528 N.E.2d 608 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1988
Lead Opinion
In 1982, while being held in the Summit County Jail pending trial on charges of sexual abuse of children, plaintiff-appellant, Donald Stoyer, was the victim of rapes by two other prisoners on two separate occasions. Thereafter, Stoyer was convicted of the sexual abuse charges. In 1986, he filed suit for the rapes allegedly perpetrated against him, naming as defendants, inter alia, the Summit *172 County Sheriff, Executive, and Council.
The complaint stated a claim for damages suffered as the result of negligence or intentional tort, as well as a claim under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted. Stoyer now appeals.
"II. The lower court erred in finding no duty to the plaintiff-appellant as a prisoner in a county detention facility."
The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, provides, in pertinent part, that:
"The court, having considered the motion, finds that there is no statutory duty that creates liability under these circumstances. See Ohio Revised Code Section
It was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment on this basis.
R.C.
"Political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function, including, but not limited to, office buildings and courthouses, but not including jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility, as defined in section
However, R.C.
Accordingly, there was no statutory exemption from liability available to the defendants at the time Stoyer's cause of action arose. There was also no judicially recognized common-law immunity which could have been afforded the defendants as the result of the decision in Zents v. Bd. of Commrs. (1984),
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, both the trial and appellate courts must follow the standard specifically set forth in Civ. R. 56(C):
"* * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. * * *"
Stoyer contends that the defendants had a duty, at common law and by statute (pursuant to R.C.
Accordingly, appellant's assignments of error are well-taken. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and law.
Judgment accordingly.
BAIRD, P.J., and GEORGE, J., concur.
Concurrence Opinion
In granting summary judgment for the county, the trial court, citing to R.C.
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the protections provided a county under R.C.
Although the trial court was correct in finding that the county had no statutory duty to Stoyer, the granting of summary judgment was error. In order to fully ascertain the county's liability in tort, both common-law and statutory duties must be addressed.Heckert v. Patrick (1984),