Notes, each of which clearly names CFM as its holder. (Kahnke Deck Ex. H.)
Given plaintiffs’ awareness of which business entity they had contracted with, their decision to bring suit solely against CFSC might still be reasonable if they had reason to believe that this Court could somehow enforce the purported agreement, and issue an order of specific performance, against CFSC. New York
Plaintiffs counter by arguing that “obvious” factual issues have been raised both about who owns and controls the TPL equity, and the relationships between the various Cargill entities.
(See
Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 20-21 & n. 20). These arguments, however, do not stand up to those facts, which are clear on their face, discussed above. For instance, plaintiffs argue in a footnote that one obvious factual issue is the fact that, in his telephone conversations with Mr. Khosla, Mr. O’Neill stated that
“we own
the economic interest in those shares” and
“we are
the economic beneficiary of those shares.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 20 n. 20 (emphasis added).) These statements, and Mr. O’Neill’s use of the pronoun “we,” are ostensibly offered to show that the use of a generic “we,” — either CFSC or some generic “Cargill” — owned the shares. But Mr. O’Neill’s off-hand reference to a “we”
Plaintiffs also argue that there are inconsistencies between defendant’s Rule 26(a) disclosures and statements on a Car-gill website concerning the corporate affiliations of some of its employees.
13
They argue that these inconsistencies “provide a further basis for enforcement of a specific performance order.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 20-21.) While not explicitly argued, this statement impliedly portrays “Cargill” as a unitary business form rather than as a global corporation comprised of a multitude of business entities with various inter-relationships between them. The further implication is that the various Car-gill entities do not respect each other’s corporate form because certain emрloyees have been represented to be employees of more than one entity. Regardless, the Court need not evaluate the merits of plaintiffs’ implications because the purpose of the current analysis is to determine from the parties’ submissions whether plaintiffs’ choice of forum was made out of genuine convenience or as a result of forum shopping.
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.,
The Court finds that the documentation evidencing plaintiffs’ acknowledgment that they were contracting with CFM, coupled with the rather basic proposition that a court is foreclosed from issuing a decree of specific performance against a party that cannot perform the underlying contract, leads the Court to accord to plaintiffs’ choice of forum less deference than it normally would give to plaintiffs who, while foreign, entered into a contract through an agent located in this forum.
15
See Capital
Plaintiffs’ proffered explanations of their “bona fide connection” to this Court do not overcome the finding that their decision was motivated by forum-shopping motives. While the location of plaintiffs’ agent in New York would normally provide such a bona fide connection, the futility of bringing their action here, as opposed to England where the proper party — CFM—could be sued, materially differentiates this case. While the fact that CFSC is amenable to suit in New York also would normally serve as a proper connection to this forum, the fact that there is strong evidence of plaintiffs’ knowledge that CFSC is not the indirect holder of an equity interest in TPL, extinguishes this otherwise appropriate connection. Plaintiffs also argue that necessary witnesses and evidence can both be made available in this district. While it is true that documentation residing in England can be made available here, for reasons detailed below, see infra Discussion Part X, numerous fact witnesses actually cannot be compelled to appear before this court. This argument, consequently, fails. Next, the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel is based in New York does not overcome the Court’s finding — plaintiffs cannot procure local counsel after bringing suit for forum-shop.ping reasons nearby. Finally, while dismissal would effectively shift to plaintiffs the costs defendant will incur if the case is tried in this forum, this fact is not accorded much deference when, as here, there is other evidence of forum shopping.
B. Does a Suitable Alternative Forum Exist?
Defendant has adequately demonstrated that England is a suitable alternative forum for this dispute. First, defendant is amenable to suit in England because it has submitted an agreement (Krauss Decl. Ex. 11) in which it voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the English courts, waiving any right it might have to contest the issue of personal jurisdiction.
See R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co.,
C. Do the Public and Private Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Dismissal?
Not surprisingly, defendant and plaintiffs argue that both public and private interests weigh in favor of their arguments for dismissal and non-dismissal, respectively. The Court turns to the private interest factors.
1. Private Interest Factors
In evaluating the private interests of the parties, the Court is obligated to weigh the inconvenience to a defendant of maintaining the dispute in this forum against any inconvenience a plaintiff would incur if it decided to bring its suit in the defendant’s alternative forum.
See Iragorri,
a. Ease of Access to Evidence
Defendant argues that the overwhelming majority of evidence — both witnesses and documentation — is in England. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 15-19.) Plaintiffs, in response, argue that the majority of evidence the Court needs to decide this dispute is located in the U.S., and the rest is easily accessible from abroad. (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 15.) This divergence in views on the location of pertinent evidence results from the parties’ differing views of the scope of this dispute. The scope of this dispute is critical because the Second Circuit has held that it is imperative to understand the “precise issues” to be tried when determining the inconvenience to a defendant in the present forum, and the potential inconvenience to a plaintiff if it must bring suit in the defendant’s preferred forum. Id.
Plaintiffs adopt a narrow view of their case. They argue that the only question before the Court is whether in their phone conversations Messrs. Khosla and O’Neill made the requisite еxpressions of intent to enter into a contract on behalf of their respective principles.
See Rule v. Brine, Inc.,
Defendant argues that its defense of this claim would require the Court to review a significantly larger universe of evidence than that necessary under plaintiffs’ version of the dispute. Defendant argues that the parties did not enter into a contract — if anything, the parties reached an agreement in principle, subject to their working out the details of the transaction in a subsequent written contract. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 16). This argument, of course, is well grounded in contract formation doctrine.
Winston v. Mediafare Entm’t Corp.,
The most important “detail” to be worked out would be whether the equity could be extracted. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 16.) Defendant would need to call employees of both Western and Northern to testify as to whether those firms would have exercised their consent or preemption rights had CFM tried to transfer the equity; representatives of Goldman Sachs International, Deutsche Bank, and Merrill Lynch International to testify as to whether their respective firms, as the ARCA debt holders, would consent to or preempt an attempted equity transfer; and the Trustee to testify as to plaintiffs’ contention that there was an understanding in the marketplace that “Car-gill” was the owner of a controlling interest in the TPL equity. (Def.’s Reply Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 6.)
Plaintiffs argue in response that such nonparty witnesses are unnecessary because they have no knowledge concerning
These third-party witnesses also would be needed to establish defendant’s interference, mistake, and impossibility defenses. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 16-17.) For instance, Eric Connor of Northern, a resident of England, would be called to testify about his communications with Mr. Clarke in order to establish defendant’s defense that plaintiffs interfered with its performance of the contract; Mr. Connor and Tariq Masood of Western would be called to testify as to whether they would have exercised their consent or preemption rights so that defendant could establish its impossibility defense; and, in support of its mistake defense, defendant would likely call a representative of the Trustee to testify as to plaintiffs’ claim that the understanding in the marketplace was that “Cargill” was the owner of the controlling equity interest in TPL. (Def.’s Reply Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 6.)
The Court also agrees with defendant’s argument that, if defendant were found to be liable, the Court would need to review a body of largely English evidence in order to fashion appropriate remedies. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 17.) This fact weighs in favor of dismissal.
18
See Iragorri,
274
F.3d
at 74 (“The court should consider also whether the plaintiffs damages are genuinely in dispute and where the parties will have better access to the evidence relating to those damages.”) While it apрears unlikely that this Court would
In sum, defendant has identified at least nine nonparty witnesses that it would like to call to testify in a trial. All nine of those witnesses reside in England. Additionally, plaintiffs do not contest that the overwhelming majority of documentary evidence — such as, for example, data concerning TPL’s operations and the value of its equity — resides in England. Where most of the witnesses and documentary evidence reside in a foreign country, conducting trial in the U.S. could impose such significant burdens on the parties that dismissal is favored.
See Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank
PLC;
b. The Availability of Compulsory Process for the Attendance of Unwilling Witnesses and the Cost of Obtaining Willing Witnesses
The Court is obligated to weigh the costs defendant would incur in obtaining willing witnesses to appear at a trial in the present forum.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
Because it is undisputed that the overwhelming majority of witnesses and documentary evidence reside in England, the only question before the Court is whether the costs defendant will incur in procuring such evidence for a trial in this forum are great enough to weigh in favor of dismissal. A district court is afforded broad discretion when deciding a motion for dismissal on
forum non conveniens
grounds,
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
While there are only two American party-witnessеs in this litigation, a fact that might normally weigh in favor of dismissal, there are only three other foreign defendants, one of whom, Jason Clarke of SVP-U.K., plaintiff has agreed to bring before the Court. (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 15.) Consequently, defendant has only identified two key party-witnesses that it will have to bring to New York from London. (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 15.) Because defendant leaves open the possibility that it may call additional foreign party-witnesses (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 15),
21
the Court cannot at this juncture ascertain what the cost would be to bring such willing witnesses before the Court. As to the documentary evidence,
The fact that defendant’s nonparty witnesses are not subject to the Court’s compulsory process weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
See Pollux,
The Second Circuit has held that a witness’s live in-court testimony is the preferred method of presenting his or her testimony.
DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp.,
Defendant argues that another private interest factor weighs in favor of dismissal: the fact that, if the Court finds defendant to be liable, it will not be able to issue a decree of specific performance in plaintiffs’ favor (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 20-21), a remedy that plaintiffs claim is far more important than any award of damages because of the pressing need to take control of TPL’s management. (Letter from David A. Barrett, Esq., Plaintiffs’ Counsel, to the Court at 1 (Dec. 15, 2005) (“Because the equity interest in the TPL plant is unique, plaintiffs seek specific performance of their agreement to buy it. Damages after the fact are a poor substitute for control over future strategic management of the asset.”).) The Court already discussed this argument when it determined the amount of deference to be accorded plaintiffs’ choice of forum. See supra Discussion II.A. The Court finds that for the reasons set forth above, supra Discussion II.A, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
d. Defendant’s Inability to Implead Foreign Third Parties
An additional private interest that the parties do not explicitly address is the fact that defendant is foreclosed from im-pleading CFM, the Cargill entity it argues is the true party to the contract, if one is found to exist, or any other English third party because doing so would destroy diversity. Such a fact weighs heavily in favor of dismissal,
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
2. Public Interest Factors
The public’s interest in a dispute must also be weighed when evaluating a motion for dismissal on
forum non conveniens
grounds.
Gulf Oil Corp.,
a. New York’s Interest in the Dispute and Whether New York Jurors Should Be Forced to Decide the Dispute
Defendant argues that because this dispute is “English in character,” England, and not New York, has the primary interest in resolving this dispute in its own courts. (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp.
Plaintiffs argue that New York has a stronger connection to the dispute than England because (1) while plaintiffs are foreign, their agent who negotiated the contract did so from New York (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22); (2) New York residents who are either employed by or have investments with plaintiffs have an interest in the contract being enforced in the current forum (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22); (3) the contract was formed entirely in the United States (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22); (4) defendant is registered to do business in New York and “undeniably direct[s] much business toward New York” (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22); and (5) because New York is the “unofficial hedge fund capital of the world,” it has a strong interest in adjudicating this dispute (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22-23).
By arguing that New York residents have a greater interest in this litigation than residents of England, plaintiffs again attempt to limit the scope of the Court’s inquiry to the question whether plaintiffs’ and defendant’s agents manifested the requisite intent to enter into a contract for the sale of the TPL equity. This view ignores the fact that the Court will need to look at English evidence and the testimony of English residents in order to assess (1) whether any conditions precedent to contract formation existed, (2) defendant’s other defenses, and, (3) if liability is established, the determination of what remedy or remedies are appropriate.
Plaintiffs quote another Southern District of New York case in support of the proposition that New York has a “substantial interest” in the litigation because “ ‘many New York residents who are employed by or have accounts or investments with these Plaintiffs are no doubt interested in these Plaintiffs recovering millions of dollars of lost investments.’ ” (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22) (quoting
Bank of Am. Corp. v. Lemgruber,
Plaintiffs next argue that the United States has a stronger interest than England in the instant dispute because “the contract was formed entirely in the United States.” (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 22.) Plaintiffs again cite two district court cases from this circuit in support of this contention.
See Alnwick v. European Micro Holdings, Inc.,
More importantly, there is binding appellate authority favoring dismissal in factual scenarios closer to the instant case. For example, the Second Circuit has upheld a dismissal on
forum non conveniens
grounds in a breach of contract action where the trademark license contract was made in New York.
Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co.,
No. 90 Civ. 5611,
Finally, where a plaintiff voluntarily reaches out to a foreign business entity in order to engage it in a business transaction, which plaintiffs do not dispute is the case in the instant action (Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 22 (“[N]either CFSC nor CFM chose to transact with SVP because SVP is located in New York — Khosla sought out CFSC on this proposed deal.”); Def.’s Reply Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 9 (“Nor do they
[ie.,
plaintiffs] dispute that CFSC and CFM never ‘entered’ New York in connection with this transaction, which centers on English interests and an English asset.”).), it is reasonable to expect that a dispute resulting from the transaction will be adjudicated in the forum in which the adversary resides.
See Carey v. Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank AG,
This factor weighs in neither party’s favor because, while this district is one of the country’s busiest,
Tel. Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Network Telecom PLC,
c. Choice of Law
The likelihood that the present forum would have to apply a foreign jurisdiction’s law would weigh in favor of dismissal.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
The determination of which forum’s law applies is made by performing a choice of law analysis. When a district court assumes jurisdiction over a case on diversity grounds, it is obligated to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,
Plaintiffs argue in their brief that defendant errs by arguing that English law applies to this dispute because defendant skips the required first step of determining whether a conflict even exists. (PL’s Mem. Law Opp’n Mot. at 13.) Plaintiffs argue that the Second Circuit has held that “[u]nder both New York and
While plaintiffs may be correct in their proclamation that English and New York state law have identical contract formation principles, the scope of this dispute will require the Court to apply other and additional legal principles if it were to find that a valid contract was formed. For example, enforcement of the contract, as detailed herein, would implicate the rights of the other TPL shareholders, debt holders, and the Trustee. The various agreements among and between those third parties are governed by English law. As such, the Court would have to, at least in part, look to English law to determine how to fashion an appropriate remedy that would invariably impact those third parties. In sum, whichever court presides over this dispute will have to go beyond thе threshold question whether a contract was formed, and look to whether the TPL equity can even be extracted. This latter question, and all of the attending questions of law, involve English law. This factor, therefore, does not weigh in favor of either party.
On whole, the public and private interests are largely centered in England and not the United States, and, therefore, dismissal is warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on forum non conveniens grounds is granted, conditioned on, and subject to, defendant filing with the Clerk of this Court by May 22, 2006 a document (1) appointing a firm or individual resident in London as its agent for the receipt of service of process for an action by plaintiff covering the same subject matter as in the instant case; (2) representing that it will not, in an action brought by plaintiffs in an English court covering the same subject matter as in the instant case, assert or rely upon any statute of limitation defense that may have arisen since the commencement of this action up to and including May 21, 2006. (As noted above, defendant has already filed with the Clerk of this Court a document in which it agrees to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the English courts, and a waiver of any right it might have to contest an English court’s personal jurisdiction over defendant.) Upon the timely filing of such a document, the Clerk shall enter final judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The declaration of Rhodri Davies, defendant's expert on English law, states that Magnolia Power (TPL) Ltd. (“Magnolia”), and not Midlands Power (TPL) Ltd. ("Midlands”), was one of TPL's five shareholders at the time of the events giving rise to this action. (Davies Decl. ¶ 14.) The Court will assume this is an error, as it is the only reference to Magnolia. Regardless, Mr. Davies's declaration states that, since the time of the events giving rise to this action, TPHL has acquired Magnolia’s
. TPHL also owns 100% of the preference shares of TPL. (Davies Decl. ¶ 14.)
. Again, TPHL today holds an additional 19.23% of TPL's stock. (Davies Decl. IT 32.)
. Mr. O'Neill is no longer employed by CFSC. (PL's Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. at 4 n. 7.)
. While a district court normally must first determine whether it retains subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute, the Second Circuit has held that a district court may decide a motion for dismissal on
forum non conveniens
grounds without first establishing its subject matter jurisdiction. In re
Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak
“Forum non conveniens does not raise a jurisdictional bar but instead involves a deliberate abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction. ... While such abstention may appear logically to rest on an assumption of jurisdiction, ... it is as merits-free as a finding of no jurisdiction. By the same principle on which the [Supreme] Court has approved a discretionary declination to exercise a pendent jurisdiction that may not have existed, ... it would be proper to dismiss on such grounds (if meritorious) without reaching the FSIA issue. Similarly, dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction is independent of the merits and does not require subject-matter jurisdiction."
Id.
(quoting In re
Minister Papandreou,
. In
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not defeat a motion to dismiss for
forum non conveniens
on the sole ground that the substantive law to be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable than the law that would be applied in the present forum.
. Because the Court enjoys “broad discretion” in reviewing this type of motion,
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.,
. Plaintiffs do not argue, nor would the Court find, that this Court could maintain subject matter jurisdiction if CFM were joined as a defendant. While § 1332(a)(3) states that a district court's subject matter jurisdiction is satisfied where the suit is between "citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3), courts in this Circuit have held that diversity jurisdiction fails where an alien brings suit against another alien and a U.S. citizen.
Fosen v. United Techs. Corp.,
. It also dispels any notion that plaintiffs mistakenly believed that Mr. O'Neill worked for CFM — or any other Cargill entity — but was acting as an agent for CFSC. If that were the case, it would not follow that CFM would be the signatory to the contract.
. As discussed later in this opinion, infra Discussion II.C.2.C, the Court makes no finding as to which jurisdiction's law — New York or England — would apply if the Court were to adjudicate this dispute.
. New York choice of law rules would dictate that the law of the state in which the corporation was incorporated applies to the question whether the corporation is the alter ego of another.
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.,
.For instance, a 2005 annual report for CFSC shows total assets of over £270MM, and total assets, less current liabilities, of £190MM. (Kahnke Decl. Ex. I.)
. For example, plaintiffs note that defendant’s Rule 26(a) disclosures and defendant’s responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories identify Messrs. Brice and Belongoff as employees of CFM, while the website identifies them as employees of Cargill Value Investment. (Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. at 4 & n. 6.)
. Plaintiffs, in their opposition papers, also gloss over the issue of CFSC’s ability to provide the relief they are seeking — damages and, more importantly, specific performance of the alleged contract — and the more general question of why CFSC, among other Cargill entities, was chosen as the lone defendant in this action. They first imply that they brought suit against CFSC because CFSC was the entity named in a letter written by defense counsel to Mr. Khosla in August 2005 which denied that the parties had ever reached an agreement on a trade. (Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. at 11.) Defendant argues that the letter was written on behalf of CFSC for another reason: It was written in response to a prior letter from SVP to CFSC demanding performance of the parties’ contract. (Def.’s Reply Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 3.) Another aspect of plaintiffs' opposition brief raises an inference that plaintiffs have sought to obfuscate the court as to whether CFSC is the appropriate defendant in this action: After stating in the first page of their brief that CFSC is the party who entered into an agreement with plaintiffs, but not defining CFSC as “Cargill,” plaintiffs refer to the defendant in the action as “Cargill,” a generic business entity that does not exist. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. at 1-2.)
.As CFM appears to be the real party in interest, it is not entirely clear why plaintiffs would choose to bring suit against CFSC in
. In
Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
for instance, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on
forum non conveniens
grounds where, as here, the plaintiff was a foreign entity, the proposed alternative forum was England, and the lawsuit included a breach of contract claim.
[s]ince plaintiffs have not asserted that English courts are in any way inadequate and because we have expressed high regard for those courts’ fairness and commitment to the rule of law, it certainly cannot be said that it was an abuse of discretion to hold that England was an adequate alternative forum.
Id. at 75 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir.2000)).
. Defendant’s English law expert opines that it is unlikely that an English court would be able to order CFM or CFSC to transfer shares in TPL because neither company directly holds any TPL equity. (Davies Decl. ¶¶ 101-02.) The Court finds that this does not, however, make an English court an inadequate forum because it is unlikely that this Court could issue an order for specific performance either. See supra Discussion II.A. Litigating this dispute in England is a superior option to litigating the suit here because plaintiffs will at least be able to bring suit against the proper defendant, CFM, in England. (Davies Decl. ¶ 93 ("There would be no jurisdictional or procedural difficulty in bringing proceedings against CFM in the English Courts since, as a company incorporated in England, it can be served here and the Claimant would have a right to proceed against it in England under Article 2 of the Judgments Regulation.”).).
. The Court recognizes that the Second Circuit has held in at least one instance that a district court erred when it considered in its
forum non conveniens
analysis the inconvenience of trying the case in the American forum because certain evidence residing in India was relevant to the plaintiff's claimed damages, an issue of “secondary importance” to the primary consideration of whether the underlying contract was breached.
R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co.,
. While the
Gilbert
Court called for a district court’s consideration of the “cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses,” the Court also stated that the district court should also consider “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
. Because such a tipping point cannot be quantified, the Second Circuit will generally affirm a district court's dismissal where the district court found that the defendant's cost of putting on its case would be high.
See, e.g., Capital Currency Exch., N.V. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC,
. Defendant's memorandum of law in support of its motion only includes a non-exhaustive list:
There are only two American witnesses, O'Neill (who lives in Minnesota) and Khos-la, and according to plaintiffs' Rule 26(a) disclosures, even Khosla is no longer in New York. Everyone else involved in this dispute is in England. These are employees and representatives of SVP, including Clarke; employees of CFM, including Brice and Belonogoff; employees or officers of the other existing and former TPL shareholders; and employees of U.K. investment banks.
(Def.’s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. at 15) (emphasis added).
. Plaintiffs seek to distinguish the instant case from other cases in which the majority of relevant evidence was located in a foreign jurisdiction (PL's Mem. Law Opp'n Mot. at 20) by arguing that in those cases dismissal was only favored because the cost of procuring the foreign evidence, when weighed relative to the damages sought, was prohibitively costly.
See Tel. Sys. Int’l Inc. v. Network Telecom PLC,
. On February 14, 2006, Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger granted defendant’s motion for the issuance of eight letters rogatory for (1) the production of documents from Northern, Western, Magnolia, E.ON UK Pic, Credit Suisse First Boston Europe Limited, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs International, and Merrill Lynch International, and (2) for testimony of witnesses related to each of the foregoing companies. (Feb. 14, 2006 Order.)
. The Second Circuit has, in at least one instance, accepted a district court's finding that the existence of several witnesses who could not be compelled to testify in the United States weighed heavily in favor of dismissal, without raising the question whether alternative methods, such as video deposition by letters rogatory, could be used to procure such testimony.
Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
.Plaintiffs cite to a district court case which held that, while proceeding under the Hague Convention is not as efficient as compelling witnesses to testify, the burden faced by the defendant to proceed in such a fashion did not rise to a level warranting dismissal.
Anglo Am. Ins. Group, P.L.C.
v.
CalFed Inc.,
. This fact further dispels plaintiffs' argument that New York is the proper forum because it is the “unofficial hedge fund capital of the world.” (PL's Mem. Law Opp’n
