The testimony in the cause very satisfactorily proves that the defendant received no more of the purchase money, than he admits in his original and amended answer was paid to him; that the receipts written on the notes, and which acknowledge their payment, was made at the solicitation of Cousins who had intermarried with the widow and administratrix of the intestate; that no money was paid to the defendant, but the receipts were given, because Cousins urged it — stating that the judge of the orphans’ court desired it, and it would enable him to settle the administration account. Upon this branch of the case, it is urged for the plaintiffs in error, that the defendant’s receipts are conclusive evidence of the payment of the notes by the representatives of the vendee, and that testimony under the circumstances, is inadmissible to prove the reverse ; and to this point we will now‘address ourselves.
In Cook and Lamkin v. Bloodgood, use, &c. 7 Ala. Rep. 683, we determined, that, where one member of a partnership formed for the practice of the law, acknowledges the receipt
A receipt is but the admission of the party giving it that money or something else has been received by him, yet as a general rule it is inconclusive. It is not only impeachable for fraud, but it is competent to show a mistake or any erroneous or false statement in it, though designed by the parties —in a word, they may always be contradicted, varied, or explained by oral testimony, as will abundantly appear by the decisions of this and other courts. [See 2 Phil. Ev. 213 to 216; 3 Id. 1438-9, C. & H's Notes.] There is nothing in
Having attained this conclusion, there can be no doubt that the complainants are not entitled in the present condition of the cause to the relief they seek. The bill is at fault in not alledging the payment of the purchase money or any offer to pay it; and if the bill were unobjectionable, the proof is defective in not showing a payment, or a tender.
Even conceding, that, after the settlement of the administration, and a discharge of the administrators from the trust, it is competent for the heirs and distributees to maintain a suit in equity for the recovery of money which was paid by their intestate upon a contract which has been rescinded since his death, and then it may be asked, whether the bill is so framed as to authorize such a decree. It is not alledged that a contract for the sale of the land by the defendant to the intestate had been put an end to, but it is explicitly affirmed that the purchase money had been paid by one or both the administrators; that S. J. Westmoreland, one of the administrators, complainants are informed and believe, fraudulently placed the boud for titles in the defendant’s possession, who now retains or has destroyed the same, that he may defeat the complainants’ claim, and enjoy the lands. Thereupon, the complainants pray that the title be vested in them, &c.
The premises or stating part of the bill contains a narrative of the facts and circumstances of the plaintiff’s case, and of the wrong or grievance of which he complains, and
It is an unquestioned rule, that, if the complainant mistakes the relief to which he is entitled, in his special prayer, the court may afford the redress to which he is entitled, under the prayer of general relief; provided the relief, is such as is agreeable to the case made by the bill. Thus we see, although a prayer of general relief is sufficient, the special relief prayed at the bar must essentially depend upon the proper frame and structure of the bill; for the court will "grant such relief only, as the case stated will justify; and will not ordinarily be so indulgent as to permit a bill framed for one purpose to answer another; especially, if the defendant may be surprised or prejudiced thereby. If the complainant doubts his title to the relief he wishes to pray, the bill should be framed with a double aspect, so that if the court should decide against him in one view of the case, it may yet afford him assistance in another. [Story’s Eq. Plead. 40, to 43. See also Driver v. Fortner, 5 Port. Rep. 26.]
We have stated the law applicable to the frame of the bill, from which it appears, that the relief which the court grants must be adapted to, and Warranted by the premises. Although it may be competent thus far to afford redress even under a prayer for general relief, we think it may be questioned whether the case stated, would authorize a decree under any state of proof for the amount paid by the intestate and his administrators upon the purchase of the land in controversy. But we will not determine this question, nor consider, whether, if the contract is at an end, the administrators should not have proceeded at law. The proof abundantly shows that the defendant and the administrator of the intestate agreed to rescind the contract of sale upon the latter
This view is decisive of the cause, and relieves us from the necessity of inquiring into the extent of the powers of administrators in respect to contracts by their intestates for the purchase of real estate. We have but to add, that the decree of the court of chancery is affirmed.