14 Ohio App. 165 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1921
So far as the facts in this case are concerned there is no real dispute in the record;
Some time after the contract was made, and while they were waiting for the abstract before finally closing up the transaction, Jeffers went to the property and the Stowes ordered him off of the premises, stating to him that they had sold the
The Stowes did not then know that Watson had bought the property for Jeffers, but at the trial of this case Watson testified that he did not buy the property for himself and then sell it to Jeffers, but that he bought it for Jeffers, stating that he concealed such facts from the Stowes and 'misrepresented the real facts to them.
Regenstein brought this action in the municipal court of Cleveland against the Stowes to recover his commission, alleging in the statement of claim that the Stowes agreed to pay him a compensation equal to 3 per cent of the selling price of the premises. He offered no testimony to prove that allegation. However, under the admissions and pleadings, it is apparent that the Stowes impliedly agreed to pay for such services the reasonable value of the same, which would be the usual commission; but there was no evidence offered as to the value of the services or the usual commission paid for such services.
As has been said, there was no evidence tending to prove this charge, but on the contrary the evidence overwhelmingly established that it was not true. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no proof of an express agreement to pay a stipulated compensation, and no proof of the value of the services rendered, and notwithstanding the fact that the Stowes were not guilty of any fraud, but acted in the utmost good faith, Regenstein recovered a judgment in the municipal court on the law as announced by the court of appeals of this district in the case of Wangerein v. King et al., decided March 2, 1914, in which it was held:
“That a real estate agent is entitled to his commission when he finds a customer to whom the owner sells the property, though the owner, by reason of the fault of the purchaser and of another real estate, agent who conspires with the purchaser, is induced to deed the property to a third person, who takes title for the real purchaser, and the owner at the timé does not know that he is really selling to the customer of the first agent.”
We have examined this case and disapprove of the statement of the law as there made. We hold that the law is as announced by this court in a later decision, that in the case of Brown v. Hayes, No. 2778, of this court of appeals, decided January 30, 1920.
The facts in the Connecticut supreme court case are very similar to the facts in the case at bar, and there is a very complete exposition of the law in reference thereto. Having stated our views to the same effect in Brown v. Hayes, supra, we do not deem it necessary to restate the same, but we refer counsel to above cases.
Our holding is that under the record in this case Regenstein was not entitled to his commission, and the judgment of the municipal court being contrary to law the same is reversed.
Judgment reversed.