*1 RAGER, STRASMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, VIRGINIA A. EDWARD J. Defendant-Appellee.
Third District No. 3 — 85—0518 July
Opinion filed *2 J.,
BARRY, specially concurring. Hughes Charles J. and Steven P. Clancy, both of Smith, Lester Berry Ltd., of Peoria, for appellant. Mark D. Henss and Duncan B. Cooper III, both Heyl, Royster,
Voelker Allen, & of Peoria, for appellee.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: The accident occurred on Route 24 on a misty, somewhat foggy mоrning in November 1981. Route 24 a straight and level two-lane road limit The posted speed per of miles hour.
headed The to a The stop west Peoria. came traffic. ve- hicle between the car and the defendant’s car was a plaintiff’s pickup truck. The truck avoided a collision with the car pickup bеing driven an incline plaintiff by swerving right down of plaintiff’s into a ditch. defendant drove her car into rear traveling car. The defendant testified that she was at 10 to 15 miles hour, when it per length pickup, one-half to one car behind about her as hard off the road. The defendant hit brakes suddenly swerved the rear of as she could until after she struck but was unable receiving after plaintiff’s pleaded guilty car. defendant ticket for traveling
The defendant further her pickup testified that the truck blocked forward vision. left the road she followed it off with pickup When Her vehicle traveled to V-k car while she was eyes. lengths Then watching pickup. up she looked and saw the testified that she her brakes as fast as she could but applied she did not at- unable to time. The defendant testified that tempt right pickup to swerve or to the left because the ditch of traffic to right oncoming to her and there was an lane her left. truck,
Jerri testified that it sits Ramey, *3 than a the defendant’s vehicle immedi- up higher observed off did not ately the time that her vehicle went the road. She prior feel following closely. the defendant’s vehicle was too
The initial in this is whether the trial court question appeal raised erred in motions for a directed verdict failing grant plaintiff’s or not determining n.o.v. The standard applied all of the grant a directed verdict or a n.o.v. is whether evidence, opponent, most to the when viewed favorable that no verdict based contrary favors movant that evidence could ever stand. case, maintains that in rear-end-colli plaintiff the present holding for precedent
sion cases there is a line of generally accepted matter of law. In support the driver of the rear vehicle as a negligent v. 39 Ill. 3d Mosley (1976), App. of his cites Glenn position, plaintiff 172, the court stated: where must de collisions, negligence
“In rear-end be question but, case, generally, on the facts of each particular cidеd negligence guilty who collides with a vehicle party as a matter of law.” Ill. 3d App. 3d App. 63 Ill. Burroughs also cites v. McGinness the court held: wherein knowledge, the ev general and common light experience
“In not attentive that the defendant was idence before us reveals A therefore, approaching drivеr driving negligent. while and he must a safe lookout keep from the rear has the duty to stop required take into consideration the fact that he Furthermore if he does or slow his vehicle suddenly. [Citations.] not maintain a lookout for traffic ahead he is proper 63 Ill. 3d 667. App. [Citation.]” posits application Burroughs that thе of Glenn and principles demonstrates that the defendants’ conduct violatéd the these cases and also v. negligence. constitutes See Waldron Hardwick 36; 99 Ill. 2d v. Be Mac Co. App. Apato Transport 1099;Payne 3d v. 2d 245. App. Kingsley (1965), App. cases, no dispute
While we have above cited collision does not cаses held that a rear-end create automatically have of the rear car was an inference a matter of law that as driving negligent or that he was too following closely Rather, to deter it is the of the trier of fact responsibility driver, accidents, mine whether the rear reasona acting such bly cirсumstances, under the or that the accident unavoidable. v. 74 Ill. (Burgdorff Corp. (1979), International Business Machines Service, See also Motor Inc. Kent Knox 223; Thomas v. Northington (1985), 141. bar,
In the
case at
there is
a clear
present
driving
to whether the defendant’s
too fast for conditions was
the proximate
alleged
cause of the
The defendant
injuries.
was ticketed for
section 11—601 of the Illinois
Code
violating
Vehicle
(Ill.
951/2,
Rev. Stat.
ch.
par.
601).
pleaded
The defendant
11—
guilty
charge
that she
in order to
failed to decrease her speed
safely encounter hazardous weather and highway conditions. How
ever, it does not follow that such a violation
presents proof
negli
gence per se or a
as a matter of
finding
contributory negligence
law. “The failure to
of the Illi
obey one or more statutory provisions
nois Vehicle Code is
only
negligence
evidence
considered
circumstances.”
jury along
(Doris
with all the other attendant
*4
Bradlеy (1979),
App.
893.)
3d
See also Lerette v. Director
General
In v. Blue the defendant defendant, Blue, struck the rear of the The was issued plaintiff’s driving charge a traffic ticket for too for To this he fast Gullberg opinion fine. The held that stand pleaded guilty and a paid alone, condi ing plea driving a to the guilty offense tions was insufficiеnt establish that driver was Therefore, too driving defendant’s a ques fast for conditions was a cause of the collision was proximate for the trier with the other at along tion of fact to be considered all tendant facts and circumstances.
The evidence, in a most favorable to the defend light viewed ant, Strasma, shows that a in traffic. came to defendant, conditions, admittedly who was too fast driving to a in front of bring unable to her vehicle after truck time, the defendant first suddenly swerved off the road. At that saw the A collision ensued. Whether plaintiff’s stationary vehicle. col defendant was and caused the negligent proximately whether she that proper jury. say lision were of fact for the We cannot questions might the inferences drawn from this evidence reasonably which could plaintiff that no verdict contrary favors and a ever stand. motion for a directed verdict Accordingly, plaintiff’s judgment n.o.v. were properly denied. allow
Plaintiff next thаt the trial court erred in not contends him to or connec question prospective jurors any about interest trial, they tion have in an automobile-insurance Prior may company. filed motion for voir dire. pro to ask plaintiff sought one or both of the spective jurors following questions: have, or “1. Do friends or relаtives you any your close that had, ever all with any any company have connection at makes a of this kind or do have practice defending you cases interest in such any company? financial 2. Do busi- you any your any friends or relatives have State Farm Mutual Insurance dealings ness Automobile Company?” Intеr alia motion, filed an affidavit. In- Mutual
it that a had State Farm stated defense been tendered that State pointed surance The affidavit out Company. located less headquarters Farm is a mutual whose world company that miles trial site of It further stated State than 50 from the Pekin. Tazewell agents throughout County Farm has numerous court’s atten- It called employees residing county. have Pekin and offices in corporate the fact that Pekin Insurance has tion officers, in Tazewell agents it has employees numerous motion. The trial County. court denied Imparato Rooney we stated:
831 “Generally, evidence which informs the thаt the defend- jury ant in a personal action injury against is insured is in- liability admissible on grounds of relevancy. rationale [Citation.] this rule underlying is twofold: the in- (1) fact that a party sured can have no possible bearing on the his negli- gence; (2) knowledge such insurance on the part of the larger will result in a probably verdict than that awаrded knowledge. However, absence such the doc- [Citation.] trine prohibiting disclosure of insurance is ex- subject several ceptions.
ofOne
these exceptions permits the
within certain
limitations, to interrogate prospective jurors on their voir dire
as to their interest and
to insurance
relationship
сompanies.”
(
The court in Imparato then went to cite Wheeler Rudek 397 Ill. 438. Wheeler our court supreme right held that the to con duct such an examination depends the faith good of the plaintiff. “If there is no reasonable probability of the who are to any jurors be called being connected in some way interested in the company, then the should inquiry not be made.” (397 438, Ill. 442.) As a matter of practice, the determination of the questions of good faith is for the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse discretion. 438, Ill. 444.) In denying motion the court plaintiff’s held that the plaintiff’s affidavit did not support request for voir dire. We do not deem an аbuse of discretion. Wheeler, an affidavit substantially like the one involved here
was held insufficient to good exhibit the faith of the In refer- plaintiff. ence to whether affidavit demonstrated reasonable possibility that one or more jurors be called in the case was interested in or connected with an insurance company court stated:
“Such could not proof be made by conclusions, the statement of and to say that the company has ‘numerous persons [insurance] at employed its office’ and that it ‘has act many persons as investigators, agents and in brokers county’ is [the trial] (Wheeler resting claim on the merеst shadow of possibility.” 438, Rudek 397 Plaintiff cites Haymes v. Catholic 336, Bishop (1968), Moore v. Edmonds of his contention that the trial court erred in refusing to voir dire. For the allow rea sons given in Dertz v. Pasquina (1973), 470, 474, rev’d on other grounds (1974), 59 Ill. 2d both these cases are distin- from at bar. guishable case occupations prospec
The trial into the inquired record is on this the trial jurors, point, tive not clear Although into occupations spouses also of their apparently inquired had and children. This to reveal those who procedure sufficient companies. procedure with insurance employment relationships had inadequate jurors to enable counsel to learn whether Nonetheless, noted close friends the insurance business. we Restaurant, Leischner v. Daniel’s Inc. Ill. App. is in con jurors way are some friend who some without “[f]ew trial industry.” nected with the cannot say insurance We its in this court abused discretion matter. Without some substantiat *6 this serve suggested inquiry, purpose basis it would nо the that the insurance. apprise by than to loss was covered jurors is the trial erred in al remaining question court the the to be asked of defendant on direct lowing following question examination:
“Question: right, Virginia, assuming All the conditions to, that there is just you existed as testified do feel they you impact could have the that оccurred? any way you that avoided No, I Answer: don’t.” were by
An motion strike the objection question the to an ul question goes denied. Plaintiff that above argues quoted calls for a agree. question improperly timate issue case. We the recent Closely point answer on an ultimate issue. is conclusory Freeding-Skоkie Hamilton decided our supreme case of by Roll-Off (Freeding-Skokie Hamilton 108 Ill. 2d Roll-Off objectionable. Similar were there found to be 223). questions an express opin In order for witness to lay permitted the cannot issue, ion or an it must that witness ultimate be evident upon opinion communicate to the the facts which adequately jury Freeding-Skokie, case, compar like The instant involves based. There simple of whether the defendant atively not commu adequately no could why reason witness appears jury opinion nicate to the the facts which his based. reversal, exist, it unless compel is shown to will “Where error prejudicial.” shows that the error was not affirmatively the record the record v. Cortesi 511, 517.) only 2 Ill. 2d Not does (Duffy the testi admitting to show that the error in the instant case fail The ques not we the reverse be true. believe mony prejudicial, highly prejudicial. tion and in this case were response County circuit court Tazewell Accordingly, judgment is reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
STOUDER, J., concurs. BARRY, JUSTICE specially concurring: I Although agree with the that the in favor of majority judgment defendant remanded, should be reversed and this cause I do not agree with one of the holdings majority. my view the trial court erred in denying motion for directed verdict and n.o.v.
In Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. 37 Ill. 2d 510, 229 504, 513-14, N.E.2d supreme said:
“In our judgment ought verdicts to be directed judgments n.o.v. entered only evidence, those cases in which all the when most viewed to the opponent, favorable favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that could ever stand.” evidence This is the reviewing “Pedrick rule” which a court must use in con- sidering evidence. notes,
As the majority Gullberg court held in v. Blue 85 Ill. App. 3d 406 N.E.2d to a traffic pleading guilty violation is not alone sufficient to establish negligence but rather is one of the facts to be by jury. Gullberg considered v. Blue we went on find that a n.o.v. was entered properly standard, trial court under Pedrick and we said: “The concluded that the defendant was not negligent; *7 however, stand, such a conclusion cannot for based his own the defendant did not his until it testimony apply brakes bring was too late to his vehicle control. own under The evi dence fails to any intervening parties, disclose events factors which would finding that the defendant was not the cause of the collision. A proximate approaching from the a duty rear has to a safe lookout and must take into con keep sideration the fact that he be to required stop slow suddenly. vehicle Failure to maintain a safe lookout for traffic ahead constitutes on the negligence part of a driver.” 85 Ill. 389, 392, N.E.2d 930. I think the evidence in the cаse before us indicates that defendant was the cause of the collision. She was proximate familiar with congested and traffic were usual highway conditions which length one-half to one car traveling route. within along suddenly see around. She which she could not high truck behind her and was unable to car in front of upon рlaintiffs came regulated she Obviously that car. when hitting in time to avoid she following, did her from the truck she speed distance and the fact that visibility limited forward not take into account her truck stop suddenly. When might required she ahead and from the road swerved, her attention defendant diverted of the extra distance be- spite into the ditch. go the truck watched she the time defendant saw by plaintiff’s, tween her car and a collision. prevent could not Burroughs are similar to those of this case
The circumstances occurred when the defendant a rear-end collision v. where McGinness he not see the plain- his left did traffic to was distraсted it. The striking he too close avoid car until was slow-moving tiff’s him turn- in front óf the car had slowed down because reversed Burroughs ing. The appellate defendant and said: most favor evidence, even when viewed
“The negli defendant, defendant’s clearly established able him.” the traffic preceding alert as to his failure gеnce by 664, 669, 380 v. McGinness Burroughs 37, 40. N.E.2d of defendant was in favor a directed verdict Mosley Glenn stating: reviewing with the appeal,
reversed traffic lookout for maintain a proper does not “A motorist who is negligent. ahead *** duty the rear has from A driver approaching ahead the vehicle colliding with lookout to avoid a safe keep having prospect account he must take into Mosely (1976), suddenly.” his car Glenn N.E.2d cases, situa- in these the factual stated of the law as On basis of a directed ver- one for entry a compelling in this case seems tion the judg- I reverse plaintiff. would n.o.v. in favor dict or judgment in favor of to enter directions ment and remand with damages. the issue of a new trial on to have plaintiff and