STEVEN M. STRALEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM O. GAMBLE III, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
No. B240380
Second Dist., Div. Two
June 25, 2013
217 Cal. App. 4th 533
Spierer, Woodward, Corbalis & Goldberg and Stephen B. Goldberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Susan H. Hoover and Susan H. Hoover for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
ASHMANN-GERST, J.—Steven M. Straley appeals from a trial court order denying his petition for an order to determine the validity of a trust amendment (the petition). He contends that the trial court erred in finding that the petition was untimely pursuant to
We agree with appellant that he timely brought an action to contest the trust. Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Rebecca S. Straley, appellant‘s mother, was the trustor and settlor of the Rebecca S. Straley Living Trust Dated May 27, 2009 (the trust). Appellant was deliberately not named as a beneficiary of the trust. But, under the provisions of the trust, Mrs. Straley had the right, as settlor, to amend the trust in writing as she elected.
Mrs. Straley passed away on April 6, 2011.
Procedural Background
On April 21, 2011, the successor trustee served appellant with notice of the administration of the trust, pursuant to
On August 18, 2011, appellant filed the petition. In the petition, appellant asked the trial court to determine whether the entire trust distribution had been changed pursuant to the amendment. Appellant did not, however, serve notice of his petition until he served notice of hearing on October 28, 2011.
On November 28, 2011, the trustee filed and served his response to the petition, asserting, inter alia, that the petition was time-barred, pursuant to
At the hearing on November 30, 2012, the trial court denied appellant‘s petition for the reasons set forth in the trustee‘s response. In particular, the trial court found that the petition was time-barred by
Appellant‘s timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
As the parties agree, we review the trial court‘s order to the extent it is based upon the interpretation of
We review the trial court‘s finding that the doctrine of laches applies for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Fogarty & Rasbeary (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364–1365 (Fogarty).)
II. The trial court erred in finding that appellant‘s petition was time-barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches
A trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court to determine the validity of a trust provision. (
The timeframe in which to bring an action to contest a trust is delineated by statute.
Here, the trustee served the notification on appellant on April 21, 2011. Thus, appellant had until August 24, 2011, to “bring an action” to contest the trust. Because appellant filed his petition on August 18, 2011, the petition was timely filed. In other words, appellant brought an action to contest the trust within the time constraints set forth in
In defending the trial court‘s order, the trustee argues that to “bring an action,” appellant was required to file and serve his petition within the 120-day statutory period. In light of the procedure set forth above, we cannot
Our conclusion is bolstered by the definition of the phrase “bring suit.” To “bring suit” is to initiate legal proceedings in a legal action; “[a] suit is ‘brought’ at the time it is commenced.” (Black‘s Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 192, col. 2.) If something more than just filing the petition was required, either the Judicial Council or the Legislature could have said so. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1342(a), 3.1700(a)(1).)
We also gain the guidance of other similar statutes. (See, e.g.,
While the statute does not use the word “filed,” we believe that the statutory phrase “bring an action” is clear: Appellant brought the action when he filed his petition. Service of the petition was not required to timely bring an action.
Having determined that appellant‘s petition was timely under the terms of the statute, we next consider whether the petition was nonetheless barred by the doctrine of laches. “Laches is an equitable defense to the enforcement of stale claims. It may be applied where the complaining party has unreasonably delayed in the enforcement of a right, and where that party has either acquiesced in the adverse party‘s conduct or where the adverse party has suffered prejudice. . . . [Citations.]” (Fogarty, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1359-1360; see In re Marriage of Copeman (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 324, 333 [” ‘In practice, laches is defined as an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable right, causing prejudice to an adverse party such as to render the granting of relief to the other party inequitable. [Citation.] Thus, if a trial court finds (1) unreasonable delay; and (2) prejudice, and if its findings are not palpable abuses of discretion, a finding of laches will be upheld on appeal.’ [Citation.]“], superseded by statute on other
Despite the deferential standard of review, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that appellant‘s petition was barred by the doctrine of laches. In particular, there is no indication that the trustee was prejudiced by any sort of delay in the timely filing and subsequent service of the petition. Certainly trusts are supposed to be administered expeditiously. (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 308.) But, there is no evidence here that the trust‘s assets were in fact administered before appellant‘s petition was heard. While the trustee argues that the trial court could have inferred that the trustee already commenced distributing trust assets, that argument is based upon pure speculation. (City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362, 386 [substantial evidence is not argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1209, 1216 [speculation is not substantial evidence].)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.
Boren, P. J., and Chavez, J., concurred.