176 So. 700 | La. Ct. App. | 1937
The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that it was not taken within ten days, not including Sundays, after the judgment was signed.
The appellants contend that the application for the appeal was timely, inasmuch as the judgment in favor of appellee was taken by default on issue joined by domiciliary service of citation; that no notice of judgment was served upon them; and that in such cases default judgments do not become executory, under the provisions of articles 624 and 575 of the Code of Practice, until after the expiration of ten days from the date on which the defendant is notified of the judgment.
The record reveals that the services of citation and the petition upon the defendants-appellants were domiciliary, and that a default judgment was entered upon issue joined by virtue thereof. This default judgment was signed on June 10, 1937, *701 and the appellants were never served with notice of it. Accordingly, under the provisions contained in articles 624 and 575 of the Code of Practice, the district judge properly granted to the appellants a suspensive appeal, inasmuch as the judgment had never become executory.
But the appellee asserts that articles 575 and 624 of the Code of Practice were repealed by article 117 of the Constitution of 1898 and by Act No.
The appellants deny that articles 624 and 575 of the Code of Practice were repealed either by article 117 of the Constitutions of 1898 and 1913, or by Act No.
It has been well established by a long list of authorities, some of which are cited by the court in the Mitchell Case, supra, that, under articles 624 and 575 of the Code of Practice, a notice of judgment is necessary, where a judgment is taken by default on issue joined by domiciliary service, before such judgment can become executory and that the party cast has ten days, after the service of such notice, within which to apply for a suspensive appeal.
This conclusion is also plainly exhibited by the language of these articles, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Article 624. "Respecting judgment subject to appeal, the party in whose favor one is rendered can only proceed to the execution after ten days, counting from the notification which he isobliged to make to the opposite party, * * * provided, that whenever an answer has been filed in a suit, in which the defendant has had personal service made upon him to appear and file his answer, or when a judgment has been rendered in a case after answer filed by the defendant, or by the counsel, the party cast in the suit shall be considered duly notified of the judgment, by the fact of its being signed by the judge." (Italics ours.)
Article 575. "If the appeal has been taken within ten days, not including Sundays, after the judgment has been notified to theparty cast in the suit, when such notice is required by law to begiven, it shall stay execution and all further proceedings, until definitive judgment be rendered on the appeal. * * *
"Whenever judgment has been rendered in a suit in which the defendant has had personal service to appear and file his answer, or when judgment has been rendered in a case after answer filed by the defendant, or by his counsel, the party cast in the suit shall be considered duly notified of the *702 judgment by the fact of its being signed by the judge." (Italics ours.)
These articles remained in full force and effect until the passage of the Constitution of 1898 which provided, in article 117, that: "Until otherwise provided by law, judgments shall be signed after three days from the rendition thereof, and becomeexecutory ten days from such signing." (Italics ours.)
Act No.
This act repealed all laws or parts of laws conflicting with its provisions.
The court, in the Mitchell Case, supra, was of the opinion that article 117 of the Constitution of 1898 and Act No.
The same provision, contained in the Constitution of 1898, was again inserted in the Constitution of 1913. However, the provision was omitted from the Constitution of 1921. Notwithstanding this omission, Act No.
The court, in the Mitchell Case, was of the opinion that the effect of the re-enactment of article 575 of the Code of Practice, by the passage of Act No.
This latter declaration is an enumeration of the cases in which notice of judgment is not necessary, and it would seem to follow that in all other cases a notice must be given. To hold that it was not the intention of the Legislature to provide for notice of judgment, where the same was taken by default on issue joined by domiciliary service, would be to render the article without effect, as it must be borne in mind that prior to its passage a notice of judgment was unnecessary in all cases.
It is well recognized that, in cases of statutory construction, the court will presume that the Legislature knew and was well acquainted with its prior enactments. We must therefore assume that the lawmaking body was fully informed that, under the law as it stood prior to 1926, a notice of judgment was not required in any case. That it was its intention to provide otherwise is plainly evidenced by the passage of Act No.
Appellee, in his criticism of the Mitchell Case, calls our attention to the fact that the court did not discuss the case of Hitt v. Herndon,
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Motion to dismiss denied.