321 Mass. 507 | Mass. | 1947
This is an action of contract by the adminis-tratrix de bonis non of the estate of Ansley R. Strachan to recover the amount of a policy issued to the intestate and payable “to Lillian Strachan, beneficiary, wife of the insured,” and to his personal representatives if no beneficiary was living at the time of his death. The judge found for the defendant, but this finding was vacated by the Appellate Division, which ordered a new trial upon the question of damages. The second trial resulted in a finding for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed from the final decision of the Appellate Division dismissing the report from the second trial.
The appeal brings before us for review both decisions of the Appellate Division, but we need consider only the first trial because if there was no error at that trial then the find
The only matter reported to the Appellate Division from the first trial was the denial of the plaintiff’s request that she was entitled to recover as matter of law because (1) there was no marriage between the insured and Lillian Wadel, (2) the defendant insurance company knew that Lillian Wadel was not the wife of the insured when she signed the proof of death as Lillian Wadel, (3) Lillian Wadel knew she was not married to the insured, (4) the name Lillian Wadel was fictitious, (5) she was the paramour of the insured, and (6) as paramour his designation of her as the beneficiary fails and his estate is entitled to the proceeds of the policy. The judge denied the request because he found that Lillian Wadel was the one intended by the insured to be the beneficiary; that, although she was not his wife, she and the insured lived together as man arid wife; that they were engaged to be married; and that the defendant paid the amount of the policy to her. He made no other findings except the general finding for the defendant.
The first five grounds included in this request dealt only with matters of fact. The judge could not be required to make findings of fact, and this is especially true where the plaintiff, instead of stating the facts hypothetically, assumed the truth of the matters contained in these grounds and, upon the assumption that they were true, requested not only a ruling of law as to each of them but also an implied finding of all the facts involved in each of the alleged grounds. The plaintiff was not entitled to findings on these five grounds although the judge in refusing the request made findings on most of the material matters embraced in these grounds. Memishian v. Phipps, 311 Mass. 521. Codman v. Beane, 312 Mass. 570. Liberatore v. Framingham, 315 Mass. 538. Union Market National Bank v. Derderian, 318 Mass. 578, 584. Godfrey v. Caswell, ante, 161.
This leaves open for consideration the question whether
The plaintiff contends that the beneficiary was not entitled to the proceeds of the policy and that the payment to her by the company was invalid. We must determine the obligation of the company to her.
The judge was justified in finding that the insured intended that the proceeds of the policy should be paid to her if he died before her and before the maturity of the policy; and the fact that she was incorrectly described as his wife did not render uncertain the identity of the person whom he designated as the beneficiary. Brogi v. Brogi, 211 Mass. 512. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 131 Fed. (2d) 448. Frank v. Frank, 209 Ala. 630. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Martin, 133 Ind. 376. Ester v. Prudential Ins. Co. 298 Mich. 330. Vivar v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 23 Vroom, 455. Durian v. Central Verein of the Hermann’s Soehnne, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 168. Gibson v. Travelers Ins. Co. 183 Misc. (N. Y.) 678. Pierce v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 46 Ohio App. 36. Green v. Southwestern Voluntary Association, Inc. 179 Va. 779. Levas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 175 Wash. 159. It was not necessary that she should have an insurable interest in his life. Campbell v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 381. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24. Potvin v. Prudential Ins. Co. 225 Mass. 247. Where the power to change the beneficiary is reserved by an insured in an ordinary life policy, the beneficiary acquires not merely an expectancy in the anticipated benefits but a qualified vested interest subject to be divested if a change in the beneficiary is made, Kochanek v. Prudential Ins. Co. 262 Mass. 174; Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 286 Mass. 305; Kruger v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. 298 Mass. 124, or if the beneficiary
The case is distinguishable from Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 245 Mass. 565, where the beneficiary was the sole wrongdoer and brought about the death of the insured, and from cases where the death of the insured was caused by his own illegal act, as in Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 120 Mass. 550, DeMello v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. 281 Mass. 190, and Millen v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. 300 Mass. 83.
The first decision of the Appellate Division is reversed and its second decision after the new trial dismissing the second report is also reversed. Judgment is to be entered for the defendant in accordance with the finding made at the first trial.
So ordered.